How could desperate danger be abated? Within approximately a week after the discovery of the critical shortage, Washington received an answer of unexpected nature: From Philadelphia under date of August 1, Richard Henry Lee wrote that Congress had adjourned for approximately a month. “The capital object of powder,” Lee said, “we have attended to as far as we could by sending you the other day six tons, and tomorrow we shall propose sending you six or eight tons more, which, with the supplies you may get from Connecticut, and such further ones from here, as future expected importations may furnish, will I hope enable you to do all that this powerful article can in good hands accomplish.”
Arrival of this supply before an attack by the British would give the Continentals a fighting chance. The odds against the Army no longer would be hopeless. Eagerly Washington traced the progress of the wagons with the powder and learned that if all went well, they would draw up in his camp on the sixteenth. The promised supply would not give the Army more than 184 barrels, or a bare thirty cartridges per man; but that would be a condition at least three times better than the one that had existed. It would raise the spirits of the men, too. Besides, the arrival of the powder would be heartening proof that Congress had been mindful of the Army and energetic in seeking supplies.
Congress was not the only contributor to the magazines. The powder it collected in Philadelphia was supplemented by lead that Schuyler, on order, forwarded from Ticonderoga. Gov. Nicholas Cooke, of Rhode Island, likewise purchased for the army seven thousand pounds of powder, seventy hundredweight of lead and five hundred stand of arms. Soon two additional tons of powder were sent from Philadelphia. Gradually the situation was being changed to the extent that instead of dreading an attack, Washington was to lament the fact that his supply still did not suffice for him to take full advantage of his positions.
Washington still hoped against hope that the war would be concluded in 1775 and that peace would be restored. What he could not understand was why the British withheld the blow that might decide the campaign. Was Gage preparing by regular approaches to force the Americans from their lines; or were the British counting winter as an ally before whose blasts the Army would scatter? Could there be truth to the rumor that the King’s men would use their seapower and transfer the war to New York, where the waters of the Hudson and the northern lakes might give them contact with their comrades in Canada?
For such light as could be shed on these questions, Washington undertook to develop a rough-and-ready intelligence system that had been established before his arrival. Chelsea, north of the approaches to Boston harbor, was an ideal place from which to observe movements of British shipping. After Washington’s coming, Col. Loammi Baldwin was made responsible there and at Maiden for daily intelligence reports. Besides the results of Baldwin’s observation, much of fact and more of rumor was supplied at Chelsea, in Cambridge and at Roxbury by Boston residents who were passed through the lines in spite of orders to the contrary. Almost a full history of what happened in the city could be pieced together, in time, from questioning those General Gage authorized to leave the town in order to reduce the consumption of food there. Of the deserters, another traditional and unreliable source of intelligence, a few knew much; others knew or would tell nothing.
Washington steadfastly refused to detach any large part of his Army to serve as garrison or combat raids, even though he told himself that he would “be accused of inattention to the public service and perhaps with want of spirit to prosecute it.” He continued securing his positions and improving his organization and discipline. It was not enough to be safe against attack; he must place his guns where he could answer the enemy’s bombardment as soon as he had the powder with which to do so.
On the northwestern flank of the American lines was an eminence known as Plowed Hill. This elevation did not obstruct in the least the American fire from Prospect Hill or that of the British from Bunker Hill, but there were rumors that the British intended to seize it in order to command the low ground between that eminence and Bunker Hill. It was ground worth fighting for. Washington resolved to seize and fortify it. Colonial troops moved out to Plowed Hill on the night of August 26 and threw up so much earth that when daylight came they had cover against enemy fire. The British cannon slumbered until 9 A.M. but when they did wake up, they barked all day, though with little hurt to the Americans. For making the fortifications proof against this fire, Charles Lee was given credit. Washington was pleased and at the same time was distressed because he could not expend the powder required to answer the British effectively.
Organization must progress along with fortification while Washington waited either for the enemy to attack or for the coming of powder with which to seize the initiative. The commissioning of Thomas as senior Brigadier on the Boston front and the return of General Spencer had put an end, apparently, to what one officer described as “uneasiness in camp.” Further down the scale of rank, men had been granted Continental commissions without inquiry into their fitness. Washington had to deal vigorously with the inevitable result of this bad system and, in particular, with the inertia of ignorance. One remedy, he thought, was in naming officers from other Colonies, now that the Army was continental. A second means of improving the quality of officers was for Congress to keep open a number of commissions as rewards of merit. Still another was that of setting an example of what an officer should be. On occasion, too, as when Col. William Woodford of Virginia wrote for his advice on the duties of an officer, Washington could put on paper some of the essentials of his code of command: “Be strict in your discipline; that is, to require nothing unreasonable of your officers and men, but see that whatever is required be punctually complied with. Reward and punish every man according to his merit, without partiality or prejudice; hear his complaints; if well founded, redress them; if otherwise, discourage them in order to prevent frivolous ones. Discourage vice in every shape, and impress upon the mind of every man, from the first to the lowest, the importance of the cause, and what it is they are contending for.” In applying this to his immediate subordinates, Washington undertook to see that their rights were not disregarded, that their seniority was established and respected, and that they were treated as individuals and gentlemen. The rotating officer of the day, the officer of the guard and the adjutant of the day, no matter who they might be, had standing invitation to dine at Headquarters: Washington was resolved, having done what he could in ridding the officers’ corps of cowards, rascals and incompetents, to acquaint himself thoroughly with the others and develop their good qualities.
