The original case officer cabled back enthusiasm about the information as well as the exciting prospect of a continued dialogue with Nosenko. The Soviet warned them not to try to make any contact with him in Moscow, as he knew of the overwhelming surveillance performed by the KGB there, especially since the Popov affair. All contact would have to be restricted to the times he could come out from the Soviet Union.11
In order to arrange a contact procedure for such a time, George called the Office of Security at headquarters, obtained a number of high-security, secret mailing addresses in New York City, and selected one for Nosenko. When he came out of the Soviet Union again, Nosenko then would be able to contact George and the other case officer through this address by cable or mail. Nosenko would use the name "Alex." It was agreed that three days after the date of the cable or letter, Nosenko would stand at 7:00 P.M. underneath the marquee of the movie house whose name was listed alphabetically first in the phonebook of the city from whence the cable or letter had originated. (In the case of a letter as opposed to a cable, "Alex" would date the letter a few days later than the actual date in order to compensate for the longer transit time. The meeting, then, would take place three days after the date indicated in the letter, without regard to its postmark.) Nosenko stayed in Geneva until the fifteenth of June and then returned to the Soviet Union.
After Nosenko's departure for Moscow, George and his fellow case officer returned to Washington from Geneva on separate airplanes, one carrying the tapes recorded during their meetings and the other hearing the handwritten notes, a precaution against losing everything if they were together in a fatal plane crash.12 Both were delighted that they were working with a high-level KGB officer who was able and willing to divulge significant amounts of valuable information. Moreover, the KGB man would be staying "in place," which made him that much more valuable. When he got home, George tested from time to time the communication channels that he had set up for Nosenko. He contacted the chiefs of stations in selected European cities, asking that both cables and letters be sent to the Manhattan address. This enabled him to predict the transit times for Nosenko's anticipated correspondence from different locations.
On 20 January 1964, Nosenko again arrived in Geneva as part of the Soviet Disarmament Delegation. Leading that delegation was Semyon K. Tsarapkin, who later would come under some scrutiny for what was to occur. The conferences were to be held at the Palais des Nations in downtown Geneva, commencing the next day. Nosenko stayed in the nearby Rex Hotel. Shortly after arriving, he sent a coded letter to one of the New York City addresses. Within hours of its receipt George and the other case officer were winging toward Geneva on separate airplanes.
By this time George had been promoted to a special position in which he received all of his assignments from the director of clandestine services. He nevertheless would continue for awhile as an interpreter and case officer in the Nosenko matter. Likewise, the other case officer had enjoyed two significant promotions within the CIA. First, he had been elevated to the position of counterintelligence branch chief within the Soviet Bloc Division. In this capacity, he had extensive contact with James Angleton, the Agency counterintelligence chief, who advised him that he and Golitsyn both believed Nosenko to be a KGB plant. After having been the CI branch chief of the Soviet Bloc Division only for a short period of time, the case officer then was promoted to deputy chief of the division. Nevertheless, he still was acting as one of Nosenko's two case officers.
The original case officer met Nosenko under the marquee of the designated movie theater in Geneva at 7:00 P.M. three days after the date of the letter. In a brush contact, he gave Nosenko a note specifying the address of the new safehouse located in the suburbs of Geneva. The case officer, Nosenko, and George met together that evening and on five additional occasions during this episode.
Most importantly, Nosenko now wanted to defect, a complete reversal from his desires of eighteen months ago. "Why?" asked George. "Because the KGB suspects me, my marriage is not so good, and I want to make a new life," replied the defector.'3
"And your daughter?"
"She is much better now. The medicine saved her life. She will be well."
Nosenko talked about Cherepanov, stating that operations described in the Cherepanov papers were known to him, and that he had participated in the nationwide manhunt for the renegade during the previous October. He produced his own travel papers relating to the exercise, including an identification document exhibiting his rank of lieutenant colonel in the KGB. Since the Cherepanov papers dealt mainly with surveillance techniques, they confirmed Nosenko's previous revelations about the KGB procedures. Moreover, the papers' description of the Popov detection dovetailed with Nosenko's earlier story that Popov had first been detected by surveillance.
