Sources of Chinese Tradition, Volume 2

by Wm. Theodore de Bary

  Besides this, there was in the nineteenth century another important change that also had an extremely important bearing on pragmatism. This is Darwin’s theory of evolution. . . . When it came to Darwin, he boldly declared that the species were not immutable but all had their origins and developed into the present species only after many changes. From the present onward, there can still be changes in species, such as the grafting of trees and crossing of fowls, whereby special species can be obtained. Not only do the species change, but truth also changes. The change of species is the result of adaptation to environment, and truth is but an instrument with which to deal with environment. As the environment changes, so does truth accordingly. . . . The knowledge that mankind needs is not the way or principle that has an absolute existence but the particular truths for here and now and for particular individuals. Absolute truth is imaginary, abstract, vague, without evidence, and cannot be demonstrated. [pp. 294–295]

  The Pragmatism of James

  What we call truth is actually no more than an instrument, comparable to this piece of paper in my hand, this chalk, this blackboard, or this teapot. They are all our instruments. Because this concept produced results, people in the past therefore called it truth, and because its utility still remains, we therefore still call it truth. If by any chance some event takes place for which the old concept is not applicable, it will no longer be truth. We will search for a new truth to take its place. . . . [pp. 309–310]

  The Fundamental Concepts of Dewey’s Philosophy

  Dewey is a great revolutionist in the history of philosophy. . . . He said that the basic error of modern philosophy is that modern philosophers do not understand what experience really is. All quarrels between rationalists and empiricists and between idealists and realists are due to their ignorance of what experience is. [p. 316]

  Dewey was greatly influenced by the modern theory of biological evolution. Consequently, his philosophy is completely colored by bio-evolutionism. He said that “experiencing means living; and that living goes on in and because of an environing medium, not in a vacuum. . . . The human being has upon his hands the problem of responding to what is going on around him so that these changes will take one turn rather than another, namely, that required by his own further functioning. . . . Heis obliged to struggle—that is to say, to employ the direct support given by the environment in order indirectly to effect changes that would not otherwise occur. In this sense, life goes on by means of controlling the environment. Its activities must change the changes going on around it; they must neutralize hostile occurrences; they must transform neutral events into cooperative factors or into an efflorescence of new features.“23

  This is what Dewey explained as experience. [p. 318]

  The foregoing are the basic concepts of Dewey’s philosophy. Summarized, they are (1) Experience is life and life is dealing with environment; (2) In the act of dealing with environment, the function of thought is the most important. All conscious actions involve the function of thought. Thought is an instrument to deal with environment; (3) True philosophy must throw overboard the previous toying with “philosophers’ problems” and turn itself into a method for solving human problems.

  [Hu, “Shiyan zhuyi,” Hu Shi wencun, collection 1, ch. 2, pp. 291–320; originally published in Xin qingnian 6, no. 4 (April 1919): 342–358—WTC]

  THE DEBATE ON SCIENCE AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF LIFE

  The prevailing glorification of science prompted a reaction in some quarters, which pointed to the inadequacy of science when conceived as a philosophy for dealing with some of the fundamental questions of human life. The debate was touched off by a lecture at Qinghua College, near Beijing, by Dr. Zhang Junmai (Carsun Chang, 1886–1969), who insisted upon the need for a metaphysics as the basis for a genuine philosophy of life. In the controversy that followed (also known as the controversy between metaphysics and science), Zhang drew some support from his teacher Liang Qichao, now much disillusioned with Western materialism and scientism, and from the professional philosopher and translator of Bergson, Zhang Dongsun (1886–1973). A far larger number of writers, however, immediately rose to attack metaphysics and defend science. Zhang’s chief opponent was Ding Wenjiang (1888–1936), a geologist by profession, who stigmatized metaphysics as mere superstition and insisted that there were no genuine problems of philosophy or psychology that lay outside the domain of science or to which science, with the progress of civilization, would not eventually find an answer. Many others with a basically materialistic view, from Chen Duxiu (now a Marxist and Communist) to Hu Shi and Wu Zhihui (1865–1953), a writer closely identified with the Nationalists (Guomindang), joined in the battle. Altogether the writings that dealt with this issue, later compiled in book form, amounted to more than 250,000 words. In the end, as far as majority opinion was concerned, the “anti-metaphysics, pro-science” group carried the day. The controversy thus served to underscore the overwhelming acceptance of pragmatism and materialism among the younger generation of writers and students.

  ZHANG JUNMAI: “THE PHILOSOPHY OF LIFE”

  Zhang Junmai was a young professor of philosophy when he delivered this controversial lecture on February 14, 1923. Like so many others of his generation, he had received his higher education in Japan (Waseda University) and Europe. A follower of Liang Qichao and a believer in the “spiritual” civilization of China, he combined Bergsonian intuitionism with the Neo-Confucian teachings of Wang Yangming. In later years Zhang was also politically active as the leader of a “third force” advocating nationalism and socialism, which had some influence among intellectuals but little mass following.

