But if Montgomery was ready to play by Eisenhower’s rules, the CIGS was not. As Brooke prepared for the Malta meeting, however, he realized how weak his position was. The point at issue went beyond the relatively simple problem of choosing a ground commander, and even beyond the nature of the final offensive. Certainly the issue was also much more important than Montgomery’s ambition and bad manners. In their related demands for a single offensive north of the Ruhr and a single ground commander, the British were trying to assert themselves. They were, they felt, being ignored.
There was a good reason for British feelings of relative inferiority. The United States had replaced Great Britain as the dominant power bordering on the Atlantic Ocean. By 1945 American production was reaching levels that were scarcely believable. The United States was producing forty-five per cent of the world’s armaments and nearly fifty per cent of the world’s total goods. Some two thirds of all the ships afloat in the world were American-made. Under the circumstances, what the Americans wanted, if they wanted it badly enough, they got. Montgomery knew that, if Eisenhower threw before the CCS the mutually exclusive choice of himself or Montgomery, Eisenhower would win because the JCS dominated the CCS, just as Eisenhower dominated the AEF. This American domination reflected a newly arrived era in the world’s history.
Brooke knew that, for good or ill, the Americans were determined to claim their rightful position. In 1942 and even in 1943 he had been able to shape CCS decisions, but now that power had slipped away. It was galling but, more important, the strategy the Americans insisted upon was hurting Britain more each day because it delayed the final victory. The War Department’s refusal to give Eisenhower any more replacements during the Bulge illustrated this point. The Americans had made, in 1942, a basic priority decision—the United States would concentrate on industrial production as her chief contribution to victory. The implementation of this decision involved holding the number of U.S. combat divisions to ninety. In denying Eisenhower his replacements, the War Department was holding firm to the original priority.29 Churchill, meanwhile, had impulsively called up another quarter of a million men, so that while American production and wealth increased, Britain’s, due to the resultant decrease in the industrial work force, decreased. A number of high-ranking British officials were critical of Churchill for overtaxing his country by putting too much of a strain on the economy in order to win the war.30 No one accused Roosevelt or the Americans of making that mistake.
Even though the British strained to the limit of their power, American strength in the AEF at this time was so great that Eisenhower could do almost as he wished. That he had such great patience with Montgomery was, in fact, as much a mark of human courtesy as of need. The British contributed only about one quarter of his troops. Churchill, realizing this, and realizing that Britain would no longer be able to play a lone, powerful hand in world politics, but could exert an influence only through association with the United States, was much more inclined to tread lightly with the Americans than Brooke. It was the Prime Minister, for example, who told the British press that in the Ardennes the Americans engaged thirty or forty men for every British soldier in the battle, and had suffered sixty to eighty casualties for every British soldier killed or wounded. Churchill told the British press to be careful not to give too much credit to the British Army for victory in the Bulge, for he did not want to irritate the Americans.31 Still, of course, the Prime Minister did want his nation to have a voice in making strategic decisions, and he was also concerned about British prestige. At a meeting with Brooke on January 2, Brooke noted that “Winston … then propounded strategies based on ensuring that British troops were retained in the limelight, if necessary, at the expense of the Americans”; that is, that Twenty-first Army Group make the drive across Germany alone.32
As Forrest Pogue points out, the British realized that they were no longer full partners in the alliance. “Their only hope for controlling the course of events … was to gain over-all ground command or to get a substantial portion of the Allied resources allocated to offensives led by British commanders. It was difficult under these circumstances to determine whether the British were advocating a course of action because they believed in it or because it would best serve British interests.”33
