The twentieth century was Russia’s lost century culturally as well as politically. The nineteenth century was the golden age of Russian music, art, and literature. Czarist rule was dictatorial and repressive, but it at least permitted some artistic expression. Communist rule sought total control of mind, body, and spirit, stifling the creativity that is the soul of any people. Great works are generated by individual inspiration, not by consensus. The democratic revolution in Russia holds out the hope that it will once again find its creative voice and share its great talents with the world.
Our interest in a strong Russia does not mean that our support for the Russian government should be unequivocal. We would criticize what we considered irresponsible behavior by England, France, or Japan, and we should not hesitate to criticize the Russians should they take actions we believe are inconsistent with our interests and those of peace in the world. But we should not withhold support from Russia now because of the possibility that it might take on a hostile character in the future. Practically speaking, our influence at such a time will be greater if our economic and political relations with Russia are strong. Morally speaking, we owe the Russian people our support now. Personally speaking, I am glad that I lived to see the Russian tricolor flying over the Kremlin, to shake the hand of a pro-Western leader within its walls, and to say to my fellow Americans, from the unique perspective of the quintessential living Cold Warrior, that it is time for us to match our rhetoric with our money in supporting our new friends in the democratic Russian republic.
No practicing American politician or diplomat has ever dealt with a nation like the new Russia. It is not a defeated enemy like Japan or West Germany that we are nursing back to health. It is not an ally like France or England, with which we have obvious historical and strategic interests in common. It is not a strategic adversary like the old Soviet Union. It is a powerful, independent nation with which we have some interests in common and some interests, prospectively, in conflict. Those used to the easy answers of the Cold War will have to find a new measure of maturity and subtlety if they are to develop constructive policies toward post–Cold War Russia, a fundamentally friendly great power that may at times pursue its interests in an aggressive manner that we will find objectionable.
In terms of military strength, including nuclear weapons, Russia is still one of the most powerful nations in the world. If economic and political reforms succeed, within a generation it could once again achieve the status of superpower. As Russia grows in power and influence, the United States should be candid when our views do not coincide. But the inevitable clashes in our views must be seen as differences between friends and not between potential enemies.
The most dangerous mistake we could make would be to ignore our differences or attempt to drown them in champagne and vodka toasts at feel-good summit meetings. Rather than papering over differences with diplomatic gobbledygook, we must find ways to disagree without damaging one of the world’s most important strategic relationships.
The second most dangerous mistake would be to neglect our responsibility for assisting Russia in its transition to freedom, or arrogantly to scold or punish it for every foreign or domestic policy transgression, as though it were an international problem child. I saw Helmut Kohl in Bonn after visiting Moscow in early 1994, and he had an apt summation of the importance of treating Russia as a great power. “My mother was a wise, simple, pious woman,” he said. “She told us several adages that apply to politics as well as to private life. One was that you always meet everyone twice in your lifetime. The first time, always have in mind the impression you will make the second time. We are going to meet these Russians again in a few years, I’m convinced of that.”
The recent flap over the indictment of a highly placed Russian mole in the CIA was a glaring example of how unprepared many Americans are to think of Russia as a great power with its own interests and prerogatives. Many observers were quick to condemn Yeltsin, even though the mole was first recruited under Gorbachev. But the demands that we should not send aid to a country that spies on us were disingenuous at best. How many of these same critics called for a cutoff of our massive aid to Israel in the wake of the Pollard spy case, where Israeli intelligence was spying on the United States? As that incident and others show, most nations reserve the right to gather intelligence about both friends and foes. Although the Cold War had been over for more than three years, the CIA budget in 1993 was an estimated $30 billion. What did we spend it on—finding out whether they were growing coffee instead of cocoa in Ghana?
Twenty-seven years ago, two years before I took office as President, Charles de Gaulle told me that the United States should reestablish relations with China before its power impelled us to do so. A generation later, China’s explosive growth and burgeoning economic, diplomatic, and military power represent a total vindication of de Gaulle’s assessment. A similar sense of anticipation must govern our relations with Russia. Its seemingly overwhelming problems will not last forever. Its human and natural resources, and thus its capacity to recover and ultimately to excel, are virtually unlimited. The United States and the West should develop a collaborative, businesslike relationship with Russia today so that when we meet these Russians again, we will do so as friends, if not necessarily as partners, rather than as potential adversaries.
What the United States wants most from Russia is a nonaggressive foreign policy. While being sensitive to Russia’s legitimate interests, the administration, in discussions with the Yeltsin government, should not hesitate to raise questions about aspects of Russia’s international conduct that affect our interests. Our support for Russia’s reformers does not justify failing to present security concerns to Moscow forthrightly and early on, while there is still a possibility of having an impact without causing a conflict.
Any attempt to reestablish the Russian empire by force, coercion, or destabilization of its neighbors would be contrary to U.S. interests. To avoid any possible misunderstanding, the American government should make this clear to the Russian leadership at the outset. In addition, the other newly independent states need to be reassured that America’s desire for partnership with Russia does not imply neglect of their security interests.