Nosenko told of the American Embassy being bugged, describing an array of dozens of microphones. Later he pinpointed for the State Department several dozens of locations where these microphones had been built into the walls of the U.S. Embassy in Moscow when it was constructed in 1952. This meant that the Soviets had covertly listened to private embassy conversations for twelve years. Golitsyn previously had mentioned that some microphones were there, but he had not suspected so many nor known of their locations. When embassy personnel eventually opened the walls to remove the microphones, they found many more.14
Nosenko gave his own account of how Oleg Penkovsky had been detected, arrested, and forced to participate in the compromise of members of the British and American team who had worked with him. Nosenko mentioned the KGB discovery of the dead drop that the CIA had readied for Penkovsky. The KGB had seen an American Embassy person going there, so they set up shop in the adjoining building. They bored a peephole through the wall of the apartment foyer where the dead drop was located and posted a man there twenty-four hours a day for the next six months.15
Nosenko also revealed that the KGB had been in control of an important American source in Paris who had transmitted American NATO military secrets to the Soviet Union. This led to the arrest of Robert Lee Johnson and his friend, James Allen Mintkenbaugh, two sergeants who had served together in the U.S. Army. Johnson had been a sentinel at the heavily guarded military courier station at Orly Field near Paris. The Orly vault contained highly classified material sent to and from the Pentagon as well as various American and NATO commands in Europe. Seven times, from December 1962 until April 1963, Johnson, with Soviet-provided technical aid, defeated three sets of locks, entered the vault, removed the documents, delivered them to the Soviets for predawn, lightning-fast photographic sessions, and then replaced them in the vault.16
Finally, Nosenko dropped the intelligence bombshell that reverberated throughout the CIA and other parts of the U.S. government for at least a decade. He declared that he had supervised the KGB file on Lee Harvey Oswald in 1959. At this point in time, January of 1964, only two months after the devastating assassination of President Kennedy and the spectacular murder of Oswald himself, rumors were raging like a virus throughout the North American continent. Some people believed that the U.S. government, including the CIA and the FBI, had been complicit, if not solely guilty, in the killings. Others were convinced that organized crime, right-wing groups, left-wing groups, Cubans, or other foreigners had been involved. Many also considered the FBI to have been criminally derelict in not forewarning Dallas police and the Secret Service of Oswald's background and menace. In an attempt to put an end to such speculation, and to restore faith in the competence of our government, President Johnson convened the Warren Commission to investigate all aspects of the assassination and the murder of Oswald.
Lee Harvey Oswald joined the United States Marines in October 1956 and served at Atsugi Air Force Base, Japan, as a radar technician from October 1957 until November 1958. He was discharged in September of 1959 and defected to the Soviet Union in October, only a month after his release from the marines. He lived in Minsk for two and a half years. While there, on the 30 April 1961, he marri
ed Marina Nikolaievna Prusakova, a hospital worker. Her consent to marry him hinged, at least partially, on his promise that he would never return to the United States. In June of 1962 he returned to the United States, bringing with him his new Soviet bride and their infant child, June Lee Oswald, so named in accordance with the old Russian, then Soviet, law regarding the patronymic.17
While back in the United States, Oswald exhibited many attributes of a misfit. Among them was his propensity to campaign for fringe groups such as "Fair Play for Cuba." The FBI was aware of some of his activities but did not consider him dangerous enough to charge him specifically with any misdemeanor or felony. It was later revealed that he had fired his rifle into the home of Gen. Edwin Walker on 10 April 1963. The bullet narrowly missed Walker's head. In September of 1963, Oswald, wishing to return to the Soviet Union, applied to the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City for a visa to go to Cuba, offering his services to "the Cuban revolution" while in transit to the USSR. Cuba would not allow its embassy in Mexico to grant him the visa to Cuba until he first obtained an entrance visa to the Soviet Union. The USSR denied the same. Probably sensing that he was being bumped around, he returned to the United States in October. One month later he shot the president in Dallas.18
Nosenko assured his masters, George and the companion case officer, that he had supervised the Lee Harvey Oswald case when the ex-marine had arrived in Moscow in 1959. Additionally, he stated that he, along with a few other officers of the Second Chief Directorate, had decided that Oswald must return to the United States when his visa expired. Oswald subsequently attempted suicide. The decision that Oswald must leave the USSR then was overridden by powers above the KGB. The reason given was the fear of adverse publicity if he were successful at suicide. Such publicity would be worse than any that was likely to arise from his living in the Soviet Union.
