There had been other letters to answer and as the day wore on there came two more by express, one from McDougall and the other from Simeon Deane, a stranger. Washington opened and read: Deane had left Brest on March 8, aboard La Sensible, and after a swift voyage had reached Falmouth April 13. He had hurried on to York in order to deliver to Congress five packets. One of them contained the text of a treaty, signed February 6, at Versailles, by which France recognized the independence of the United States.
CHAPTER / 14
“I believe no event was ever received with more heartfelt joy”—that was the observation of Washington in the first letter he wrote Congress after receiving the news that France had recognized the independence of the United States. Soon everyone at Valley Forge heard of an agreement that opened a new and more hopeful period of the Revolution. On May 5 the Commander-in-Chief was free to inform the Army officially:
It having pleased the Almighty ruler of the Universe propitiously to defend the Cause of the United American-States and finally by raising us up a powerful Friend among the Princes of the Earth to establish our liberty and Independence up [on] lasting foundations, it becomes us to set apart a day for gratefully acknowledging the divine Goodness and celebrating the important Event which we owe to his benign Interposition.
The next morning hasty arrangements were carried out jubilantly by men whose pride covered their nakedness. At nine o’clock the bridgades assembled and listened to the reading of the treaty and a discourse by their chaplains. An hour later the regiments were inspected and commanded to load their arms. Next, the brigades marched into the field and formed. As a compliment to the French officers, Lafayette was given command of the right of the first line and Kalb was put in charge of the second. When all the troops were ready a triumphant salute of thirteen guns was delivered. A running fire of musketry followed from right to left on the first line and then from left to right on the second. A shout went up, “Long live the King of France!” A second salute and feu de joie were a prelude to the huzza, “And long live the friendly European powers.” A final tribute, with the same accompaniment, was, “To the American States.” The men marched from the field and received each a gill of rum. Washington saw it all and, when the ceremonies were at an end, entertained the commissioned personnel of the Army at a cold collation—“profusion of fat meat, strong wine and other liquors.”
What would be the effect of “those fatal documents which seemed,” as one British observant wrote, “to stamp a seal upon the separation of America from England”? The alliance was a boon for which Washington scarcely had permitted himself to hope; but he held to the conviction that America’s first reliance had to be on herself, and he saw a danger in complacency. If this could be avoided, the alliance meant that France’s aid would supply, in some measure, what General Kalb had described as the “one obstacle . . . which exceeds all others, the absence of a navy.” France might not be able to end speedily the domination of American waters by the British, but she could reduce it. Arms, clothing, monetary aid and needed foreign goods likewise might be forthcoming from the ally. Beyond this, it seemed that self-help was the surest way of making French help effective.
An “immediate good consequence” of the treaty, Washington thought, would be that the States would “shake off their languor and be stimulated to complete their battalions,” but when he returned to the tasks of organization he found the old story repeating itself. Congress approved a plan for the “establishment” of the Army, but it accepted an unpalatable compromise of seven years’ half pay for retired and disabled officers. A shortage of arms was reduced by a shipment from New England; but inoculation, exposure and the diseases of crowding and undernourishment incapacitated close to four thousand of the troops at Valley Forge at a time when the flow of recruits was slow. Washington felt it necessary by the middle of May to call for the five thousand militia Congress had authorized.
Even in the continuing military squalor and misery of Valley Forge improvement in the Army was discernible. It was the task of Washington to see that this gain was not cancelled by the officers who usually made trouble for him. In spite of repeated notice that he was leaving America, Thomas Conway lingered in hope of being restored to command. Thomas Mifflin reappeared as a division commander—and speedily left camp to answer formal inquiry by Congress into his accounts as Quartermaster General; restraint had to be set on the zeal of Baron Steuben, whom some of the line officers suspected of ambition to take over the direction of their troops; it was not until May 9 that Gates finally quit Valley Forge to resume command of the Northern Department.
Conway, Mifflin, Steuben, Gates—to the diversified perplexities these four represented those of Lee were added. He returned to camp shortly before May 21 and received temporary command of Lincoln’s Division. Washington took pains to stipulate: “. . . in case of action or any general move of the Army, the three eldest Major Generals present fit for duty are to command the two wings and second line according to their seniority.” When misunderstandings developed Washington reaffirmed the orders, but he could not quite satisfy Lee, who continued to angle for promotion to Lieutenant General.
To the difficult question of administration two others now were added. The first was, what should and what could he do to aid in assuring a firm rejection by America of proposals the British ministry were certain to make in accordance with Lord North’s “reconciliation acts”? On May 30 an invitation from Sir Henry Clinton for a personal interview was promptly declined on the ground that military proposals should be in writing and diplomatic matters should be addressed to Congress. A little later three British commissioners undertook to procure from Washington a passport for their Secretary, Dr. Adam Ferguson, to visit York. Washington replied that he would not issue this without instructions from Congress and during the whole of the abortive negotiations refused to do more for the commissioners than to transmit dispatches. He was relieved to hear that the main condition of the commissioners was the demand he believed Americans would not accept, that of a return to British allegiance.
