G to H
Signs of heavy fighting and determined stand having been made here. Kraal at G full of dead Zulus. Colour Sgt Wolf and 20 men (24th Regt) found amongst rocks just above G. The southern crest line from G to H strewn with empty cartridge cases. Guns of R.A. were firing for some time from point H to kraals at I which were afterwards found full of dead Zulus.
ARCHAEOLOGICAL AREAS OF INVESTIGATION IN 2000
Potential firing line of artillery
Zulu Umutzi (homestead) to fron tof camp
Main British camp
Cairns of Royal Artillery gunners and final position of guns (after escape from 1)
Density of expended Martini-Henry ammunition cases (Lt Pope’s last stand?)
Line of expended Martini-Henry ammunition cases – probable true position of British line
Courtesy of 2nd Lieutenant Andrew Greaves RA, then an archaeology student at Oxford University.
APPENDIX I
Conditions in Camps during 1879
Prevalence of fever at Helpmakaar and Rorke’s Drift
In the middle of February fever made its appearance at Helpmakaar and Rorke’s Drift. Immediately after the disastrous affair at Isandlwana, these two important strategic positions were immediately placed in a more secure state of defence, and revetments were extemporized with sacks of mealies. The garrison troops, both European and native, were now crowded together without tents or shelter, except that afforded by a few tarpaulins. Over 1,000 men were at Helpmakaar exposed to cold and rain, some sleeping on wet mealie bags, others on the damp ground, their nights sleepless from constant alarms, and subjected to the noxious exhalations given off from the decomposing grain and a soil saturated with urine. The danger of rotting grain and mealies was frequently represented to the military authorities, but to little purpose, military necessity ruling paramount. Under these unfavourable conditions a low vital tone quickly supervened, indicated by malaise and loss of appetite, the young and weakly men being soon attacked with fever, diarrhoea and dysentery.
The fort at Rorke’s Drift was similar in many respects to that of Helpmakaar, there being the same overcrowding, excessive fatigue, exposure to the cold and rain, and to the emanations of fermenting mealies and want of sleep, inducing a depressed condition of the vital powers highly favourable to the invasion of febrile attacks.
Notes
PREFACE
1 J.S. Rothwell, figures from Narrative of Field Operations Connected with the Zulu War of 1879 (London 1881).
2 Norman Etherington, Anglo Zulu Relations 1856–1878 – New Perspectives (University of Natal Press 1981). Total of seventy-two colonial wars – figures from Niall Ferguson, BBC 2003.
CHAPTER 1 Early Settlers in South Africa
1 H.E. Marshall, South Africa (London 1915), referring to Drake’s secret circumnavigation from east to west after having discovered the Cape Horn passage to the Pacific Ocean. By 1879 a total of sixty-three European vessels were lost between the Cape and Durban – see J. Smail, With Shield and Assegai (Cape Town 1969).
2 L. Van der Post, The Heart of the Hunter (Penguin 1923).
3 By the early 1800s the largest non-white group at the Cape consisted of Boer-owned slaves and their descendants. The majority of these slave people had been taken from Madagascar, Ceylon, India and the East Indies, the most popular being black men from Madagascar for physical labour while the other nationalities were prized for their domestic skills.
4 J.B. Peires, House of Phalo (Johannesburg 1981)
5 John Milton, The Edges of War – A History of Frontier Wars 1702–1878 (Juta & Co., Cape Town 1983)
6 Johannes Meintjes, The Voortrekkers (Corgi 1973)
7 The umfecane was the period of internecine clan fighting pre 1825, not attributable to King Shaka. One curious result of the umfecane relates to the feared man-eating attributes of the lion. The San have long related that because there were so many dead or maimed human bodies readily available, lions acquired their liking for human meat. Prior to the umfecane, lions avoided contact with the San.
8 Anglo Zulu War Historical Society Journal 1, June 1997 p. 33.
9 Graham Leach, The Afrikanerss (Mandarin 1989) quoting Prof. Liebenberg’s Myths Surrounding Blood River and the Vow.
10 J. Laband and P. Thompson, Field Guide to the War in Zululand and the Defence of Natal (University of Natal Press 1979).
CHAPTER 2 The Zulus, Defenders of the Buffalo River
1 Anglo Zulu War Historical SocietyJournal 1, June 1997, introduction.
2 A.T. Bryant, The Zulu People (Shuter and Shooter 1949). See reference to ukuSula isiKuba.
3 Some modern writers have used the term ‘assegai’ to mean a stabbing spear. In fact, the word ‘assegai’ has nothing to do with the Zulu language. The word is Berber and was widely used by the Spanish and Portuguese and was later adopted by the French and English. In fourteenth-century French, such a weapon was known as the ‘archegaie’ while in English, Chaucer used the term ‘lancegay’. The word ‘assegai’ never existed south of the Sahara.