After Oswald attempted suicide, two different panels of psychiatrists examined him at KGB behest and each independently concluded that, though quite abnormal and unstable, he was not insane. Nosenko maintained that KGB headquarters had ordered Oswald routinely watched by Byelorussian Republic KGB units of Minsk but not recruited, or in any way utilized. When Oswald returned to the United States in 1962 they were glad. Further, Nosenko insisted that in September of 1963, when Oswald applied in Mexico City for a visa to return to Moscow, the KGB blocked his return. Continuing, Nosenko averred that the KGB didn't want to have any more to do with the Oswalds. He was unstable and "Marina was stupid, uneducated, and anti-Soviet," he reported. "The KGB was glad to see them go when they left for the United States."19
Nosenko emphatically volunteered that no one in the Soviet Union had anything to do with the assassination. George and his fellow case officer were curious as to how the man could give total assurance to such a declaration. The informer answered that he and certain other officers were in charge of investigating the question of KGB involvement in the assassination. He maintained that the whole Soviet Union was shocked with the news of the assassination and very much aware of American public opinion. Further, he stated that the KGB was fearful that some maverick officer in the field might have utilized Oswald for some unauthorized purpose, without the awareness of the chain of command. He indicated that anxiety was so great within the KGB that they immediately ordered Oswald's file flown in a military plane from Minsk, where Oswald had lived, to KGB headquarters in Moscow. Nosenko insisted that he was there, along with the others, scrutinizing the document with trepidation as each page was turned, fearing that some relationship might have existed between Oswald and some overly ambitious member of the KGB. If so, the consequence could be devastating to both the Soviet Union and the United States. In addition, he stated that General Gribanov, the chief of the Second Chief Directorate, had sent a squad of investigators to Minsk to question officials on the spot. To emphasize his willingness to cooperate, Nosenko offered to testify to the Warren Commission.20 The information provided by Nosenko was immediately forwarded to Langley. It later caused great concern and controversy at the CIA among those preparing to assist the Warren Commission.
The provocative agent continued to work for several days with his American handlers and then repeated his previous revelation to them: "I am not going back to the USSR." They, on the other hand, wanted to keep him in place and work with him when he returned to Moscow. He said, "No, I am afraid of counterintelligence. You might have one meeting with me-maybe two-then the KGB surely will catch me, especially after the case of Lt. Col. Pyotr Popov, because they now are very well trained."
It was the end of January and it did not appear to Nosenko that the handlers would accept his defection. He had told them at the first meeting that he was not going back to the USSR, yet still they were not moving. He was afraid that he would be recalled home. Before he had left the USSR for this trip, his group, the Department for Tourists in the Second Chief Directorate, had been planning a conference of all KGB tourist representatives from all of the Soviet republics where tourists normally visited. He was part of a task force preparing for this conference and he had been told just as he was leaving for Geneva that before the disarmament talks were over he might be recalled. He also knew that the chief of the Second Chief Directorate, General Gribanov, would be coming to Geneva under cover as a diplomat. If Gribanov were to see Nosenko there, he might ask, "What in the world are you doing here?" He then could command Nosenko back home, embarrassing the man. After all, Nosenko was not essential to the group; he had gotten the temporary assignment in the hope that a chance to defect might arise.
