The possibility of an attack on Boston seemed at times to be remote and, in other circumstances, to be not unlikely; but as of May 5, Washington had to admit: “The designs of the enemy are too much behind the curtain for me to form any accurate opinion of their plan of operations for the summer’s campaign.” He still thought that no place was of more importance to the British than the mouth of the Hudson. He and Congress soon had information that the enemy might be strong enough to reenforce their troops in Canada, send Howe to New York and, perhaps, strike simultaneously at some other point. By the second week in May, American leaders came to believe there was truth to reports that the King had hired German troops from continental princes. Regiments were known to have been dispatched from Ireland, also. A stronger Britain would confront an America weakened by dispersion of force, losses of many sorts and the ravages of smallpox.
The worst nightmare was disaster in Canada. Thomas had arrived in front of Quebec May 1 and had taken general command; Thompson, promoted to Brigadier, was known to have reached Fort George. Sullivan and his command were supposed to be proceeding north from Albany; Schuyler was doing his utmost to forward supplies. The Commissioners to Canada reported from Montreal that a supply of coin was necessary and that the lack of it was responsible, along with “other arbitrary proceedings,” for many of the difficulties the troops were encountering. By May 15 papers that passed through Washington’s hands led him to conclude: “nothing less than the most wise and vigorous exertions of Congress and the Army there can promise success.”
It did not so befall. Two days after writing this letter, Washington received from Schuyler a report that covered a tale of calamity. Smallpox, paper money, poor transport and divided leadership had weakened the Americans hopelessly in the face of a strengthened adversary. A British squadron of five vessels had reached Quebec May 6. There followed an affair thus summarized in the American Commissioners’ letter to Schuyler, the paper Washington read: “The enemy made a sally . . . in a body supposed not to be less than a thousand. Our forces were so dispersed that not more than two hundred could be collected at headquarters. In this situation, a retreat was inevitable, and made in the utmost precipitation and confusion, with the loss of our cannon on the batteries, provisions, five hundred stands of small arms and a batteau load of powder. . . .”
Washington had hoped that the besiegers of Quebec could remain in front of the city until the reenforcement of ten regiments from his own Army arrived, but he did not interpret the bad news to mean that the major effort of the British was certain to be directed south from that stronghold. On the contrary, his office was preparing to draft orders for a continuing general alert in New York. He had, in short, to face the possibility that the vital line of the Hudson might be assailed from the north and from the south; he felt that the response to this should not be vain regret but active resolution. He encouraged and exhorted Schuyler and undertook to rally Sullivan.
Washington received on the eighteenth from an escaped prisoner of war, George Merchant, a number of papers, among which were copies of the treaties England had made for the employment of approximately seventeen thousand German troops. This action was enough to quicken demand for a final break with the mother country, and, so far as Washington’s military problem was concerned, it meant also that the enemy with more troops, could strike heavier blows in more places—and speedily. Merchant brought with him a letter that indicated fifteen British regiments were at sea or soon would be bound for America.
Washington concluded that Adjutant General Gates should go at once to Philadelphia. He did not feel that he himself should leave New York when there was a prospect the British fleet might descend on that city at any time. He turned over to Gates the copies of the German treaties and, in a communication to Hancock let it be understood that Gates had the largest latitude to make suggestions. On the evening of the day Washington wrote this letter, there arrived from Hancock an invitation for Washington to visit Philadelphia for his health and for consultation with Congress. Along with this came highly interesting Army news: Horatio Gates had been promoted Major General, and Thomas Mifflin had been made a Brigadier. With this much Washington was heartily in accord. The disturbing note was in a request from Hancock that both Gates and Mifflin be assigned to duty in Massachusetts, where Washington did not believe there was material danger of a British landing. It was too much to lose Gates as Adjutant General and, in addition, to have him shelved on Beacon Hill.
