Tulagi, 791, 832, 833, 836, 837
Turkey, 18, 260, 404, 405
Turkish Straits, 749, 766, 818, 821, 824, 825, 881
U
U.S.S. Tulagi, 791
Ukraine, 341
Ukrainians, 850, 869, 870, 872
US, 337, 365, 412
US Army, 353, 412
USAAF, 336, 495, 496, 501, 507, 512, 523, 524, 527, 709, 1059, 1061
USS Augusta, 860
USS Franklin, 503, 795
USS Franklin D. Roosevelt, 503
USS Iowa, 821, 860
USS Solar, 795, 796
USS Wisconsin, 506, 549, 750, 792, 860
USSR, 17, 18, 284, 404
V
V Corps, 612, 614, 722, 767
V2, 343
V2 rocket, 529
Venona
Venona Papers, 550
Venona Papers, 550
Vienna, 335, 336, 337, 366, 496, 499, 500, 506, 508, 513, 517, 536, 537, 539, 542, 560, 561, 603, 612, 718, 719, 725, 726, 773, 780, 843, 882, 887
VII Corps, 506
VIII Corps, 488, 496, 497, 499, 503, 512, 537, 726
Vistula River, 882
voice-pipe, 798
Voytolovo, 853
VT fuse, 614, 996, 1064
VVS, 18, 402, 403, 404, 466, 496, 523, 524, 542, 730, 764, 797, 858, 873, 917, 992, 1061, 1062, 1063, 1064, 1065
W
Wake Is Island, and, 512
Walker, 342, 364, 365, 366, 367, 368, 411, 487, 488, 496, 497, 504, 506, 507, 509, 514, 726, 773, 779, 780, 783, 843, 882, 888, 933, 934, 935, 948, 1031
War of 1812, 842
Washington, 506
Wasserfal, 533, 1059, 1061
World War One, 365
World War Two, 496, 551, 553, 554, 555, 596, 613, 630, 634, 658, 663, 679, 722, 725, 746, 747, 762, 765, 770, 792, 801, 806, 820, 821, 848, 850, 873, 886
X
X4, 537
Y
Yugoslavian, 495, 496, 500, 507, 512, 520
Z
Zhukov, 338, 339, 556, 560, 561, 565, 567, 568, 569, 593, 594, 599, 601, 603, 604, 605, 606, 607, 610, 655, 656, 657, 658, 698, 762, 763, 765, 766, 826, 881, 882, 888, 889, 890, 891, 892, 893, 894, 895, 896, 897, 909, 910, 911, 912, 913, 914, 915, 923, 957, 958,960, 961, 962, 980, 982, 984, 991, 992, 995, 996, 999, 1003, 1005
* * *
[i] Importance of Assembly Teams - Page 12 American War Plans 1945-1950 - By Steven T. Ross
[ii] -Operation Unthinkable was the British authored plan to attack the USSR immediately after WWII. It was a codename of two related plans of a conflict between the Western Allies and the Soviet Union. Both were ordered by British Prime Minister Winston Churchill in 1945 and developed by the British Armed Forces' Joint Planning Staff at the end of World War II in Europe.
The first of the two assumed a surprise attack on the Soviet forces stationed in Germany in order to "impose the will of the Western Allies" on the Soviets and force Joseph Stalin to honor the agreements in regards to the future of Central Europe.
[iii] - Swords of Armageddon by Chuck Hansen www.uscoldwar.com; Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists May 1982 US Nuclear Stockpile 1945-1950 by David A. Rosenberg pg. 26
[iv] - Assembly time of Mark III atomic bomb - Page 12 American War Plans 1945-1950 - By Steven T. Ross
[v] - Number of pits and nuclear storage facilities 1946 - Page 13 American War Plans 1945-1950 - By Steven T. Ross;
[vi] - Mark III 48 hour ready state - Page 12 American War Plans 1945-1950 - By Steven T. Ross
[vii] - ARMY DOWNSIZING FOLLOWING WORLD WAR I, WORLD WAR II, VIETNAM, AND A COMPARISON TO RECENT ARMY DOWNSIZING
A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE Military History by GARRY L. THOMPSON, USA B.S., University of Rio Grande, Rio Grande, Ohio, 1989
THE U.S. ARMY IN THE OCCUPATION OF GERMANY
Page 421-425 ARMY HISTORICAL SERIES 1944-1946 By Earl F. Ziemke
[viii] - Combat ready division in Western Europe 1946 - Page 16 American War Plans 1945-1950 - By Steven T. Ross
[ix] - Surprise Attack by Richard K. Betts pg. 4
[x] - New York Times January 9th, 1946 Article Headline: Germans Now Handle US Surplus Supplies
[xi] - Harry R. Borowski. A Hallow Threat: Strategic Air Power and Containment before the Korean War.
