Dikes and flood-prevention measures . . .
Market towns and overland or water commercial routes . . .
Postal depots . . .
Historical relics . . .
Pettifoggers. . .
Leading lineages . . .
Sales of government salt . . .
Sub-officials assigned to the district. . .
[Peiyuantang oucun gao 12: 28–32—WR]
ON GOVERNANCE BY LOCAL ELITES
One of the major preoccupations of Qing scholar-officials was how to achieve more effective governance of the empire’s population (of whose rapid growth they were well aware) without greatly increasing government budgets or personnel. Put another way, what was the best means to bridge the widening chasm between state and society? One method, associated by most Qing thinkers with the radical anti-bureaucratism of Gu Yanwu, was to delegate various quasi-governmental tasks to members of the non-official indigenous elite. Chen Hongmou did not share Gu’s deep antipathy to the state apparatus; indeed, we have just seen how he sought to order society in part by increasing the efficiency and the powers of control exercised by the bureaucracy itself. Yet he was also attracted by programs to further local self-governance, especially when these could be placed in the hands of men whose positions of authority were sanctified by ritually correct kinship bonds.
The following proposal, which Chen developed as governor of Jiangxi in the 1730s, was admiringly reprinted nearly a century later in Huangchao jingshi wenbian. Note, however, that despite the language of empowerment of lineage headmen that characterizes this directive, Chen’s policy was at least as much aimed at asserting government control over these men, whom he knew in Jiangxi to be notoriously unmanageable, by forcing them to register with and accept subordinate status under the county magistrate.
When antisocial or illegal incidents arise among the common people, if a criminal action has occurred it must be punished accordingly. The law must be respected. Yet how much better is it to civilize and enlighten an individual before he has committed a crime than to punish him after he has already done so? The local official’s primary tasks are to provide moral leadership and to uphold the law. If people nevertheless violate the law, the official must punish them. But for each person who can be reached through moral instruction, there is one more constructive member of society. For each incident or conflict that can be avoided, there is one more socially beneficial act.
Yet the local official’s jurisdiction is widespread and his duties many. He simply cannot be aware of everything that goes on. This is where ancestral temples come in. Each ancestral temple has a lineage headman, and below him a number of lineage-branch headmen. These individuals naturally enjoy the respect of their lineages. They are directly on the scene and are joined to their constituencies by familial ties. Through their function of officiating at the ancestral rites, there is nothing within the lineage, good or ill, beneficial or harmful, that does not fall under their purview.
Local officials, then, should issue formal patents of authority to lineage heads, making them solely responsible for providing moral instruction and discipline to lineage members. Each and every affair within the lineage ought to be made subject to their management. If any lineage member acts unfilially or shows an inclination to violent or criminal behavior, he should be admonished by the lineage-branch headman. If he fails to respond with due respect to this admonition, he should be reported to the lineage headman and ritually disciplined in the ancestral temple before the assembled lineage members. Only if he still fails to reform should he be reported to the local official for criminal punishment.
Disputes or property transactions internal to the lineage should be mediated and resolved in an equitable way by the lineage or the branch headman. Conflicts between lineage members and outsiders should be mediated by the headmen of the two lineages and their decisions enforced. Where necessary, the local official should bring the two lineage headmen together in his office and resolve the dispute collectively and impartially. . . .
In this way, we invest the lineage headmen with the authority to enforce the laws of the government among their dependent kinsmen, with whom they collectively share the vicissitudes of life. It is only natural that they will find it far easier to scrutinize and discipline their kinsmen than will any community-compact headman or local constable who bears a different surname and is not of that family.
[Peiyuantang oucun gao 13: 46–48—WR]
STATECRAFT IN THE GRAIN TRADE AND GOVERNMENT-CONTROLLED BROKERAGES
The distribution of grain, as well as government measures to control the grain market so as to maintain adequate supplies and stable prices, was a perennial problem of traditional Chinese statecraft. The following memorial is typical of the efforts of Qing officials to deal with the complexities of the problem in different times and places. It was written in 1763 by Yang Yingju, governor-general of Shaanxi and Gansu, in response to an inquiry from the court regarding the advisability of maintaining or abolishing brokerages in the grain trade. The inquiry was prompted by Yang’s reported abolition of grain brokers in Guangdong, of which the court had not been informed, when he had been acting governor-general of Guangdong and Guangxi in 1754. Two of his most experienced and prestigious colleagues at the time, Fang Guancheng and Yin Jishan, were also asked for their opinion on the proper policy toward grain brokerage.
