These missionaries are at the bottom of all evil. They want war so that they might take the Zulu country, and thus give them homes in a good and pleasant land. They have not been turned out. They came of their own accord. The Zulus do not want them and I for one cannot see why we should cram these men down their throats.12
After hasty and delicate discussions with his senior political advisers, Frere was obliged to realize that publication of the Commission’s findings could unleash powerful forces against Britain – both from neighbouring black nations who would believe their campaign against progressive European settlement was vindicated, and from furious Boers who could well retaliate by resorting to military action against British-controlled Natal. Such action could provoke additional antagonism from a number of the Boers’ European allies, especially Holland and Germany. This possible complication would be most inconvenient as Britain was becoming seriously engaged in war against Afghanistan and relationships with Russia were deteriorating. Frere had not been idle since activating the Boundary Commission; he and his staff, encouraged by Shepstone in the Transvaal, had wrongly anticipated that the Commission would find for the Boers and Shepstone accordingly believed that the Zulus might retaliate against Britain with a military offensive into Natal. In consequence, plans were already well advanced for a British pre-emptive invasion of Zululand; invasion would also neutralize the dangerous findings of the Boundary Commissioners.
There were other attractive incentives for an invasion. The Zulus were blocking British progress to the north and their defeat would facilitate Confederation. It would also placate the Boers and such a display of force would certainly impress other Bantu nations who might protest against British expansion. Invasion would overturn the Zulu king by eradicating his military potential while at the same time freeing a valuable source of labour for British and Boer commercial activities. In connection with this issue, Sir Theophilus Shepstone wrote in 1878 that
Had Cetshwayo’s thirty thousand warriors been in time changed to labourers working for wages, Zululand would have been a prosperous peaceful country instead of what it is now, a source of perpetual danger to itself and its neighbours.13
Frere ordered his General Commanding British Forces in South Africa, Sir Frederic Thesiger (shortly to become Lord Chelmsford), to proceed to Natal in secret and prepare his forces for an immediate and brief war against the Zulus. There were also important personal considerations for both Frere and Chelmsford: success for Frere would add lustre to his already glittering career and for Chelmsford an early defeat of the Zulu army would ensure him a heroic return to England. Meanwhile, Frere gained himself more time by forwarding the Boundary Commission’s findings to Sir Michael Hicks Beach, the new Colonial Secretary in London (who had succeeded Lord Carnarvon). He also requested additional Imperial troops, ostensibly to protect Natal and the Boer families still within the area. Frere knew full well that Hicks Beach’s official reply would take several months to reach him and by that time the Zulus would be subjugated.
In early October there was a minor incident at one of the border crossing points. A British surveyor named Smith and a trader named Deighton were reviewing the condition of a drift across the Tugela river near Fort Buckingham when they were accosted by some Zulus and questioned about their activities. Although they remained on the Natal side of the river, the questioning lasted for about an hour before they were released; the Zulus were on guard at the drift due to the rumours of an impending British invasion of Zululand. The matter was commented on in Smith’s routine report as being of a minor nature. The incident came to the attention of Frere who virtually dismissed it out of hand, although he later included the incident in the list of grievances about King Cetshwayo that would form part of his infamous ‘ultimatum’. He initially wrote:
I concur with you in attributing no special importance to the seizure and temporary arrest of the surveyors, which was partly due to their own in-discretion, and was evidently in no way sanctioned by the Zulu authorities.14
On 9 October another incident occurred which precipitated action by Frere. A local chief, Mbilini, had led his warriors through the Pongola valley in the area under dispute, attacking immigrant Boers and natives and stealing herds of their cattle. Frere was already in the process of devising an ultimatum, which he and his advisers knew would be impossible for King Cetshwayo to accept. It would also negate the Boundary Commission’s report and justify Frere’s war against the Zulus; accordingly the raid by Mbilini formed the basis of the first item in the ultimatum. Britain effectively allied itself to the Boer cause and prepared for war against the Zulus; Frere made representations to the Boers for support and, following a meeting at Utrecht on 5 December 1878 between Colonel Wood VC and local Boers, Wood was confident of having several thousand mounted and well-armed Boers under his command. Three days later the Boers discovered that the Boundary Commission had long since found against them. Stung by the British deception, the Boers accordingly withheld their support – with the exception of isolated individuals, most notably Piet Uys, whose father and brother had earlier been killed by the Zulus.
Eventually, on 11 December 1878, Zulu representatives were summoned to the site of a shady fig tree on the Natal bank of the Tugela river to learn the result of the Boundary Commission’s deliberations. The British erected a tarpaulin under the tree, laid on a roast beef lunch and even brought a photographer from Durban to record the event. John Shepstone represented the British officials, while King Cetshwayo sent three of his senior izinduna together with eleven chieftains and their retainers to listen to the findings. The Zulus, to whom writing was unknown, were accomplished at memorizing even lengthy speeches, which probably accounts for the number of senior Zulu representatives, who would have needed to corroborate each other when they rendered their account of the event to the king.