4 T.V. Bulpin, Shaka’s Country (Howard Timmins, Cape Town 1952), quoting Fynne’s diary.
5 Ibid.
6 John Dunn, a local trader of English extraction, had allied himself to Chief Mbulazi and escaped only by swimming the river; Dunn helped some of Mbulazi’s men to safety. Zulus avoided swimming at all times for cultural reasons – Cetshwayo’s men forced the survivors into the river or put them to death. See AZWHS Journal 1 June 1997.
7 So many Zulu men had crossed the Tugela into Natal during King Mpande’s reign that the amabutho system became seriously depleted. Throughout Zululand the king’s weakening control encouraged up-and-coming clan leaders to develop their own power bases which resulted in the 1850s civil wars. King Cetshwayo operated a system of border patrols to deter would-be escapers.
CHAPTER 3 The Zulu Military and Their Tactics
1 George Chadwick, The Zulu War of 1879 (Natal Educational Activities Association, undated).
CHAPTER 4 Trade, Diamonds and War
1 Louis Creswicke, The Zulu War (E.C. Jack, Edinburgh 1900).
2 Enclosure in Dispatch No. 12, 26 February 1864 p. 43. This also included the area surrounding the Boer town of Utrecht as Zulu territory.
3 Parliamentary Papers C.1748 p. 24.
4 The Zulu War.
5 Parliamentary Papers, C.1776 p. 150.
6 Louis Creswicke, The Political Web (E.C. Jack, Edinburgh 1900).
7 Frances Colenso, History of the Zulu War and Its Origins (Chapman & Hall Ltd, London 1880).
8 The Zulu War.
9 Damian O’Connor, The Zulu and the Raj (Able Publishing 2002).
10 The Zulus would not have appreciated tables and chairs; they had no documents to put on tables and preferred to sit on mats. There is an old Zulu saying that ‘Only Englishmen and chickens sit upon perches.’
11 The Zulu War (quoting Sir Henry Bulwer). Similar situations had arisen during 1878; the British reaction had been to return offenders to Zululand – in November 1878 the British opinion was that such occurrences were not the responsibility of King Cetshwayo as the act ‘had not been with his concurrence or even cognisance’. See Parliamentary Papers C.2222 p. 173. Further, Sihayo’s errant son, Mehlokazulu, was never charged with any offence relating to the alleged murder of Sihayo’s wives – on the grounds that there ‘was no evidence to maintain the charge’. See Daily News 30 October 1879.
12 R.W.F. Droogleever, The Road to Isandlwana (Greenhill Books 1992).
13 Letter dated 1878, Anglo Zulu War Historical Society Journal 1, June 1997, p. 27.
14 Parliamentary Papers C.2222 p. 176.
15 Parliamentary Papers C.2308 p. 16.
16 Sir Reginald Coupland, Zulu Battle Piece Isandhlwana (Collins 1948).
17 Paul Thompson, The Natal Native Contingent in the Anglo Zulu War (University of Natal Research Fund 2003). See also Parliamentary Papers C.2308 pp. 69 and 70 evidencing multiple warnings of a Zulu attack
and protesting that the warnings were ignored.
18 Lieutenant Archibald Milne RN, from his Report on Proceedings (Public Record Office).
19 The Zulu and the Raj.
CHAPTER 5 The British, Invaders of Zululand
1 Public notificaton by Sir Bartle Frere dated 11 January 1879. See Parliamentary Papers C.2242 p. 24.
2 Précis of Information Concerning Zululand (War Office 1879). See Colonel Bray – p. 140.
3 By the end of the war, the invasion force used over 27,000 oxen and nearly 5,000 mules to reach Ulundi for the final battle. (Figures from the War Office Précis.)
4 See Appendix A.
5 John Laband, Lord Chelmsford’s Zululand Campaign 1878–1879 (Army Records Society 1994), Vol. 10 p. xxxv, Introduction.
6 Lord Chelmsford’s Zululand Campaign.
7 Memorandum by Lieutenant General Lord Chelmsford, 23 October 1878.
8 Natal Witness, 1 January 1879.
CHAPTER 6 The Five Invading Columns
9 Natal Witness, 5 January 1879.
1 Lt. Gen. Chelmsford to Sir Bartle Frere, 6 January 1879, quoted in Lord Chelmsford’s Zululand Campaign 1878–1879 (Army Records Society 1994).
