Secondly, from the beginning we should have paid more attention to the dictum “follow the money.” We of course knew that the majority of spies were motivated by financial profit, and that it was usual for them to spend some of their ill-gotten gains instead of putting them away for a retirement nest egg. Yet it had never been the practice to pay special attention to sudden affluence. As a matter of fact, the Office of Security background investigations were aimed more at discovering who was in debt than to discovering who was in the clover. Such an approach made sense if one were trying to identify employees with potential vulnerabilities, but it was not likely to uncover someone who had already begun to profit from espionage. Luckily, we had Dan Payne as a member of our team. Thanks to his initiative and perseverance the right steps were taken to pin down the sources of Ames’ substantial income.
As covered at length in earlier chapters, one of the most important mistakes made was the failure to inform Congress of the investigation, with periodic updates as to the progress being made. This was not the team’s responsibility, but the failure to take these steps led to general Congressional animosity and suspicion of CIA’s professionalism, which in turn led to subsequent overmanagement of espionage investigations by the legislative branch.
CI investigation is an art form carried out by experts. It is not a science, and throwing money and unqualified personnel or helpers at such a problem does not guarantee or even improve the chances of success. In many cases, quite the opposite result is achieved—analytical chaos with no resolution. Luck is involved—both in what you learn during the investigation and what you don’t learn until the damage assessment is done—but in a wide-ranging and lengthy probe it probably does not play the defining role.
While there are several “must haves” for a successful CI investigation, knowledge of the target organization, in this case the KGB, is paramount. We had to be experts on the personnel, organization, tradecraft, and operational philosophy of the KGB to have a chance of success. Luckily, our previous assignments had allowed us to acquire the necessary expertise.
Personal knowledge of the personnel, organization, and methods of operation of the penetrated organization, in this case the CIA, is equally important. We had to educate our FBI colleagues on how CIA case officers thought and operated. Also, as we have always said, we would have a difficult time finding a spy in the Department of Defense, or any organization other than our own, simply because we don’t know the players or how the game is played.
Scattered throughout this book is a large amount of material concerning the relations between the CIA and FBI. This subject has been the theme of many books, most of them fairly nonsensical. They describe the exchanges between the two services in a fairly stark and negative fashion, often attributing many of the ills of the intelligence world to failures in cooperation. In fact, the relationship is much more nuanced and has varied from time to time and from target to target. Certainly it is partly personality-driven and turf-driven. In a general sense, differences are perhaps more acute at the upper levels. Those actually involved in the various cases have often been more attuned to getting the job done than trying to grab all the credit even when they didn’t necessarily see eye to eye. The cooperation between Les Wiser’s squad and our little group in the CIA was, as we see it, exemplary. Despite a few disagreements, some caused by stress and some by interference from management, we managed to keep our eye on the prize: getting Aldrich Ames arrested under circumstances that would leave no doubt as to his guilt and eligibility for the most severe punishment legally permissible.
Further examples can be found in past Soviet cases. When Piguzov produced information in 1978 to the effect that former CIA officer David Barnett had volunteered to the KGB, the FBI was informed, and was given access to the pertinent Directorate of Operations files. This lead from a CIA operation resulted in Barnett’s 1980 arrest, conviction, and sentencing to eighteen years in prison, as described above.
In the late 1970s and early 1980s, cooperation reached a new high. An integrated FBI/CIA unit called COURTSHIP was set up in the Washington, DC, area. It was this unit that was responsible for the recruitment in 1982 of KGB officer Valeriy Martynov, who was run jointly thereafter. Additionally, the FBI allowed CIA officers to participate in the debriefings of KGB officers who were under control of the Bureau. Examples are Boris Yuzhin and Sergey Motorin. From an earlier period there is of course the Polyakov case, recounted in detail in earlier chapters. Of course, less collegial inter-relationships also existed, as can be seen from the Kulak case and the sparring for credit in the wake of Ames’ arrest.
Returning to the positive side, it is not generally known that the FBI let the CIA disseminate reporting from FBI cases to the U.S. intelligence community. Those with a jaundiced view of the FBI might emphasize that the FBI is not an intelligence organization and has never been able to produce polished reporting to pertinent U.S. customers so they had no choice. Those with a more charitable outlook would focus on the fact that the FBI was thereby losing credit for its operational successes, but that in so doing it was adding to the security of its sensitive assets. Although there were a few notable exceptions, in the main the CIA disseminated all of the counterintelligence reporting from both its own and the FBI’s sources. With all the reporting lumped together this way, it was much easier to disguise how many sources existed and just what their access was.
On another level, there is a final but difficult story that must be told. Ames has acknowledged the impact of his crime on his own family, and has spoken candidly about his other direct victims including those who lost their lives or were imprisoned. However, there exists yet another group of innocents whose personal losses were enormous and whose futures were irrevocably changed because of Ames’ treachery. Who were these people? They were, first of all, the spouses of the condemned, their parents, and their sons and daughters. As is only right, the CIA has made every effort to resettle the families in the United States when they have so wished. We have met some of the sons and daughters. While each victim’s story is unique to his father’s case, many shared common tragic elements. In several cases their mothers died prematurely and as one son has so poignantly described it, “After the arrest of my father, my mother never smiled again.” Yet some of the younger generation have not only survived, but because of their courage and strength of character have succeeded in their new lives to an astonishing extent.
