At this point the President was called from the room. While he was out Randolph inquired of Pickering and Wolcott how the intercepted despatch had come to the Executive’s attention. “The President will, I presume, explain that to you,” Wolcott replied coldly. Immediately upon returning, Washington directed Randolph to step into the adjoining room while he, Pickering and Wolcott conferred; and the Secretary did so. For the next forty-five minutes Randolph’s reactions and explanations were discussed. All agreed that he had betrayed no emotion during the interview, but when Randolph returned his control had broken. The President asked him if he still wished to commit his representations to writing. It would be done, Randolph replied abruptly—but without access to Despatches No. 3 and No. 6 he scarcely could be expected to dispel the false impression that he had encouraged the Pennsylvania insurrection! Washington chose to ignore the remark. How soon could the Secretary produce a paper? “As soon as possible,” Randolph flared, and declared he never could remain in office after such treatment as he had just received at the President’s hands. With this said, he turned and departed.
Randolph’s letter of resignation, dated the nineteenth, was delivered to the President the next day. Randolph had written:
Immediately upon leaving your house this morning, I went to [my] office . . . where I directed the room, in which I usually sat, to be locked up, and the key to remain with the messenger. My object in this was to let all the papers rest as they stood. Upon my return home, I reflected calmly and maturely upon the proceedings of this morning. Two facts immediately presented themselves. One . . . was that my usual hour of calling upon the President had not only been postponed for the opportunity of consulting others upon a letter of a foreign minister highly interesting to my honor, before the smallest intimation to me, but they seemed also to be perfectly acquainted with its contents and were requested to ask questions for their satisfaction. The other was that I was desired to retire into another room until you should converse with them upon what I had said. Your confidence in me, Sir, has been unlimited and, I can truly affirm, unabused. My sensations, then, cannot be concealed when I find that confidence so immediately withdrawn without a word or distant hint being previously dropped to me! This, Sir, as I mentioned in your room, is a situation in which I cannot hold my present office, and therefore I hereby resign it. It will not, however, be concluded from hence that I mean to relinquish the inquiry. No, Sir, far from it. I will also meet any inquiry. And to prepare for it, if I learn this morning that there is a chance of overtaking Mr. Fauchet before he sails, I will go to him immediately. . . . I am satisfied, Sir, that you will acknowledge one piece of justice due on this occasion, which is that until an inquiry can be made, the affair shall continue in secrecy under your injunction. For, after pledging myself for a more specific investigation of all these suggestions, I here most solemnly deny that any overture ever came from me which was to produce money to me, or any others for me; and that in any manner, directly or indirectly, was a shilling ever received by me. Nor was it ever contemplated by me that one shilling should be applied by Mr. Fauchet to any purpose relative to the insurrection.
Randolph closed with a request that the President furnish him a copy of the intercepted letter and with Fauchet’s Despatch No. 6 if that document was also in his possession.
Washington replied at once, but he neither acknowledged the grievance nor expressed regret at the resignation. “Candor induces me,” he wrote,
to give to you, in a few words, the following narrative of facts. The letter from Mr. Fauchet . . . was, as you supposed, an intercepted one. It was sent by Lord Grenville to Mr. Hammond; by him put into the hands of the Secretary of the Treasury; by him shown to the Secretary of War and the Attorney General; and a translation thereof was made by the former for me. . . . Whether it is known to others, I am unable to decide. While you are in pursuit of means to remove the strong suspicions arising from this letter, no disclosure of its contents will be made by me. And I will enjoin the same on the public officers who are acquainted with the purport of it, unless something shall appear to render an explanation necessary on the part of the Government—of which I will be the judge. A copy of Mr. Fauchet’s letter shall be sent to you. No. 6, referred to therein, I have never seen.
The President wrote Randolph on August 22, “Agreeably to your request and my promise, and as soon as it has been in my power, I send you a copy of Mr. Fauchet’s Letter No. 10.” Although Randolph had left Philadelphia and was hurrying to Rhode Island to overtake Fauchet before the diplomat sailed for France, the President made no mention of this in his note of one sentence only. If this reticence was callous, the press of other matters explained it in part. Before he could resume his interrupted vacation at Mount Vernon, Washington must take steps to fill the office of Secretary of State; he must induce some able man to succeed Attorney General Bradford, whose lingering illness ended in death on August 23; he must approve instructions for the American agent who was to carry out the formal exchange of treaty ratifications in London; and he must look into a complaint from Gov. Arthur Fenner of Rhode Island that the British cruiser Africa was hovering off Newport.