Brooke and Churchill wanted to get Alexander transferred to Eisenhower’s headquarters so that he could have an influence on Eisenhower’s thinking. Brooke also wanted the CCS to send Eisenhower a directive that would force him to concentrate north of the Ruhr, where as he saw it lay the only hope of a quick victory. He was disturbed at what he felt to be an absence of a sense of urgency on the part of the Americans, especially Eisenhower, and was shocked at Eisenhower’s statement before the Bulge that the Rhine might not be crossed before May. The British were dipping deeper and deeper into their human and material resources and it was imperative for them, if they were to have any position at all in the postwar world, to end the war as soon as possible. As Arthur Bryant puts it, “With their manpower and resources all but exhausted after five years of war and with no possibility of making good further losses, they [the British] had staked everything on an early victory in the West and had seen it, as they felt, thrown away by the inexperience of the American High Command. The war, instead of ending in 1944, had been prolonged into another year and, unless a very different method of conducting it was now to be adopted, seemed likely to continue until, not only their own position, but that of Europe was desperate.”34
But the real point at issue was not what Brooke sometimes thought it was. Eisenhower was just as anxious to end the war as the British, and was willing to take any reasonable risk to do it. The disagreement was over strategy. All through January 1945 Montgomery protested to Brooke that Eisenhower was up to his old tricks, promising to make the major effort in the north but meanwhile allowing Bradley and Patton to operate as they wished. “The real trouble is that there is no control and the three Army Groups are each intent on their own affairs,” Montgomery complained on January 22. “Patton to-day issued a stirring order to Third Army, saying the next step would be Cologne.… One has to preserve a sense of humour these days, otherwise one would go mad.”35 Eisenhower continued to insist on closing to the Rhine all along his front before crossing the river north of the Ruhr. He felt that if he could destroy the Germans west of the Rhine he could walk across the rest of Germany. Brooke thought that closing everywhere would take strength from Montgomery’s drive and thus delay the victory. That was the real issue.
The CCS meeting at Malta began on January 30, 1945. Two days earlier Eisenhower had flown to Marseilles to meet with Marshall. After discussing ETO problems they turned to the British demands for a single ground commander and a directive forcing Eisenhower to turn over all his offensive power to Montgomery. Marshall said he would never agree to any proposal to set up a single ground command. If it were done, he added, he would resign as Chief of Staff. He told Eisenhower he was right to want to fight a major battle west of the Rhine and to close to the river everywhere before crossing in the north. Eisenhower flew back to Versailles knowing that, with the support Marshall was giving him, he would have his way.36
Brooke arrived in Malta with the air of a man who has one last, desperate chance. Eisenhower sent Smith to represent him, giving Smith two objectives—to retain the SHAEF plan for the campaign, and to hold the alliance together. The Americans might be dominant, but Eisenhower did not want to play the bully. All considerations of friendship and fair play aside, he still needed the British. He also believed, with Churchill, that Anglo-American co-operation was essential to a peaceful postwar world.
Smith got the job done. Brooke knew that the Americans were all against him, so he could not press matters too far. He did insist that it would be foolish to pass up an opportunity to cross the Rhine in the north if one presented itself, and Smith said that obviously Eisenhower would take advantage of any such opportunity. Brooke wanted it in writing, so Smith and Eisenhower exchanged cables i
n an attempt to find a satisfactory wording. The upshot was a cable from Eisenhower to Smith that Brooke accepted: “You may assure the Combined Chiefs of Staff that I will seize the Rhine crossings in the North immediately this is a feasible operation and without waiting to close the Rhine throughout its length.” Then Eisenhower added, “I will advance across the Rhine in the North with maximum strength and complete determination as soon as the situation in the South allows me to collect the necessary forces and do this without incurring unnecessary risks.”37
Reassured, although still suspicious because of Eisenhower’s last sentence, Brooke then talked privately with Smith. The CIGS said he doubted that Eisenhower was “strong enough” to do his job. “Goddam it,” Smith replied, “let’s have it out here and now.” He suggested that the two of them speak bluntly, off the record. He asked what Brooke meant. Brooke replied that Eisenhower paid too much attention to the desires of his field commanders, that he was too likely to be swayed by the last man to whom he talked. Going straight to the heart of the matter, Smith retorted by stressing Eisenhower’s cordial contacts with his commanders and pointed out that the Supreme Commander could hold the Allied team together only by a combination of diplomacy and sternness. He added that if the BCOS doubted Eisenhower’s ability they should put their cards on the table before the CCS. Brooke knew that would be hopeless. He lamely responded that Eisenhower had many abilities and conceded that there was no one else available and acceptable to Marshall who could hold down the Supreme Commander’s job.38