In the course of the post-arrest investigations, immediate family members were separately interrogated for extended periods at Lefortovo prison. KGB surveillance teams were assigned to each. The KGB conducted numerous and lengthy searches of their homes and apartments. Personal belongings were confiscated and never returned. Repeated requests for visitation were repeatedly denied or were put off for extended periods. Family members were not permitted to attend the trials and were denied any details of the case against their loved one. No pardons were granted. The families were unaware that sentencing had been carried out until a notice of death arrived in the mailbox. The men were buried in unmarked graves whose location is unknown. One family member was told to consider changing his last name and warned that his life would never be the same. “Some important people will never, ever trust you. Like father, like son, you know.”
The Ames story is only a part of this book. In a broader sense, we feel that we were lucky in that we lived and worked in a simpler world. In the Cold War environment, there was only one main enemy who could harm us—the Soviet Union. Moral ambiguities as to the necessity of neutralizing the USSR to the best of our ability simply did not exist. The target was not amorphous, discrete, or widely scattered. We could concentrate our efforts on one country and one government. Alas, the colleagues who have come after us do not have that luxury.
HONOR ROLL
THE FOLLOWING IS OUR HONOR ROLL of Agency employees either with whom we worked closely over the years or who had a significant impact on our careers. We would like to acknowledge publicly their
commitment to the mission. Some rose to high-level positions; some did not; some were maligned; some left the Agency under a cloud; and some died before they could bring their careers to fruition. Some were more intellectually gifted than others; some had more common sense; some were better case officers; some were better analysts; some were better leaders; and some were better teachers. But they all had one thing in common. They were men and women of honor, courage, integrity, and talent. Their names are presented alphabetically. Unfortunately, a few retired under cover or are still active in the Agency. We have had to omit those names.
Pauline Brown
Walt Lomac
Dick Corbin
Len McCoy
Cleve Cram
John McMahon
Paul D
Ruth Olsen
John Winthrop Edwards
Dan Payne
Jim F
Ben Pepper
Joe F
Paul Redmond
Jack Fieldhouse
Sheri Riedl
Myrna Fitzgerald
Fran Smith
Frank Friberg
Dick Stolz
Burton Gerber
Ruth Ellen Thomas
Dottie Hanson
Don Vogel
Gus Hathaway
Freddie Woodruff
Dick Kovich
Diana Worthen
SELECTED CHRONOLOGY
26 May 1941—Aldrich Hazen “Rick” Ames born in River Falls, Wisconsin
18 Apr 1944—Robert Philip Hanssen born in Chicago, Illinois
Dec 1954—James Jesus Angleton becomes chief of CIA’s newly created Counterintelligence Staff
Nov 1961—GRU officer Dmitriy Fedorovich Polyakov volunteers to the U.S. military in New York City. Later backs off, but is brought to recruitment by the FBI.
Dec 1961—KGB CI officer Anatoliy Mikhaylovich Golitsyn defects to CIA in Helsinki
Mar 1962—KGB S&T specialist Aleksey Isidorovich Kulak volunteers to the FBI in New York
Jun 1962—Ames joins the CIA, works part time while completing his college education at George Washington University
Jun 1962—KGB Second Chief Directorate (internal CI) officer Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko, while on a trip to Bern, makes his first contact with the CIA
Early 1960s—GRU photo technician Nikolay Chernov volunteers to the FBI in New York. Shortly thereafter returns to the USSR. One further contact takes place in the early 1970s while he is on a short trip to the United States.
22 Nov 1963—assassination of U.S. president John F. Kennedy
Feb 1964—defection of Nosenko
Nov 1965—SB reports officer Len McCoy writes his paper defending Nosenko
May 1966—the East European (EE) Division and the Soviet Russian (SR) Division of the CIA’s Directorate of Operations are combined into the Soviet Bloc (SB) Division
Dec 1967—after completing college, Ames applies for the CIA Officer Training Program and is accepted
Summer 1968—Rolfe Kingsley becomes chief, SB, replacing David Murphy
Sep 1969—Ames is assigned to Ankara
May/Jun 1970—Richard Stolz becomes chief, SB/CI
Jul 1970—Burton Gerber becomes chief, SB/CI/I. Cynthia Haussmann is his deputy.
Late spring 1971—David Blee becomes chief, SB, replacing Deputy Chief Stacy Hulse, who served for a short period as acting chief following the departure of Kingsley
Apr 1972—Ames leaves Ankara, is assigned to SE Division
1 May 1972—death of J. Edgar Hoover
1973—academic researcher Sergey Petrovich Fedorenko recruited by the FBI/CIA in New York City. Ames later becomes one of his handlers, traveling from CIA headquarters.
