After excluding the Hindu Mahasabha from consideration, RSS activists, especially Vasantrao Krishna Oke, the Delhi state pracharak, and Balraj Madhok, a young activist pracharak from Kashmir, encouraged Dr Shyama Prasad Mookerjee, minister of industry and supplies in independent India’s first cabinet, to form a new nationalist party.46 The initial contact with Mookerjee was not sanctioned by the RSS leadership which was even somewhat apprehensive about the early contacts with Mookerjee made by some of its pracharaks. Golwalkar, for example, was later to say of Oke that he ‘developed a liking for political work to a degree uncommon and undesirable for a swayamsevak’.47 Oke’s attraction to politics, however, was shared by many other swayamsevaks, particularly those of refugee origin.
While Mookerjee had only a casual acquaintance with the work of the RSS, he was a logical political mentor for it: He was well known; he had established his Hindu bona fides in his defence of Hindu interests in Bengal; he was Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel’s ally in cabinet politics; he was extricating himself from the discredited Hindu Mahasabha; and he was looking for another political forum to express his nationalist viewpoint.
Mookerjee belonged to one of Bengal’s most prominent families.48 His grandfather was one of the first graduates of Calcutta University. His father had served on the Calcutta High Court and had been vice chancellor of Calcutta University. Shyama Prasad graduated from Calcutta’s most prestigious college and studied law in England. He was elected to the Bengal Legislative Council in 1929 from the university constituency, and five years later became vice chancellor of Calcutta University, the youngest person ever to have held that position.
Mookerjee began his political career under the Congress label, though he questioned Gandhi’s periodic call for boycotts. When Gandhi called for a boycott of assemblies in 1930, Mookerjee resigned his seat and ran for re-election in his former constituency as an independent. He again won the seat as an independent in the 1937 assembly elections and joined the Hindu Mahasabha soon after. His support of the Mahasabha was prompted by his fear that the interests of the Hindu middle class were threatened by the policies of state cabinets dominated by Muslims.49 During the war, he played a prominent role in Bengal politics and also became a major national figure in the Hindu Mahasabha.
After Independence, Nehru invited Mookerjee, one of three Mahasabha members in Parliament, to join the cabinet. Soon after Mookerjee joined the cabinet, Mahatma Gandhi was assassinated, an event that prompted Mookerjee publicly to express long-standing reservations about the Mahasabha. He proposed that the Mahasabha should either become a cultural organization or change its policy of excluding non-Hindus. He argued that Hindus, who formed over 80 per cent of the population, hardly needed a separate Hindu party to protect their interests. He advised the Mahasabha to terminate its political activities.50
The All-India Hindu Mahasabha working committee, meeting in New Delhi two weeks after Gandhi’s assassination, adopted Mookerjee’s proposal that the Mahasabha withdraw from politics and decided ‘to concentrate on real sanghatan work, the relief and rehabilitation of refugees and the solution of our diverse social, cultural, and religious problems for the creation of a powerful and well-organized Hindu society’.51 The decision was clearly a tactical manoeuvre; and at its 8–9 August 1948 meeting, the committee decided to ‘resume political activities and function as a political organization open to all citizens of India’.52 The real controversy was over the criteria for membership, and a reorientation committee was appointed to prepare a report on this issue. The majority report recommended that the Mahasabha continued to exclude non-Hindus, and the working committee, at its 8 November 1948 meeting, accepted the majority report,53 against the advice of Mookerjee. The Mahasabha’ s all-India committee met about six weeks later to resolve the issue.54 Mookerjee lobbied unsuccessfully to defeat the majority report and resigned from the working committee.
A deterioration in Indo-Pakistani relations was soon to prompt Mookerjee to establish a separate political party. In late 1949, communal violence again erupted in both East Pakistan and West Bengal.55 Nehru and Home Minister Patel had serious disagreements over how to handle the situation. Mookerjee sided with Patel’s stand that India take a hard line against Pakistan. Nehru’s support of negotiated settlement prevailed, resulting in talks which led to an agreement with Pakistan on 8 April 1950. On that day, Mookerjee and K. C. Neogy, another Bengali cabinet minister, resigned from office.
