Containing the Smolensk pocket, in the face of such pressure, became an obsession for von Bock. ‘At the moment,’ he wrote on 20 July, ‘there is only one pocket on the Army Group’s front! And it has a hole!’(6) The Panzer ring holding it, lacking strong infantry support, was extremely porous. Without the attached Luftwaffe anti-aircraft batteries, originally configured to protect the Panzers against air attack, the defence situation would have been even more alarming. High-velocity 88mm Flak guns were switched from air defence to the ground role. An example of their effectiveness is revealed by 7th Panzer Division’s defensive battle tally against 60–80 attacking Russian tanks on 7 July. Just under half – 27 of 59 enemy tanks – were knocked out by Flak Abteilung 84. Of the remaining 29 kills, 14 were knocked out by five other infantry units and 15 by the division’s Panzerjäger Abteilung (also equipped with Flak guns).(7)
On 21 July von Bock grudgingly acknowledged the pressure the enemy was applying to his closing ring, ‘a quite remarkable success for such a badly battered opponent!’ he admitted. The encirclement was not quite absolute. Two days later Bock complained, ‘we have still not succeeded in closing the hole at the east end of the Smolensk pocket.’(8) Five Soviet divisions made good their escape that night, through the lightly defended Dnieper valley. Another three divisions broke out the following day. Unteroffizier Eduard Kister, a Panzergrenadier section commander, fought with the 17th Panzer Division near Senno and Tolodschino against break-out attempts mounted by the Sixteenth Soviet Army.
‘They came in thick crowds, without fire support and with officers in front. They bellowed from high-pitched throats and the ground reverberated with the sound of their running boots. We let them get to within 50m and then started firing. They collapsed in rows and covered the ground with mounds of bodies. They fell in groups, despite the fact the ground being undulating offered good protection from fire, but they did not take cover. The wounded cried out in the hollows, but still continued to shoot from them. Fresh attack waves stormed forward behind the dead and pressed up against the wall of bodies.’
Schütze Menk, serving in a 20mm Flak company with the ‘Grossdeutschland’ Regiment, described the desperate need to keep all weapons firing in the face of such suicidal mass assaults.
‘Our cannon had to be fed continually; flying hands refilled empty ammunition clips. A barrel change, a job that had to be done outside the protection of the armour plate, was carried out in no time. The hot cannon barrel raised blisters on the hands of those involved. Hands were in motion here and there, calls for full clips of ammunition, half deaf from the ceaseless pounding of the gun… there was no time to feed hidden fears by looking beyond one’s task, the Russians were unmistakably gaining ground.’(9)
Kister maintained it was a totally unnerving experience. ‘It was as if they wanted to use up our ammunition holdings with their lives alone.’ His sector was attacked 17 times in one day.
‘Even during the night they attempted to work their way up to our position utilising mounds of dead in order to get close. The air stank dreadfully of putrefaction because the dead start to decompose quickly in the heat. The screams and whimpering of the wounded in addition grated on our nerves.’
Kister’s unit repelled another two attacks in the morning. ‘Then we received the order to move back to prepared positions in the rear.’(10)
Pockets were not only porous, they moved. As Red Army units continually sought to escape, German Panzers had frequently to adjust positions to maintain concentric pressure or bend as they soaked up attacks. ‘Wandering pockets’ complicated the co-ordination of hasty defence and especially the reception of march-weary reinforcing infantry units moving up to form the inner ring. Infantry divisions moving behind Panzergruppen fared particularly badly. They were often obliged to change direction at little notice onto secondary routes to avoid Panzer countermeasures rapidly manoeuvring along the primary or supply arteries. Movement in such fluid situations was perilous, as described by Feldwebel Mirsewa travelling with one 18th Panzer Division convoy:
‘Suddenly they were there. Even as we heard the engine noises it was already too late. Soviet T-26 and T-34 tanks rolled, firing uninterruptedly, parallel to our supply convoy. Within seconds all hell had broken loose. Three lorries loaded with ammunition driving in the middle of the column blew up into the air with a tremendous din. Pieces of vehicle sped over us, propelled on their way by the force of the explosions.’