Brooke made one more effort. When the CCS moved on to Yalta for the conference with the Russians, he proposed a switch—Tedder to go to the Mediterranean and become Supreme Commander there, with Alexander replacing him at SHAEF. On February 2 Brooke, Churchill, Marshall, and Roosevelt discussed the proposal. The Americans thought that “politically such a move might have repercussions in America if carried out just now.… They were, however, quite prepared to accept this change in about six weeks’ time after further offensive operations will have been started and the Ardennes operation more forgotten.”39
Word of the proposal reached SHAEF in mid-February. Eisenhower discussed it with Montgomery, who assured the Supreme Commander that he wanted no change and could see no good coming out of Alexander’s moving to SHAEF. Tedder told Eisenhower the same thing.40
On February 16 Eisenhower wrote a long letter to Brooke on the subject. He said that any change in the working team would be deplorable, but if the CCS insisted upon it he wanted to make sure Brooke understood what Alexander’s position would be. “There can be no question whatsoever of placing between me and my Army Group Commanders any intermediary headquarters, either official or unofficial in character.” Montgomery agreed with this point, Eisenhower said, and indeed the field marshal had declared that “the command arrangements I have made are as nearly perfect as circumstances, including diverse nationalities, will permit.”
Eisenhower was candid with Brooke. He pointed out that the Americans in the AEF, especially the senior commander, “feel themselves aggrieved” because of Montgomery’s press conference on the Bulge and the treatment of the battle on BBC and in the London newspapers. “The upshot is that should there be any attempt on the part of any newspaper to interpret Alexander’s appointment here as the establishment of a ground headquarters or the interposition of any kind of intermediate control between myself and my Army Group Commanders, I would find it immediately necessary to make a formal announcement setting forth the facts.” This would be quite embarrassing to Alexander. Eisenhower said that he liked Alexander enormously and would be delighted to work with him again, “but it is one of my principal jobs to see that nothing occurs that may tend to create misunderstandings within my own command, or to mar the generally splendid British-American relationships that we try to promote.”41
Brooke showed Eisenhower’s letter to Churchill, who was upset at the implication that Eisenhower’s British deputy had nothing to do. Eisenhower then wrote Churchill to set him straight. Tedder was an intimate member of the SHAEF family, the Supreme Commander pointed out, and Alexander would be too if he were transferred. Turning to the main point, Eisenhower added, “Far from regarding this problem from a British versus American viewpoint, my whole effort is to exercise the authority of my office so as to weld and preserve the sense of partnership that to my mind is absolutely essential to the winning of the war and to our common welfare.”42
Montgomery added his voice in support of Eisenhower’s position. On March 4 he declared that the command arrangement should be left as it was and warned that a change would merely raise a storm and cause an organizational setback. The next day Churchill met with Eisenhower and Tedder and agreed that the decision regarding command arrangements belonged entirely to Eisenhower. The Supreme Commander made no changes.43
Eisenhower had won, but that was not the most significant result of the long and often bitter dispute over command. Given the difference in the size of the contribution of the two nations to the AEF, Marshall’s attitude, Eisenhower’s support from the British members of SHAEF, and Roosevelt’s inclination to follow Marshall’s lead in military matters, it was inevitable that Eisenhower would have his way. His real achievement was that he had won without alienating the British. They felt strongly about the issues, and pressed their points as hard as they dared, giving Eisenhower’s patience a thorough testing. He kept turning them down, but only after giving them the opportunity to fully state their views, and he never let himself be provoked into losing his temper. At the end of the war his reputation with the British remained extraordinarily high, a unique achievement for an allied commander.
