Hamilton appealed urgently and fluently in the cause of peace. A special mission to England, he argued, was imperative, and the need imminent. The President must nominate Jay, “the only man in whose qualifications for success there would be thorough confidence, and him whom alone it would be advisable to send.” Hamilton, together with Senators King, George Cabot, Caleb Strong and Ellsworth, visited Jay on April 15. The Chief Justice came next morning to tell Washington that he would accept the appointment. A letter of nomination went to the Senate at once. A day in Executive session, despite objections by James Monroe, John Taylor and Aaron Burr, proved sufficient for the Senate to concur. Federalist humor, however, was spoiled by campaigning on the part of House Republicans to make a bill out of Clark’s non-intercourse resolution. “As the prospects of peace brighten, the efforts of these sons of faction are redoubled,” King wrote in disgust. The resolution, with minor amendments by Madison, passed on April 25. While Republicans did not expect success in the Senate, the vote on April 28 was perilously close. Vice President Adams’s negative voice from the chair broke a 13-13 tie.
Two specific tasks awaited Washington’s attention. Instructions must be drawn for Jay and arrangements must be made to replace Morris at Paris. Randolph thought he had a solution. Why could not Jay resign as Chief Justice and accept a permanent appointment as Minister to Great Britain? Then Pinckney might be reassigned to France. Washington made this proposal to Jay on April 29, but the Chief Justice showed no interest. In accord with Randolph’s alternate suggestion the President then wrote to offer the Paris post to Robert R. Livingston, prominent New York Republican and a man of some experience in diplomacy.
Meanwhile Federalist planners were outlining a set of instructions for Jay. Immediately upon confirmation of his appointment the Chief Justice met with Hamilton, King, Cabot and Ellsworth, and in this conclave certain ideas were evolved. As was his habit, the President called for opinion from each Cabinet member, and Hamilton’s letter of April 23 was the first he received. Jay should be instructed, Hamilton said, to demand compensation for all damage done to American commerce by British cruisers in the past year and press for a clarification of “contraband” to exclude foodstuffs and other non-military cargoes. Further, Jay should call for prompt evacuation of the frontier posts and indemnification for slaves carried away during the Revolution. In return he should be empowered to promise that the United States would settle the unpaid prewar debts of its citizens up to a sum, perhaps £500,000 sterling. Finally, authority should be given the plenipotentiary to negotiate a commercial treaty with Britain, provided its terms did not contradict existing American arrangements with France. On May 6 Randolph delivered a formal protest to the Federalist plan to endow Jay with treaty-making power, but by this time the President was in complete accord with the idea. Instructions which Randolph signed that day were largely a product of Hamilton’s pen, though the Secretary of State was able to insert a few proposals.
When Jay left New York May 12 a thousand cheering citizens escorted him to his ship, but by this time Republican criticism of the appointment was savage. Anti-administration newspapers challenged its constitutionality and prophesied a disgraceful outcome of the venture; assaults upon his own character were the most severe Washington yet had known. He doubtless hoped Republican rancor would lessen with news of the appointment of a successor to Morris in France. By the middle of May it was clear that Livingston did not want the post. Hamilton suggested that Randolph be sent to Paris. Randolph favored James Monroe, but the Virginia Senator was hesitant so long as his friend Aaron Burr evinced a desire for the appointment. Only when Randolph declared that Burr would not be considered did Monroe finally accept on May 26. The President’s message to the Senate the next day received immediate confirmation.
