Like many theories, this emphasises the role of external pressures in forcing profound change on the later Roman Empire. Yet we have already seen that the scale of the threat posed by the Persians and Germans in the third century has been greatly exaggerated. Their successes had far more to do with Roman weakness from internal disorder than the inherent failings of the army and frontier systems. It is also very hard to see any noticeable difference in the level of competence displayed by senatorial and equestrian commanders. The evidence is lacking to say much about standards of generalship in the third century, but the 'professional' army commanders in the better recorded fourth century do not seem any more capable than the `amateur' senators of the Principate. Both led their troops in much the same way."
It is all too easy to impose modern ideas of specialism on the Roman world. Equestrian officers were professional in the sense that their career consisted only of military posts - they did not receive any specialist training. Some rose to higher ranks after service as more junior officers, most notably as centurions, but many were directly commissioned to command a force of 500 or more men (most usually an auxiliary infantry cohort). They had experience of long service, over time in progressively more senior posts, and it was clearly assumed that they would learn as they went along. The same assumption had also been made about senatorial officers, save that they had less time to acquire the skills to command. There is not a shred of evidence that competence was the main criterion for selecting equestrian officers for promotion. In fact, it would be most surprising if patronage did not play the key role in the process. There was also the question of loyalty to the emperor.
Under the Principate, equestrians commanded the praetorian guard and also governed Egypt and led the legions stationed there. No emperor wished the only military force in Rome, or control of the province that supplied the bulk of its grain, to fall to a senator who might easily become a rival. Equestrians could be trusted because they lacked the social status and political connections to make a bid for the throne - at least without first becoming a senator. Septimius Severus rose to power after the murder of two emperors and four years of civil war during which he disposed of three rivals. Unsurprisingly, he greatly increased the troops at his immediate disposal by augmenting the guard units and stationing II Parthica near Rome. This and the other two legions he raised were all commanded by equestrians, as was his new province of Mesopotamia. At the same time many existing provinces were split in two. Senatorial legates were left in charge, but none commanded more than two legions. Senators at the head of powerful military forces were potential threats, most of all to emperors who had themselves only recently gained power through armed force. Equestrians were seen as less dangerous, although over time this ceased to be true.16
Caracalla disliked the company of senators and preferred to be surrounded by army officers. Hence, after his murder the equestrian Macrinus was able to convince those on the spot to accept him as emperor. As a body the Senate quickly acknowledged his claim. He had an army, and they did not, while the memory of Severus' purges of their class were recent. After this, it was the exception rather than the rule for a new emperor to come from the Senate. Several were infants, but the overwhelming majority were equestrian army officers. As senators ceased to command armies it became even less likely that any of them would be elevated to imperial power.
Only a handful of third-century emperors died a natural death - Septimius Severus and Claudius II are the only two where this was certainly the case. The majority died at the hands of their own subordinates. Assassination and open rebellion by a usurper with an army were frequent occurrences. The men who seized power in these years were obviously ambitious or, in the case of the teenage emperors, had ambitious people behind them. They were also inevitably nervous and insecure. Not one lasted long enough to feel fully safe, still less to found a stable dynasty.
Frightened people will tend to trust only those they know well. Family were preferred and generally proved reliable - one of the main exceptions being the fragile relationship between Elagabalus and Alexander. Otherwise, men chose former colleagues and subordinates. Therefore, equestrians who had spent their careers with the army tended to choose other army officers to command their armies, govern provinces and fill senior posts in the administration. They did not know many senators intimately, and in any case were wary of those who could boast of senior magistracies, wide connections and great wealth. There was no sudden exclusion of senators from government, it was just that over time all senior appointments, and especially military commands, came to be filled by men from outside the order. Had any emperor lasted several decades in power, then it is possible that he would have felt confident enough to begin trusting more senators with such important posts. This never happened, although our sources claim that some rulers, for instance, Alexander and Tacitus, showed great public faith in the Senate .17
The great irony was that in the long run the exclusion of senators from high commands made emperors more, rather than less, vulnerable to challenges. In the first and second centuries only senators were deemed suitable for the throne if there was no acceptable candidate from the imperial family. Furthermore, only the more distinguished members of the order were likely to succeed - at most a few dozen men out of a council of boo. Emperors succeeded by establishing a working relationship with the Senate, tolerable to both sides. Septimius Severus eventually managed to do this, even if his methods were at times brutal.
It was much easier to control the Senate than the larger and more diverse equestrian order. Senators returned to Rome throughout their career, mixed socially and inter-married. An equestrian officer was most unlikely to know men of a similar rank serving with the army in distant provinces. It was now far easier to become emperor, since a man only needed to gain the support of the troops on the spot. Persuading the rest of the empire that his rule was better than any alternative was much harder. The Senate had remained a force for political cohesion long after it lost genuine political independence. Yet its value in this respect was dependent on emperors treating the body with respect and employing senators in the vast majority of senior posts. This was the way Augustus had smoothed the feelings of Rome's elite, helping them to accept the passing of the Republic. For emperors it was a voluntary convention, but it had generally worked well for over two hundred years.