Washington drew up careful instructions for Putnam to press the fortification of New York and set out for Philadelphia, where he found a great diversity of business to be transacted in an atmosphere of excitement over possible independence and depression over Canada. When the Commissioners prepared their report, four days after Washington dismounted in Philadelphia, they listed circumstances to humiliate the continent: “General Wooster is, in our opinion unfit, totally unfit, to command your Army. . . . Your army is badly paid; and so exhausted is your credit that even a cart cannot be procured without ready money or force. . . . Your army in Canada do not exceed 4000; above 400 are sick with different disorders. . . . We cannot find words to describe our miserable situation. . . .” Washington told himself that America must expect a “bloody summer” for which she was not prepared; but he could not believe the situation in Canada beyond redemption by courage and effort. The force in Canada must be augmented, but not at the expense of the Army that was to defend New York against almost certain attack. That was the major premise of his recommendations to Congress.
On May 24 and 25 Washington appeared before Congress to answer inquiries of members. When this proved an awkward arrangement, he, Gates and Mifflin held frequent conferences with a committee named for that purpose. The broad conclusion was to contest “every foot of ground” occupied by the Americans in Canada and to do the utmost to hold a position below the mouth of the Richelieu River. Entry of the British into the upper country of the United Colonies was to be prevented by American operations on the St. Lawrence; efforts were to be made to prevail on Indians to attack Niagara and Detroit; New York and the mouth of the Hudson were of course to be defended. A two-to-one superiority of force was desired and was to be had, substantially, by enlisting until December 1 approximately twenty thousand militia, who were to be apportioned among the Colonies from New Jersey northward. Indians not exceeding two thousand were to be hired in Canada. In addition, the Middle Colonies of Delaware, Pennsylvania and Maryland were to provide until December a total of ten thousand militia who were to constitute a “Flying Camp,” under “such continental general officers as the Commander-in-Chief shall direct.” All this was agreed upon readily. Washington believed short-term enlistment responsible for much of the woe of the Army in Canada and urged the grant of a bounty to men already in the Army who would enlist for a term of years or for the “continuance of the war.” He found Congress not yet willing to vote the bounty or provide for enlargement of the Continental Line on the basis of two or three years’ service. Reliance still was on the militia for emergencies. Washington acquiesced.
While this discussion of “survive or perish” called for Washington’s full participation, the other subject of talk at every table—whether and when the Colonies should declare their independence—was one with which he scarcely had patience. He wrote his brother: “. . . things have come to that pass now as to convince us that we have nothing more to expect from the justice of Great Britain.” Washington found this the view of virtually all those members of Congress with whom he had been on closest terms during the months he had belonged to the Virginia delegation. Having gone so far, they felt they now might as well go all the way. Most of New England was impatient over delay. As the end of May approached, Virginia and North Carolina were believed to be ready for action. It was understood that the Middle Colonies and some of those in the south would be the last to assent, but there was a disposition to wait for a few weeks in the belief that unanimity might be achieved. Soon, it seemed, an answ
er was to be made to the warning of Charles Lee: “If you do not declare immediately for positive independence, we are all ruined.”
Washington’s immediate task was to counsel regarding the means by which the evil day in Canada could be redeemed, and his, too, was the duty of advising on the choice of men to take the place of Gates as Adjutant General and of Mifflin as Quartermaster General. Now it was possible to offer Joseph Reed the post of Adjutant General and invoke the aid of members of Congress in prevailing on him to accept. Reed’s lack of precise knowledge of the Adjutant’s functions and duties did not weigh decisively, in Washington’s mind, when set against the quick perception and social skill of the Philadelphian. Divided New York called for the finesse Reed could display. Washington had been showing great deference for the feelings of New York, but he wanted to have at his command the diplomatic address and diversified knowledge of men and of law that Reed possessed. With some difficulty, he prevailed.
