I won’t go into the origin of the discovery of the disease, as we are all well familiar with the discovery of Liza Sole by myself and the Nogales police department.
Unlike other diseases such as SARS and bird flu, NOBI is by all indicators deliberately spread to others as an intentional act. Therefore, travel advisories are of little to no impact in regard to this disease. We have recorded no instances where the disease has been passively spread. Although reported cases have spiked during certain days of certain months, we have yet to determine the significance of these instances. Interestingly, we have yet to find any evidence that this virus is zoonotic, the result of crossing species from animal to human. The University of Texas at Austin has been at the forefront in developing methods for detecting NOBI using a proprietary cell culture approach, but we have not made significant progress in developing diagnostic tests for NOBI. Additionally, the university has curtailed their DNA and recombinant vector vaccine research due to ethical concerns expressed by numerous private entities.
Another issue that the public health sector has had to confront is the numerous cases of the disease that go unreported. We surmise that there are certain societal pressures that would make a person not be inclined to report an infection. Therefore, there have been no reports of any variant forms of NOBI, unlike other communicable diseases which do report a certain percentage of variant forms. We still do not know about the effect that a particular genetic profile has on the infected person. It may establish why certain people are successful in “re-creating” as opposed to others who are not successful.
As a side note, as a medical professional, I prefer the term “infection” when referring to the point when an individual’s bloodstream has been introduced to the biological mechanism which becomes NOBI. I dislike the term “re-creation” as it implies a positive result, when we have definitive evidence that the instances which would define a so-called re-creation are at approximately 50 percent. It is imperative that health professionals gain access to the bodies of the unsuccessful re-creations to better understand the intricacies of the disease.
In other words, when a Gloaming infects a non-NOBI, there is only a 50 percent chance of the infected person surviving and becoming an actual Gloaming. Re-creation is a myth I have no interest in glamorizing.
Today, we estimate that close to one thousand probable cases of NOBI have been reported. We cannot estimate the amount of people carrying the virus, as we have not found an acceptable means of conducting a census of persons who identify as Gloamings. One of the more troubling aspects of the virus has been the simultaneous reports by law enforcement of the mysterious deaths of individuals closest to the Gloaming.
As far as the mechanics of the disease are concerned, we still have little information. We know that the virus infects dendritic cells which kill off the body’s T lymphocyte cells but with no appreciable effect on the body. The virus then manufactures never-before-found proteins which block immune cells from signaling to the antibodies to attack the virus. At this point, the virus begins to replicate and change the internal structure of the body. Many viruses work in part by inhibiting interferon, but NOBI actually structurally changes the interferon of the person. This is the limit of our knowledge of the disease. I realize that Congress has expressed concerns about our ability to map the complete genomes of the virus similar to what has been done to other viruses.1 The NOBI virus [NOBI]—although hampered by a lack of full-length viral genomes—genome substitution rate in the Nogales/Sole strain has been estimated at between 1.5 times three to ten mutations per nucleotide, per genomic replication. This is equivalent to fifteen to thirty-five mutations in each genome, meaning that sequences diverge rapidly enough to identify distinct sublineages during the epidemic. NOBI appears to evolve moderately at the epidemiological level but also at the within-host level. Our current class of machines and sequencers is not yet fully capable of analyzing the virus in its current state.
At this moment, public health authorities, doctors, nurses, scientists, and law enforcement and laboratory staff around the country are struggling to cope with NOBI at a time when some hope remains that the disease might still be contained. Economists and market analysts are simultaneously struggling to calculate the present and future costs. Another, less publicized aspect of the disease is the reluctance of major pharmaceutical companies to begin research on any aspect of the virus. Numerous institutions of higher education are avoiding conducting any research on NOBI even when offered substantial grants from the federal government. This has left our medical community severely shorthanded regarding research and forced to conduct its own research on a smaller scale without the equipment and resources that are available to the major participants in medical research.
One of the other aspects of the virus which hampers our ability to adequately analyze the disease is that most microscopes are unable to evaluate the particles. The inherent radioactive ingredients cause interference with the equipment.
The NOBI disease has no vaccine and no treatment. It is forcing health authorities to resort to control tools dating back to the earliest days of empirical microbiology: isolation and quarantine. At the same time, we are combating certain media organizations glamorizing the disease. Neither of which have been successful due to our limited aspects of our current laws in dealing with such diseases. Attempts by certain media organizations to glamorize the disease have hampered our efforts to learn more about it; in addition, the provincial and clannish behavior of the Gloamings has left many of our health authorities in the dark when it comes to analyzing the virus.
Our greatest fear when it comes to diseases such as NOBI is the tendency of the disease to mutate into forms which could be substantially more detrimental to our health system and society. The nature of the infected to disperse radiation is another concern that should be studied from a long-term impact assessment. The novel nature of the NOBI virus has created an extra step in the containment response—many wish to be infected. This desire to become a Gloaming leaves many citizens at risk of a failed re-creation or, in the alternative, the risk of the long-term effect on the body of a successful re-creation.