  The central focus of a philosophy of life is the self. What is relative to it is the nonself. . . . But all problems of the nonself are related to human life. Now human life is a living thing and cannot so easily be governed by formulae as can dead matter. The unique character of a philosophy of life becomes especially clear when we compare it with science.

  First of all, science is objective, whereas a philosophy of life is subjective. The highest standard of science consists in its objective efficacy. Mr. A says so, Mr. B says so, and C, D, E, F all say so. In other words, a general law is applicable to the entire world. . . . A philosophy of life is different. Confucius’s doctrine of firm action and Laozi’s doctrine of Doing Nothing represent views. . . . Darwin’s theory of struggle and survival and Kropotkin’s theory of mutual aid represent different views. All these have their pros and cons, and no experiment can be conducted to determine who is right and who is wrong. Why? Because they are philosophies of life; because they are subjective.

  Second, science is controlled by the logical method whereas a philosophy of life arises from intuition. . . . Science is restricted by method and by system. On the other hand, philosophies of life—whether the pessimism of Schopenhauer and Hartmann or the optimism of Lambert, Nietzsche, and Hegel; whether Confucius’s doctrine of personal perfection and family harmony or Buddha’s doctrine of renunciation; and whether the Confucian doctrine of love with distinctions or the teaching of universal love of Mozi and Jesus—are not restricted by any logical formula. They are not governed by definitions or methods. They are views held according to one’s conscience for the sake of setting a norm for the world and for posterity. This is the reason why they are intuitive.

  Third, science proceeds from an analytical method, whereas a philosophy of life proceeds from synthesis. The key to science is analysis. . . . A philosophy of life, on the other hand, is synthetic. It includes everything. If subjected to analysis, it will lose its true meaning. For example, the Buddha’s philosophy of life is to save all living beings. If one seeks his motive and says that it is due to the Indian love of meditation or to India’s climate, to some extent such analysis is reasonable. But it would be a mistake to conclude that Buddhism and all it contains can be explained in terms only of the motives just analyzed. Why? Motives and a philosophy of life are different things. A philosophy of life is a whole and c
annot be discovered in what has been divided or mutilated. . . .

  Fourth, science follows the law of cause and effect whereas a philosophy of life is based on free will. The first general law governing material phenomena is that where there is cause, there is effect. . . . Even the relation between body and mind . . . is also the result of cause and effect. But purely psychological phenomena are different, and a philosophy of life is much more so. Why is it that Confucius did not even sit long enough to warm his mat [before hurrying off to serve society] or that Mozi’s stove did not have a chance to burn black [before he did likewise]? Why was Jesus crucified, and why did Shakyamuni devote his life to asceticism? All these issued from the free action of conscience and were not determined by something else. Even in an ordinary person, such things as repentance, self-reform, and a sense of responsibility cannot be explained by the law of cause and effect. The master agent is none other than the person himself. This is all there is to it, whether in the case of great men like Confucius, Mozi, the Buddha, and Jesus, or in the case of an ordinary person.

  Fifth, science arises from the phenomenon of uniformity among objects, whereas a philosophy of life arises from the unity of personality. The greatest principle in science is the uniformity of the course of nature. Plants, animals, and even inorganic matter can all be classified. Because of the possibility of classification, there is a principle running through all changes and phenomena of a particular class of objects, and therefore a scientific formula for it can be discovered. But in human society some people are intelligent while others are stupid, some are good and some are bad, and some are healthy while others are not. . . . The distinction of natural phenomena is their similarity, while that of mankind is its variety. Because of this variety there have been the “first to be enlightened” and the “hero,” as they are called in traditional Chinese terminology, and the “creator” and “genius,” as they are called in Western terminology. All these are merely intended to show the unique character of human personality.

  From the above we can see that the distinguishing points of a philosophy of life are subjectivity, intuitiveness, synthesizing power, free will, and personal unity. Because of these five qualities, the solution of problems pertaining to a philosophy of life cannot be achieved by science, however advanced it may be, but can be achieved only by people themselves.

  [Zhang Junmai, “Rensheng guan,” in Zhang et al., Kexue yu rensheng guan 1: 4–9—WTC]

  DING WENJIANG: “METAPHYSICS AND SCIENCE”

  Ding Wenjiang (V. K. Ting, 1888–1936) was a professor of geology at the University of Beijing when he responded to Zhang Junmai with this article, published in April 1923. Trained at Cambridge and Glasgow Universities, he was widely respected for his writings in such fields as geology, mining, and geography but became known also as a leading political pamphleteer. In 1919, a few years before this controversy arose, he had accompanied Liang Qichao, Zhang Junmai, and others on an inspection trip to Europe, from which Zhang returned much disillusioned with the materialism of the West. Though Ding’s basic outlook was not altered by this experience, from it developed his interest in a wider range of questions—political and philosophical—than his scientific studies had embraced earlier.

  Metaphysics is a bewildered specter that has been haunting Europe for twenty centuries. Of late it has gradually lost its treacherous occupation and all of a sudden come to China, its body swinging, with all its banners and slogans, to lure and fool the Chinese people. If you don’t believe me, look at Zhang Junmai’s “Philosophy of Life.” Zhang is my friend, but metaphysics is an enemy of science. . . .