[xii] - Electronic countermeasures - A move to develop countermeasures against proximity fuzes stemmed from the Germans, who during the "Battle of the Bulge," captured an Army munitions dump that contained a large number of the new radar proximity-fused shells. Concerned that the Germans might attempt to copy the proximity fuze, the Research Division of the Aircraft Radio Laboratory at Wright Field, along with the help of the RLL, was called in begin the development of jamming equipment. Lieutenant Jack Bowers, an engineer with the Aircraft Radio Laboratory at Wright Field, recounted the following to Alfred Price:
"The proximity fuse had been a closely guarded secret on our side. Even though we had been working on countermeasures for a long time, we at Wright Field had never heard of the device. Now we were asked to investigate, on a crash basis, the possibility of a jammer to counter the fuse. We asked why such a jammer had not been developed earlier, and were told that the developing agency had conducted tests and concluded that the fuse could not be jammed! We worked on the problem, and within two weeks, a jammer had been built which would detonate the proximity fuses prematurely."
"It was the sort of test that would never be allowed today under the prevailing flight safety guidelines. At the time, there was a war on, and the small risk to our one aircraft had to be weighed against the far larger risk to our whole bomber force if the Germans used such a weapon against us. We who were to fly the test were confident we would be all right - we hoped that the jamming would work as planned, and if it didn’t, the offset fed into the guns would burst the shells at least 240 feet away from us at a range of about 20,000 feet."
"The test lasted about 3 months, during which about 1,600 VT shells were fired, individually, in our direction. Sitting in the fuselage of the B-17, the two RCM operators could pick up the radar transmissions from the shells coming up. The VT fuse radiated CW (continuous wave) signals, but the projectiles would often yaw a little in flight. This, in combination with the spin of the shell, would modulate the signal. We in the back could not see out, but the pilots and the navigator would get a kick out of watching the shells burst well below, or if there was a late burst because the jamming had taken some time to sweep through the shell’s frequency, it might explode close to our altitude. The general conclusion of the test was that, modified to radiate CW swept across the VT fuse band, the APT-4 jamming could significantly reduce the effectiveness of the proximity fused AA shell."
http://www.smecc.org/radio_proximity_fuzes.htm
[xiii] - Soviet Trainees in U.S.A. in World War II by Edward Pinkowski
Russian Review - Vol. 6, No. 1 (Autumn, 1946), pp. 11-16
[xiv] - New York Times January 9th Article Headline: Germans Now Handle US Surplus Supplies
[xv] - 1. In June 1946 800 bridges were repaired and operational in Germany
2. There were 60 bridges alone over the Rhine
Page 85 "Post War" by Tony Judt
[xvi] - Post War - A History of Europe since 1945 pg 85 by Tony Judt
[xvii] - Germans were actually being used as slave labor by the US, GB and France to rebuild Europe. Savage Continent: Europe in the Aftermath of World War II by Keith Lowe;
Eugene Davidson "The death and life of Germany: an account of the American occupation.
[xviii] - US Government Accountability Office (GAO)
[xix] - Adjusted Service Rating - http://users.skynet.be/jeeper/point.html -
Stars and Stripes http://warren421.home.comcast.net/~warren421/score.html
[xx]-Reference Admiralty Publications C.B. 3148 (Feb. '45) Gunnery Revie
w - Normandy Bombardment Experience (June/Sept., 1944, Page 29).