Washington considered John Marshall of Richmond particularly fitted for the Attorney Generalship and wrote accordingly to the Virginian. His choice for the Department of State was William Paterson of New Jersey, but the Supreme Court Justice declined an oral invitation, and the offer went next to Thomas Johnson of Maryland. Johnson pleaded failing health, and a similar invitation then was forwarded to Charles Cotesworth Pinckney. It would take some time for Pinckney’s answer to return from Charleston; until an appointment could be made, Pickering had agreed to handle the business of the Department of State as well as that of his own office. Pickering’s first task in the new capacity gave him a challenge—he had to prepare definitive instructions for the American diplomat who was to execute the exchange of treaty ratifications with Great Britain. The only United States official at the London legation was William A. Deas, secretary to Thomas Pinckney and now chargé ad interim. The President knew nothing of Deas’s character or qualifications and much preferred to assign the exchange to a diplomat of rank, the most available of whom was the American minister resident at The Hague, John Quincy Adams. It was decided that Adams should be ordered to London; but as delay must be avoided, Deas should have authority to proceed if Adams had not arrived by October 20. Pickering had a set of instructions ready August 25, and the President approved it that day. The American agent, Adams or Deas, was to carry out the exchange, qualifying the treaty by excision of Article XII, and then protest orally against the recent “provision order.” Finally, he was to urge immediate evacuation of British troops from the western posts. As soon as Pinckney was back in London, further negotiation should be left to him.
On August 31 Washington wrote Hamilton of the activities of Capt. Rodman Home of His Majesty’s cruiser Africa off Newport. While hovering there in the hope of intercepting the French frigate Medusa when that vessel put to sea, Home had impressed several seamen from American merchant ships. Then, on July 31, Home and British Vice Consul Thomas W. Moore demanded that Governor Fenner assist them in reclaiming British sailors on shore leave in Newport. The next day Home entered American territorial waters to stop and search the coastal packet Peggy, on which Fauchet had embarked at New York on his journey to Newport where the Medusa awaited him. Forewarned, Fauchet left the Peggy at Stonington, but his baggage was ransacked by Home’s searchers. In spite of a formal protest by Pickering to Consul Phineas Bond, senior British diplomat in the United States now that Hammond was gone, no explanation of Home’s and Moore’s conduct had been given. The President complained to Hamilton, “. . . it would seem next to impossible . . . to keep peace between the United States and Great Britain.” Washington waited two days more for some apology from Bond, but patience proved fruitless. On September 2, determined that the sovereignty of the United States should not be affronted without redress, he approved a detail
ed indictment of Home and Moore which had been drafted by Pickering for transmission to Bond. Three days later the British diplomat was notified that the exequatur of Moore had been revoked by the President and that henceforth all intercourse was prohibited between the people of Newport and the Africa.
Popular response to his acceptance of the treaty was exactly what Washington had anticipated; Federalists lauded the action and Republicans denounced it. Washington ignored the whispers that came to his ears, as likewise he ignored the abusive memorials now arriving in every mail. His state of mind at the close of August was much the same as it had been the day he signed the treaty. On the thirty-first he sent this reply to an address from the Republicans of Savannah:
Next to the consciousness of having discharged my duty according to my best judgment, nothing could have afforded me a greater pleasure than to have found my decision consistent with the wishes of all my fellow citizens. On this occasion I have, however, been directed by the great principle which has governed all my public conduct: a sincere desire to promote and secure the true interest of my country.
A note from Pickering on September 7 informed the President that no public business remained to prevent his departure for Mount Vernon the next morning. This word was gratifying, but that night Washington received a private communication which disturbed him and which called for an immediate decision. A letter from Knox in Boston enclosed a message from George Washington Lafayette, son of the Revolutionary hero, who recently had disembarked in that town after a voyage from France. Young Lafayette’s letter expressed a desire to hurry to Philadelphia and place himself in the care of the President. Such action, Washington feared, could have embarrassing repercussions; yet Washington felt deeply responsible for the welfare of his namesake. With emotions as strong as they were mixed at the moment, the President penned a hasty letter to Senator George Cabot of Massachusetts. He asked Cabot to act temporarily as the lad’s sponsor, enroll him at Harvard College that fall, and impress upon the boy the great necessity for moderate behavior and prudence. National interest made it impossible for him to disclose his sentiments at present, Washington told Cabot, but he added emphatically, “Let me in a few words declare that I will be his friend . . . a father, friend, protector and supporter. . . My friendship for his father, so far from being diminished, has increased in the ratio of his misfortune.”
On September 8 the President left Philadelphia in the expectation of being absent five or six weeks. At Elkton, Maryland, he interrupted his journey to write an urgent letter to Pickering. Late news from Rhode Island had reached him: the Medusa, with Fauchet aboard, had slipped to sea from anchorage in Newport the night of August 31, but had been pursued at once by Captain Home in the Africa. Washington was distressed; the flight of the Medusa had occurred before he took action against the offensive British commander. “This circumstance . . . I regret exceedingly,” he told Pickering, “because the effect of [my] order for the departure of the [Africa] will be the same to the British as if she had been in the harbour of Newport, and we shall obtain no credit for it from the French and their partisans.” He directed Pickering to inform Monroe of the facts of the case and stress to the Minister at Paris the necessity of presenting the American position accurately and well.
The President was at Georgetown the twelfth and spent most of the next day in conference with the commissioners of the Federal City. No money at all had been paid as yet by Morris and Nicholson on their contract for lots. Work on the public buildings was almost at a standstill. Washington still refused to believe that Morris and Nicholson were engaged in speculation and had no real interest in the progress of the city, but rumors of such duplicity were gaining every day.