Most remarkable in Yang’s response is an acute sense of regional variation and, as a consequence, of the need for flexibility in devising policies. While his text is devoid of anti-merchant rhetoric and stresses the advantages of an open and competitive market where brokers and merchants cooperate harmoniously for the benefit of both producers and consumers, he also insists that the latter are the ones to be protected by the state and that no “abuse” should be tolerated on the part of traders. Also typical of the Qing statecraft discourse is the insistence on the necessity to curb official interference and harassment and resist the multiplication of regulations, even though state intervention appears highly desirable in the poorer areas where “traders do not go.” According to Yang, practical statecraft required a combination of time-honored policies, experience in adapting them to local circumstances, accurate information, and both personal integrity and finesse on the part of officials. Excerpts from Yang’s long and detailed analysis follow.
A MEMORIAL ON GRAIN PRICES, THE GRAIN TRADE, AND GOVERNMENT-CONTROLLED BROKERAGES
I respectfully observe that in the nineteenth year of Qianlong [1754] I was appointed by imperial grace acting governor-general of Guangdong and Guangxi. Having reached my post, I thoroughly investigated the sufferings of the people and learned that Guangdong has many mountains and few rice fields and is not normally considered a rice-producing area. Year after year, its people largely depend upon the resources of [neighboring] Guangxi for their food. This is why, in the past, grain brokers were established according to quota in the provincial capital and in Foshan. Whenever grain boats from Guangxi came to Guangdong, the merchants were authorized freely to select brokers to whom they could entrust the sale, giving them a fee for their costs. For a long time things went this way peacefully.
[Then] during the tenure of former governor-general Bandi and former governor Haonian, to these brokers established by quota were added pier directorates in charge of brokering grain, one each in Canton and in Foshan, with an officially established brokerage firm [at its head]. When grain boats from Guangxi [arrived], or grain shipments from the countryside, [the merchants] were required to go to the pier directorate, and only then would they be allowed to sell. The intention was to prevent the rice brokers [already in operation] from raising or depressing market prices arbitrarily. But in fact in the past there were several established rice brokerages, and merchants were authorized freely to go to the broker [of their choice] and deal with him; if a broker was even slightly unfair, he would have to fear that the merchants would drop him and go to another one. This is why, until now, they had not dared t
o indulge in abuses freely. [By contrast,] the newly established pier directorate, taking advantage of the fact that they were alone in control of the situation, used their power to monopolize and manipulate [the market]. The result was that grain prices soared.
Besides, one more regulation means one more abuse; one more person means one more fee. And these fees as a rule are met out of the pockets of the small folk who buy and sell; thus as [occasions for] fleecing multiply, the costs of meeting them become more and more numerous. For this reason, the Guangxi grain boats traveling east decreased steadily in number, which was a serious obstacle to the proper nourishment of the people. . . . [The pier directorates were thereupon abolished by Yang Yingju, the new governor-general.]
When I was in Guangdong and taking care of the people’s nourishment in order to meet [Your Majesty’s] sagely concerns, I managed to make market prices go down, but the abolition of the grain pier directors and brokers was only one link in the process. For if the Guangxi merchants are only moved by profit, in the same way they are necessarily deterred by harassment; [from this] it follows that it is necessary both to treat them with compassion and to know how to encourage them, so as to make it clear to them that they have no harassment to fear and that there is profit to be made; then, inevitably, grain will come in a continuous flow. I [therefore] gave strict orders to the district magistrates along the route [from Guangxi], to the effect that when they have to restock grain in the [public] granaries, they should acquire it in the markets, and in no case halt the Guangxi merchants’ grain boats and force them to sell, resulting in coercion and delay.