The replacement of senators by equestrians at the head of Rome's armies had nothing to do with military requirements. Still less was it caused by concerted demands from an increasingly prosperous and numerous class for a greater role in public life, for the equestrian order lacked any sense of corporate identity. It had always been possible in the past for the most successful individuals to be enrolled in the Senate. The rise of equestrians to dominate high office in fact led to increasingly stark divisions within the order between those of higher and lower status. The dominance of equestrian officers was a result of the desire of a succession of newly made and normally equestrian emperors to surround themselves with men they felt could be trusted. That this was largely an illusion is shown by the number murdered by such `trustworthy' subordinates.
As the Senate lost its central role in public life, so Rome itself also diminished in importance, although both were still powerful symbols of the empire's greatness. The Senate continued to meet, debating and passing motions - usually for very formal praise of the emperor. Senators still had influence, and also filled administrative posts in Italy and governed lesser provinces. Rome's population continued to be pampered with free and subsidised food and drink, enjoyed spectacular entertainments in huge venues like the Colosseum and Circus Maximus, and took their pleasures in massive public bath houses. People rarely saw an emperor, and even when one was resident in the city, he was most unlikely to enter the Senate House. Rome remained the largest city in the empire, but it and its Senate had drifted to the margins of political life. Power rested with the emperor and his court, and these rarely came anywhere near Rome.
; Surviving the Crisis
Emperors spent little time in Italy, and even less in Rome itself. They frequently went to war, in some cases campaigning every year. Rule of a single emperor became unusual. In some cases this was involuntary, for instance, when rival emperors emerged who were too strong to overcome at the time. More often it was a matter of choice. Emperors with sons tended to elevate these to joint rule almost as soon as they seized power. If they were still infants this marked out a clear successor and so gave the promise of long-term stability. Adult sons could be sent to deal with problems in another region while the father was busy elsewhere.
For many scholars this development shows that it was no longer possible for a single emperor to rule the entire empire. Most also claim that from at least the time of Marcus Aurelius, emperors were expected to preside over major wars in person. They were also expected to win. If there was more than one war at the same time, then there needed to be more than one emperor. Therefore, the trend was towards the division of imperial power, and ultimately this would lead to the split between eastern and western empire at the end of the fourth century. Such analysis not only relies on hindsight, but assumes that this major change was a reasonable, perhaps even inevitable, response to new problems. Once again, this is bound up with the belief that in the third century the empire faced far greater threats from the outside than ever before."
Change was inexorable and stimulated by external pressure. Similar reasoning has often been used to claim that the fall of the Republic and creation of the Principate by Augustus was equally inevitable. If he had not done this, then someone else much like him would have created an essentially similar monarchy. This sort of analysis robs the individuals whose decisions and deeds shaped the process of any independence of action, perhaps even of responsibility. More importantly, a closer examination of the course of events paints a very different picture. Many of the underlying assumptions prove deeply questionable and any sense of inevitability vanishes.
In the second century Trajan spent several years of his reign on campaign, and Hadrian carried out long tours of the provinces. Both also spent a good deal of time in Italy, and Antoninus Pius never left there. The joint rule of Marcus Aurelius and Lucius Verus had nothing to do with any perceived need for two emperors. When Verus died he was not replaced for seven years until Commodus was considered old enough. It had long been normal to mark out a successor by sharing power with him. Commodus ruled alone, as did Septimius Severus until he wished to make clear that his sons would succeed him. Caracalla and Geta inherited jointly because an adult son could not be safely passed over.
Marcus Aurelius took his role as emperor extremely seriously and spent much of the second half of his reign on campaign. This was out of his sense of duty rather than any obligation. Commodus saw things differently and never again went on campaign after he returned to Rome from the Danube. Severus waged war often. At first his opponents were Roman and then subsequently he led major operations in the east and in Britain - the regions that had supported his rivals. There may have been good reasons for these wars, but Severus was also concerned to create a bond with the troops in each area and to win glory - Augustus had been similarly aggressive in the first years of the Principate. Caracalla craved an image as a tough soldier and preferred life on campaign to public life back in Rome. Winning great victories always had valuable propaganda value - hence the taking of triumphal names like Ger manicus, Samarticus or Parthicus, and the prominence of symbols of victory on coins."