His first full day at home, the fourteenth, brought the President news most welcome. Wayne had concluded a treaty with the northwest tribes, though no text of the pact had yet come to Philadelphia. Washington instructed the Secretary of War to send Indian Agent James Seagrove to the southwest border to arrange a cessation of hostilities between Creeks and Chickasaws. It would be “a pleasing circumstance,” the President thought, to report to Congress in November that the United States enjoyed peace with every Indian nation and, as well, had been instrumental in negotiating a truce between two warring tribes. Towards the end of the month, Pickering was able to forward a certified text of the accord Wayne had signed with the Ohio tribes at Greeneville on August 9.
Washington had not been long on the Potomac shore when he was visited by Henry Lee on a matter of personal business. Lee wished to know if the President would sell or trade his plantation in the Dismal Swamp. Lee held stock in the Bank of Columbia in the Federal City and was willing to exchange it; but Washington could not set a price on his share in the Dismal Swamp Company, because he had no idea of the current value of the land. The President would attempt to ascertain its worth. On the twenty-fifth Washington rode to Alexandria to spend the night at the home of Lear and his bride of one month, Frances Bassett Washington. Doubtless the President took this occasion to ask Lear’s opinion of the prospects of the Bank of Columbia and of the real value of Lee’s stock.
On September 27 the President went to his desk for a task he did not relish; he must write Randolph. Recent mails had brought three communications from him, two dated September 15 and the third September 21. Randolph had pursued Fauchet to Newport and overtaken him there August 31. He had described to Fauchet the circumstances of his resignation and asked for a statement that no secrets had been divulged to him and that no money ever was received, requested or suggested by the Secretary of State. Fauchet promised to furnish such a certificate, then embarked suddenly when the captain of the Medusa saw an opportunity to slip out of Newport. Randolph’s distress at this was relieved when the pilot returned with the certificate Fauchet had written as the vessel put to sea. He returned immediately to Philadelphia and secured extracts of Fauchet’s Despatches No. 3 and No. 6 from Adet. Then, on September 15, he wrote Washington: “. . . I trust that I am in possession of such materials . . . as will convince every unprejudiced mind that my resignation was dictated by considerations which ought not to have been resisted for a moment, and that everything connected with it stands upon a footing perfectly honorable to myself.” His letter of the twenty-first asked Washington for information and employed a tone more aggressive than aggrieved, language tart and altogether unpleasant. Washington replied September 27 in a note conspicuously unspecific. “It is not in my power to inform you,” he told Randolph, “at what time Mr. Hammond put the intercepted letter of Mr. Fauchet into the hands of Mr. Wolcott. I had no intimation of the existence of such a letter until after my arrival in Philadelphia the 11th of August.” Then the President added: “No man would rejoice more than I should to find that the suspicions, which have resulted from the intercepted letter, were unequivocally and honorably removed.” Some days later Washington received from Wolcott a report that Randolph had released the letter of September 15 to Republican newspapers. In answer on October 2, Washington enclosed for Wolcott’s and Pickering’s inspection the letters from Randolph and the reply to the last of them. Annoyance, distrust and a hardening of attitude were manifest in the President’s words. If, as Washington supposed, Randolph had made similar inquiries of Wolcott and Pickering, his aim was only “to see if he could involve inconsistencies in the answers . . . and to know what kind of superstructure he might build on the information he has obtained (if any) from Mr. Fauchet. . . .” Whatever defence Randolph might produce, Washington expected the worst of him now.
In spite of vexations, the President’s month at Mount Vernon might have provided a fine rest from the cares of office had it not been for the pressing need to fill vacancies in the Executive. Appointment of Elias Boudinot as Director of the Mint established an able man in that minor position, but the posts of Secretary of State and Attorney General still were unoccupied. Washington had been at home only a few days when he received Marshall’s declination of the Attorney Generalship. A satisfactory
Attorney General, the President thought, might be James Innes of Virginia, and the opinion of Edward Carrington would be valuable here. Before he had Carrington’s reply, Washington was visited again by Lee on October 4. As Charles Cotesworth Pinckney had by now declined the office of Secretary of State, conversation turned to this vacancy and Lee repeated an intimation that Patrick Henry no longer was antagonistic to the Federal government. Lee thought that Henry would accept the Secretaryship and could be expected to serve with credit in that post. Not at all sure that Lee was correct in either assumption, the President weighed his estimate for several days and finally composed a careful offer to Henry. The President signed this letter but did not send it immediately. Instead, he enclosed it in a message to Carrington on October 9. If Carrington felt that Innes would not do or would not accept the offer, the letter to Henry should be forwarded from Richmond. Nomination of two Virginians to high office at the same time would violate his rule of geographical distribution, Washington explained to Carrington; and, very likely, Henry would not accept a portfolio in any case. A last alternative, then, would be the formal transfer of Pickering to the Department of State. If this were done, would Carrington himself accept the Secretaryship of War?
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