Washington could not always find men equipped to fulfill the ideal he set before Colonel Woodford, but he selected them with care from the class he thought most conscious of obligation and best qualified to meet his special needs. He made Thomas Mifflin Quartermaster General with rank of Colonel; he approved the best brigade majors he could procure, and after a bit of finessing in avoiding political appointments, he named Edmund Randolph and George Baylor as aides. Both were Virginians and both of the upper stratum of the Colony’s society.
While improving the organization of his officers during the time he was awaiting Gage’s attack, Washington continued his efforts to make the troops comfortable and healthy and to better their discipline. This second task was rendered more difficult by the arrival in camp of rifle companies recruited in accordance with a resolution Congress adopted June 14. The idealized argument for companies of this type had been compressed by Richard Henry Lee into a few clauses when he wrote of these men’s “amazing hardihood, their method of living so long in the woods without carrying provisions with them, the exceeding quickness with which they can march to distant parts and above all, the dexterity to which they have arrived in the use of the rifle gun.” Lee added almost with awe: “There is not one of these men who wish a distance less than 200 yards or a larger object than an orange—Every shot is fatal.” Washington wanted some of them; he probably did not desire too large a contingent. When they began
to arrive late in July, everyone marvelled at the speed with which the men had enlisted, settled their affairs at home and covered on foot the hundreds of miles to Boston. The very first comers showed a marksmanship that taught the British to keep their heads below the nearer parapets, but the anticipated deficiency soon was apparent: These riflemen had no such word as “discipline” in their vocabulary. They saw one duty and one only; that was to kill the British. Whenever they saw a “Lobster,” as the Americans now styled the Redcoat, they would take a shot at him even if he was within the very farthest range of their rifles. The result was much wastage of powder and no increase in British casualties.
There were many matters in which the members of his staff could be of service to the General. This was increasingly true of Reed, whom James Warren described as “a man of sense, politeness and abilities for business.” Gates was similarly useful and soundly versed in military affairs. The Adjutant General was operating as smoothly as could be expected with men still inexperienced in military usages. The Army was improving. If it was not yet good, it was less bad by far than it was at the beginning of July. The General doubtless would have been reluctant to have his men attempt, as yet, to stand up against the British in the open field; but, assuming that powder and ball sufficed in quantity, he would not be afraid to meet a British attack—if only the British would come out and assault American positions.
That continuing uncertainty was worse than all the remaining woes and perplexities of the Army put together. Suppose Gage still refused to attack as autumn brought warning of the long months when sentries might freeze at their posts and the tents of the camp be deep in snow. Winter quarters would be required, and they would have to be built with much labor and cost. Besides, virtually all the enlistments had been to December 7 or to the end of 1775; what would happen then?
Whatever had to be done, Washington would do. If winter quarters had to be provided, all the buildings of Harvard College that could must be closed in; those officers who were erecting board-covered retreats must allow them to be occupied by as many persons as could be accommodated. The Commissary General must formulate plans for feeding the men.
Washington cast aside his theory that his strategical task simply was to confine the British to Boston. He reflected on the possibilities, deliberated with Massachusetts lawmakers and Congressional Delegates on vacation, and decided to undertake three things: First, now that he had stopped all deliveries to Boston by land, he would arm some coastal vessels and try to cut off the supplies that were reaching the British by sea. Second, he would attempt to give help to Schuyler, if the New York commander was able to formulate a plan for the early invasion of Canada. Third, he would himself deliver with his Army a direct attack of some sort on Boston.
The effort at sea had to be made with armed schooners by some of the numerous mariners in the regiments from the coastal towns. Nicholson Broughton was appointed Captain in the Army and was directed to proceed with the armed schooner Hannah to capture, if he could, any craft laden with men, arms, ammunition or provisions inward or outward bound from Boston.
Plans for a diversion in Canada were now considered. They had probably originated in reports that the British had few troops in the region wrested from France and that the native population was still hostile to the Redcoats. Washington learned that there was a route by which he could cooperate with Schuyler in attacking in Canada. The previous spring Col. Jonathan Brewer had offered to follow this trail and, if five hundred men were assigned him, make a demonstration against Quebec. His proposal was to move troops up the Kennebec River to a carrying place opposite a stretch of Dead River, then west on that stream to its headwaters near Lake Megantic and thence northward again down the Claudière to the St. Lawrence almost directly opposite Quebec. The advance up the Kennebec and down the Chaudière would force the British commander in Canada, Gen. Sir Guy Carleton, “either to break up and follow this party to Quebec,” by which Carleton would leave Schuyler’s approach on Montreal unopposed, or else to “suffer that important place, [Quebec] to fall into our hands, an event which would have a decisive effect and influence on the public interests.” Washington regarded the detachment of a small column to Canada as a risk worth taking. The essentials were, first, to be certain Schuyler was going to advance in the general direction of Montreal; second, to procure the necessary batteaux for the ascent of the rivers; and, third, to find an able man to lead the expedition.