Men cried out and horses stampeded in all directions, running down anything that stood in their way. Suddenly the Russian tanks changed direction and swept through the column, firing as they went.
‘I will never forget the dreadful screams of the horses that went under the tracks of the tanks. A tanker lorry completely full with tank fuel burst apart into orange-red flames. One of the manoeuvring T-26 tanks came too close and disappeared into the blaze and was glowing incandescently within minutes. It was total chaos.’
A 50mm PAK was rolled up from the rear and quickly immobilised two of the heavier T-34 tanks, hitting their tracks. Both began to revolve wildly, completely out of control in the surreal battle now developing. Meanwhile, the lighter and faster T-26 types had shot every vehicle in the column into flames. Bodies of men who had attempted to flee their vehicles were strewn across the road. ‘I heard the wounded cry out,’ recalled Mirsewa, ‘but not for long, as the Russian tank clattered up and down over the dead and injured.’ A platoon of Panzergrenadiers with additional anti-tank guns drove up and swiftly set to work. At first the unmanoeuvrable T-34s were despatched. The scene began to resemble Dante’s ‘Inferno’ as the T-26s still engaging the burning vehicles were attacked.
‘The crack of detonations mixed with the tearing sound of huge tongues of flame. Metal parts whirled through the air. In between, machine guns hammered out as the grenadiers first engaged tank vision slits before their destructive high explosive charges were brought to bear. The chaos intensified into an inferno. Everywhere tanks were exploding into the air. Burning steel colossuses melted alongside our blazing supply column forming a long wall of flame.
‘The heat radiating across the road and reaching our position was hardly bearable. Worse of all, though, was the sight of numerous dead from our column lying in the road. Just as well our people back home will never get to know how their boys met their deaths.’(11)
Containing ‘wandering pockets’ appeared an insurmountable problem. Von Bock reacted belligerently to the ‘Führer’s ideas on the subject, the gist of which was that for the moment we should encircle the Russians tactically wherever we meet them, rather than with strategic movements, and then destroy them in small pockets’.(12) This implied Blitzkrieg sweeps should be subordinated to minor tactical actions. With it came the realisation that the increasing gap developing between Panzers and infantry was annulling the previously proven benefits of a combined arms advance. Panzers were not robust in defence while infantry were insufficiently protected on the move.
The Soviets, sensing this weakness, attacked the outside of the Smolensk ring to exploit the vulnerability. The attempts, however, were unco-ordinated and lacked tactical sophistication. But in terms of naked aggression and totally uncompromising resistance, the Panzer divisions were sustaining punishment far beyond that meted out by any foe thus far in the war. Von Bock lamented the appearance of new Russian build-ups, ‘in many places they have tried to go over to the attack’ even as he closed the Smolensk pocket. ‘Astonishing for an opponent who is so beaten,’ he admitted, ‘they must have unbelievable masses of material, for even now the field units still complain about the powerful effect of the enemy artillery.’(13) The next day the Smolensk pocket was sealed.
The battle continued for another 14 days. At its height the Wehrmacht fielded elements of 32 divisions consisting of two Panzergruppen with 16 Panzer and motorised (and one cavalry) divisions and 16 infantry divisions. This was 60% of the fighting power of Army Group Centre. Some 50% of its strength had been Bialystok-Minsk e
ncirclement perimeters between 24 June and 8 July. The same troops had then to march further eastward to embrace the even greater Kessel at Smolensk and participate in the battle that raged between 11 July and 10 August. Trapped inside were the Soviet Sixteenth, Nineteenth and Twentieth Armies. By 8 July OKH calculated it had destroyed 89 of 164 Russian divisions identified.(14) At this point Blitzkrieg momentum had petered out. There were no further German formations of appreciable operational size available to continue eastward until this pocket was annihilated. Breathtaking though the victories were, the price was now becoming apparent, even to the highest commanders at the front.
