[Chen, “Wenxue geminglun,” pp. 1–4—WTC]
HU SHI: “CONSTRUCTIVE LITERARY REVOLUTION—A LITERATURE OF NATIONAL SPEECH”
A National Speech of Literary Quality
Since I returned to China last year, in my speeches on literary revolution in various places, I have changed my “eight points” [in the previous selection] into something positive and shall summarize them under four items:
1. Speak only when you have something to say. (A different version of the first of the eight points.)
2. Speak what you want to say and say it in the way you want to say it. (Different version of points 2–6.)
3. Speak what is your own and not that of someone else. (Different version of point 7.)
4. Speak in the language of the time in which you live. (Different version of point 8.)
The literary revolution we are promoting aims merely at the creation of a Chinese literature of national speech. Only when there is such a literature can there be a national speech of literary quality. And only when there is a national speech of literary quality can our national speech be considered a real national speech. A national speech without literary quality will be devoid of life and value and can be neither established nor developed. This is the main point of this essay. . . .
Why is it that a dead language cannot produce a living literature? It is because of the nature of literature. The function of language and literature lies in expressing ideas and showing feelings. When these are well done, we have literature. Those who use a dead classical style will translate their own ideas into allusions of several thousand years ago and convert their own feelings into literary expressions of centuries past. . . . If China wants to have a living literature, we must use the plain speech that is the natural speech, and we must devote ourselves to a literature of national speech. . . .
Someone says, “If we want to use the national speech in literature, we must first have a national speech. At present we do not have a standard national speech. How can we have a literature of national speech?” I will say, this sounds plausible but is really not true. A national language is not to be created by a few linguistic experts or a few texts and dictionaries of national speech.. .. The truly effective and powerful text of national speech is the literature of national speech—novels, prose, poems, and plays written in the national speech. The time when these works prevail is the day when the Chinese national speech will have been established. Let us ask why we are now able simply to pick up the brush and write essays in the plain-speech style and use several hundred colloquial terms. Did we learn this from some textbook of plain speech? Was it not that we learned from such novels as the Water Margin (Shuihu zhuan), Journey to the West (Xiyou ji), Dream of Red Mansions (Hongloumeng) and Unofficial History of the Scholars (Rulin waishi)? This type of plain-speech literature is several hundred times as powerful as textbooks and dictionaries. . . . If we want to establish anew a standard national speech, we must first of all produce numerous works like these novels in the national speech style. . . .
A literature of national speech and a national speech of literary quality are our basic programs. Let us now discuss what should be done to carry them out.
I believe that the procedure in creating a new literature consists of three steps: (1) acquiring tools, (2) developing methods, and (3) creating. The first two are preparatory. The third is the real step to create a new literature.
1. The tools. Our tool is plain speech. Those of us who wish to create a literature of national speech should prepare this indispensable tool right away. There are two ways to do so:
(a) Read extensively literary works written in the plain speech that can serve as models, such as the works mentioned above, the Recorded Conversations of the Song Neo-Confucians and their letters written in the plain speech, the plays of the Yuan period, and the stories and monologues of the Ming and Qing times. Tang and Song poems and ci written in the plain speech should also be selected to read.
(b) In all forms of literature, write in the plain-speech style. . . .
2. Methods. I believe that the greatest defect of the literary men who have recently emerged in our country is the lack of a good literary method. . . .
Generally speaking, literary methods are of three kinds:
(a) The method of collecting material. . . . I believe that for future literary men the method of collecting material should be about as follows: (i) Enlarge the area from which material is to be collected. The three sources of material, namely, officialdom, houses of prostitution, and dirty society [from which present novelists draw their material], are definitely not enough. At present, the poor man’s society, male and female factory workers, rickshaw pullers, farmers in the interior districts, small shop owners and peddlers everywhere, and all conditions of suffering have no place in literature [as they should]. Moreover, now that new and old civilizations have come into contact, problems like family catastrophes, tragedies in marriage, the position of women, the unfitness of present education, and so on, can all supply literature with material. (ii) Stress actual observation and personal experience. . . . (iii) Use broad and keen imagination to supplement observation and experience.