The findings were relayed to the Zulu officials but in heavily worded terms deliberately designed to cause confusion. The hitherto secret ultimatum was then read to the Zulus who, astonished by the about-turn, anxiously set off to report the terms of the ultimatum to King Cetshwayo. The main requirements of the ultimatum included some conditions to be fully met within twenty days, all of them impossible within the timescale: the Swazi chief, Mbilini, was required to surrender and pay a fine of 500 cattle for his previous cattle-raiding activities, as were Chief Sihayo’s three sons and brother for crossing the river border into Natal and abducting and then murdering two of Sihayo’s adulterous wives. A fine of 100 cattle was also to be paid for having molested the two British citizens, Deighton and Smith, at the border crossing.
Further conditions to be fully met within thirty days: King Cetshwayo was to observe his coronation ‘promises’ – of which he was certainly unaware. A number of prominent Zulus were to be surrendered for trial (no names were specified), summary executions were forbidden and the Zulu army was to disband along with the Zulu military system. Every Zulu was to be free to marry (a reflection of the European misunderstanding of marriage within the Zulu society), missionaries were to be readmitted to Zululand without let or hindrance and Zulus were to be permitted to attend religious classes without obstruction, a British resident official was to oversee Zulu affairs, no sentence of expulsion from Zululand could be enforced without the permission of the resident and, finally, any dispute involving a European was to be dealt with under British jurisdiction.
Even by this late stage and notwithstanding the impossible nature of the ultimatum, King Cetshwayo sent a conciliatory message to the Lieutenant Governor of Natal stating:
Cetshwayo hereby swears, in presence of Oham, Mnyamana, Ntshingwayo and all his other chiefs, that he has no intention or wish to quarrel with the English.15
Again, this was ignored.
The timing of the ultimatum was unwittingly in favour of King Cetshwayo whose army was already in the process of assembling at Ulundi for the umKhosi ceremony. In the weeks leading up to the British invasion, the king had been fully aware that event
s were rapidly moving beyond his control. All along the border with Natal, Zulu women and children, often leading their cattle, could be seen moving away from the probable invasion routes and going into hiding. King Cetshwayo ordered wild animal hunts to be held along the borders of the neighbouring territories and those taking part were instructed to ensure that Shepstone’s spies observed the Zulus’ state of preparedness. By the time the ultimatum reached King Cetshwayo, most of the amabutho were already gathered at Ulundi and the ritual preparations for war began. Notwithstanding soothing reassurances from Shepstone, King Cetshwayo was not to be caught off guard; shrewdly, he decided to wait, prepare and watch. Aware of the growing consternation of his people at the menacing gathering of British troops along the Natal border, the king sent a number of induna emissaries to implore British restraint; but on presentation of their credentials they were arrested and imprisoned.
In the meantime the British invasion force was already gathering along the border of Zululand in total confidence that King Cetshwayo could not comply with the ultimatum. Hicks Beach’s reply finally reached Frere and it was, as Frere anticipated, an indication that Hicks Beach was uninterested in southern Africa. It contained little more than a request that caution must be exercised. The reply read:
Her Majesty’s Government are [sic] not prepared to comply with a request for reinforcement of troops. All the information that has hitherto reached them with respect to the position of affairs in Zululand appears to justify a confident hope that by the exercise of prudence and by meeting the Zulus in a spirit of forbearance and reasonable compromise it will be possible to avert the very serious evil of a war with Cetshwayo.16
Frere deliberately misconstrued Hicks Beach’s reply as conferring authority to initiate a local war and, once started, he was fully aware that the British government was powerless to stop him. It took at least ten weeks for a message to travel to London and back; his exploitation of the delay, on the grounds of the tension and urgency he had created, was blatant. Without doubt there were numerous occasions when any leader other than Sir Bartle Frere could have resolved the matter peacefully, without the tragic loss of life, national honour and financial cost that war would incur.
King Cetshwayo knew exactly where the British were amassing their forces and correctly presumed that his capital, Ulundi, was their objective. Perhaps because he also knew that Lord Chelmsford was to accompany the Rorke’s Drift column, the king singled it out as being the most dangerous force. Chelmsford’s tactics of using three columns to advance on Ulundi was a direct copy of the Zulu impondo zankomo (horns of the bull) tactic and King Cetshwayo would certainly have noticed the irony. His understanding of the intricacies of the technique is perhaps one reason why the Zulu army were confident that they could defeat the British. The time for peaceful negotiation had passed; both sides, although long-standing friends, were ready for war. The first hurdle for Chelmsford’s army was crossing the Buffalo river.