Another aspect of the virus is the desire or requirement of the NOBI-infected people to ingest blood for their survival. However, without the cooperation of the Gloamings, any evidence we obtain will only be in theory. Must the Gloamings feed on human blood, or can they ingest other types of blood? This is imperative to determine in order to know whether the Gloamings can be safely integrated into general society.
The CDC will continue working with our partners to monitor NOBI. This is simply a snapshot of where the country stands today.
I hope this hearing will illuminate the issues and successes of our health system in combating this and other diseases.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and committee.
MR. KERR:
Thank you, Dr. Scott. My office will continue to provide oversight of CDC programs through a combination of proactive audits, inspections, and administrative investigations.
We shall now hear from Dr. Chad Kelly from Northwest Memorial Hospital of Chicago, Illinois, to discuss the treatment of NOBI patients within their hospital system…
1“Genome sequencing in viral outbreaks is desirable to characterize the infectious agent and determine its evolutionary rate. Genome sequencing also allows the identification of signatures of host adaptation, identification and monitoring of diagnostic targets, and characterization of responses to vaccines and treatments.” Quick J, Loman NJ, Duraffour S, Simpson JT, Severi E, Cowley L, Bore JA, Koundouno R, Dudas G, Mikhail A, Ouedraogo N, Afrough B, Bah A, Baum JH, Becker-Ziaja B, Boettcher JP, Cabeza-Cabrerizo M, Camino-Sanchez A, Carter LL, Doerrbecker J, Enkirch T, Garcia-Dorival I, Hetzelt N, Hinzmann J, Holm T, Kafetzopoulou LE, Koropogui M, Kosgey A, Kuisma E, Logue CH, Mazzarelli A, Meisel S, Mertens M, Michel J, Ngabo D, Nitzsche K, Pallasch E, Patrono LV, Portmann J, Repits JG, Rickett NY, Sachse A, Singethan K, Vitoriano I, Yemanaberhan RL, Zek
eng EG, Racine T, Bello A, Sall AA, Faye O, et al. 2016. Real-time, portable genome sequencing for Ebola surveillance. Nature 530:228–232. 10.1038/nature16996.
Rolling Stone
November
Each month Rolling Stone features first-person accounts from individuals on the front lines of conflicts that are given limited exposure through the mainstream media. This month we feature an account from a doctor stationed with a refugee camp in South Sudan, Africa, after it was attacked by a neighboring militia.
Dr. Keith Miller—Doctors Without Borders:
When I arrived at the Girba refugee camp, Drs. Henry and Bradford—the two Gloamings out of the ten aid workers—showed me around the camp, which was in dire shape. Tarps fitted with salvaged wood pieces created a makeshift tent, and a three-foot trench winding through the camp was a provisional sewage system.
The Gloamings were incredible in transforming the refugee camp. Although they were confined to their pods during the daylight, they made the most of the night hours. They coordinated a clinic and immunization room, and helped dig a pit for trash disposal, which cut down on disease. Dr. Henry researched and found safe chemicals for placement in the trench for human waste treatment. They worked harder than any of us—immune to fatigue.
We were caught off guard when a United Nations ambassador for Chad called our supervisor in South Africa: a peacekeeping unit in North Sudan detected a column—estimated at two thousand troops—of National Liberation militias moving toward the refugee camp. The troops would arrive in about two days. Doctors Without Borders contacted the United Nations peacekeeping forces in neighboring nations, but the UN indicated it needed Security Council approval. That process could take months.
Dr. Henry contacted the Gloaming Council and in twenty-four hours they had assembled a private mercenary force which stopped the militias’ advance for a month, until United States and French forces dispersed the militias from attacking the refugees. The Gloaming Council and the Gloamings on our staff saved thousands of lives.
When people ask me what I think about the Gloamings, I tell them this story and hope that they can see the hope and promise of a future where the Gloamings are involved in all aspects of our lives.
Chapter 6
September 15
Sixteen Months After the NOBI Discovery
Hugo Zumthor
FBI Agent
It’s not easy chasing ghosts. Especially ones bigger, stronger, and faster than you. But that’s what I’ve been doing for a long time now. Hey: how does a ghost say goodbye to a vampire? So long, sucker!
By chance, I was actually on the FBI’s original extraction team investigating the Liza Sole incident. I worked closely with Dr. Lauren Scott of the CDC to understand the NOBI virus and how it affected the bodies of the carriers. The agency needed to know the risks involved in confronting this virus. As I learned more from Lauren, I advocated for a large team to guard Liza Sole at the hospital, but my superiors denied it—and then, of course, she escaped.
Even so, at the start of the Gloaming presence, we never had a dedicated Gloaming unit in the FBI. It really wasn’t until the art heist incident that the FBI determined there should exist a dedicated unit for crimes suspected of involving Gloamings.
After the Liza Sole case and the accompanying investigations, I was considered the closest thing to a Gloaming crime expert.1 So when the alert came in about a theft at the University of Texas campus’s Blanton Museum of Art, I was sent to Austin to help the investigation.
An alert came into the office of the special agent in charge about a theft on the campus, specifically at the Blanton Museum of Art. Now, normally this wouldn’t cause much of a blip on the screen of our crime roster, but one of the local FBI agents had taken a Geiger counter to the scene and the radioactive traces were off the charts, which caused the local office to suspect a Gloaming angle.
