Our present trouble lies in our clinging to old institutions without knowing how to change. In an age of competition between states, to put into effect methods appropriate to an era of universal unification and laissez-faire is like wearing heavy furs in summer or riding a high carriage across a river. This can only result in having a fever or getting oneself drowned. . . .
It is a principle of things that the new is strong but the old weak; that new things are fresh but old things rotten; that new things are active but old things static. If the institutions are old, defects will develop. Therefore there are no institutions that should remain unchanged for a hundred years. Moreover, our present institutions are but unworthy vestiges of the Han, Tang, Yuan, and Ming dynasties; they are not even the institutions of the [Manchu] ancestors. In fact, they are the products of the fancy writing and corrupt dealing of petty officials rather than the original ideas of the ancestors. To say that they are the ancestral institutions is an insult to the ancestors. Furthermore, institutions are for the purpose of preserving one’s territories. Now that the ancestral territory cannot be preserved, what good is it to maintain the ancestral institutions? . . .
Although there is a desire to reform, yet if the national policy is not fixed and public opinion not united, it will be impossible for us to give up the old and adopt the new. The national policy is to the state just as the rudder is to the boat or the pointer is to the compass. It determines the direction of the state and shapes the public opinion of the country. [1b–2b]
Nowadays the court has been undertaking some reforms, but the action of the emperor is obstructed by the ministers, and the recommendations of the able scholars are attacked by old-fashioned bureaucrats. If the charge is not “using barbarian ways to change China,” then it is “upsetting the ancestral institutions.” Rumors and scandals are rampant, and people fight each other like fire and water. To reform in this way is as ineffective as attempting a forward march by walking backward. It will inevitably result in failure. Your Majesty knows that under the present circumstances reforms are imperative and old institutions must be abolished. I beg Your Majesty to make up your mind and to decide on the national policy. After the fundamental policy is determined, the methods of implementation must vary according to what is primary and what is secondary, what is important and what is insignificant, what is strong and what is weak, what is urgent and what can wait. . . . If anything goes wrong, no success can be achieved.
After studying ancient and modern institutions, Chinese and foreign, I have found that the institutions of the sage kings and Three dynasties [of Xia, Shang, and Zhou] were excellent, but that ancient times were different from today. I hope Your Majesty will daily read Mencius and follow his example of loving the people. The development of the Han, Tang, Song, and Ming dynasties may be learned, but it should be remembered that the age of universal unification is different from that of sovereign nations. I wish Your Majesty would study Guanzi4 and follow his idea of managing the country. As to the republican governments of the United States and France and the constitutional governments of Britain and Germany, these countries are far away and their customs are different from ours. Their changes occurred a long time ago and can no longer be traced. Consequently I beg Your Majesty to adopt the purpose of Peter the Great of Russia as our purpose and to take the Meiji Reform of Japan as the model for our reform. The time and place of Japan’s reform are not remote and her religion and customs are somewhat similar to ours. Her success is manifest; her example can be easily followed. [3a–b]
[From Yingchao tongchou quanjuzhe, in Wuxu zougao, 1b–3b—CT]
THE GRAND COMMONALITY
In these excerpts from Kang’s magnum opus, he first professes his humanitarian motivations and aspirations, combining the bodhisattva’s unlimited compassion for the sufferings of humankind with the Neo-Confucian sense of a heroic vocation to save the world. His final messianic vision is of a world totally liberated from all limits and bounds, as if history and inevitable progress assured a millennial outcome. Although Kang himself opposed revolutionary violence, in the absence of any realistic process or structure his anarchistic “no hands” approach to a total solution of human ills lent itself to the illusions of a revolutionary idealism, echoed later by the founders of the Chinese Communist Party.
Having been born in the Age of Disorder, I have been struck by the sufferings [of this age], and I have wondered if there could be a way to save it. “Bewildered, I have pondered.” [The solution lies] only in following the Way of the Grand Commonality of Complete Peace-and-Equality. If we look at all the ways of saving the world through the ages, to discard the Way of Grand Commonality and yet to hope to save men from suffering and to gain their greatest happiness is next to impossible. The Way of the Grand Commonality is [the attainment of] utmost peace-and-equality, utmost justice, utmost humaneness, and the most perfect government. Even though there be [other] Ways, none can add to this. . . .
We see that the whole world is but a world of grief and misery, all the people of the whole world are but grieving and miserable people, and all the living beings of the whole world are but murdered beings. The azure Heaven and the round Earth are nothing but a great slaughter yard, a great prison.
Being that I was born on the earth, then mankind in the ten thousand countries of the earth are from the same womb but of different bodily types. Being that I have knowledge of them, then I have love (qin) for them. All that is finest and best of the former wisdom of India, Greece, Persia, Rome, and of present-day England, France, Germany, and America, I have lapped up and drunk, rested on, pillowed on; and my soul in dreams has fathomed it. With the most ancient and noted savants, famous scholars, and great men, I have likewise often joined hands.