The first of a series of blunders was now beginning to develop. During the days following the invasion, members of the Native Border Guard – locally recruited Natal blacks under white command – learned that a large Zulu force would oppose the British invasion. By 21 January their locally gathered intelligence accurately indicated that this Zulu force was located near Isandlwana and had orders to ‘cross the Mzinyathi [Buffalo river] into Natal during the night’. The Border Guard moved their men to meet this possible crossing and their district commandant reported the matter to Major Bengough who was with his 2nd NNC battalion at nearby Sand Spruit; Bengough passed the warning to Chelmsford, as did Mr Fannin, the Border Agent, on 20 January. The effect of these reports on Chelmsford’s staff is not known; they appear to have been ignored – or forgotten. If acted upon, Fannin and Bengough’s reports could have averted the approaching disaster.17
During the same afternoon Chief Gamdana, who had previously submitted to Chelmsford, arrived at Isandlwana camp with the news that he was expecting a Zulu impi that same day. He was sent away.18
Meanwhile, oblivious to escalating events in South Africa, Disraeli’s government was wrestling with the problem of Irish Home Rule; the British Army was gearing up for war on India’s North-West Frontier where the British felt vulnerable to Russia’s steady absorption of the vast territories east of the Caspian Sea. Fighting had also broken out in Afghanistan during the latter part of 1878 and by early 1879 the British had occupied the capital, Kabul, and installed a puppet ruler. An uneasy peace lasted but a few months until the British Political Officer, Major Sir Louis Cavagnari, and his escort were slaughtered. It was prophetic that Cavagnari, piqued by the lack of press interest, had previously written, ‘I am afraid there is no denying the fact that the British public require a blunder and a huge disaster to excite their interest.’19 Three days later he was dead and the British public were about to have their blunder.
When confirmation was received in London, the invasion of Zululand was considered so insignificant that only one of the London newspapers bothered to send a correspondent to cover the event. Instead, all efforts were focused upon Afghanistan where, in the event, the British had a comparatively easy advance.
CHAPTER 5
The British, Invaders of Zululand
The British Government has no quarrel with the Zulu people.1
SIR BARTLE FRERE, HIGH COMMISSIONER,
11 JANUARY 1879
For the British troops in South Africa, life was reasonably satisfactory. The climate was good and the posting offered sufficient conflicts and skirmishes to make life interesting for the 5,000 men stationed there. The soldiers’ lot was certainly better than could be expected in England.
Life was exceedingly tough throughout the British Isles of the 1870s. Many of the population were unhealthy, with a high incidence of suffering, particularly from the ravages of diseases that swept the population of the time; tuberculosis, cholera, influenza, whooping cough, scarlet fever, measles, syphilis and a variety of lesser infectious diseases were rife. The life expectancy of industrial England’s labouring classes was as low as thirty-eight years, with only the well-off or the very lucky having any hope of reaching their mid-fifties. British agriculture, formerly the main rural employer, had been in decline for some decades and by the 1870s less than 15 per cent of the working population were still engaged in farming. Many young men left the countryside to seek employment in the rapidly expanding urban areas, and the 1880s witnessed a surge of emigration to the United States, Canada or Australia, not only from Britain but also Ireland where there had been the worst potato crop since the famine of 1846. It was not only agricultural workers who were finding work hard to come by. Those employed in factories, which had previously enjoyed a virtual monopoly in supplying products and materials to the rest of the world, now found that they faced increasing competition from the United States and Europe. The combination of these intensely bleak circumstances resulted in more than enough recruits for the army to make conscription unnecessary; taking the queen’s shilling on enlisting was a legally binding contract between the recruit and the army.
With the increasing threat of lay-offs and lockouts, the average industrial worker felt highly insecure; unemployment was reaching terrifyingly new proportions and many workers were forced, as a last resort, to enlist in the army. Recruiting sergeants frequented the public houses and taverns where hungry and unemployed young men collected. Any recruit who was drunk at the time of his ‘enlistment’ could, theoretically, be released from the commitment on the immediate payment of £1, which for these young men was an improbable amount to produce on demand. Recruits were normally ‘sworn in’ within twenty-four hours before being medically examined and posted to a regiment or to join a draft being sent abroad. Most young men joined the army to escape unemployment, poverty and wretched squalor.
The army was still popularly regarded by the civilian population as the last resort for a desperate man and private soldiers were still looked upon as social outcasts. Giving a convict
ed criminal the choice of prison or the army had faded away though the option still remained for less serious offences. Because times were so hard, the unemployed and the unemployable could find security of a kind in the army. But bored youngsters, dazzled by the stories and flattery of flamboyant recruiting sergeants, soon found the reality of a home posting in the army even more restricting than their previous existence. It was something of a relief when a regiment was sent abroad to some exotic posting; it also meant escape from the grinding grimness of barrack life. A comparison of contemporary statistics reveals that in 1869 there were 12,000 recruits to the army with 3,341 desertions, or 27 per cent. In 1878 the recruits numbered 28,325 and the desertions 5,400, or 19 per cent.
The average height of an army recruit had fallen over the previous ten years to an undernourished 5ft 4in and yet, in spite of their poor physical condition, several weeks of sustained military training usually sufficed to transform the recruits into competent soldiers. Most British soldiers about to face King Cetshwayo’s Zulus were resilient fellows hardened by the extremes of African weather and most were experienced veterans from six years’ constant campaigning during the recent Border War. Few had any idea why they would be fighting the Zulus. They amused themselves with a variety of sports such as wrestling and spear-throwing and, in order to maintain an acceptable level of fitness, soldiers with less than fifteen years’ service were expected to undertake three half-mile runs each week.
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