If Washington thought fleetingly that Genet’s outrageous inferences were adequate reason to demand immediate recall of the diplomat, he said nothing. Despite recent evidences of popular approval of the Proclamation, the President did not fail to realize that powerful opposition existed. An accurate gauging of sentiment in Virginia would be most valuable, and Randolph set out on June 6 for an extensive tour of that state. From Annapolis the Attorney General reported that the people of Maryland seemed to appreciate the Proclamation and that Gov. Joshua Clayton of Delaware had spoken well of it. Before this heartening news arrived, Washington had to summon the Cabinet again to deal with infractions of neutrality in New York. To his credit, Governor Clinton had ordered prompt detention of the sloop Polly, a prize brought into the harbor and there rechristened Republican by her French captors and armed for privateering. Hammond complained also that the British brig Catherine, another prize at New York, had been captured in American territorial waters. On June 12 the President approved a unanimous verdict of the Cabinet that France was wrong in both cases and instructed the Secretary of State to take appropriate action.
It did not please Jefferson to have to respond so readily to British supplications, but on June 15 he found full reason to share Washington’s mounting disapprobation of Genet. The French Minister now insisted the Republican was being armed merely for her own defence; and further he wished Washington to know that a United States marshal had used the President’s name to interfere with sale of the prize William at Warder’s Wharf in Philadelphia! When Hammond delivered still another appeal for guarantees, Washington ordered a Cabinet session for June 17. Was there to be no end to the stream of diplomatic depositions, protests and petitions from the emissaries of France and England? Hopeful that the Cabinet decision of June 17 and subsequent notices to Genet and Hammond would silence both men for a time, the President turned to serious consideration of Hamilton’s proposal to arrange a loan in Holland. Reasons for a loan, Washington told Jefferson, were very cogent. The Secretary of State disagreed, but approval to negotiate for two million florins went forward without delay.
In the Cabinet meeting of June 20 Jefferson had in hand a communication from the Spanish Commissioners which required instant attention. Jaudenes and Viar charged that the President was countenancing incitement of the Chickasaws against the Creeks and declared that the continuance of peace was “very problematical.” It was plain, in Jefferson’s mind, that Carondolet meant to pick a quarrel with the United States. Washington and his counsellors expected no miracle, but a full appeal to the Court of Madrid seemed the last logical measure to avert the disaster of war with Spain and the Creeks. The President directed Jefferson to prepare comprehensive instructions for Carmichael and Short. The British Minister chose this very moment to press again for definitive assurance that French privateers would not be allowed to reenter American ports. Hammond’s persistence angered the President. “I leave it to you,” he instructed Jefferson, “to say what or whether any answer should be given to the British minister’s letter. . . . It would seem as if neither he nor the Spanish commissioners were to be satisfied with anything this Government can do, but on the contrary are resolved to drive matters to extremity.”
However manifold the President’s tribulations, Genet always was enough to augment them. Washington must have been tempted to speak sharply as Jefferson presented two significant papers in a meeting of the Cabinet June 22. One was a note from Governor Mifflin of Pennsylvania; French seamen were outfitting the Little Sarah with cannon. The ship was in process of conversion from prize to privateer right here at Philadelphia! The President instructed Knox to determine what exactly had been done. Official patience was put to even greater test as Jefferson disclosed a communication from the French Minister which surpassed all earlier arrogance. So intense was Genet’s disappointment in the American government that he threw aside “diplomatic subtleties” and challenged Jefferson to explain matters “as a republican.” This was too much insolence, even for the Secretary of State; Genet’s note was left unanswered. Genet had finally alienated the only man in the Cabinet on whose sympathies he might have played.