Two days after the closure of the Smolensk pocket, von Bock noted in his diary that ‘powerful Russian attacks are in progress on almost the entire front of Ninth Army’ and that ‘40 batteries [of artillery] have been counted at one place opposite its eastern front’. A Soviet penetration was even reported south of Beloye. ‘The fact is,’ concluded von Bock, ‘that our troops are tired and are also not exhibiting the required steadiness because of heavy officer casualties.’(15) The German Army at the end of July was beginning to conclude the vast battles of encirclement that had been designed to destroy Soviet forces in western Russia. Only now was the Pyrrhic nature of this achievement becoming apparent, hidden within sensational Sondermeldungen at home.
On 21 July, 7th Panzer Division reported a strength of 118 tanks, which indicated 166 had been knocked out (although 96 of these were under repair).(16) One battalion of Panzer Regiment 25 was temporarily broken up to keep the other two at effective strength. Most of the tank crews survived. It is interesting to compare the lot of Panzers and infantry fighting in the same formation.
Panzer gunner Karl Fuchs was exuberant prior to the battle of Smolensk. ‘Our losses have been minimal and our success great,’ he wrote to his wife Madi. ‘This war will be over soon, because already we are fighting against only fragmented opposition.’(17) Six days later he wrote:
‘For the time being I am in a safe spot. If only I had some water to wash myself! The dirt and the dust cause my skin to itch and my beard is growing longer and longer. Wouldn’t you like to kiss me now! I am sure you can see the dirt on the paper on which I write.’
On 15 July he anticipated, ‘I would imagine that within eight to ten days this campaign will be over.’ Soldiers often prefer to offer a sanitised version of experiences writing to their families. They confirm they are alive and in good health and generally like to predict future prospects with some optimism. Karl Fuchs was typical of the soldiers of his generation. Two days later he exuberantly described how:
‘Yesterday I participated in my 12th attack. Some of these attacks were more difficult than others. With 12 attacks under my belt, I have now caught up with the boys who had a head start in France! You can imagine that I’m very proud of this achievement.’(18)
Fuchs wrote what he thought his wife would expect to read. The rotation of tank crews for rest referred to ‘in a safe spot’ was likely the result of tank casualties and battle fatigue. Diary entries, expressed in private and only selectively released, are often more frank. An infantry officer serving in Fuch’s division wrote more candidly the following week:
‘The faces of the youngsters exude the same image as First World War veterans. Long beards and the filth of these days make many of them look older than is the case in reality. Despite the pleasure at sudden Russian withdrawals, one notices this change in the faces of the soldiers. Even after washing again and shaving the chin – something difficult to describe is from now on different! The first days at Yartsevo have certainly left an impression.’(19)
Panzer Regiment 7 was deployed at the eastern end of the Smolensk pocket, directly in the path of Russian divisions attempting to escape. General Halder caustically commented in his diary:
‘Four [German] divisions are advancing eastward from the west, pushing the enemy against the eastern block formed by only four battalions of the 7th Panzer Division which is also being attacked by the enemy from the east. We need hardly be surprised if 7th Panzer Division eventually gets badly hurt.’(20)
The Panzergrenadier Regiment ‘Grossdeutschland’ was under similar pressure. Repeated surprise encounters in confused situations caused a steady drain of casualties. Commanders had to react to swift situation changes with no clear information about the enemy. It produced a cumulative toll.
‘No one could say during the advance whether one would see heavy fighting within the next hour, or whether Russian troops would be on the roads during the hours of darkness. This constant tension strained men’s nerves to breaking point. The resulting over-exertion left them somewhat indifferent, almost resigned to accept everything as it arose. It also explains the losses among officers and NCOs, which were dreadfully high at the outset of the campaign.’(21)
It was to get worse. From 23 July the Ist Battalion ‘Grossdeutsch-land’ Regiment fought defensive battles near Yelnya and Smolensk along the Kruglowka railway embankment. For five days the unit was attacked by masses of Russian infantry desperate to flee the pocket. ‘GD’ grenadiers were generally paired to each foxhole. The official historian relates how ‘many spent the day next to a dead comrade. No one could help the wounded while it was still daylight.’ At night the dead were laid out behind a shack wall to the rear of the position.
