Members had not advanced their legislation satisfactorily during the month Washington had been ill and convalescing. Seven acts had been passed, none of first importance, but neither the bill to provide for the public credit nor the measure to establish the seat of government had received approval. On the contrary, the two had become entangled in a manner that excited the politician and made the citizen shake a puzzled head. When division of the House of Representatives had been tested, assumption of state debts had been rejected in Committee of the Whole by a majority of two. At first, after that defeat, the resentment of New Englanders and South Carolinians ran so high that they were suspected of planning to reject all funding at that session of Congress. They were too wise and too much interested to be guilty of any such blunder. They rallied their forces while the Virginians continued in unyielding opposition to every proposal that the debts of the States be assumed. To the surprise of some members of Congress, tempers suddenly cooled. Hamilton, Jefferson, Robert Morris and others took advantage of this and made common cause. The Secretary of the Treasury had resolute ambition to see his funding plan succeed, but he lacked a vote or two and he must find them. Jefferson saw no reason why he should not use his influence with members of Congress in what he considered good causes—such, for example, as seating the government on the Potomac. Morris was desperately anxious to have the government moved temporarily to Philadelphia, doubtless in the hope the choice might be in perpetuo. Out of these interests came agreement whereby the advocates of assumption of state debts were to effect conversion of a few doubters, in return for which Philadelphia was to be the seat of government until 1800. After that the capital was to be near Georgetown, on the Potomac. The bill “for establishing the temporary and permanent seat of the Government of the United States” was passed and presented to the President July 12. Those who favored New York as the capital and those who opposed assumption of state debts were furious.
The President signed the bill on July 16. For this action Washington received what was almost the first direct newspaper censure that had been leveled at him since he had taken office. It was mild, guarded intimation that Washington lacked gratitude to New York. Doubtless conversation of disappointed members of Congress was sharp, but there is no record of any rebuke from the floor, nor does any letter by Senator or Representative allege that Washington was party to the bargain. Washington had hoped the valley of the Potomac would be chosen as the site of the capital, but if any member’s vote was affected by the President, it was because the individual wished to do what Washington desired and not because the General asked him to do it.
The bill to move the capital was followed in little more than a fortnight by the funding measure. In final form, the bill embodied Hamilton’s foundation of a new foreign loan, payment of accrued interest, and assumption of state debts; but the superstructure was simpler than in his design. If the Secretary might claim to be the architect, he still owed thanks to the draughtsmen of Congress. Washington believed in the bill and signed it with a sense of relief that the dangerous issues involved in it had been settled.
The weeks during which Congress fought over debt settlement and the seat of government witnessed several developments that encouraged or puzzled the President in his convalescence. On May 29, Rhode Island ratified the Constitution. Maj. George Beckwith, aide to Lord Dorchester (formerly Sir Guy Carleton), Governor of Canada, sought out Hamilton on July 8 and, in traditional diplomatic indirection, hinted that Britain not only might settle differences with America but also might be willing to enter into an alliance. In event of war between England and Spain, Beckwith remarked, the United States would find it to their interest to uphold Britain. There was much besides, in the Major’s conversation, but these were the points of strongest emphasis.
Hamilton reported this to Jefferson and went with the Secretary of State to inform the President what had occurred. Washington was usually cautious in his conclusions and did not clinch them until he had deliberated and heard all that the best men around him had to say. This time his judgment was clear and quickly shaped: The British had determined not to give an answer to Gouverneur Morris in London until they ascertained by Beckwith’s indirect approach whether the United States were willing to make common cause with them against Spain. If America did this, then the British would negotiate a commercial treaty and would “promise perhaps to fulfil what they already stand engaged to perform” under the treaty of 1783. The result of this and another diplomatic fencing bout between Hamilton and Beckwith was a decision by Washington to let it be impressed that the United States had no understanding with Spain and had not settled with that country the question of the navigation of the Mississippi. Beyond this, civility and reticence were the course of prudence on the part of a country that desired to remain neutral and at peace with all foreign powers.
Thus the matter stood until mid-August, when there was intimation that if England and Spain opened hostilities Lord Dorchester might wish to descend the Mississippi through the territory of the United States and attack Louisiana or its outposts. If Britain made a request for her troops to have unhindered passage, what should Washington do? He thought such application would be made by Dorchester and believed that no decisive answer should be given, but he sought the advice of Hamilton, Jefferson and Knox, and of the Vice President and the Chief Justice as well. The President found these counsellors divided. Diversity of counsel underscored the warning the President’s judgment gave him: he would have an unhappy decision to make—one that would outrage the West or divide the East—if the British started southward. He could not tell, as yet, whether the two powers who together hemmed in his country would go to war—with the prospect that British victory would set King George’s ramparts north, west and south while the Royal fleet ruled the Atlantic.