The first week of June had brought a letter from Anthony Whiting which disclosed a precarious illness. The President offered to have medical consultation on Whiting’s condition and made suggestions for treatment of the malady meantime. Washington added that he would endeavor to be at Mount Vernon by July 1 for a brief stay. Not the least disturbing of Washington’s domestic affairs was the decision of Lear to resign. This young man of extraordinary ability had won Washington’s affection as well as his confidence and had been regarded as a member of the family. Lear was leaving to set up his own business in the Federal City. A warm letter to the commissioners of the District of Columbia in his behalf went forward from Washington’s desk June 13, and the President turned over his private secretarial duties to Bartholomew Dandridge.
Although on a mission of his own, Lear responded in characteristic fashion to an emergency that developed almost immediately after his departure. Within an hour of Lear’s arrival at Georgetown on June 17, he had met Doctor Craik and learned from him that Whiting’s death was imminent. He would go promptly to Mount Vernon, see Whiting and ascertain conditions generally. On June 19 Lear sent a report of affairs at the plantation. Early harvest was progressing fairly well, but Whiting was “under a very great anxiety about leaving your interest without seeing some person who could inform you of the situation of it at this time.” Lear’s visit eased the manager’s mind. Washington was acutely distressed, both because of Whiting personally and because of the probable effect on his business “present and to come.” Washington’s homeward journey began June 24. A letter from Lear written that day reached the President en route. It told of Whiting’s death on the twenty-first, Lear’s interview with the overseers from the various farms, and his intention to await Washington’s arrival at Mount Vernon.
Much as he lamented the state of plantation affairs, Washington could not devote his brief visit exclusively to their betterment. One problem which accompanied the President to Mount Vernon was that of architectural design for the Capitol. At Georgetown he spent the better part of June 27 with Stephen Hallet and James Hoban and listened to their vigorous objections to Doctor Thornton’s plan. Convinced that decision should wait on deliberation, Washington took to Mount Vernon papers given him by the two professional architects. After review of the problem, Washington prepared instructions for Hallet and Hoban. They were to set out for Philadelphia by the next stage with all documents necessary to effect an early decision. Jefferson was requested to call together all those concerned for a full discussion of the matter without delay. Washington admitted he had been influenced by the exterior beauty of Thornton’s plan without full knowledge of the principles of architecture. He would rely on Jefferson’s more experienced judgment—”A plan must be adopted and, good or bad, it must be entered upon.”
It was July 11 when Washington again reached Philadelphia. The trip had been leisurely—he had no forewarning that a climax of diplomatic peril awaited him. There lay on his desk a stack of papers left by the Secretary of State and marked for “instant attention.” Here were two letters from Mifflin, a statement signed by the port warden of Philadelphia, Jefferson’s memorandum of a conversation with the French Minister, minutes of a meeting of the Cabinet, a note from District Attorney William Rawle, and finally Genet’s letter of July 9 to the Secretary of State. All these related to the French prize Little Sarah. On July 5, evidently, Jefferson had been told by Hamilton that the Little Sarah was equipping for sea as a privateer. Immediately Knox ordered Mifflin to investigate. The warden’s official report of July 6 substantiated rumors of fourteen cannon aboard the brig instead of four, six swivels and a crew of 120 men, Americans as well as Frenchmen. That Saturday night Governor Mifflin learned that the Little Sarah might be ready to sail immediately. He called up the state militia and rushed a message to Jefferson’s country hous
e. The Secretary of State hastened to town Sunday afternoon to find that Mifflin’s assistant, Alexander J. Dallas, had gone to Genet late the previous evening for assurance that sailing orders would be withheld. No success attended this mission. The Minister refused categorically to detain the vessel, threatened to make public his diplomatic correspondence with the American government and to “appeal from the President to the people.”