(b) The method of construction. . . . This may be separated into two steps, namely, tailoring and laying the plot. . . . While tailoring is to determine what to do, laying the plot is to determine how to do it. . . .
(c) The method of description. . . .
3. Creation. The two items, tools and methods, discussed above are only preparations for the creation of a new literature. . . . As to what constitutes the creation of a new literature, I had better not say a word. In my opinion we in China today have not reached the point where we can take concrete steps to create a new literature, and there is no need of talking theoretically about the techniques of creation. Let us first devote our efforts to the first two steps of preparatory work.
[Hu, “Jianshe di wenxue geminglun,” Xin qingnian 4, no. 4 (April 1918): 290–306; Hu Shi wencun, collection 1, pp. 56–73—WTC]
THE DOUBTING OF ANTIQUITY
Another significant trend of the New Culture Movement that owes its inception to Hu Shi is the new historical and critical approach to the study of Chinese philosophy and literature begun by Hu with his doctoral studies at Columbia. His Outline of the History of Chinese Philosophy (Zhongguo zhexue shi dagang), published in 1919, is permeated with a spirit of doubt that led him to reject tradition and to study Chinese thought historically and critically. This spirit soon penetrated the whole New Culture Movement. Hu’s friend Qian Xuantong (1887–1939) and pupil Gu Jiegang (1895–1980) took it up as a concerted “debunking” movement in the early 1920s, which resulted in an almost complete rejection of traditional beliefs in regard to ancient Chinese history, as well as to the loss by the Confucian classics of whatever sacredness, prestige, or authority they still retained.
The attacks of reformers in recent decades had already undermined belief in the political and social ethics of Confucianism among young Chinese. As nationalists, however, these same reformers had often felt a pride in Chinese antiquity that inclined them to spare it the devastating scrutiny to which they subjected the recent past. Now ancient history too—a domain in which Confucians had always excelled and that was so vital to their whole worldview—was invaded and occupied by modern skepticism.
GU JIEGANG: PREFACE TO DEBATES ON ANCIENT HISTORY (1926)
In those years [1918 ff.] Dr. Hu Shi published many articles. Those articles often provided me with the methods for the study of history. . . . If I can do what Dr. Hu has done in his investigations for the novel Water Margin (Shuihu zhuan), discovering the stages through which the story developed and going through the story systematically to show how these stages changed, wouldn’t it be interesting! At the same time I recalled that this past spring Dr. Hu published an article on the “well-field” system in the periodical Construction (Jianshe), using the same critical method of investigation. It shows that ancient history can
be investigated by the same method as the investigation of the novel. [p. 40]
As is well known, the history of China is generally considered to be five thousand years old (or 2,276,000 years according to the apocryphal books!). Actually it is only two thousand years old if we deduct the history recorded in spurious works and also unauthenticated history based on spurious works. Then we have only what is left after a big discount! At this point I could not help arousing in my mind an ambition to overthrow unauthentic history. At first I wanted only to overthrow unauthentic history recorded in unauthentic books. Now I wanted also to overthrow unauthentic history recorded in authentic works. Since I read the first section of [Kang Youwei’s] Confucius As a Reformer [Kongzi gaizhi kao], my thought had been germinating for five or six years, and now for the first time I had a clear conception and a definite plan to overthrow ancient history. What is this plan? Its procedure involves three things to be done. First, the origin and the development of the events recorded in unauthentic histories must be investigated one by one. Second, every event in the authentic histories must be investigated to see what this and that person said about it, list what they said, and compare them, like a judge examining evidence so that no lie can escape detection. Third, although the words of liars differ, they follow a certain common pattern, just as the rules governing plots in plays are uniform although the stories themselves differ. We can detect the patterns in their ways of telling falsehood. [pp. 42–43]