The Jack S. Blanton Museum of Art was located on the campus of the University of Texas at Austin. It’s a beautiful campus among the hills and green grass of central Texas. It was also one of the largest university art museums, with a pretty substantial permanent collection and endowment. The museum was an imposing and modern building constructed of granite and limestone surrounded by a well-manicured lawn and shaded with rows of pecan trees.
During the time of the robbery, the Blanton museum was hosting an exhibit entitled Haring, Warhol, and the Beginning of the Media Street Art Generation. It was an exhibition of works of art primarily from the 1980s focusing on the abstract political illustration of that time period—with its garish colors and outlandish messages.
There were several valuable paintings among the collection, but the thief, or thieves, only took one particular painting: Untitled (Madonna, I’m Not Ashamed), a 1985 piece by Andy Warhol and Keith Haring. The painting consisted of synthetic polymer, Day-Glo, and acrylic paint on a canvas measuring twenty by sixteen inches.
At the time, the FBI didn’t really have a theory as to why that particular painting was stolen. Arguably, the Lichtenstein and Basquiat artworks were more valuable, and the thieves had ample time to take any number of works from the collection, but they took only the Madonna painting.
When I arrived, the museum was teeming with cops and museum staff, all in a state of nervous panic. No doubt the respective Warhol and Haring trust representatives—not to mention the insurance investigators crawling the museum floors—had everyone on edge. It was a sweltering July day, and I felt sweat roll down my legs when I was dropped off near the yellow crime scene tape at the museum’s entrance. Campus security appeared overextended: the news crews were spilling over into the fifteen-story dormitory and other classroom buildings.
Special Agent Dana Webb of the Austin field office led me to the exhibition hall. “This is where the exhibition was being held,” she said. “It takes up all three of the large first-floor halls.” A posse of technicians pored over every inch of a blank square on a pale wall between a Basquiat and a Rauschenberg. “This is where it was hung,” she continued, pointing at the empty space with almost a shrug.
I suppose my face said it all.
“You don’t like modern art,” Webb said.
I winced as if I felt bad about it—I didn’t. “I have a distinct love-hate relationship with fine art. All that money trading pictures that could be drawn by a child. It’s like a middle finger to the poor.”
“Well, this blank space is like a middle finger to us,” Webb replied.
I nodded. I could already tell they weren’t going to find much of anything on that wall. “Before we get into the actual theft, explain to me the security system in place.” Webb and I first reviewed the museum’s security apparatus—they had a central station for security personnel at a secure location in the basement. I quickly learned that for a university museum, their standards were actually quite rigorous, based on the requirements forwarded to me by the Museum Association Security Committee of the American Association of Museums.2
By all accounts, the thief or thieves entered through the single service entrance door at the northwest corner of the museum—the back of the building. The metal door was opened from the outside with a duplicate key apparently stolen the night before but not found until after the theft.
I was then taken to the security headquarters located in the museum’s basement. Entrance was limited to members of the security detail, the museum director, and her two direct assistants. The security room was lit with banks of fluorescent lights and rows of closed-circuit feeds on numerous screens and monitors. I sat at the table as an assistant cued up the replay, and as we studied footage from the outdoor cameras around the university at the time of the robbery, the pattern of the static and warped reception correlated approximately with the effect of a Gloaming being recorded, based on my experience. A further analysis from the FBI lab would later confirm this suspicion.
The cameras that covered the road leading to the back entrance showed no vehicles from an hour before to an hour after the b
urglary. So I requested any cameras at the university that encompassed coverage for half a square mile from the museum. The university police provided us with access to the full bank of surveillance videos for a square mile around the museum. An hour of further scrolling later, I spotted a car in an empty lot near the philosophy building—a late model black Mercedes with heavily tinted windows. A specially fitted Gloaming-safe automobile.
The plates on the Mercedes were removed, and a physical inspection of the trail, using a portable electronic dosimeter to check for radiation, led us back to the first-floor exhibition room and the empty square on the wall.
Honestly, this crime scene told me nothing—well, nothing except that the crime was committed by a Gloaming. But hey, that was a start. I could feel Agent Webb’s eyes on me as I stared again at the empty square on the wall.
“Any ideas?” she asked as she put her business suit coat back on—truth be known, they kept the temperature in the museum at winter levels. She leaned over and her mouth smelled like domestic beer and clove cigarettes. This girl was more me than myself.
“We’re not going to get anything from this damn crime scene,” I said.
“Any way to salvage the videos?” Webb asked.
I shook my head. “We’ve tried many times, but our technicians, and other outside consultants, have failed to make anything usable out of them. The radiation they give out completely ruins the video.” To be honest, I wasn’t feeling much confidence in getting any closer to solving this crime. I had been here before with other Gloaming-suspected crimes, mostly high-end burglaries of upper-income estates, but hitting a museum was a first. The only thing the crimes had in common was a 0 percent clearance rate by the authorities.
A People's History of the Vampire Uprising Page 9