While the collapse of the Soviet empire may be seen as a historically progressive development, the disintegration of the Russian Federation would be a different matter. It is hard to imagine an amicable divorce between the central government in Moscow and the Russian republics and regions. Twice before in Russian history—in the seventeenth century during the so-called Time of Troubles, and at the beginning of the twentieth century during the rule of the Provisional Government of 1917—separatist trends split Russia apart. The separation triggered bloody civil wars and the emergence of governments in Moscow that came to power through the barrel of the gun, reunited Russia with an iron fist, and soon became a menace to Russia’s neighbors.
It is impossible to overstate the dangers of a civil war in a nation with thousands of nuclear weapons, dozens of nuclear power stations, and numerous depots with chemical and perhaps biological weapons. The consequences of such a conflict would inevitably extend far beyond Russia’s own borders.
Stability does not mean the re-creation of a unitary state. Russia is too big, too complex, too diverse a country to be run from the Kremlin in an efficient yet democratic way. The most stable arrangement for Russia is a genuine federation as set forth in the new Russian constitution, under which the republics and regions have considerable control over their own affairs and a meaningful voice in the central government.
The Russian armed forces do not now represent a serious threat to the United States. Russia lacks any serious nonnuclear force projection capability. Its conventional forces are grossly understaffed and underpaid. Military manpower has fallen below the 1.5 million authorized by the former Supreme Soviet and continues to shrink. Draft dodging is a chronic problem: In the spring of 1993, 60 percent of all eligible males avoided the draft. The militar
y does not have the necessary funds for even minimally adequate training, and its logistical base is deteriorating rapidly. Major offensive operations outside the former Soviet region are completely beyond the capability of the Russian military for the foreseeable future. The strategic nuclear forces, in the absence of any serious conflict, are not a significant threat to the United States. Today, with Russia’s GNP roughly a third of the former Soviet Union’s, it will be difficult to rebuild the military machine from scratch.
At the same time, the West must take note of warning signs on the horizon. Russian military thinking is becoming more nationalistic and more assertive in defense of Russia’s interests in the other former Soviet states bordering on Russia, and more supportive of the use of military force as an instrument of foreign policy.
Russian policy toward other post-Soviet nations represents the greatest dilemma for the United States. A new attempt by Moscow to rebuild its empire would be a tragedy for Russia and its neighbors alike. In view of the Russian-Soviet historical legacy, it is understandable that Russia’s neighbors are sensitive to any signs of new assertiveness on Moscow’s part. It took Germany and Japan several decades to rehabilitate themselves after World War II, and even today some European and Asian nations are nervous about Berlin’s and Tokyo’s more assertive conduct.
Perceptions and fears of aggression have real consequences in that they affect international security. The United States cannot be indifferent to the fears of Russia’s neighbors, particularly because in many instances those fears are based on new, disturbing elements in Russia’s own behavior. There is considerable evidence that Russian security thinking during the two years since the collapse of the Soviet Union has moved in a more aggressive direction. Force has become a more acceptable instrument in Russian foreign policy, and the “divide and rule” technique is frequently relied upon by the Kremlin in such places as Georgia and Azerbaijan.
That Russian policy has become more assertive, even heavy-handed, is not in dispute. Yeltsin and his pro-Western Foreign Minister, Andrei Kozyrev, talk proudly about the newly muscular defense of Russian interests in the “near abroad”—the Russians’ term for the other former Soviet republics. Ukrainian President Kravchuk and former Latvian President Anatoly Gorbunous, now Speaker of the Parliament, are ex-communists and not anti-Russian firebrands. But they personally expressed concern to me last year about the Russian tendency to push their countries around.
Still, I do not think a new imperialism looms. I have spoken with many Russian politicians of different persuasions, including President Yeltsin, who were nostalgic for at least some aspects of the former Soviet empire. But with the exception of the supernationalistic fringe, all the Russians with whom I have spoken seem to understand that the past can no longer be recreated. Russia’s Defense Minister, General Pavel Grachev, has told me that he was adamantly opposed to any Russian military intervention in former Soviet republics. Others confirmed that the understaffed and poorly supplied Russian armed forces were not enthusiastic about a greater role outside their country’s borders.
Similarly, both Yegor Gaidar, then the Russian First Deputy Prime Minister, and Oleg Lobov, Secretary of the Russian Federation Security Council, made a strong case to me that Russia does not want to accept economic responsibility for other newly independent states. Russian monetary and economic policies during the past year have actually been pushing other former Soviet republics out of the ruble zone—hardly a policy one would undertake if planning to re-create the Soviet Union.