My only objective is to explain the ancient history transmitted in the tradition of a certain period by the circumstances of that period. . . . Take Boyi [c. 1122 B.C.?, who according to tradition preferred starving to death to serving another king]. What was the man really like? Was he the son of the Lord of Guzhu? We have no way of knowing. But we do know that in the Spring and Autumn period people liked to talk about moral cultivation and upheld the “gentleman” as the standard of molding personal character. Consequently, when Boyi was talked about in the Analects, he was described as “not keeping in mind other people’s former wickedness” [5: 22] and “refusing to surrender his will or degrade himself” [18: 8]. We also know that in the Warring States period, rulers and prime ministers liked to keep scholars in their service and scholars desperately looked for rulers to serve. For this reason, the book of Mencius says of Boyi that, having heard King Wen was in power, his hopes were aroused and he declared, “Why should I not go and follow him? I hear King Wen is hospitable to the old” [4a: 13, 7a: 22]. We also know that after the Qin united the empire, the concept of absolute loyalty to the ruler became very strong and no one could escape from the mutual obligation between the ruler and minister. For this reason, in the Records of the Historian he is recorded as one who bowed before King Wu of Zhou to admonish him [not to overthrow King Zhou of Shang] and, having failed in this mission, chose to follow what he believed to be right, refusing to eat the food produced under the Zhou and starving to death in the Shouyang Mountain.22 After the Han dynasty the story, which had undergone many changes before, became stabilized; books had become common and as a result the personality of Boyi no longer changed in accordance with the varying circumstances of time. We therefore should treat ancient history in the same way as we treat the stories of our own day, for they have all passed from mouth to mouth.
[Gu and Luo, Gushi bian, vol. 1, pt. 1, pp. 40–66—WTC]
A NEW PHILOSOPHY OF LIFE
The energetic assault on traditional thought and literature focused attention on what should replace Confucianism as a way of looking at the world and at life. Here again, during the years 1918–1919, Chen Duxiu and Hu Shi manifested their role as leaders of the whole New Culture Movement. At a time that saw the introduction and lively discussion of the philosophies of Kant, Hegel, Marx, Nietzsche, Bergson, James, Dewey, Russell, and others, Chen and Hu bespoke the dominant belief in science and social progress. In these days Chen, reacting strongly against what he conceived to be the social conformism and authoritarianism of Confucian thought, emphasized individualism as the basis of his philosophy. Yet his belief in science and materialism also inclined him strongly to the study of Marxism—an inclination checked to some degree by his interest in the ideas of John Dewey, who lectured widely in China in 1919 and 1920. Hu Shi, for his part, identified himself unequivocally with pragmatism. Nevertheless, in the movement as a whole, philosophical allegiances were less clear-cut. It was a period of fermentation and transition, producing also strong countercurrents to trends from the West (as shown in succeeding sections). We can say, however, that the prevailing trend among the educated was toward acceptance of such ideas as individualism, freedom, progress, democracy, and science.
CHEN DUXIU: THE TRUE MEANING OF LIFE
What is the ultimate purpose in life? What should it be, after all? . . . From ancient times not a few people have offered explanations. . . . In my opinion, what the Buddha said is vague. Although the individual’s birth and death are illusory, can we say that humanity as a whole is not really existent? . . . The teachings of Christianity, especially, are fabrications out of nothing and cannot be proved. If God can create the human race, who created Him? Since God’s existence or nonexistence cannot be proved, the Christian philosophy of life cannot be completely believed in. The rectification of the heart, cultivation of the person, family harmony, ordering of the state, and world peace that Confucius and Mencius talked about are but some activities and enterprises in life and cannot cover the total meaning of life. If we are totally to sacrifice ourselves to benefit others, then we exist for others and not for ourselves. This is definitely not the fundamental reason for man’s existence. The idea [of altruism] of Mozi is also not free from one-sidedness. The doctrines of Yang Zhu [fourth century B.C.?] and Nietzsche fully reveal the true nature of life, and yet if we follow them to their extremes, how can this complex, organized, and civilized society continue? . . .