2 In 1873 the Gatling gun had been present during the Ashanti War but not used in action.
3 Parliamentary Papers C.2242 p. 26.
4 Frances Colenso, History of the Zulu War and Its Origins (Pietermaritzburg 1880).
5 History of the Zulu War and Its Origins.
6 Letter to his mother, 11 November 1878. See also The Road to Isandlwana by R.W.F. Droogleever for the life of Colonel Durnford.
7 The Hon Gerald French, Lord Chelmsford and the Zulu War (Unwin Brothers 1939).
8 History of the Zulu War and Its Origins p. 266.
9 Natal Witness, 5 January 1879.
10 Parliamentary Papers C.2242 p. 27, 28.
11 Anglo Zulu War Historical Society Journal 9, June 2001.
12 See Chapter 7 note 2.
13 History of the Zulu War and its Origins.
14 Parliamentary Papers C.2242 p. 24.
15 Originally spelled Helpmekaar by the Boers and subsequently as Helpmakaar by British settlers and troops. In Dutch it means ‘help one another’ whereas it was popularly known as ‘help m’ cart up’ by the British troops due to the steep hill climb to the settlement. This work retains the original spelling throughout (except in quoted passages).
16 A.H. Swiss, Records of the 24th Regiment (London 1882).
17 Natal Witness, 5 January 1879.
CHAPTER 7 The First Invasion of Zululand, 11 January 1879
1 Natal Mercury, December 1878, commenting on the British invasion force.
2 Dispatch from Lord Chelmsford at Pietermaritzburg to Col. Wood, 23 November 1878.
3 The following is an extract from the official orders issued by Lord Chelmsford in November 1878. Item 145 deals with ‘Cattle and other prize’ and reveals why all ranks had a vested interest in the price obtained from the contractors.
Item 145. The following rules, having reference to the capture of cattle, or other prize, will be adhered to by all forces serving under the orders of the Lieutenant-general commanding – On any cattle or other prize being taken, the officer commanding the corps or party making the same will at once report the circumstances and number or nature of the prize to the officer in charge of the operations, who will thereupon determine what troops will share, and will appoint prize agents to arrange for the disposal of the cattle, &c., and to distribute the proceeds according to the following scale, viz. – Private or trooper – 1 share. NCO – 2 shares. Captain or subaltern – 3 shares. Field officer – 4 shares. Officer in command of the operations – 6 shares. Officers of the staff – shares according to their rank.
4 Parliamentary Papers C.2454 p. 183 re Milne’s report.
5 Hamilton-Browne, A Lost Legionary in South Africa (Werner Laurie, London 1890).
6 Anglo Zulu War Historical Society Journal 3, June 1998. The decision not to laager caused a serious rift among certain senior officers when, on 14 January, Major William Dunbar of the 2/24th was detailed to take his company and some native troops to the Batshe valley between Rorke’s Drift and Isandlwana to repair the old wagon road. Ordered to pitch his tents beneath a rock outcrop close to Sihayo’s homestead and among heavy thorn bushes, Dunbar was obliged to mount strong guards every night with men who had been working all day. When Chelmsford, Col. Glyn, their respective staff officers and an escort rode up to inspect the work, Dunbar asked for permission to move his camp. In the discussion that followed, Chelmsford’s senior staff officer, Lt. Col. John Crealock, seems to have lost his temper and remarked impatiently, ‘If Maj. Dunbar is afraid to stay there, we could send someone who was not.’ Dunbar, a big, imposing man, walked off in a rage and resigned his commission; it was several hours before Chelmsford could persuade him to withdraw his resignation. The embarrassment caused to both Chelmsford and Glyn and to all the officers of the 24th should not be underestimated. On the very same day Inspector George Mansell of the Natal Mounted Police had lookouts placed along the top of the Nqutu plateau overlooking Isandlwana. Major Clery, a former professor of tactics and the senior staff officer of the 1/24th, later withdrew the lookouts on the grounds that they served no useful purpose.
7 AZWHS Journal 3, June 1998.
8 Charles Norris-Newman, In Zululand with the British throughout the War of 1879 (W.H. Allen 1880).
9 Lord Chelmsford’s Zululand Campaign 1878–1879 (Army Records Society), Vol. 10.
10 The Natal Carbineers 1855-1911, edited by Rev. Stalker (Davis & Son, Pietermaritzburg 1912).
11 Ron Lock, Blood on the Painted Mountain (Greenhill Books 1995). Also, during a formal archaeological survey of Isandlwana battlefield in summer 2000 by Glasgow University and the South African authorities, it was discovered that the British front line was approximately 200 yards further from the camp than previously supposed. The new position suggests it was covering the dead ground to its immediate front and puts the front line out of sight of Pulleine’s HQ tent and even out of sight of the main British camp at Isandlwana. This hypothesis is based on the location of clusters of spent Martini-Henry ammunition cases and ammunition-box straps.