‘They had all died from head or chest wounds. That meant all were standing in their holes and firing at the enemy when they were hit. In so doing they had to expose their upper torsos or at least their heads. They knew the likely consequence of this. Can a man do more, or be stronger?’
At night they heard calls, shouts and the clatter of vehicles as the enemy manoeuvred in preparation for fresh assaults. During the fourth night of the defence the battalion was informed it could not be relieved. They had to hold on for longer, because infantry units earmarked to relieve them were needed elsewhere.
‘Now what were we going to do? Several Grenadiers overheard the message. Their reaction was “Man, that’s totally impossible.” The tension mounted. It spread through the position like poison. Several men wept, others immediately fell asleep. Most sat still in their holes. Our eyes were red from the heat, smoke and lack of sleep.’
The relief delay resulted in a number of Russian penetrations during the heavy fighting that continued in all company sectors. Russians shared holes with dead grenadiers in trenches often only 20m away from the surviving German outposts. Eventually during the night of 26/27 July, after five days of uninterrupted fighting, the remnants of the battalion were withdrawn behind a German machine gun battalion that set up a new line 1,000m behind them. One company, the second, lost 16 dead and 24 wounded. Elements from three Russian divisions had been attacking in their sector. Despite this temporary reprieve the regiment was kept in the line a further 23 days.
On 5 August 1941 Generalfeldmarschall von Bock announced the conclusion of the battle at the Dnieper, Dvina and Smolensk. The trapped Russian divisions were destroyed. Booty, he announced, included 309,110 prisoners, 3,205 captured or destroyed tanks, 3,000 guns and 341 aircraft, and the count was still going on.(22) The announcement was of scant interest to the remaining soldiers of the ‘Grossdeutschland’, finally pulled out of the line for a much needed, albeit brief, rest.
‘We lay in the meadow dozing in sunshine and relishing every breath… Within eight days we would be in a hole again in combat and perhaps in 14 days already dead. But nobody was crippled by such thoughts. Instead we lived life more consciously, also more simply. We just lived. In contrast, in peacetime one merely passed the days.’(23)
For the German infantry, these weeks and days were becoming increasingly short.
‘Do not cry’… Soviet defeat in the West
‘A terrible misfortune has befallen this country,’ announced Ina Konstantinova to her diary in mid-July. ‘The Germans are already so near… They are bombing Leningrad and Mozhaisk. They are advancing toward Moscow.’ A sense of foreboding was now beginning to erode
the initial popular emotion and outraged patriotism that had accompanied the invasion. ‘How troubled our life has become!’ wrote Konstantinova. Aircraft were constantly taking-off from the nearby Kashin airfield north-east of Moscow. Military detachments of tanks and anti-aircraft guns were observed moving through the streets. Things were different. ‘Even the atmosphere has changed somehow,’ she lamented. ‘What does the future hold in store for us?’(1) Her concern was echoed by Soviet staff officer Ivan Krylov:
‘Smolensk! Smolensk in danger. The way to Moscow, the great highway followed by the army of Napoleon, was once again the invasion artery. But it was only 10 July, hardly three weeks from the beginning of hostilities. I began to think that the fighting abilities of our forces must be lower than… imagined.’(2)
Russian units were retreating in front of an apparently inexorable German advance. Common to any examination of Soviet military staff documents covering this early period is recognition of the stultifying impact of Luftwaffe air attacks, a dearth of knowledge of the actual limit of German advances and confusion following on from a total breakdown of communications with alarming reports of appalling losses. Commander Fourth Army reported to the commander of the Western Front as early as 30 June that:
War Without Garlands: Operation Barbarossa 1941-1942 Page 25