Jefferson went at once to Genet’s quarters and was subjected to a long harangue. The Frenchman commented acidly on the American Constitution but said nothing which Jefferson could interpret as a direct insult to the President or threat of popular appeal. After Genet had spent himself in declamation, Jefferson pressed for a promise that the Little Sarah would be held in port until the President had returned to Philadelphia and rendered a decision. The Minister insisted that every new gun on the brig had been procured from other French vessels; he declined to give a guarantee, but declared that the ship was not yet ready to put to sea. She would merely drop down the river to another anchorage. On Monday morning, the Secretary of State met Hamilton and Knox at Mifflin’s office. He rejected their proposition to establish militia and cannon on Mud Island in the Delaware as an obstacle to premature departure of the privateer. The Governor dismissed his militia, no battery was erected, and the Little Sarah promptly moved down the river to Chester. The next day Genet notified Jefferson that command of the vessel, rechristened the Petite Democrate, had been assigned to Ensign Amiot. “When ready,” the Minister wrote, “I shall despatch her . . . When treaties speak, the agents of nations have but to obey.”
Washington could stand no more. What superlative of insolence was this? Did Genet dare send an illegal privateer to sea from Philadelphia? Why did not the Secretary of State come in person to discuss the business? The President penned a note for instant delivery to Jefferson. Jefferson’s reply, phrased formally in the third person, reached the President that evening. He had been ill for several days, and had gone home certain that Hamilton and Knox would inform the President of the facts of the case and give their views. Since neither had done so, he now enclosed a copy of their opinion favoring erection of a battery on Mud Island, together with his own argument against the proposal. He would be at his office early the next morning and available at any time the President chose.
The hours spent in Cabinet session of July 12 must have been as exasperating as any Washington yet had experienced in the Presidency. Jefferson, Hamilton and Knox met in his office to ponder a problem which emerged as the residue of months of difficult diplomacy. The Petite Democrate’s fate was not in question. She could slip to sea on a nod from Genet. Obviously, with twenty French warships expected daily from the West Indies, the government could not so far jeopardize its neutrality as to send Federal cutters to secure the corsair by force. What really mattered was that the behavior of the French Minister had become unendurable. At his hands the sovereign dignity of the United States had suffered a gross outrage. There could be no dispute on this point; Jefferson admitted it as readily as Hamilton made the charge. Formal demand for recall was the privilege, indeed the duty, of a nation insulted by a diplomat accredited to her. The President realized America’s honor was at stake—yet he hesitated when Hamilton now urged that France be asked to recall Genet and Knox proposed further that the Minister’s functions meanwhile be totally suspended. All that issued from the Cabinet was a decision to apply to the Supreme Court for an opinion on general and particular aspects of neutrality. The Secretary of State was to notify the ministers of France and Great Britain that every private vessel of either nation would be expected to remain in port until the judges had forwarded recommendations to the President.
If Washington’s prudence on July 12 appeared close to procrastination, the reason was plain. The Petite Democrate was at sea a day or two later; opportunity to obstruct her flight had been lost while he travelled from Mount Vernon. American neutrality had been breached; what damage was done could not be repaired. Peremptory suspension of Genet’s ministerial status might do greater damage. The heat of faction was high. Hamilton was storming the public prints under the pseudonym “Pacificus.” Popular sympathy for France stood at a new peak. Much as he wished to deal decisively with Genet, Washington would await the return of Randolph from Virginia. That trusted adviser would give valuable counsel.
For much of the next ten days the President successfully relegated the omnipresent image of Genet to a corner of his mind. It was not done easily, for the fervid Frenchman was exulting in his success, but Washington determined to ignore the Minister for the present. On July 15 the President sat down with Jefferson to discuss with Hallet and Hoban Dr. Thornton’s plan for the Capitol. It was decided that Hallet, the architect in charge of construction, should proceed with his original plan but that certain of Thornton’s exterior features should be incorporated. Later the same day Washington was surprised to learn from Jefferson that Secretary of War Knox had promised Governor Mifflin that army cannon would be raised on Mud Island to command the passage of the river. This should have been done before the Petite Democrate sailed, but the responsibility was the Governor’s alone; the administration no more could be expected to supply Federal cannon for the port of Philadelphia than for a harbor in any other place. The Cabinet met and Jefferson was treated to a spectacle of Knox in discomfiture under sharp reprimand from the President. Many Republicans might believe Washington showed partiality to Hamilton and Knox as Revolutionary comrades, but impartial justice was the President’s rule where duty required an official judgment.