12 A. Greaves and B. Best, The Curling Letters of the Zulu War (Pen & Sword 2001).
13 Frank Emery, The Red Soldier (Jonathan Ball, Johannesburg 1977).
14 Ibid.
15 The Curling Letters of the Zulu War.
16 Appendix to Field Exercises – Rifle and Carbine Exercises and Musketry Instructions issued by Horse Guards (War Office) July 1879.
17 Field Exercises – Rifle and Carbine Exercises and Musketry Instructions.
18 George Mossop, Running the Gauntlet (Nelson 1937). Furthermore, an examination of some of the contemporary paintings of the time, often painted from descriptions given by actual combatants, clearly reveals palls of smoke on various Zulu War battlefields. This effect can be seen in, among others, C.E. Fripp’s painting Isandlwana, De Neuville’s Rorke’s Drift, Lt Evelyn’s two sketches Nyezane, Crealock’s Final Repulse of Gingindlovu, Orlando Norie’s watercolour Kambula and the equally famous Illustrated London News’s Square at Ulundi.
19 The Curling Letters of the Zulu War.
20 In due course the dogs became so savage that the Buffalo Border Guard stationed at Fort Pine had to shoot them.
CHAPTER 8 An Appalling Disaster
1 Trooper Richard Stevens, Natal Mounted Police, as quoted in the Natal Colonist, 17 April 1879.
2 Numerous Zulu accounts. The red jackets were dyed from the extract of the root of the madder plant.
3 A. Greaves and B. Best, The Curling Letters of the Zulu War (Pen & Sword 2001).
4 Adrian Greaves, Isandlwana (Cassell 2001).
5 Revd John Stalker, The Natal Carbineers 1855–1911 (Davis & Son, Pietermaritzburg 1912).
6 This is also supported by:
7 Sir Reginald Coupland, Zulu Battle Piece Isandhlwana (Coll
ins 1948).
8 C.T. Atkinson, The South Wales Borderers (Cambridge University Press 1937). In 1879 colours were still used in battle to rally troops and this policy continued through to the first Boer War. It appears that at the battle of Laing’s Nek the 58th went into battle with both colours flying – the colours were carried by Lieutenants Baillie and Peel. Both officers and their colour parties came under concentrated fire. In the following confusion, Baillie tripped and fell; the colour was taken to safety by Sergeant Bridgestock. Lieutenant Hill tried to assist Baillie who was then hit and killed. Hill left Baillie and rescued another soldier for which he was awarded the VC. Such was the rate of Boer fire on the colour parties that in 1882 a War Office order was promulgated throughout the British Army that colours would never again be carried into battle.
9 Michael Glover, Rorke’s Drift (Wordsworth Military Library 1997). Note – if Adendorff fought at Rorke’s Drift, he was the only person to see action at both Isandlwana on 22 and Rorke’s Drift on 22–23 January. Likewise, the Rorke’s Drift lists prepared by Dunbar and Bourne make no mention of him. Glover states that Adendorff was later arrested at Pietermaritzburg. The desertion of Captain Stevenson at Rorke’s Drift was also fresh in everyone’s mind.
10 Ian Knight, The Zulu War Then and Now (Plaistow Press 1993).
11 The Zulu War Then and Now.
12 Anglo Zulu War Historical Society Journal 2, December 1997.
13 Robert Hope, The Zulu War and the 80th Regiment of Foot (Churnet Valley Books 1997).
14 The Natal Carbineers 1855–1911.
CHAPTER 9 Rorke’s Drift, 22–23 January 1879
1 Letter from Gunner Howard RA, February 1879.
2 Boys were permitted to join the Regular Army, but those under the age of 17½ were enlisted as ‘boy soldiers’ and only entitled to half pay until reaching that age. Curiously, Colour Sergeant Bourne receives no mention in Donald Morris’s classic The Washing of the Spears.
3 Chelmsford wrote that it was ‘the non-arrival of this detachment that caused Major Spalding to go to Helpmakaar to hasten its departure’. He went on, ‘I refer to this latter point in justice to Major Spalding as I have heard that remarks have been made relative to his absence from this post at the time’. Chelmsford’s letter dated 19 May 1879.
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