In the exchanges between Hamilton and Beckwith there had been polite intimation and horrified denial that Britain had been exciting northwestern tribes to violence and American frontier officers had been threatening British posts verbally. The fuel for a conflagration was scattered widely north of the Ohio. Although the Six Nations no longer were a firebrand, the Miami and Wabash tribes were attacking boats on the Ohio and Wabash and were crossing into Kentucky on raids of massacre and arson. Efforts to make peace had been futile. Washington, St. Clair and Knox were of one mind in belief that nothing short of a vigorous, punitive campaign would dispose of a danger that otherwise might stop all movement on the Ohio. Washington instructed St. Clair, as Governor of the Northwest Territory, to prepare the expedition and call out militia to reenforce a small contingent of regulars, who were to have some artillery with them. On July 15 troops, presumably about fifteen hundred, were assembling at Fort Washington on the Ohio. With good fortune and good leadership, they might strike a blow in the autumn that would clear the river and make the settlements secure. The commanding officer, Brevet Brig. Gen. Josiah Harmar, had served with Pennsylvania troops during the Revolution, but was not well known to the President.
South of the Ohio, most of the Indians were thought to be well-disposed, though a handful of Cherokee and Shawanese bandits were proving troublesome. As for the Creeks, Knox, through a shrewd and patient agent, Col. Marinus Willett, at last had accomplished what had seemed impossible: Willett had prevailed on Alexander McGillivray, the Creeks’ half-breed Chief, to come to New York with twenty-nine head men. On their arrival Knox supervised negotiation of a pact by which the Creeks yielded to Georgia disputed lands on the Oconee but refused to give up their hunting-grounds southwest of the junction of that river and the Ocmulgee. Washington shared in some of the entertainment of the Indians; and gave his approval to the various measures Knox desired at the hands of Congress. He wrote Lafayette that except for the crimes of a few bandits, the treaty “will leave us in peace from one end of our borders to the other.”
The adjournment of Congress on August 12 left Washington free to execute a plan he must have fashioned from the time he received news that Rhode Island h
ad ratified the Constitution. He had not entered that State during his tour of New England. Now he would go there, meet the leaders, see the people and make it plain that he no longer kept in his heart resentments petty spokesmen of the State had aroused. The journey, begun on August 15 with Jefferson, Clinton and other notables, was the easiest Washington had made in years. The most noteworthy occurrences of the brief visit were Washington’s answers to three of the addresses delivered him. Instead of perfunctory, polite avowals, he made thoughtful statements, half philosophical and admirably phrased. He told the representatives of the Jewish Congregation of Newport:
It is now no more that tolerance is spoken of, as if it was by the indulgence of one class of people, that another enjoyed the exercise of their inherent natural rights. For happily the government of the United States, which gives to bigotry no sanction, to persecution no assistance, requires only that they who live under its protection should demean themselves as good citizens, in giving it on all occasions their effectual support. . . .
Washington left Providence August 19, reached New York on the twenty-first, and took up his part of another task: the transfer of the seat of government to Philadelphia. The President took it upon himself to supervise the moving of those contents of his residence that were not too bulky or too much a part of the house to be taken down; the labor was one that Washington performed zestfully. Rehabilitation, literal or metaphorical, made a peculiar appeal to him. Details were left to Lear, who had the rare and needful combination of diligence and patience. Lear’s service was more difficult and more nearly indispensable because of reorganization of the office staff. Humphreys was going to Spain and thence to Portugal on diplomatic assignment; Lewis was returning to Virginia to act as steward while George Augustine Washington went “to the mountains” in hopes of physical recovery; Nelson went, also, to Virginia on a vacation. The President consequently was left with two secretaries only, Lear and Jackson.
By August 30 all matters were arranged; amenities of departure observed, and accounts settled. On the twenty-eighth the Governor of New York, the Mayor of the city and the Aldermen had been the President’s guests at dinner. In spite of his request for an unceremonious leave-taking, the Governor, the Chief Justice of the United States, the heads of Federal departments and the executive officers, state and municipal, came to his house on the thirtieth and escorted him with the utmost good will to the wharf. Although New York was losing the “seat of government” and the prestige accompanying that honor, the last minutes were impressive: “All was quietness,” reported the New York Daily Advertiser, “save the report of the cannon that was fired on his embarkation . . . the heart was full—the tear dropped from the eye; it was not to be restrained; it was seen; and the President appeared sensibly moved by this last mark of esteem. . . .”
Lear had requested that there be “no more parade on [the President’s] journey than what may be absolutely necessary to gratify the people.” All went quietly until, in the afternoon of September 2, Washington reached the vicinity of Philadelphia. There he was met by a troop of light horse, militia companies and numerous citizens. Bells were rung, a feu de joie was tendered—everything was as if the President were visiting the city for the first time. Dinners and other ceremonies were offered, but at least some of them would have been declined with the excuse of a hurried journey had not Martha fallen sick. As it was, the President enjoyed various affairs and found time to satisfy himself concerning arrangements for a residence. The municipal corporation of Philadelphia had rented for him the home of Robert Morris, probably the handsomest dwelling in the city. Washington wrote Lear: “It is, I believe, the best single House in the City; yet, without additions it is inadequate to the commodious accommodation of my family”; and went on to describe the changes he thought necessary and the servants he would require. Then, on the sixth, Washington left for Mount Vernon. No accident worse than a harmless overturn of the chariot and the wagon delayed the remainder of the journey, and the entourage reached Mount Vernon on September 11.