For Mifflin’s successor as Quartermaster General, Washington turned to another member of his military “family,” his recently appointed aide Stephen Moylan, who previously had been Mustermaster General. He had energy and a ready tongue and gave promise of as good an administration as could be expected where almost everything a Quartermaster sought was crude and costly or unprocurable.
Throughout these consultations with Congress, Washington felt heightened concern for the safety of New York, but no weary express knocked at Washington’s door with the anticipated news from North River. Business in Philadelphia was concluded in comparative calm. On June 3 Hancock expressed to Washington the thanks of Congress for “unremitted attention” to his trust and especially for assistance in making plans for the defence of the Colonies. The General was free, Hancock wrote, to return to Headquarters when he saw fit. Washington waited only to get copies of the various resolves of Congress that concerned his duties, and then, leaving Martha in the Quaker City, he was off on the fourth for New York, where he arrived June 6.
Good news and bad awaited him. It was good because all was quiet and because visible progress had been made on the defences: it was bad in that letters from Canada gave alarming if vague details of a new defeat at The Cedars, about thirty miles up the St. Lawrence from Montreal. Washington feared the next intelligence would be of the loss of Montreal. From other sources, he heard that General Thomas had smallpox and, on the eighth, he had the shocking announcement that the vigorous New Englander was dead. Washington reiterated to Schuyler what he had said to more than one correspondent: “The most vigorous exertions will be necessary to retrieve our circumstances there, and I hope you will strain every nerve for that purpose. Unless it can be done now, Canada will be lost forever, the fatal consequences of which everyone must feel.” Thomas’s death would have meant normally that Brigadier General Wooster would have assumed temporary command; but on the day Washington learned of it, notice was received from Hancock that Wooster had been relieved of command. Charles Carroll and Samuel Chase, two of the Canadian Commissioners of Congress, had reached New York and now reported to Washington. Their particular object of wrath was Wooster, who soon would be on his way to New York. “I wish to know what I am to do with him,” Washington asked Congress, “when he comes.”
Supplies for Canada had to be hurried up the Hudson; the fortification of New York was continued, that of Powles Hook on the Jersey side of North River was pressed, and the task of guarding the New York highlands was entrusted to Col. James Clinton. Discipline was enforced with even more vigor than previously. These and kindred tasks were discharged in an atmosphere of expectancy. Hour by hour, suspense was heightened.
As early as June 10 Governor Tryon was credited with saying that a frigate from Halifax had brought news of the embarkation of Howe’s army for New York. In the camps it was predicted that the enemy would attack within ten days. Washington felt that this information originated with Loyalists who were reporting all American activities to the Asia or to the ships off Sandy Hook and were supplying them with fresh provisions. When he had gone to Philadelphia he had been hopeful that the New York authorities would arrest the men most apt to aid the King. Now a vigorous policy was pursued by the New York patriots; a general search for disaffected persons was begun.
During the first stages of this hunt for Tories, Washington had no concern over the prospective vote on independence. He doubtless was informed promptly that Congress had decided June 10 to postpone further discussion of the issue for three weeks in the hope that the Delegates of the most hesitant Colonies would receive authority to vote for separation from England.
Even if nothing of consequence was to come from Philadelphia before July, news might be expected at any time from Canada, news so grim that Washington almost dreaded its arrival. When the first additional budget reached him in the form of two dispatches from Sullivan he felt distinct relief. Sullivan described enthusiastically what he pronounced a “strange turn” in the American cause. “The Canadians,” he said, “are flocking by hundreds to take a part with us.” He had ordered General Thompson to proceed to Three Rivers and, if that officer did not find the enemy greatly superior in numbers, attack. This was what Washington had been advocating—the American front as far as possible in the direction of Quebec. He approved Sullivan’s plan with heartiness and, at the same time, with cautious understanding of both the ambitious officer and the difficulties that had to be overcome. Sullivan manifestly was “aiming at the command in Canada.” Washington accordingly decided to transmit Sullivan’s letter to Hancock and, after presenting as fair a sketch as he could of the character of the New Hampshire General, to say nothing to influence the decision of Congress whether Sullivan should be placed at the head of the little army in Canada.