Washington lost no time in ascertaining whether General Schuyler intended to move north. He outlined the plan in an urgent letter of August 20, which he sent express to his New York comrade, and in it he admitted that much of success depended on the response of the Canadians themselves. Schuyler was prompt to reply. He expressed his agreement with Washington’s proposals and gave assurance that Gen. Richard Montgomery was making ready to leave Ticonderoga for Canada. He would join his Brigadier at Crown Point, Schuyler said, but he would not have in the two columns more than 1700 men. These would be too few to employ against Quebec after necessary detachments had been left at the places he would undertake to seize. Then he said: “Should the detachment of your body penetrate into Canada, and we meet with success, Quebec must inevitably fall into our hands. Should we meet with a repulse, which can only happen from foul play in the Canadians, I shall have an opportunity to inform your party of it, that they may carry into execution any orders you may give, in case such an unfortunate event should arise.”
Washington felt a measure of confidence about the enterprise, first, because he was reassured concerning the attitude of the Canadians and the Indians, second, because everyone said the route of the Kennebec-Claudière was practicable, and, third, because he believed the limitations of transport and supply could be overcome by the man he now selected to lead the expedition. This was Benedict Arnold. For his exploit in seizing Ticonderoga with Ethan Allen May 10, 1775, Arnold had received much applause and had proceeded to the head of Lake Champlain where he had destroyed Fort St. John. Then had followed an ugly succession of quarrels over command of a pitifully equipped little force to which four Colonies and the Continental Congress were contributing meagrely. Arnold had wished to attack Canada without delay, but his violence and the stubbornness of his rivals had paralyzed effort. At length, when he was told to recognize the seniority of his most persistent rival, Col. Benjamin Hinman, he resigned his Massachusetts command, dismissed his men and, before many weeks, appeared at Watertown for the settlement of his accounts. He had boldness, energy and ambition of a sort that would not permit him to be unoccupied in wartime and soon presented himself to Washington. Washington quickly saw that Arnold was furnished with much of the stuff that must be in a man called to head a swiftly moving expedition that was to fight water and wind and winter. Besides, as a trader, Arnold had been to Quebec and probably knew more about the town and the approaches to it than did any officer of Washington’s immediate command. Arnold could get there! He must start his march before the summer slipped away.
Washington’s discussions with Arnold and others led him to conclude that the force should consist of the equivalent of a battalion, and that three companies of riflemen should be provided—roughly 1100 men altogether. Washington apportioned the footmen among the regiments, pro rata, with the understanding that volunteers would be accepted at a parade on September 6. The riflemen were chosen by lot and as units—William Hendricks’ Cumberland County Pennsylvanians, Matthew Smith’s riflemen from Lancaster County in the same Colony, and Daniel Morgan’s Virginians. For service with these riflemen, many volunteers were forthcoming; preparations were hurried to begin the march by September 13; a resounding address to the people of Canada was completed in Washington’s name and translated into French. Washington told Arnold: “Upon your conduct and courage and that of the officers and soldiers detached on this expedition, not only the success of the present enterprise, and your own honor, but the safety and welfare of the whole continent may depend.” Arnold rolled the drums as soon as t
he different parts of his force could take the road to Newburyport.
On September 11—the very day Arnold’s men were put under marching orders—Washington met with the eight members of his council of war. He wished to know whether his Generals believed an offensive for a dual attack up the “Neck” from Roxbury and by boats from other parts of the front should be taken in hand. Lee believed an attack should be delivered. His fellow-commanders voiced concern. Boston Neck was too narrow, the officers maintained, and the approaches by water too much exposed to give the Colonials a decent chance of success. Other argument was political and hung on the hope—indeed, on the expectation—that the ministry of Lord North would fall and friends of America come into power. No word had been received of the King’s action on the appeal of the Continental Congress; but news probably had arrived of the “Humble Address, Remonstrance and Petition” which the Lord Mayor, Aldermen and Livery of London had adopted on June 24 and were seeking to present to the Monarch. This paper called on the King to dismiss his present ministers and advisers, dissolve Parliament, and put his future confidence in servants whose attachment to the constitution, when joined to the King’s own wisdom and integrity, “may enable your Majesty to settle this alarming dispute upon the sure, honorable and lasting foundations of general liberty.” Colonials who read this would conclude, not unnaturally, that even if the King ignored the appeal of the Continental Congress, he certainly must consent to receive and answer the address of the most powerful single body of his subjects. In the light of this, an attack on Boston well might be delayed, but “unanimously” was not precisely the word for rejection of the plan. Lee doubted; Washington at heart dissented. “I cannot say,” he told Congress, “that I have wholly laid it aside.”
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THE INVASION OF CANADA, 1775-1776
Washington Page 42