[xxi] Communist sympathies in Europe – Post War – A History of Europe Since 1945 pages 198-222 by Tony Judt
[xxii] - THE UNITED STATES STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY: Conclusions Pg. 15
[xxiii] - Aircraft of the Third Reich Vol.1 by Green pg. 64-84
[xxiv] - Parshall & Tully 2005, Shattered Sword pp. 215–216, 226–227
[xxv] - Bagnall, K. W. (1962). "The Chemistry of Polonium". Advances in Inorganic Chemistry and Radiochemistry 4. New York: Academic Press. pp. 197–226. doi:10.1016/S0065-2792(08)60268-X. ISBN 0-12-023604-4. Retrieved June 14, 2012.
[xxvi] - George Koval: Atomic Spy Unmasked - Iowa-born and army-trained, how did George Koval manage to steal a critical U.S. atom bomb secret for the Soviets? By Michael Walsh, Smithsonian Magazine May 2009
[xxvii] - Joint Chiefs of Staff Report Oct. 1945.
"The report estimated that the Soviet Union had the military capacity of overrunning Western Europe including Scandinavia and excluding Britain at any time between 1945 and 1948."
American War Plans 1945-1950 by Steven T. Ross Page 3
"Because of American and British demobilization and the chaotic conditions prevailing in Europe, The Soviets, even after completing their mobilization, could easily overrun the area, and by generating additional forces could also conquer Turkey and Iran."
History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Volume 1 1945-47 by James F. Schnabel pp. 14-15
"In effect the intelligence staff believed that Soviet and satellite armies could with relative ease overrun Europe and the Middle East at any time during the next several years."
American War Plans 1945-1950 by Steven T. Ross Page 7
"On April 11, the Joint Chiefs of Staff stated that in case of war the Russians could conquer the Mid-East and Western Europe. The Americans would have no strategic option but to retreat from the continent and assist the British in defending their homeland. "
JCS 1641/5 April 11th, 1945
"The committee was comprised of representatives
of the CIA and the intelligence sections of the Department of State, Army, Navy and the Air Force. The committee’s assessments, and the debates which they generated, became the basis of a new batch of contingency plans, turned out in 1948 at a frenetic pace (see glossary).
The committee delivered its first report on March 30, 1948. It concluded that the Soviets had the military capacity to overrun Western Europe and "the Near East to Cairo within a short period of time".
Fighting World War Three From the Middle East by Michael J. Cohen pp 7
[xxviii] - Post War by Tony Judt A History of Europe since 1945. Wonderfully informative.
When Hitler died 10% of the Germany's railroads where operational. By June, 1946 93% where operational. 800 bridges had been rebuilt.
American surveyors found that the bombing campaign had virtually no impact on production equipment. In West Germany only 6.5% of its machine tool equipment was lost due to war damage, only 20% of the German industrial plants had been destroyed by May, 1945. 66% of all industry in the heaviest bomb areas like the Ruhr remained intact. The USSR, France, Germany, Italy all emerged from the war with more machine tools than they started the war with. In the Czech lands industry and agriculture thrived under the Germans and emerged unscratched. Slovakia and Hungary saw their industrial situation improve.
Quote: the Soviet armies had recovered to the point where, in 1945, they constituted the greatest military force Europe had ever seen: in Hungary and Romania alone they maintained, through 1946, a military presence of some 1,600,000 men. Stalin had direct or (in the case of Yugoslavia) indirect control of a huge swathe of eastern and central Europe. His armies had only narrowly been blocked, by the rapid advance of the British under Montgomery, from moving forward through north Germany as far as the Danish border. As Western generals well knew, there was absolutely nothing to stop the Army advancing to the Atlantic if Stalin ordered it. To be sure, the Americans and the British had a clear advantage in strategic bombing capacity, and America had the atomic bomb, as Stalin knew even before Truman told him so at Potsdam in July 1945. There is no doubt that Stalin wanted a Soviet atomic bomb—it is one of the reasons why he insisted on Soviet control of those parts of eastern Germany and especially, Czechoslovakia where there were uranium deposits; within a few years 2oo.ooo east Europeans would be working in these mines as part of the Soviet atomic programme.
[xxix] - Speer, Albert (1997 Simon & Schuster paperback) [1970].Inside the Third Reich. New York and Toronto: Macmillan.ISBN 0-684-82949-5. Translated from the German by Richard and Clara Winston.