On July 17, despite a lengthy interview with Knox on Indian affairs, Washington took time to acknowledge a letter from the Speaker of the House of Representatives, Jonathan Trumbull of Connecticut. The subject was serious and in less troubled months would have had the Executive’s continuing attention. Trumbull forwarded a communication from American seamen held captive by the pirates of the Barbary States. A year earlier the President had directed Admiral John Paul Jones and Thomas Barclay, consul at Morocco, “to negotiate for the release by ransom of these unfortunate citizens.” Both agents died before progress was made, and the “Algerine business” then was entrusted to Humphreys. Washington sought to quiet Trumbull’s anxiety with assurance that “things are now in the best train . . . that circumstances will admit of.”
His advisers had been working separately on the questions concerning neutrality to be submitted to the Supreme Court, and a Cabinet meeting on July 18 eliminated duplications and resolved the final wording of twenty-nine queries. As Washington studied the set, it gratified him to realize that here was a brilliant example of the profitable cooperation of Jefferson and Hamilton. The questions comprised a remarkable statement of the whole problem of neutrality. No one could be sure the judges would accept such an extension of their duties, but, as Jefferson remarked in transmitting the questions to them, the President would be “much relieved” to have their advice. Chief Justice John Jay and Associates James Wilson and James Iredell replied politely that they would like to delay a decision on the “propriety” of compliance until their absent colleagues reached Philadelphia. This response meant that the judges probably would decline to treat the questions, in which event Washington knew the Cabinet would have to formulate rigid rules of its own. There must be no recurrence of the affair of the Little Sarah.
Randolph’s return from Virginia brought encouraging reports of devotion and loyalty on the part of the people of that state. With the Attorney General back, the President made ready to take action on Genet. The Minister’s offensive unanswered letter of June 22 was shown to Randolph, and in Cabinet on July 23 Washington proposed that the correspondence of the envoy be sent to France with a demand for his recall. Hamilton and Knox vigorously supported this view, and the next day Randolph suggested to the President that Jefferson prepare a statement of Genet’s verbal communications together with copies of the official correspondence. Washington instructed the Secretary of State accordingly on July 2
5.
Before the case of Genet could be reviewed in detail, the President’s attention was called to other business. On July 17 Washington met Governor Blount and Gen. Andrew Pickens, both recently arrived in Philadelphia, for dinner and a discussion of Indian affairs in the South. While the delegates at Sandusky apparently were enjoying little success in negotiations with the hostile northern tribes, prospects had brightened below the Ohio, but Pickens still favored a large militia invasion of the Creek country.
By the end of the month it appeared certain that the Supreme Court would refuse to give the advisory opinions Washington sought. The President summoned his Cabinet to devise Executive Orders which would prevent further infractions of the neutral status of the nation. Out of their sessions came a set of eight “Rules Governing Belligerents.” In desperation, lacking consent of Congress or judiciary counsel, the Cabinet had taken an unprecedented step. Three months of Genet’s maddening conduct had forced the Executive to implement the Proclamation of April 22. A body of regulations now specifically forbade corsairs to equip in American ports or enlist American crews.
The Cabinet conference of July 29 was brief because a sad event was scheduled that afternoon—the burial of Mary Lear in Christ Church cemetery. The wife of the President’s secretary, only twenty-three, had died late July 28 of a sudden illness. As readily as her able and devoted husband, “Polly” Lear had endeared herself to the Washington household. His usefulness extended to every phase of the President’s activity, hers in particular to the domestic duties and social responsibilities that fell on the President’s wife. Washington, who rarely attended a funeral, stood at Lear’s side during the service. Three Cabinet officers and three Justices of the Supreme Court acted as pallbearers.
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