Federalists may not have seen it at once, but party agitation in Congress was subsiding. On the twelfth, in a landslide ballot, the House voted down a move to continue the embargo beyond May 25. No other provocative resolution made headway, but tranquillity proved brief. On May 20 Philadelphia had alarming news from the northern frontier. Lieutenant Governor Simcoe of Canada, apparently afraid that Wayne meant to attack Detroit, had ordered three companies from that garrison to Fort Miamis, the abandoned British works at the rapids of the Maumee. Randolph wrote heatedly to Hammond. What could be the explanation? On May 22 the British Minister replied indignantly that American newspapers had quoted Dorchester’s February speech out of context and that there had been no authentic report of invasion of United States territory. Washington was near the end of his endurance. He sent the memorials of Randolph and Hammond to Congress as soon as copies could be made. Then he fixed attention on the crisis itself—how to prevent actual hostilities. On May 23, without the approval of the President, Governor Mifflin of Pennsylvania ordered one thousand militia to Presque Isle, on the eastern edge of Lake Erie. If Simcoe’s troops were at Fort Miamis, military preparation by Americans at Presque Isle would appear a challenge to the British, and the opposite was equally true. When Mifflin learned of the President’s disapproving apprehension, he promptly but reluctantly withdrew his marching orders. There would be sharp complaint from Republican pioneers in western Pennsylvania, Washington knew, but the President preferred criticism to the risk of war. Fortunately, now that Jay had embarked for England, the House was no longer disposed to punitive, precipitate measures. Congress was quiet again.
As June broke upon Philadelphia Washington could reflect with satisfaction that America still was at peace. Another period of exigency had passed. He could be sure at least of the continued service of his stalwarts, Hamilton and Knox, until, as he put it, “the clouds over our affairs, which have come on so fast of late, shall be dispersed.” While both men wished to return to private life, each had consented to remain until the end of the year; and Randolph showed no inclination to resign. The President had to acknowledge that war with the Creeks seemed more likely than ever, but this intelligence delayed Congress for only a few days. The legislators adjourned June 9. Washington notified the Cabinet that he would depart for Mount Vernon no later than June 18 for a visit of two or three weeks, but small business still commanded his attention. On June 12 he examined instructions Randolph had drafted for Monroe and signed the new envoy’s letter of introduction to the French government. Next, he took particular pleasure in approving the commission of John Quincy Adams, brilliant son of the Vice President, as Minister to the Netherlands. For the fourteenth, Knox had scheduled an interview with twenty Cherokee chieftains, then in the city on a mission of good will. This over, Washington left instructions with the Cabinet to effect any unanimous decision in his absence and on June 17 took the road out of Philadelphia.
While it was a flying visit to Mount Vernon, far less was accomplished by it than the returning planter had hoped. On the twenty-second, still en route, he rode from the Federal City to examine the canal and locks at the Lower Falls of the Potomac. In some manner his horse stumbled. Rider and mount seemed destined to spill onto the rocks but, by violent exertions on Washington’s part, the animal recovered its footing. In the effort the President suffered a painful injury to his back that hampered him for several weeks.
As soon as he could stand the jolting carriage without excessive pain, Washington started back to the city on July 3. One of the first questions that awaited decision was whether the United States should enter a pact with Denmark and Sweden in the interest of free neutral navigation. Knox, Attorney General Bradford and Hamilton opposed the plan in the conviction that it would alarm Britain and imperil Jay’s success. Randolph countered with favorable arguments and thought the matter should be left to Jay’s discretion, since his instructions authorized him to sound the disposition of the ministers from Denmark and Sweden. The measure was declared inexpedient; Jay’s success abroad must not be jeopardized.
Unhappy news of Kentucky called for prompt attention. Impatient Kentuckians did not appreciate the government’s efforts to attain free navigatio
n of the Mississippi by diplomatic means. In remonstrance against the administration and in hostility toward Spanish Louisiana, it seemed that Kentucky Republicans still were under the influence of Genet. For a combination of restive Americans to chance war with Spain and Great Britain was reckless beyond description, yet separation of Kentucky from the Union was unthinkable! Kentuckians must be mollified and the Spaniards placated. In Georgia also there was much to blame in the conduct of frontier inhabitants who had begun to settle on land reserved by treaty for the Creeks. Toward mid-July there was agreement in the Cabinet that a letter of admonition must go to Gov. George Matthews. Suppression of these activities was the order and, if necessary to achieve it, United States aid was the promise.
Smoldering resentment in the Allegheny region had shadowed the excise laws from their beginning. Washington had concluded that the people would comply with the law and, for the most part, in proper spirit; but he realistically observed: “It is possible . . . perhaps not improbable, that some Demagogue may start up and produce and get signed some resolutions declaratory of their disapprobation of the measure.” The demagogue was Genet. The popular clubs fathered by the French Minister had, as Washington wrote Henry Lee, continued “to sow the seeds of jealousy and distrust of Government among the people by destroying all confidence in the administration of it. . . .” Armed uprising in the West, that now was real danger Washington labelled “the first formidable fruit of the Democratic Societies.”