  Can a philosophy of life and science be separated? . . . Zhang’s explanation is that philosophies of life are “most diversified” and therefore science is not applicable to them. But it is one thing to say that at present philosophies of life are not unified and quite another thing to say that they can never be unified. Unless you can advance a reason to prove why they can never be unified, we are obliged to find the unity. Furthermore, granted that at present “there are no standards of right and wrong, truth or falsity” [as Zhang said], how can we tell that right and wrong and truth and falsity cannot be discovered? Unless we discover them, how are we going to have standards? To find right and wrong and truth and falsity, what other method is there aside from the scientific? . . . [p. 6]

  Zhang says that a philosophy of life is not controlled by the logical method. Science replies: “Whatever cannot be studied and criticized by logic is not true knowledge. He claims that “purely psychological phenomena” lie outside the law of cause and effect. Science replies: Psychological phenomena are at bottom materials of science. If the phenomena you are talking about are real, they cannot go beyond the sphere of science. He has repeatedly emphasized individuality and intuition, but he has placed these outside the logical method and definition. It is not that science attaches no importance to individuality and intuition. But the individuality and intuition recognized by science are those that “emerge from living experience and are based on evidences of experience” [as Hu Shi has said]. Zhang has said that a philosophy of life is a synthesis—“It is a whole and cannot be discovered in what has been divided and mutilated.” Science replies: We do not admit that there is such a confused, undifferentiated thing. Furthermore, he himself has distinguished the self and the nonself and listed nine items under the latter. Thus he has already analyzed it. He says that “the solution of problems pertaining to a philosophy of life cannot be achieved by science.” Science replies: Anything with a psychological content and all true concepts and inferences are materials for science. [pp. 14–15]

  Whether we like it or not, truth is truth and falsity is falsity. As truth is revealed, metaphysics becomes helpless. Consequently, the universe that used to belong to metaphysics has been taken over by science. . . . Biology has become a science. . . . Psychology has also declared [its] independence. Thereupon metaphysics has retreated from First Philosophy to ontology, but it is still without regret and brags before science, saying: “You cannot study intuition; you cannot study reality outside of sensation. You are corporeal, I am metaphysical. You are dead; I am living.” Science does not care to quarrel with it, realizing that the scientific method is all-mighty in the realm of knowledge. There is no fear that metaphysics will not finally surrender. [p. 16]

  Metaphysicians talk only about their ontology. We do not want to waste our valuable time attacking them. But young people at large are fooled by them and consider all problems relating to religion, society, government, and ethics to be really beyond the control of the logical method. They think there is really no right or wrong, no truth or falsity. They believe that these problems must be solved by what they call a philosophy of life, which they say is subjective, synthesizing and consisting of free will.

  If so, what kind of society will ours be? If so, there will be no need to read or learn, and experience will be useless. We will need only to “hold views according to our conscience,” for philosophies of life “all issue from the free action of conscience and are not dictated by something else.” In that case, aren’t study, learning, knowledge, and experience all a waste of time? Furthermore, there will be no room for discussing any problem, for discussion requires logical formulae, definitions, and methods, and all these are unacceptable to Zhang Junmai. . . . Moreover, everyone has his own conscience. What need is there for anyone to “enlighten” or “set an example” for us? If everyone can “hold his view” according to his irrational philosophy of life, why should he regard the philosophies of life of Confucius, the Buddha, Mozi, or Jesus as superior to his own? And there is no standard of right and wrong or truth and falsity. Thus a person’s philosophy of life may be self-contradictory and he may be preaching the doctrine of equality of the sexes and practicing polygamy at the same time. All he needs to say is that it is “the free action of his conscience,” and he does not have to bother whether it is logical or not. Whenever it is the free action of conscience, naturall
y other people must not interfere. Could we live in such a society for a single day? [pp. 18–19]

  [Ding, “Xuanxue yu kexue,” in Zhang et al., Kexue yu rensheng guan 2: 1–19—WTC]

  WU ZHIHUI: “A NEW CONCEPT OF THE UNIVERSE AND LIFE BASED ON A NEW BELIEF”

  These excerpts are from a long essay by Wu Zhihui (1865–1953), which Hu Shi hailed as “the most significant event” in the controversy over science and metaphysics. “With one stroke of the pen he ruled out God, banished the soul, and punctured the metaphysical idea that man is the most spiritual of all things.” Wu, an iconoclast who had a reputation as something of a wit and satirist, is remembered for his declaration, which became a virtual battle cry among the anti-Confucianists: “All thread-bound [old-style] books should be dumped in the lavatory.”

  After taking the first steps up the old civil service ladder under the Manchus, Wu had become involved in the reform movement and then had studied for many years in Japan, England, and France, where he espoused anarchism. Acquaintance with Sun Yat-sen led him eventually into the revolutionary movement. He became a confidant of Sun and Chiang Kai-shek, and in his later years he was a sort of elder statesman among the Nationalists.