Being that I am a creature of all the heavens, would it be better if I could abandon the world and the heavens, cut [myself] off from my kind, flee from the social relationships (lun), and be happy all by myself? Those whose perceptiveness and awareness are small, their loving-mind is also small; those whose perceptiveness and awareness are great, their humane heart-and-mind is also great. Boundless love goes with boundless perceptiveness.
But if we look at the miseries of life, [we see that] the sources of all suffering lie only in nine boundaries. What are the nine boundaries?
The first is called national boundaries: [this is] division by territorial frontiers and by tribes.
The second is called class boundaries: [this is] division by noble and base, by pure and impure.
The third is called racial boundaries: [this is] division by yellow, white, brown, and black [skin types].
The fourth is called gender boundaries: [this is] division by male and female.
The fifth is called familial boundaries: [that is] the private relationships of parent and child, husband and wife, elder and younger brother.
The sixth is called property boundaries: [this is] the private ownership of agriculture, industry, and commerce.
The seventh is called disorder boundaries: [this is] the existence of unequal, unthorough, dissimilar, and unjust laws.
The eighth is called species boundaries: [this is] the existence of a separation between man, and the birds, beasts, insects, and fish.
The ninth is called suffering boundaries: [this means,] by suffering, giving rise to suffering. The perpetuation [of suffering] is inexhaustible and endless—beyond conception.
(The remedy for suffering lies, therefore, in abolishing these nine boundaries. The following nine parts of the book thus deal in detail with each of the boundaries, with the substitution of the Grand Commonality of Complete Peace-and-Equality in their place.) . . .
[The Historical Evolution of] Democracy, from Less to More, Presages One World
The progress of democracy from less to more is a natural principle. Hence after the United States had been established, a great revolution in laws took place, and other countries followed this. Thereupon constitutions were set up everywhere, republican[ism] flourish
ed, communist theories appeared, and labor parties were started up every day. . . . Hence the arising of democracy, the flourishing of constitutions, the talk about unions and communism, all are the first signs (lit., sounds) of One World. As for constitutional monarchy, [since the monarch] is already powerless, it is just the same as a democratic [form of government]. Some day monarchy will certainly be abolished and discarded, and [all states] will only belong to the One World [government]. . . .
If We Wish to Attain One World of Complete Peace-and-Equality, We Must Abolish the Family
Now, we desire that men’s natures shall all become perfect, that men’s characters shall all become equal, that men’s bodies shall all be nurtured. [That state in which] men’s characters are all developed, men’s bodies are all hale, men’s dispositions are all pacific and tolerant, and customs and morals are all beautiful, is what is called Complete Peace-and-Equality. But there is no means whereby to bring about this Way [and yet] to avoid abolishing the family. . . . To have the family and yet to wish to reach Complete Peace-and-Equality is to be afloat on a blocked-up stream, in a sealed-off harbor, and yet to wish to reach an open waterway. To wish to attain Complete Peace-and-Equality and yet to have the family is like carrying earth to dredge a stream, or adding wood to put out a fire: the more done, the more the hindrance. Thus, if we wish to attain the beauty of complete equality, independence, and the perfection of [human] nature, it can [be done] only by abolishing the state, only by abolishing the family.
The Abolition of Boundaries
In the Grand Commonality there will be no states, therefore there will be no severe military laws. There will be no rulers, and so there will be no cases of opposing the superior and creating rebellion. There will be no husbands and wives, and so there will be no fighting over sexual desire, no provisions against sexual immorality, no repressive regulations or bearing of grievances, no resentment or hatred, no divorces, no miseries of punishment and killing. There will be no family relationships, and so there will be no need to support [one’s family members], no compulsion to do the right thing [by them], no wrangling over [property shares]. There will be no nobility, and so there will be no depending upon intimidation or coercion, no oppression, no grabbing, no intriguing for position, no toadying. There will be no private property, so there will be no litigation over fields and houses, over industry and commerce, or over production. There will be no burial of the dead, and so there will be no litigation over the cemetery. There will be no customs barriers, and so there will be no crimes of evasion and smuggling. There will be no class divisions, and so there will be no mistreatment or oppressive laws [on the part of the superior class], and their violation or opposition [by the inferior classes].
Aside from this, then, what crimes will still exist, what punishments will still exist? I think that in the time of the Grand Commonality, while there may be faults (or, mistakes), there cannot be sins (or, crimes). What will these faults be? In a job or in official position, there may be negligence or mistakes, or discourtesy or gossip. Through the influence of twenty years’ schooling, conduct and customs will be excellent, human nature will have become perfected, and [men’s] energies will also be abundant; with this, even faults and mistakes should just about be eliminated.
[Adapted from Thompson, One World, pp. 72, 74–75, 86, 253—LGT]
For the relevance of the above to the revolutionary and millenarian thinking that inspired the founding of the Chinese Communist movement, compare the foregoing with Li Dazhao’s “The Victory of Bolshevism” (chapter 34).