Many factors figured in the discontent. Distance made trade difficult, and a widening separation of other interests inevitably followed. For wholly tangible reasons, citizens of the Pennsylvania frontier were the natural enemies of an excise on liquor. Although the burden of the tax was designed to fall on the consumer, it did, in fact, work a multiple hardship on the citizens, because they were not only the largest producers of whiskey but also the largest purchasers of their product. Consequently, the measure applied as a direct tax. Whiskey to the Westerners was literally the distillation of all their efforts toward a better existence, a surer economy. More important, whiskey was legal tender, and payment of excise in cash for a commodity used also for barter was a double imposition. Grain grew abundantly in this fertile region, yet had no market value as such. Four bushels of grain, as harvested, was the load capacity of one horse, but in the form of whiskey the equivalent of twenty-four bushels could be carried in a single load—reason enough for the prevalence of stills, but no reason at all, Washington knew, for defiance of law.
United States Marshal David Lenox had served thirty-nine writs on Pennsylvania excise offenders in uneventful succession, only to meet with angry attack by armed men after the fortieth. On this last visit the marshal was accompanied by the Inspector of the Western Survey, General John Neville. The Inspector’s presence aroused great indignation and led to the destruction July 17 of Neville’s fine property on Chartiers Creek. The Federal officer was unpopular because he had accepted appointment as Inspector in spite of his own expressed disapproval of the excise. The fury of the mob was heightened by the fact that Maj. James McFarlane, leader of the attack on Neville’s Bower Hill, was killed in the exchange of fire. The angry rabble ordered Neville and Lenox imprisoned at Pittsburgh. Thoroughly frightened and intimidated, the two men shortly made their escape and fled towards Philadelphia.
A few days later, July 23, at Mingo Creek Presbyterian Church, Hugh H. Brackenridge, prominent Pittsburgh lawyer and leader, warned those of insurgent leanings that “what had been done might be morally right, but . . . was legally wrong”—it was high treason, he said, and put it within the power of the President to call out the militia. Brackenridge ventured that the government would prefer to offer amnesty and even urged the citizens to seek it. No formal declaration of defiance was made at this meeting, but the majority showed their displeasure and thereafter excluded Brackenridge from their confidences. Washington County attorney David Bradford, on the other hand, made the most of the prevailing spirit of rebellion and emerged as undisputed leader. A circular appeared bidding militia officers to assemble their men at Braddock’s Field on August 1 with arms and accoutrements and four days’ rations. Bradford assumed the office of Major General. Pittsburgh residents were alarmed, but a noisy march through the streets and the burning of a single barn seemed to satisfy the rioters, at least temporarily. Meanwhile, Bradford had been persuaded, albeit reluctantly, to countermand his order for seizure of the magazine at Fort Fayette.
The Chief Executive realized the necessity for immediate, compelling measures. Congress on two occasions had modified the excise law materially, duty had been lightened and payments eased. Although Washington understood the essential causes of the Westerners’ dissatisfaction, he could not understand their failure to take valid recourse by means of further appeal to Congress. He would not tolerate contempt of legislation established by that body. Every power inherent in the Executive would be used—even to the extreme of military measures.
On August 2 Washington held the first official conference in this crisis with the Cabinet. Governor Mifflin attended, accompanied by other officials of Pennsylvania. That the disturbance centered in the State wherein the seat of Government resided was itself humiliating to Washington, and he thought it proper that preliminary action come from the Governor. State officials showed unified reluctance to acknowledge the need for military measures and were disposed to minimize the gravity of the situation. Before the meeting closed, the President requested written opinions from his Cabinet members and from Mifflin.
In a last anxious effort to avoid coercive means, Washington appointed James Ross, Jasper Yeates and Attorney General Bradford as Federal commissioners to confer with representatives from western Pennsylvania. Mifflin named Pennsylvania Chief Justice Thomas McKean and William Irvine as agents of the Commonwealth on the same mission. Decisive action would wait on their word. On the President’s desk by the fifth were full statements from Randolph, Hamilton, Knox, Bradford, and Mifflin. Along with these opinions, Washington could weigh the assertion of Justice James Wilson of the Supreme Court, brief but authoritative. Within a single paragraph from Wilson lay the key declaration. Authority to call out the militia was the President’s—in certain circumstances—and a simple statement attested the existence of such circumstances.