[xxx] - The Bäckebo rocket - See also: Project Big Ben - A German V-2 rocket.
On June 13, 1944, a V-2 rocket under test by the Germans (test rocket V-89,serial number 4089) from Peenemünde crashed in Sweden after the rocket had flown into cumulus clouds which had strayed into the controller's line of sight, it was supposed to crash in the sea outside Bornholm in occupied Denmark.
Quote: V-89 contained "Kehl-Strassburg"joystick radio control equipment that had been designed for the Wasserfall antiaircraft missile (code named Burgund), a development of that used to guide the Henschel Hs 293 glide bomb. The ground controller appeared to have no trouble maneuvering the rocket until it disappeared into the high cloud layer.
A captured German prisoner later explained to the British that the controller was an expert at steering glider bombs from aircraft, but that the spectacle of a rocket launch had caused him to incorrectly operate the control lever in his astonishment. Peenemünde guidance and control expert Ernst Steinhoff explained that the excited operator applied a set of planned corrections (such as that for the Earth's rotation) in the opposite direction to the way he had been instructed
[xxxi] - Every single RAF Squadron was researched for this chapter.
http://www.raf.mod.uk/history/historicsquadrons.cfm
[xxxii] - It is estimated that the bombings in Normandy before and after D-Day caused over 50,000 civilian deaths. The French historian Henri Amouroux in La Grande histoire des Français sous l’Occupation, says that 20,000 civilians were killed in Calvados department, 10,000 in Seine-Maritime, 14,800 in the Manche, 4,200 in the Orne, around 3,000 in the Eure. Henri Amouroux, La Grande histoire des Français sous l’Occupation, volume 8.
[xxxiii] - Study the Soviet Operation August Storm to get an idea of what the Soviet Red Army was capable of in May 1946. Leavenworth Paper No. 7, "August Storm: The Soviet Strategic Offensive in Manchuria, 1945," LTC David M. Glantz
[xxxiv] - Farfetched you say? This very situation happened to my Grandfather in the very spot described. Luckily he survived.
[xxxv] - Kemp, Paul (1999). Midget Submarines of the Second World War. Chatham Publishing. ISBN 1-86176-042-6.
[xxxvi] - Spies
What this shows to me is how far reaching the Soviet spy network was. Bill Weisband informed his spy master that the US had broken its code before we started to decipher it. Pretty amazing and quite an opportunity for mischief. Read his story. He was in contact with Philby and the others we know about. If anything I think we have underplayed the amount of information that could have come out of the Soviets incredible infiltration of both the US and GB.
Quote:
Most decipherable messages were transmitted and intercepted between 1942 and 1945. Sometime in 1945, the existence of the VENONA program was revealed to the Soviet Union by the NKVD agent and United States Army SIGINT analyst and cryptologist Bill Weisband. [1] These messages were slowly and gradually decrypted beginning in 1946 and continuing (many times at a low-level of effort in the latter years) through 1980, when the VENONA program was terminated, and the remaining amount of effort that was being spent on it was moved to more important projects.
Here are some of the things the Perlo group transmitted to Moscow in 1945.
Quote:
Allen Weinstein and Alexander Vassiliev in Haunted Wood, a book written from an
examination of KGB Archives in Moscow, report the KGB credits the Perlo group members with having sent, among other items, the following 1945 U.S. Government documents to Moscow:
February
Contents of a WPB memo dealing with apportionment of aircraft to the USSR in the event of war on Japan; WPB discussion of the production policy regarding war materials at an Executive Committee meeting; Documents on future territorial planning for commodities in short supply; Documents on a priority system for foreign orders for producing goods in the United States after the end of the war in Europe; Documents on trade policy and trade controls after the war; Documents on arms production in the United States in January 1945;
March
A WPB report on "Aluminum for the USSR and current political issues in the U.S. over aluminum supplies" (2/26/45);
April
Documents concerning the committee developing plans for the U.S. economy after the defeat of Germany, and also regarding war orders for the war against Japan; Documents on the production of the B-29 bomber and the B-32; Tactical characteristics of various bombers and fighters; Materials on the United States using Saudi Arabian oil resources;
June
World War Three 1946 Series Boxed Set: Stalin Strikes First Page 137