Because we Chinese have accepted the teachings [of contentment and laissez-faire] of Laozi and Zhuangzi, we have to that extent been backward. Scientists say that there is no soul after a man’s death. . . . It is difficult to refute these words. But although we as individuals will inevitably die, it is not easy for the whole race or humanity to die off. The civilization created by the race or humanity will remain. It is recorded in history and will be transmitted to later generations. Is this not the consciousness or memory of our continuation after death? From the above, the meaning of life as seen by the modern man can be readily understood. Let me state it briefly as follows:
1. With reference to human existence, the individual’s birth and death are transitory, but society really exists.
2. The civilization and happiness of society are created by individuals and should be enjoyed by individuals.
3. Society is an organization of individuals—there can be no society without individuals. . . . The will and the happiness of the individual should be respected.
4. Society is the collective life of individuals. If society is dissolved, there will be no memory or consciousness of the continuation of the individual after he dies. Therefore social organization and order should be respected.
5. To carry out one’s will and to satisfy his desires (everything from food and sex to moral reputation is “desire”) are the basic reasons for the individual’s existence. These goals never change. (Here we can say that Heaven does not change and the Way does not change either.)
6. All religions, laws, moral and political systems are but necessary means to preserve social order. They are not the individual’s original purpose of enjoyment in life and can be changed in accordance with the circumstances of the time.
7. People’s happiness in life is the result of their own effort and is neither the gift of God nor a spontaneous natural product. If it were the gift of God, how is it that He was so generous with people today and so stingy with people in the past? If it is a spontaneous, natural product, why is it that the happiness of the various peoples in the world is not uniform?
8.
The individual in society is comparable to the cell in the body. Its birth and death are transitory. New ones replace the old. This is as it should be and need not be feared at all.
9. To enjoy happiness, do not fear suffering. Personal suffering at the moment sometimes contributes to personal happiness in the future. For example, the blood shed in righteous wars often wipes out the bad spots of a nation or mankind. Severe epidemics often hasten the development of science.
In a word, what is the ultimate purpose in life? What should it be, after all? I dare say:
During his lifetime, an individual should devote his efforts to create happiness and to enjoy it, and also to keep it in store in society so that individuals of the future may also enjoy it, one generation doing the same for the next and so on unto infinity.
[From Chen, “Rensheng zhenyi,” pp. 90–93—WTC]
HU SHI: “PRAGMATISM”
There are two fundamental changes in basic scientific concepts that have had the most important bearings on pragmatism. The first is the change of the scientific attitude toward scientific laws. Hitherto, worshipers of science generally had a superstition that scientific laws were unalterable universal principles. They thought that there was an eternal, unchanging “natural law” immanent in all things in the universe and that when this law was discovered, it became scientific law. However, this attitude toward the universal principle has gradually changed in the last several decades. Scientists have come to feel that such a superstitious attitude toward a universal principle could hinder scientific progress. Furthermore, in studying the history of science they have learned that many discoveries in science are the results of hypotheses. Consequently, they have gradually realized that the scientific laws of today are no more than the hypotheses that are the most applicable, most convenient, and most generally accepted as explanations of natural phenomena. . . . Such changes of attitude involve three ideas: (1) Scientific laws are formulated by men. (2) They are hypotheses—whether they can be determined to be applicable or not entirely depends on whether they can satisfactorily explain facts. (3) They are not the eternal, unchanging natural law. There may be such a natural law in the universe, but we cannot say that our hypothecated principles are this law. They are no more than a shorthand to record the natural changes known to us. [pp. 291–294]
Sources of Chinese Tradition, Volume 2 Page 55