Montgomery summed up Eisenhower’s achievement in a letter he wrote the Supreme Commander shortly after the surrender. “Dear Ike,” he began, “… I suppose we shall soon begin to run our own affairs.” Before the AEF split up, he wanted to say “what a privilege and an honor it has been to serve under you. I owe much to your wise guidance and kindly forbearance.” Montgomery said he knew his own faults very well “and I do not suppose I am an easy subordinate; I like to go my own way. But you have kept me on the rails in difficult and stormy times, and have taught me much.” Montgomery thanked Eisenhower for all he had done for him and signed off, “Your very devoted friend, Monty.”44
Eisenhower himself put things in perspective in a February 20 letter to Marshall. The Supreme Commander said he had just had two conferences with Montgomery, who was “emphatic in his statement that everything is developing soundly, and he has been especially vehement in protesting his complete loyalty and his belief in the efficacy of our command system.” Eisenhower said he had told Montgomery that he hoped the field marshal would have an opportunity to tell that to the Prime Minister. Rumors about Alexander replacing Tedder continued to crop up from time to time, but they no longer worried Eisenhower. “The vague rumors and statements that tend to create … uneasiness are largely froth,” he said. Meanwhile, ironically, Americans had been protesting that Churchill had a veto on all United States officers serving on SHAEF, and it was sometimes said that SHAEF was a British operation. Eisenhower felt that “the trouble often is that to gain a particular end, people, even in high places, are sometimes not above using gossip and misinterpretation.” But, he added, “all these things I ignore as long as they have no important effect upon this Command.”45
* Interview with Eisenhower, July 8, 1966. Eisenhower recalled that in his letter he “sacked Montgomery.” but this is unlikely, for he intended to ask Brooke or Churchill to relieve the field marshal. Eisenhower’s letter of December 29 to Montgomery was also not sent.
CHAPTER 17
Duties and Responsibilities
In January 1939 Eisenhower wrote a letter to his brother Milton, who had been offered a position as a dean at Pennsylvania State University. Milton wanted his brother’s advice: should he continue his work at the Department of Agriculture, where he was head of a bureau, or should he go to Penn State? Lieutenant Colonel
Eisenhower said that Milton’s happiness was the most important consideration, then went on to warn his brother about overwork. “The human machine wears out,” he declared, “although none of us ever applies this inescapable law to his own case. Deterioration and destruction are familiar phenomena, but the mind recoils from personal application of the logical conclusion.” If Milton decided to stay in Washington, Eisenhower continued, he should be aware of the danger. “Men of ability in the government service see so much to be done, they create or have created for them so many jobs that lazier men like to shunt from their own shoulders (except of course when it comes to collecting the glory for recognized accomplishment) that gradually the victim … loses his sense of values, and with this needful governor failing him, he applies his mind, consciously and unconsciously, day and night, to important and intricate problems that march up ceaselessly, one after the other, for consideration.” Do not, in other words, Eisenhower wrote his brother, get bogged down in detail. Save your time and energy for the really important matters. Be willing to delegate responsibility.1 Eisenhower was not just handing out “trite but nevertheless sound truisms,” as he put it—these were the rules he later followed himself as Supreme Commander.
At the height of the European campaign the total strength of SHAEF was 16,312. Nearly 1600 of those serving at SHAEF were U.S. officers; another 1229 were British officers. The remainder were British or American enlisted men.2 In theory all matters moved up the chain of command to the Supreme Commander, his deputy, and his chief of staff, but in practice Tedder’s role was usually advisory and he seldom served as an executive agent. The principal sections included the deputies to the chief of staff, the Allied naval commander, the air commander in chief (a position that disappeared in late 1944 when Leigh-Mallory left), the secretary, General Staff (the record-keeping agency), and the five G-divisions. Most of the men Eisenhower relied upon for advice and information could be found in one of these sections, officers like Humfrey Gale, the chief administrative officer (a deputy chief of staff), Morgan (also one of Smith’s deputies), Whiteley (G-2 and later G-3), Bull (G-3), and Strong (G-2). SHAEF had twelve additional divisions and five “missions” (to France, the Netherlands, Belgium, Denmark, and Norway).
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