Military victories were especially attractive to insecure emperors. Success in war showed their competence and, with its implications of divine favour, suggested that their rule was legitimate. Well-established emperors could take credit for wars won by their governors just as Antoninus Pius had done. The less confident needed to preside over the success in person. They were also reluctant to let anyone else gain glory that might rival or surpass their own. The division of the provinces into smaller units anyway ensured that governors had smaller armies at their disposal and these were not always sufficient to deal with a major problem. The third century saw the growth of extraordinary commands - for instance, Philip's brother Priscus over much of the eastern frontier, and the similar rank later granted to Odaenathus. This was necessary because provincial governors now operated on too small a scale to cope in some circumstances. Yet it was inherently dangerous. Time and again a local success by a governor or other commander prompted him to declare himself emperor."
This was the root of the need to share imperial power, far more than an increased threat from outside. Sharing rule with a colleague meant that there was someone else who could - hopefully - be trusted to take command of substantial forces in another part of the empire. Trustworthiness, however, did not ensure competence. Nor did it prevent the colleague from being murdered and a challenger taking over command of his troops. No emperor was ever truly secure in the third century. Long ago, Emperor Tiberius had described ruling the empire as equivalent to `holding a wolf by the ears'. He had the advantage of succeeding a father by adoption who had ruled for forty-five years, and himself reigned for more than two decades. No ruler lasted that long between Severus and Diocletian."
The Roman army often receives much blame for its role in the disruptions of the third century. Clearly, none of this could have happened without the willingness of Roman soldiers to fight and kill each other. Yet the army did show a clear preference for established dynasties, just as it had done throughout the Principate. Enough of the troops were willing to back Elagabalus, in spite of his extremely dubious claim, because he was seen as a Severan. Similarly, it took major failures on the part of Severus Alexander before a coup succeeded. None of the other emperors could lay much claim to deep loyalty, especially since so many of them had in the first place been involved in killing their predecessor. The army wanted stability, when it could be sure of being paid and the more ambitious could win promotion. Failing that, soldiers usually wanted to be on the winning side, hence the number of emperors killed when their army was approached by that of a stronger rival.
Soldiers of all ranks certainly took advantage of the chaos of civil war, which inevitably relaxed discipline. There were plenty of opportunities for looting and extortion. It was also possible to rise very quickly to high rank. Elagabalus' leaders promised to promote to the vacant rank any of Macrinus' men who killed a senior officer refusing to defect to them. The best prospects of all were open to officers closest to the emperor. If they joined a conspiracy to arrange for his murder then they could expect rewards from his successor. There were opportunities, but there were also great risks. Backing the wrong side could prove fatal, and certainly risked damaging a career, so that men had to judge very carefully whether to stay loyal or switch allegiance to a challenger. The majority of emperors died at the hands of men who had been close to them. Trust was a precarious thing for the ruler and his subordinates. Fear of execution prompted several assassinations from Commodus and Caracalla onwards.22
It was a vicious circle, as each new assassination or rebellion by a usurper - no matter how quickly it collapsed - made a renewal of civil war more likely. A humiliating defeat in a foreign war was likely to provoke an emperor's rapid fall. Others were murdered because of alleged pursuit of their officers' wives. Some died simply because ambitious followers believed that they or an associate could take imperial power for themselves. Emperors were always more worried by Roman rivals than foreign enemies. Even the Persians stood no real chance of seizing large areas of Roman territory. German warriors might raid Italy, Spain or Asia Minor, but they could not stay there.
In the third century the Roman Empire wasted much of its strength fighting itself. Its military system suffered severe dislocation and became less able to deal with foreign threats. Augustus had created a system that veiled the power of the emperor. It was not a clear, constitutional position and so there was no formal arrangement for succession. This was a weakness, but the general stability of th
e first two centuries make it hard to see this as responsible for the problems of the third century. Chance played more of a role than historians might care to acknowledge. It happened that Marcus Aurelius was survived by a young son who was simply not up to the job of being emperor. Pertinax need not have misplayed his hand and been killed, and Septimius Severus might have lived longer and perhaps taught his sons how to work together and to rule well. Had Commodus, Caracalla, Elagabalus or Alexander been older when they came to power, then they might have proved more capable.
Decisions by successive emperors made the situation worse. The gradual exclusion of senators from military commands and their replacement by equestrians was intended to make emperors safer. In the long run it did the opposite, and emperors came more and more from the ranks of senior equestrian army officers. Similarly, reducing the size, and therefore garrisons, of provinces weakened the capacity of the governors to deal with major operations. Emperors had to go themselves or give sufficient extraordinary power to allow a subordinate the resources to deal with the situation, hoping that it would not also give him the ability to rebel. Not until Diocletian was a measure of imperial control reasserted. Far fewer emperors were assassinated after 285. Civil wars became somewhat less common, although they tended to be much bigger and more costly when they did break out. Things were not as bad as they had been in the half century before he came to power, but we should not exaggerate the change. The stability of the first and second centuries would never be repeated.
How Rome Fell: Death of a Superpower Page 19