The other question was the perennial, what will the British attempt and how can they be frustrated? Washington estimated he would have about twenty thousand men for the campaign, plus three to four thousand militia from the middle and southern States and an unascertained force in the north. The British in Philadelphia, according to his intelligence reports, numbered ten thousand. An additional four thousand were in New York, and probably two thousand in Rhode Island. When these totals were presented May 8 to the council that Congress had directed Washington to hold, the unanimous advice was to keep the Army at Valley Forge, strengthen it, increase the cavalry, and await developments. This accorded entirely with the judgment of Washington.
Before the American commander could do more than make his first approach to a new concentration and a protracted defensive, he received from spies the startling news that the British seemed to be preparing to evacuate Philadelphia and return to New York. Why, Washington could not guess; but if there was a prospect the enemy might move north forage must be accumulated on the roads through Jersey; troops marching south under McDougall must remain around Fishkill till the plans of the British were disclosed; and strong detachments should be moved close to Philadelphia.
For this assignment Washington selected Lafayette and gave the Marquis a select force of about 2200 men. Lafayette left camp May 18 and proceeded to Barren Hill, eleven miles from Philadelphia and about twelve from Valley Forge. Probably the next that Washington heard of Lafayette was the sound of alarm guns on the twentieth, fire that led him to order the troops at Valley Forge assembled and served with ammunition. Later he learned that Lafayette had been attacked by greatly superior force and had escaped narrowly an effort to entrap and destroy the American troops. It developed that Lafayette had chosen his initial position with care, had taken pains to acquaint himself with the adjacent ground and fords, and had kept his head. The trouble was that the “Marquis,” as Washington wr
ote later, “by depending on the militia to patrol the roads on his left, had very near been caught in a snare; in fact he was in it, but by his own dexterity or the enemy’s want of it, he disengaged himself in a very soldierlike manner. . . .” After the disappointed British went back to Philadelphia, Lafayette occupied Barren Hill a second time, and returned on May 23 to Valley Forge, where he was commended and congratulated. The Commander-in-Chief did not attempt again to set up a detached observation force within a day’s march of the enemy.
Daily spies’ reports indicated more and more strongly that the British were about to quit Philadelphia. The sailing of one hundred ships from the Delaware gave color to the prediction that the best of the enemy’s troops were to strike out across Jersey for New York. Everything was made ready at Valley Forge, on the assumption that the British retreat would be overland to New York. Orders were drafted for the departure of Lee’s Division for North River as soon as evacuation of Philadelphia was confirmed; Congress approved Washington’s plans for the control of the city after the British left; Jersey militia were urged to operate in very small parties and to dog the march of the adversary. The first week of June ended with the enemy still in the Quaker City; the second week brought no change. On June 17 an impatient council of war acquiesced in Washington’s judgment that the Army remain at Valley Forge until the aim of the British was clear. Then the expected news arrived: About sunrise June 18 Clinton’s army had completed the evacuation of Philadelphia and assembled in New Jersey.
Washington took it for granted that the British were returning to New York; but would they proceed down the left bank of the Delaware and embark or would they move northward through New Jersey? Washington thought the enemy was preparing for the long march to the Raritan or the North River, and he gambled on this probability by starting a column of six brigades “towards Jersey” as soon as he heard of the enemy’s departure from Philadelphia. He ordered Charles Lee and Anthony Wayne to carry these brigades north to Coryell’s Ferry. Lafayette and Kalb were to follow with their Divisions on the nineteenth.
An easy march that day was the reward of careful preparation, but heavy rain on June 20 so delayed the troops that Washington halted for the night at Buckingham, ten miles from Coryell’s Ferry. By noon of June 21, Washington was at Coryell’s Ferry. On the twenty-second the advance of the enemy was at Mount Holly, about eighteen miles from Cooper’s Ferry on the Delaware, opposite Philadelphia. Part of Clinton’s men were at Moorestown, halfway between the ferry and Mount Holly. British shipping, except for two vessels, had dropped down the river below Reedy Island. Nearly all doubt of the enemy’s prime intention was removed, but when Washington wrote Gates he displayed his usual caution: “these appearances,” he said, “seem to decide that [the British] intend to traverse the Jerseys, though they do not appear to be in any hurry.”
If the enemy was to operate in New Jersey, Washington now had to ask himself: Why were the British proceeding so slowly? Which of the northern routes would they pursue? How and where should they be opposed? At the moment the American commander could not surmise the reasons for so leisured a British change of base. As for line of march, Clinton could go north to Bordentown, pass around to Trenton and proceed via New Brunswick; or he could withdraw from Mount Holly on roads that ran more nearly with the meridian. After that the enemy would have a choice of points of embarkation on the lower Raritan, in Raritan Bay and at Sandy Hook.