CONSERVATIVE REACTIONS
The great momentum attained by the reform movement after the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895 also provoked strong conservative reactions. A stormy debate ensued in which the reformers were charged with subverting the established order and destroying Chinese culture. In Hunan province, where reformers like Tan Sitong had organized an academy for the spreading of their ideas, the reaction was particularly forceful. Eminent scholars such as Wang Xianqian (1842–1918), outstanding classicist and compiler of the monumental Dong hua lu (Imperial Documents of the Qing Dynasty), and Ye Dehui (1864–1927), famous bibliophile, rallied to the defense of Chinese traditions and Confucianism. In Beijing powerful figures led by Rong Lu (1836–1903) fought the reformers with logic and invective until, with the help of the Empress Dowager, they succeeded in bringing the reform movement of 1898 to an abrupt end. Still another brand of opposition was encountered in the statesman Zhang Zhidong, who, though himself something of a reformer, wished to hold the line against drastic changes and tried to preserve intact the earlier distinction between traditional Confucian ethics and the Western techniques, which should serve only as means for defending the Chinese Way.
Resistance to reform took three main lines. First, conservatives argued that ancestral institutions should never be changed under any conditions. Said Zeng Lian, one of the conservative writers: “The state (dynasty) belongs to the ancestors; the emperor merely maintains the dynasty for them. He cannot change the permanent laws laid down by the ancestors.” This argument, founded upon the tradition of filial piety, was in fact the most formidable obstacle to the reformers, one that Kang Youwei tried to overcome again and again in his memorials to the throne. It was this same argument that the Grand Councilor, Rong Lu, used so effectively against Kang.
Second, conservatives argued, on traditional Confucian lines, a good government depended upon men rather than upon laws. It was the moral state of the people and their leaders that needed improvement, not legal or political institutions. Rather than try to change institutions, one should seek to change or win over the minds of the people. Without men exemplifying superior virtue in the government, this could never be achieved, and in default of it, institutional changes would only bring harm to the country.
Third, as regards the cultivation of these virtues, the traditional teachings of China were definitely superior to those of the West. The Westerners, caring only for money, might build a strong and wealthy country but would be unable to achieve harmony and unity. Western governments were based upon power; the Chinese government, upon humanity and rightness. Calculating and self-centered, the Westerners neglected the ethical bases of government and could offer no sound alternative for the establishment of a harmonious social order.
All three of these conservative arguments were conventional insofar as they assumed the legitimacy of the established order and identified Confucianism with preservation of the dynastic state, which some earlier Neo-Confucians had questioned (in writings suppressed by the dynasty; see chapter 25). Understandably, this kind of conservatism provoked a more radical response from others later, who attacked both Confucianism and the dynastic order as inseparable evils.
CHU CHENGBO: REFORMING MEN’S MINDS COMES BEFORE REFORMING INSTITUTIONS
The memorial of the censor Chu Chengbo, submitted in 1895 after China’s disastrous defeat by Japan, analyzes that failure in a manner different from the institutional reformers. It is not a failure to change laws and institutions that accounts for the defeat, but precisely that such changes were made without remedying the basic weakness—the incompetence and venality of officials. Since, in fact, graft and corruption among army and navy officers had rendered China’s modern weapons useless in battle, Chu was on strong ground in arguing the need for official probity and integrity. The implication of this for him was that in the training and recruitment of officials traditional ethical values and moral character should be emphasized over technical qualifications and scientific training (which would have involved still further changes in methods and institutions). Thus, though not wholly opposed to change or to the reforms already undertaken, Chu resisted the reform movement’s tendency toward progressive displacement of Chinese values—the Confucian Way—by Western methods and institutions.
In the present world our trouble is not that we lack good institutions but that we lack upright minds. If we seek to reform institutions, we must first reform men’s mind
s. Unless all men of ability assist each other, good laws become mere paper documents; unless those who supervise them are fair and enlightened, the venal will end up occupying the places of the worthy. . . .
At the beginning of the Tongzhi reign (1862–1874), Zeng Guofan, Zuo Zongtang, Shen Baozhen, Li Hongzhang, and others, because the danger from abroad was becoming daily more serious, strongly emphasized Western learning. In order to effect large-scale manufacture, they built shipyards and machine factories; in order to protect our commercial rights, they organized the China Merchants Steam Navigation Company and cotton mills; in order to educate persons of talent, they founded the Tongwen College and other language schools; in order to strengthen training, they established naval and military academies. Countless other enterprises were inaugurated, and an annual expenditure amounting to millions was incurred. Truly no effort was spared in the attempt to establish new institutions after the pattern of the West.
When these enterprises were first undertaken, the regulations and systems were thoroughly considered so as to attain the best. It was asserted then that although China at the outset had to imitate the superior techniques of the West, eventually she would surpass the Western countries. But [in fact] perfunctory execution of these reforms has brought us to the point now where the island barbarians [the Japanese] have suddenly invaded us, and the whole situation of the nation has deteriorated. Was it because there were no reforms or because the reforms were no good? The real mistake was that we did not secure the right men to manage the new institutions. [18a–19a]
Sources of Chinese Tradition, Volume 2 Page 41