The Cabinet met August 6 to debate the written opinions. Randolph’s argument against immediate summons of state militia was judicious and impressive, but the case for preparedness was realistic and more impressive. Hamilton’s recommendation for prompt recruitment prevailed. All concurred in the idea of a presidential proclamation to the insurgents, and it was issued the following day. Washington’s charges were forthright and formidable. Clearly set down were the authority by which the President could summon the militia and his regretful determination to do so. The insurgents were commanded to disperse and all inhabitants exhorted to “prevent and suppress dangerous proceedings.”
The Chief Executive found a shade of reassurance in information obtained by Randolph from Neville and Lenox, who arrived in Philadelphia August 8. Their report allayed Washington’s growing alarm to the extent that it did not seem necessary further to detain Knox, who was anxious to depart for Maine on private business. The function of the Secretary of War could be transferred to Hamilton for the period of Knox’s absence. Reports from the West were reviewed in a Cabinet session on the ninth, and three days later Washington ordered the garrison at Pittsburgh reinforced. By the middle of August recruitment was under way in Pennsylvania, Virginia and Maryland, and on September 1 Gov. Richard Howell issued the call in New Jersey.
While Washington anxiously “sought and weighed what might best subdue the crisis,” David Bradford grasped at every means toward rebellion. He widely advertised a meeting of delegates from the various townships on August 14 at Parkinson’s Ferry. In response to the circular, 226 appointees gathered in the presence of a large group of spectators. Sometime that morning word came that the government’s commissioners
had arrived near Pittsburgh. The Parkinson’s Ferry delegates readily agreed on the necessary committee of conference—three men from each of the four counties—then proceeded to the business of shaping resolutions. One of the resolves was recognized by the more discerning as a daring endeavor to combine against state and Federal government. It anticipated “hostile attempts” by the administration against the Westerners. Albert Gallatin rose at once in admonition. His address, shrewd but mollifying, was based on the argument that “hostility” was too harsh a term and his suggestion that the matter be referred to a committee prevailed. Amended resolutions were adopted the next day, over Bradford’s protest. The result of this meeting was mild compared with its original purpose of uncompromising demand for war. The hotheaded Bradford had been outmaneuvered by the cool Gallatin.
News of the President’s proclamation reached Parkinson’s Ferry on the second day of the meeting. It was not well received, but it was sobering. By a clever compromise move, Gallatin and Brackenridge succeeded in getting an adjournment immediately upon selection of sixty members as a standing committee of safety who would act for the people and receive the report from the committee of conference after their parley with the Federal commissioners.
On the twenty-first they met in Pittsburgh. Secret discussion lasted three days and ended with the ultimatum of the commissioners: “Perfect and entire acquiescence” in the excise law by September 1. In return the insurgents were promised pardon and amnesty. Hopes of the commissioners were high at the close of this meeting, but when the Western delegates reported to their committee of safety at Brownsville on August 28, it was apparent that few were convinced in favor of submission. The single dissenting member among the conferees at Pittsburgh had been Bradford, though he had expressed his approval of submission before the interview ended. Now he resumed his vicious opposition. The other conferees were effectively intimidated by the inflamed temper of a majority of the sixty. Bradford was eloquently refuted by Gallatin and Brackenridge, but the fever of the recalcitrants remained high. Finally, a secret ballot was taken on a resolution in favor of the proposals of the government. The result was thirty-four yeas and twenty-three nays. So far from being unanimous, such a showing certainly would not favorably impress the commissioners. With resolves from the Brownsville meeting in hand, back to Pittsburgh went nine of the conferees. They asked indemnity to persons in arrears of the excise and importuned for an extension of time to October 11. Neither request was acceptable to the commissioners, but out of this meeting came a plan to determine disposition of the inhabitants by a survey of the affected counties on September 11. Signatures of the people to a pledge of compliance would constitute proof of submission. Perhaps the spirit of moderate Westerners yet would prevail.
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