If the British could be caught in motion on any of these roads, they would present an ideal target. Should Clinton’s divisions be destroyed, now that Burgoyne’s had been captured, then King George would have no troops left in the United States. Independence would be achieved. Glorious as that prospect appeared, Washington did not permit himself to think in terms of so overwhelming a single victory with an Army as feeble as the one just emerging from Valley Forge. Daring was balanced by caution: Why stake on a single throw that which assuredly could be won by slow and careful play?
Washington was waiting for the British line of march to be disclosed. “We intend, as soon as things are in a train,” he told Arnold, “to move towards them and to avail ourselves of any favorable circumstances that may offer.” He wished the Jersey militia to continue the destruction of bridges and culverts; Arnold, whom he had put in command at Philadelphia, was urged to employ Pennsylvanians under the leadership of John Cadwalader in rear of the moving column to vex it; at every stage of the enemy’s movement the local troops were to be exhorted to dog the Redcoats. Every leader of every detachment, regardless of size, was to do his utmost in collecting and forwarding intelligence promptly. Washington expanded in a letter to the President of Congress on June 22 what he had told Arnold: “We have been a good deal impeded in our march by rainy weather. As soon as we have cleaned the arms and can get matters in train, we propose moving to Princeton, in order to avail ourselves of any favorable occasions that may present themselves of attacking or annoying the enemy.”
This shift was made by the Continental Army without incident. Before darkness on the twenty-third Washington opened Headquarters near the Baptist Meeting House at Hopewell, about twelve miles northwest of Princeton, and there he analyzed intelligence reports that were arriving in considerable number. Beyond all doubt, the enemy had reached Black Horse and probably was moving to advance on both the Crosswicks Road and the Bordentown Road. Now commenced in earnest a guessing game the like of which Washington had not seen since he had worn out his men chasing Howe’s fleet. The task of the American commander was simply stated but difficult to execute: He must use his outposts, which he urged anew to vigilance and accuracy of report, in such a manner that he would have a force on almost every road the British might use, and, at the same time, must not so scatter his troops that he would be unable to concentrate quickly when his adversary’s plan was disclosed.
For a day or two Washington suspected Clinton might be attempting to lure him to battle. Then it looked as if the King’s men might be seeking to establish themselves on the high ground around Morristown. In the uncertainty that existed Washington decided to give his men another day’s rest and hold a council of war. He found his Generals divided in judgment. Lee, who dominated the discussion, was of opinion that America would be justified in building a “bridge of gold” to expedite the march of the British across Jersey. The French alliance would assure independence; no battle should be fought at the time. Greene was strongly of opposite view but hesitated to speak out because he was performing staff duty; Wayne was for attacking; Duportail and Steuben both thought that if Washington could strike the enemy in motion he would have an opportunity which neither of them could describe adequately in English; Stirling and Knox agreed substantially with Lee; the young Marquis was vigorously in favor of detaching a strong force to assail the British baggage train or a part of their moving column.
The decision was to avoid a general engagement and to send fifteen hundred men to act as occasion might serve on the enemy’s left flank and rear. All the members of the council signed this except Wayne, but few were satisfied that a correct solution had been found. Lafayette said with much feeling, “I would that a council of war would never have been called,” and he, Wayne and Greene separately wrote Washington of their dissent. Greene’s letter was to this effect:
. . . I am not for hazarding a general action unnecessarily, but I am clearly of opinion for making a serious impression with the light troops and for having the Army in supporting distance. . . . People expect something from us and our strength demands it. I am by no means for rash measures but we must preserve our reputations and I think we can make a very serious impression without any great risk and if it should amount to a general action I think the chance is greatly in our favor. However, I think we can make a partial attack without suffering them to bring us to a general action.
Washington pondered this, but he complied with the council’s recommendations and set up a force under Charles Scott “to fall in with the enemy’s left flank and rear an
d give them all the annoyance” possible. The only addition made to the proposals of the council was to send Daniel Morgan and his small command to harass the enemy’s right. These arrangements soon were found inadequate. Steuben reported June 24 that the enemy undoubtedly had taken the direct road from Allentown to Monmouth Court House; all other intelligence indicated that the annoyance of the British by small parties was make-believe warfare. Washington must move closer to the enemy and strengthen the force intended to worry the British. The first essential was met in part on June 25 by advancing the Army to Kingston. There Washington’s main body of troops would be twelve miles from Cranbury, which Clinton would pass on his march.
This change of position was easy; the enlargement of the advance force immediately created more of those problems of pride and seniority that had burdened Washington for three years. The reenforcement of the column nearest the enemy should consist of one thousand men under Wayne, who believed in the offensive, but the senior of the forces operating on the flank and rear of the British would be Maxwell, who was not esteemed one of the best of the Brigadiers. It would be desirable, Washington reasoned, to put all these troops under Lafayette, a whole-hearted advocate of a vigorous policy. The difficulty in the way of doing this was the presence and the seniority of Lee. A man who favored a “bridge of gold” for the escape of the enemy was not a suitable officer to inflict the fullest possible punishment on the British.
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