Also, [one should remember that] the precedents according to which hoarding was prohibited dealt specifically with whoever stores too much and waits for prices [to rise], or restrains [the circulation of goods] to corner the market; but in the case of those Guangxi merchant boats coming every day, one mast following the other, the situation requires that the rich local families buy and resell, which, moreover, makes it possible for the merchants rapidly to ply their oars and repeat the process (lit. “transport back and forth like a windlass”); this is exactly how grain can be circulated and prices be brought down. How could we insist on formal adherence to the precedent on hoarding and irresponsibly block their operations, so as to create difficulties for Guangxi merchants to sell, since [the latter] would get wind of it and no longer dare to make a move? There, too, I ordered the magistrates of Nan[hai] and Pan[yu] and the assistant magistrate of Foshan to examine the situation carefully and in no case provoke the least obstruction.
Again, there is the problem of the Guangxi merchants who, having sold their grain, sail back with empty boats; when the magistrates along the way happen to have assignments for them, they requisition at short notice those who pass by, and this too is something merchants and people do not happily put up with.
I consequently strictly forbade [such practices], so as to free Guangxi merchants from such anxieties and make them still more eager to move grain. . . .
Subsequently I received the [present] edict [asking] about whether or not it would be advisable generally to abolish the institution of grain brokers and [ordering] me to investigate carefully into the question, in each case taking local conditions into account. I observe that in the provinces of Shaanxi and Gansu, with the exception of some small out-of-the-way departments and counties where there have never been any grain brokers, everywhere else they have been established according to quota. Among them, some of the grain brokers of Shaanxi still are comparatively prosperous, but those of Gansu rarely have any capital. Nevertheless, they all pass [their position] on from father to son and their trade from generation to generation. [Their role] is no more than to evaluate prices and measure quantities for others, [for which] they extract [a fee of] two or three cash per peck. They are not by any means comparable to the pier directorate grain brokers that had been established in Guangdong. Furthermore, the merchants who carry grain to the market have no familiarity with the place and its people. If they do not take advantage of a broker’s introduction, they will have difficulty finding purchasers to whom they can sell their wares; and, as far as the different qualities of grain and differences in price are concerned, there too they will have to avail themselves of the brokers’ evaluation so as to avoid wrangles between the parties involved.
Thus, as far as the situation in Shaanxi and Gansu is concerned, the role of the brokers who are presently established is basically to help merchants and people by evaluating the price of things; it would [therefore] seem difficult to suggest their abolition. If among them there are [individuals] who deceive the country folk or arbitrarily raise and lower prices, they will have to be arrested and punished immediately; in fact, this sort of abuse is easy to eradicate. . . .
The problem is that local conditions are never the same. If one wants to prevent middlemen from using their crafty devices, and thus keep prices from soaring, it is entirely a matter of examining what fits which place at which moment; it is difficult to stick by regulations fixed once and for all. . . .
When dealing with the people’s nourishment one cannot stick by a fixed set of regulations; investigating brokers and arresting stockpilers is, however, one task in the [more general program of] suppressing abuses. The edict we have now received from Our August Emperor, making inquiries and ordering careful investigations, taking account of the situation in our respective regions, truly shows the utmost wisdom and clear thinking. The only thing that high officials in the various provinces should do is deliberate on the situation in each region, according to existing circumstances, and direct their subordinates to put real energy into devising means to manage the situation, so that prices may drop and people not have to pay dearly to feed themselves; this will respond to Our Sage Ruler’s utmost sense of sympathy with the distressed. Obeying the Imperial rescript, I have carefully investigated and truthfully memorialized in response.
Prostrating myself, I implore Your Majesty’s astute scrutiny and instructions.
Vermilion [Imperial] rescript: One can say this is a discussion by someone who fully understands the tasks at hand.
[Memorial of 1763, QL 015160, Palace Museum Archives, Taibei—PEW]
HONG LIANGJI: ON IMPERIAL MALFEASANCE AND CHINA’S POPULATION PROBLEM
Hong Liangji (1746–1809), a scholar-official from Changzhou in the lower Yangzi valley, advanced slowly through the civil service system (winning the final degree only at the age of forty-four) and was assigned to minor government posts and projects, in which he applied himself to a range of statecraft studies and Evidential Learning: geography, local history, government administration, and the classics. His writings show his concerns about problems spawned by the very success of stable rule in a maturing society—problems poorly coped with, in Hong’s time, by an increasingly lethargic and corrupt government.