All this does not mean that the United States should not be concerned about heavy-handed Russian actions in the “near abroad.” We should be realistic about our limited leverage in Russia’s backyard and should avoid creating the impression that the United States wants to proceed with a new encirclement of Russia. It would be contrary to our interests to give Moscow the impression that we are prepared to help only as long as Russia remains on its knees. Russia is a great country that deserves to be treated with appropriate respect. U.S. leverage depends upon the perception in Moscow that America is a friendly nation that wishes it well and takes it seriously as a major power. At the same time, Moscow has to be told unequivocally that there is a line beyond which unscrupulous conduct in the “near abroad” will be incompatible with good relations with the United States. In this context, it should be explained in particular that Ukraine and the Baltic States occupy a special place in the American heart and—because of their location in the center of Europe—U.S. strategic thinking. The Russian government is entitled to be made aware that encroachments in that region would seriously damage U.S.-Russian relations.
It is not premature to indicate to Russia’s leaders at the highest level, quietly, but with complete clarity, that Russia’s conduct is coming dangerously close to the point at which no American administration would be able to ignore it. While appreciating Yeltsin’s need not to surrender the patriotic high ground to reactionaries, we cannot allow his need to outmaneuver political opponents to become a permanent excuse for an aggressive foreign policy.
It is likely that Russia’s leaders, even those who advocate a more nationalist policy, will be practical about the consequences of any steps that could be construed in the West as aggression against their neighbors. They will bear in mind the fragility of the political coalitions supporting aid to Russia in the West’s recession-strapped capitals. They also will certainly not forget that the Cold War was waged not only against communism but on behalf of the people who were suffering under it inside and outside Russia, particularly in Ukraine, Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania. Having seen these and other republics finally win their independence, Americans would not tolerate seeing them subjugated again.
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Similar sensitivity must govern our policies toward the other post-Soviet states. Of these, the one requiring the most subtlety and finesse is Ukraine. The United States must become much more active in reducing tensions and rivalries between Ukraine and Russia, encouraging political and economic reforms in both, and always taking care to be perceived as neither anti-Russian nor anti-Ukrainian unless either adopts policies that threaten our interests.
Russia and Ukraine have a number of complex issues to settle, ranging from Ukraine’s need for Russian energy supplies to the status of Crimea. What matters to the United States is not so much the particular outcome of their disputes as that they are settled amicably. Over time, our involvement in this relationship will be as important in ensuring regional peace as was our role in bringing about improved relations between Israel and the Arab states. Two diametrically opposite possibilities loom along the Russian-Ukrainian border. They could develop a flourishing partnership such as the one between the United States and Canada, or they could find themselves behaving like India and Pakistan, two superarmed scorpions trapped in a bottle. Ukraine’s history of domination by Moscow would seem to make the unhappier prospect the more likely one. United States policy should be designed to ensure that both sides realize that the happier prospect is in their interests.
In implementing such a policy, we have a possible ally in Ukraine’s President. Leonid Kravchuk is a former hard-line communist who has shown a remarkable knack for ending up on the winning side in Ukraine’s internal political warfare. When I first met him in Kiev in 1991, before Ukraine had won its independence from Moscow, I asked him, over a gourmet dinner in the state guest house, whether he thought Gorbachev would win a popular election if one were held the next day in the Soviet Union. He answered quickly. “Nyet.” Then I asked if he thought he himself would win an election if it were held the next day in Ukraine. This time he paused for a moment. After a shrug and a resigned smile, he again said “Nyet.”
He was half right. Today, Gorbachev is a fixture on the international lecture circuit, while Kravchuk is the elected leader of an independent nation of fifty million people that is destined to be a major European power.
After she first met Gorbachev in 1985, Margaret Thatcher shook
up some of her anticommunist supporters when she said, “I can do business with Mr. Gorbachev.” I would say categorically that we can do business with Kravchuk if we recognize him for what he is—a cold, shrewd, tough-minded political operator who was always more a Ukrainian than a communist. (Holding on to power will take all of this resourceful survivor’s remaining nine political lives.) Once the breadbasket of the Soviet Union, Ukraine is now one of Europe’s worst basket cases. Its economy makes Russia’s look like Singapore’s. Its currency is virtually worthless. Industrial production has all but collapsed. It is torn by ethnic, religious, and political divisions. Unlike Russia, it has made hardly any progress toward free-market reforms.
As we cultivate better relations with Kiev, we should stress that economic reforms must go forward if the Western investment it so desperately needs is to materialize. Meanwhile the West should open its market to Ukraine and other nations of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. When I saw him again in 1994, Kravchuk told me that his country had become an economic orphan. “The Russians cannot buy from us because they have no money,” he said, “while the Europeans limit our imports with quotas.” Economic revitalization is as much in our interests as in Ukraine’s. If Russia were to revert to authoritarianism, a strong Ukraine would be a vital deterrent to aggression. A prescription for disaster in Europe would be a weak, vulnerable Ukraine joining forces with a newly imperialist Russia. Also, Ukraine is far more likely to follow through on its disarmament commitments if our relations with it remain strong. We should move forward on the full range of cooperative policies, including military-to-military contacts, economic assistance, and wide-ranging educational exchanges. Once Ukraine adopts real economic reforms, every assistance program open to Russia should be open to Ukraine.
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