Return to Mount Vernon raised the spirits of Washington and contributed to full restoration of his health. He did not have any particular problem on the plantation other than his usual need of ready cash. Correspondence did not take any large part of his time. He was able to make a leisured examination of what was being done in the improvement of the Potomac by the company he had organized and headed. Little public business was submitted for his review, though Hamilton did pass on a rumor that Spain had admitted the right of the United States to the free use of the Mississippi.
The one official concern was over absence of any report from General Harmar, who by this time was supposed to have marched against the Miami Indians. Doubt of success rose in Washington’s mind when he learned St. Clair had notified the British at Detroit of Harmar’s expedition and assured them the United States forces were not marching against that post. The British, in Washington’s opinion, might pass this information to the Indians whom Harmar was to punish. When Washington heard later that Harmar was believed to be a heavy drinker, the President virtually abandoned hope of any substantial achievement by the American column. Knox could say nothing to reassure his Chief.
Leisure and interest prompted Washington to spend hours in planning how the Morris house in Philadelphia was to be enlarged and furnished as the official residence of the Chief Executive. No less than nine letters to Lear were devoted to the move to the Quaker City and the adornment of the dwelling. The only important point in all the long letters was insistence by the President that the house be leased by him in regular form and not accepted with the rent paid by any public body in Pennsylvania.
Washington and his party reached Philadelphia again the morning of November 27 and went at once to the Morris house. Lear had made it habitable even though the remodeling was not complete. The condition of public affairs was good and bad—good in the general prosperity and content of the people, bad in the absence of news from Harmar and in the continued hammering of Anti-Federalist newspapers, the New-York Journal in particular. These failed to raise a clamor or defeat any considerable number of members of Congress who stood for reelection that autumn. Washington proceeded to prepare for the coming session of Congress. On December 8 he drove to the Hall of Congress and in the Senate Chamber made his brief address, which he devoted principally to finance and Indian affairs. He had favorable credit standing to report and the recommendation that the Federal debt be reduced “as far and as fast as the growing resources of the country will permit. . . .” As for Indian depredations, it probably was fortunate that the flavor of an auspicious opening was not soured by knowledge of the failure of Harmar’s expedition. At the moment, Washington could say only “the event of the measure is yet unknown to me.” The President gave a paragraph to the situation in Europe and the probable curtailment of available shipping for American exports. A more cheerful statement dealt with the admission of Kentucky to the Union. The remainder of the address was devoted, briefly, to mint and militia, weights and measures, the post office and the post roads.
Knox’s report on Indian affairs, submitted on the ninth, disclosed abundant reason for Harmar’s expedition, but gave no account of what had befallen Harmar and his men. When the official report at length was received, it was found to be a complacent review of operations represented as successful, though actually they were a bloody failure in the defeat of two detachments and the loss of 180 men. Washington’s candor in keeping Congress informed and the apparent adequacy of Knox’s preparations saved the President from criticism.
Hamilton took the centre of the stage a week after the session opened and submitted two reports that forthwith made every member of Congress his advocate or his critic, to the exclusion of almost every other subject of legislative debate. Both papers were in obedience to a resolution by the House of Representatives at the previous session for a report on any further action necessary for establishing the public credit. Hamilton divided his answer into two parts, one a
series of suggestions for new and higher excises, the other a plan for the establishment of a central bank. A proposal for heavier taxes on imported spirits was coupled with one for excises on liquors distilled in the United States. Estimated net revenue would be $877,500. As Hamilton designed the bank, which he frankly styled “national,” it was to have a capital stock not exceeding $10,000,000, of which the President was to subscribe $2,000,000 on account of the United States. The bank was to establish branches throughout the country at its discretion and have an exclusive Federal charter; its notes and bills, if payable on demand in gold and silver coin, were to be receivable in all settlements with the United States. Details were well considered, the Bank of England serving as a model, but no provision had interest comparable to that of the exciting question: Did Congress have the power to charter any bank?
While legislators debated this issue in the taverns and in the boarding houses, before they so much as raised it on the floor, Washington labored over a small but a singularly perplexing series of tangles and wrangles. The reassurance of friendly Indians was particularly difficult when plans for new operations against the Miami scarcely were concealed. Preliminaries had to be arranged for laying off the Federal District as the permanent seat of government. Washington had to decide what further instructions should be given Gouverneur Morris, whose unofficial inquiries in England had brought to light no inclination on Britain’s part to execute the provisions of the treaty of peace or open friendly commercial relations on a basis of equality. The President’s conclusion was against further effort, for the time being, to press for any accord. A considerable volume of other legislation, including measures for the admission of Kentucky and Vermont to the Union, occupied Congress more than it involved the President. The sole recommendation of Washington’s that met with virtual denial was for the uniform organization of the militia. This was debated in the House and killed by postponement.
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