Embarrassment was escaped by prompt action in Philadelphia. The very day Washington’s letter to the President was written, Congress decided to vest in Horatio Gates the Canadian command and direct Washington to expedite the departure of the new Major General. Whether Gates would be acceptable to Sullivan, it was impossible for Washington to say. Nor was it certain that Gates would go there in the most cooperative state of mind. In confidential letters to New England friends, he was becoming critical of Washington.
Washington probably knew nothing of this correspondence, but he doubtless felt that he had good fortune in avoiding a disagreeable encounter with General Wooster, who arrived in New York June 17. No high officer of the Army was held in such low opinion by most of those whose opinion was of value. When Wooster arrived the Commander-in-Chief had received no answer to his inquiry concerning what he should do with the Connecticut officer, but he heard that Wooster desired to go home for a visit; so, in renewing his question about the employment of the veteran, Washington told Congress of the General’s wish. Patience paid its practitioner. Wooster announced that he wished to proceed to Philadelphia and to talk with Congressmen before going home. Gladly and promptly Washington assented.
Thus stood matters when on June 21, David Matthews, Mayor of New York, was “charged with dangerous designs and treasonable conspiracies against the rights and liberties of the United Colonies of America” by a committee of the Provincial Congress; Washington was authorized and requested to apprehend and secure the Mayor and all his papers. Matthews had been listed a few weeks previously by the Provincial Congress of New York as one of those whom the people were “naturally led to consider . . . as their enemies” because of failure to aid the American cause, but no action had been taken against him. On June 17, a man named Isaac Ketcham, who was in jail for complicity in an attempt at counterfeiting, informed the Provincial Congress that he believed two fellow prisoners, Continental soldiers, Thomas Hickey and Michael Lynch, belonged to some “corps” that was receiving money from the British fleet. These culprits and persons who came to see them in prison talked of cutting down King’s Bridge and of going over to the enemy when the British fleet came. The Provincial Congress listened in alarm to Ketcham and, after a meeting between Washington and one
of its spokesmen that day, named a committee to confer with the General.
As a result of this, John Jay and Gouverneur Morris, of the special secret committee, examined William Leary who had come to town from Orange County on the seventeenth in search of a runaway servant of Erskine’s Bigwood Ironworks. Leary found the absconder but lost him at the Powles Hook Ferry to a Sergeant who enlisted the man in Captain Roosevelt’s Company. While waiting at the ferry, Leary chanced upon one James Mason, who previously had been in the employ of the operator of the ironworks but had been discharged. After some cautious fencing, Mason confided that he and several companions had sworn to quit New York and go on board a British man-of-war. Until they could be carried out safely to the ship, they were receiving wages and provisions, he said, from a man who represented the Mayor of the city or the Governor of the Colony. Leary then went with Mason to visit Mason’s friends and later made an attempt to lure them to one of the American camps, but they became suspicious and scattered. Leary’s testimony to the committee was that enlistment for service aboard a British ship was in progress and that the Mayor or the Governor was alleged to be paying the costs. Leary believed the money came from Mayor Matthews but was not certain.
It was on the basis of the testimony of Mason and Leary that the committee asked Washington to take Matthews into custody. Matthews surrendered at his residence without resistance, but no written evidence was found there. Gilbert Forbes, a gunsmith incriminated by Leary’s statements, was also apprehended and taken before the committee but he was unwilling to say anything. The next morning, a young minister, Robert Livingston, visited him and sympathetically exhorted him to tell the truth as he probably had only a few days of life. This stirred Forbes either to clear his conscience or to try to save his neck. He offered to go before the committee and confess everything. The net thereupon was carefully and widely spread. Even suspects who belonged to Washington’s Headquarters Guard had no warning of danger until they were confronted with the bayonets of the Provost Marshal’s men.
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