Hong’s most distinguishing personal feature was his candor and conscientiousness in fulfilling the Confucian duty of political remonstrance—qualities reflecting a spirit of reformism in the New Text scholarship of his home region. His audacity in criticizing the emperor (see the letter to Prince Cheng below) led to his condemnation and exile for implicitly criticizing the emperor. To this same critical temper, perhaps, can be attributed his forthright reconsideration of a fundamental assumption in Chinese thinking: that a growing population is an index of good government and is socially desirable. Hong expressed his ideas on this subject in a few pages of miscellaneous essays, titled “Opinion,” written in 1793, five years before Malthus’s Essay on the Principle of Population. Though Hong’s essential insight is the same as Malthus’s, he did not think of himself as developing a new science according to rigorous methods, nor did any later Qing scholar explore his ideas further.
By Western standards China had been heavily populated since before the time of Christ—about sixty million, with considerable fluctuation during periods of extreme distress or prosperity. During the century or more before Hong wrote, however, the popul
ation began to rise rapidly toward the several-hundred-million level. No doubt, simple empirical observation and reflection sufficed to convince this acute and inquiring scholar that China was faced with a problem of new and massive proportions, pointing to an inherent contradiction in the concept of peaceful rule.
LETTER TO PRINCE CHENG EARNESTLY DISCUSSING THE POLITICAL AFFAIRS OF THE TIME, 1799
The following excerpts are from a long letter Hong submitted to Prince Cheng (the Jiaqing Emperor) in the autumn of 1799 with the wish that it be drawn to imperial attention.
The letter specifies in detail the lack of reform following the dismissal and death of the Qianlong emperor’s favorite and protege, Heshen, who had become all-powerful at court. The letter criticizes the conduct of the Jiaqing emperor himself (for example, being late for audiences at the throne hall and spending a great deal of time with favorite courtiers, including actors) and attacks by name officials both at court and in the provinces for corruption and abuse of power. Hong also complained about the inadequate channels of communication with the throne and the generally sad state of local administration. The Jiaqing emperor was infuriated by the letter, when it was shown to him. At imperial request, the Board of Punishment recommended the death sentence for Hong, later commuted to banishment to Yili in Xinjiang.
Why do I say that the selection of personnel and the conduct of administration have not been thoroughly reformed? This is because although the man [i.e., Heshen] has been dealt with by law, it has not been objectively discussed how, in more than a decade’s time, he altered the precedents established by the dynasty’s ancestors and brought forward officials who were personally loyal to him. Among the current practices of the Grand Secretariat, the Six Boards, and other government offices, which are in accordance with the established statutes of the state and which are the results of Heshen’s tampering with the precedents? Among the personnel of the Grand Secretariat, the Six Boards, and other government offices, who are really officials employed by the state and who, having been placed there by Heshen, were implicated in receiving bribes and shared the responsibility for corruption? The emperor is indeed humane and kind and wishes to deal with the accomplices leniently. Moreover, because so many officials were involved, it is not possible to dismiss them all. But it is my humble view that in the case of those officials whose [implication in Heshen’s misdeeds] is clearly and accurately known, even if their past acts are not to be inquired into, their names ought to be put down in the registers, so that when they come up for promotion or transfer of office, the principle of encouragement for good deeds and punishment for evil deeds can be applied to them in an appropriate manner. This would make it abundantly clear to everyone that while the sagacious Son of Heaven does not act excessively, he is nonetheless aware of and is acting to make evident the distinction between right and wrong, good and evil. In this way, those who, in the past, have known only a client-patron relationship may be transformed inwardly as well as outwardly into true subjects of the state (guojia zhi ren). Otherwise, in the future should the court not be as orderly and above reproach as at present, if, unlikely though it might seem, someone imitated what the powerful minister [Heshen] did, many officials would again gather at the gate of such a minister [and offer themselves as clients to a patron].
Sources of Chinese Tradition, Volume 2 Page 26