Jan 1973—Ames begins a year of full-time Russian language studies
Summer 1973—John Horton becomes chief of SB Division, changes the name to the Soviet and East European (SE) Division
Dec 1973—Ames finishes Russian language studies, returns to SE Division
1974—Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs official Aleksandr Dmitriyevich Ogorodnik recruited by CIA in Bogota. (Ames was the desk officer responsible for this case.)
1974—KGB officer Leonid Georgiyevich Poleshchuk recruited by CIA in Kathmandu
1974—KGB officer Oleg Antonovich Gordievsky recruited by the British SIS in Copenhagen
31 Dec 1974—Angleton fired from his position as chief of the CI staff by DCI William Colby. Replaced by George Kalaris.
1975—Poleshchuk returns to Moscow with a communications plan, which he never implements
Spring 1975—Stolz becomes chief, SE Division, replacing Horton
12 Jan 1976—Hanssen joins the FBI. After training, he is assigned to Indianapolis/Gary, where he serves on a white-collar crime squad.
Spring 1976—GRU officer Sergey Ivanovich Bokhan recruited by CIA in Athens
Aug 1976—Ames is assigned to New York City. He continues to handle Fedorenko; also is one of the handlers for Soviet UN ambassador Arkadiy Nikolayevich Shevchenko.
Aug 1976—after spending two separate tours in New York, Kulak returns to Moscow preparatory to retirement
1977—Fedorenko returns to the USSR
Jan 1977—Adolf Grigoryevich Tolkachev, a scientific worker in an R&D institution, volunteers to the CIA in Moscow. Regular communications not established until 1979.
Mar 1977—Admiral Stansfield Turner becomes CIA director, replacing George H. W. Bush
Jun 1977—CIA officer Gardner “Gus” Hathaway becomes COS, Moscow, replacing Robert Fulton
Summer 1977—Ogorodnik arrested in Moscow and commits suicide
1978—Shevchenko defects
1978—KGB officer Vladimir Mikhaylovich Piguzov volunteers to the CIA in Jakarta. The same year he returns to Moscow and we lose contact with him.
2 Aug 1978—Hanssen is transferred to New York, where he initially works on accounting matters in the criminal division
Late summer 1978—Bokhan returns to Moscow. He makes one “sign of life” signal, but otherwise we do not hear from him.
Mar 1979—Hanssen is transferred to New York’s intelligence division to help establish the office’s automated CI database. This was a classified database of information about foreign officials, including intelligence officers, assigned to the United States.
31 Oct 1979—KGB communications specialist Viktor Ivanovich Sheymov volunteers to the CIA in Warsaw
Nov 1979—Hanssen volunteers (anonymously) to the GRU
1979—KGB officer Boris Nikolayevich Yuzhin recruited by the FBI in San Francisco
1980—beginning of the GTTAW technical operation in Moscow. This operation involved CIA officers going down a manhole to tap into classified communications.
Jan 1980—Burton Gerber becomes COS, Moscow, replacing Gus Hathaway
Spring 1980—Sheymov is exfiltrated from the Soviet Union
May 1980—Polyakov summoned to Moscow from New Delhi, ostensibly to attend a conference. He does not return to India and we never have contact with him again.
20 Oct 1980—Harold James Nicholson joins the CIA
Nov 1980—KGB S&T officer Vladimir Ippolitovich Vetrov (“Farewell”) makes his first overtures to a French businessman
Early 1980s—Kulak dies of natural causes
1981—IUSAC official Vladimir Viktorovich Potashov volunteers to the U.S. defense secretary in Washington. Subsequently handled by the CIA and FBI.
Jan 1981—Edward Lee Howard joins the CIA
12 Jan 1981—Hanssen is transferred to FBI headquarters. At first he is assigned to the budget unit of the intelligence division, which, per the affidavit issued at the time of his arrest, “had access to the full range of information concerning intelligence and counterintelligence activities involving FBI resources.”
28 Jan 1981—William J. Casey becomes CIA director, replacing Turner
Spring 1981—Hanssen drops contact with the GRU
14 Jul 1981—John H. Stein becomes DDO, replacing Max Hugel
Sep 1981—Ames transfers from New York to Mexico City
1982—GRU officer Vladimir Mikhaylovich Vasilyev volunteers to the U.S. military in Budapest. Subsequently handled by the CIA.
1982—Yuzhin returns to Moscow
1982—Bokhan returns to Athens for a second tour and resumes contact with the CIA
Feb 1982—Howard begins to work in SE Division
Early 1982—KGB officer Valeriy Fedorovich Martynov recruited by an FBI officer in Washington, DC. Subsequently handled as a joint FBI/CIA asset.
Sep 1982—CIA officer Carl G becomes COS, Moscow, replacing Burton Gerber
1983—the GTABSORB technical operation is run by the CIA in the USSR. This operation involved the shipment of concealed sensors on the Trans-Siberian railroad.
Circle of Treason Page 24