Moreover, when Nosenko had come to Geneva in 1962, the KGB deputy rezident there was a close friend. Now in his place was another rezident whom Nosenko considered very "tough." Nosenko was not drinking during this 1964 trip, but he was repeatedly meeting with his handlers. He was concerned that the new rezident would suspect him. Still, the Agency was not moving on his defection.21
CHAPTER 20
Sasha
On the morning of 3 February 1964, Yuri Nosenko left his hotel and, leaving his suitcase in the room and taking almost nothing, ventured to the safehouse. There he declared to George and the other case officer, "Gentlemen, I don't know about you, but I just defected now; this day, this hour, this minute, I just defected." The original case officer replied, "No, we are not ready." Nosenko said, "I cannot go back. A cable from the KGB just arrived ordering me back to Moscow. I suspect that it is in connection with the conference that we have been planning for this spring."t
That very day, the Warren Commission took testimony from its first witness, Marina Oswald. Other than Nosenko, she was the only person outside of the USSR who could shed any light on the relations that her husband might have had with authorities in the USSR. Nosenko stated to the case officers that he had just been ordered to catch a plane back to the Soviet Union by the next day.2 Perhaps the call was routine. Perhaps his liaison with the CIA had been detected. He told George that he had no choice: "It is now or never." Nosenko's managers had tried their best to convince him to stay in place. It is almost always desired that an agent do this. Previously, they had believed they could take his testimony about Oswald to the FBI and the Warren Commission without his being present. Now, however, it was clear that the United States had to accept his defection. There was no choice; the Kennedy assassination demanded that it be done.
At this point in time, Richard Helms was the deputy director for plans at the CIA. It was his job to manage the entire clandestine services department of the Agency. He was particularly troubled with the decision regarding the acceptance of Nosenko as a defector. He believed that the potential benefits to the Agency if the man were bona fide had to be fairly weighed against the negative aspects if he were not. If Nosenko's story were true, he might help clear up some uncertainties for the Warren Commission. If Nosenko were sent by the KGB as a plant to ensure that the United States did not suspect an innocent KGB of complicity in the assassination, this could be dealt with, probably with little effort. If Nosenko were
just puffing, trying to enhance his own worth as a defector by lying about his knowledge of Oswald, his story definitely would confuse matters, but they also could deal with this situation. Most alarmingly, if the KGB had sent Nosenko because the KGB or someone within that organization was complicit in the assassination, the consequences of such a revelation could be considerably worse than the assassination itself. In any event, it would be better to have the man in custody and attempt to determine the truth from him.
Nosenko was suspected by some, including George's companion case officer, of being a plant, but his testimony could be of paramount importance to the Warren Commission. The CIA couldn't possibly turn Nosenko down, but at the same time they distrusted him and misled him. The original case officer made an employment and monetary proposal to Nosenko and convinced him that he would be formally accepted and treated well. Nosenko agreed and urged the case officer to act quickly. John McCone, the director of Central Intelligence, immediately authorized the acceptance of Nosenko. The director was empowered by Congress to admit, on his own authority but with justice Department coordination, a limited number of defectors to the United States. On 4 February, Nosenko was given documents identifying him as an American and driven from Switzerland to a safehouse on the outskirts of Frankfurt. Three days later, the CIA's chief of the Soviet Bloc Division met him in Frankfurt. He repeated the promises of money and employment made by the original case officer, but he also believed that Nosenko was lying. After a week of debriefing in Frankfurt, the two of them flew to Andrews AFB, outside of Washington, D.C., arriving on 12 February. Immediately, the chief drafted a memo to the effect that, in his opinion, Nosenko was under KGB direction.3
CIA Spymaster_George Kisevalter Page 28