At this juncture, the RSS itself began to explore supporting Mookerjee. Dr N. B. Khare, president of the Hindu Mahasabha, met Mookerjee three months after his resignation and was informed that Mookerjee and Golwalkar had already met to discuss a new political party.56 Appaji Joshi, one of the very few older Maharashtrian leaders in the RSS, who lined up with the activists, recalls arranging three meetings between Golwalkar and Mookerjee in 1950. At those meetings, Golwalkar is reported to have shown little interest in extending RSS support to any political party.57 We also know that senior RSS leaders such as Prabhakar Balwant Dani, the general secretary, strongly opposed any RSS role in politics, on the grounds that the RSS should concentrate on rebuilding itself.58
Almost fourteen months elapsed between Mookerjee’s resignation from the cabinet in early 1950 and his decision to form a new nationalist party. The evidence suggests that both Mookerjee and Golwalkar hesitated to make any final plans until the leadership struggle in the Congress was resolved. Should Patel’s group have emerged victorious, the record indicates that both Mookerjee and Golwalkar would have extended their support to the Congress.59 When the All-India Congress Committee elected Nehru party president at its 8 September 1951 meeting, this political option was closed.60
In his talks with Mookerjee, Golwalkar was concerned with two issues.61 He insisted that the RSS remain structurally separate from the new party. Golwalkar also wanted an assurance from Mookerjee that his views regarding Bharatiya rashtravad (Indian nationalism) were compatible with RSS views. Despite basic agreement on these two points, Golwalkar still hesitated. Balraj Madhok writes that Mookerjee was so irritated at Golwalkar’s delay that he considered forming a party without formal RSS backing.62 Golwalkar, however, decided to extend RSS support to Mookerjee’s new party in early 1951.63 In late May 1951 a group of RSS activists met at Jalandhar to form the first state unit of the Bharatiya Jana Sangh (hereafter referred to as the Jana Sangh), and RSS pracharaks were selected to organize the party branches in Punjab as well as in other states.64 In September, state units were established in Karnataka, Madhya Bharat/Bhopal and Uttar Pradesh; in October, units were formed in Assam, Rajasthan-Ajmer, and Vindhya Pradesh (now incorporated in Madhya Pradesh). A unit was formed in the Gujarat area of Bombay state during November, though none was established in the Marathi-speaking districts of the state.65 The RSS cadre in Maharashtra, heavily traditionalist, demonstrated little enthusiasm for political work.
While RSS activists took the leading role in organizing the party in most regions, Mookerjee himself mobilized support for it in Bengal, where the RSS was an insignificant force. At the first public meeting of the party in Calcutta in June 1951, Mookerjee stated that this party would soon align itself with like-minded political parties elsewhere, undoubtedly referring to the new state organizations which RSS activists were establishing. In outlining his political programme, Mookerjee focused attention on refugee rehabilitation and economic development. He premised greater government support for the refugees and a harder line towards Pakistan. While supporting some form of public/private partnership to tackle India’s developmental problems, he was against large-scale government control of the economy. He advocated a land-to-the-tiller policy, regional self-sufficiency, and industrial decentralization. Finally, his party would be what the Hindu Mahasabha was not—‘open to all citizens of India irrespective of caste, creed, or community.’66
The organizational structure of the new party bore many similarities to the RSS. A well-known local figure, often without an RSS background, was chosen
president of the provincial unit. Many of the secretaries were swayamsevaks, usually pracharaks. These secretaries were responsible for establishing district, city and ward units, and for organizing the campaigns for assembly and parliamentary candidates. Within a few months, these novice politicians established an elaborate campaign machine. No small part of their success was due to the support extended them by local RSS leaders. Madhok notes that a party organization tended to take shape in those areas where there were RSS shakhas.67 We shall explore the development of the Jana Sangh, and its successor party, the Bharatiya Janata Party, in Chapters 5 and 6.
RSS AND LABOUR UNION ACTIVITY
The RSS activists, having set the precedent regarding affiliates in the late 1940s, planned an even more comprehensive expansion of RSS activities. They were deeply concerned with communist successes in organizing students and workers. The Vidyarthi Parishad would counter communist activities on the campus, but there was no equivalent group to work in the labour field. To remedy this situation, Dattopant Bapurao Thengadi, a pracharak and a labour unionist,68 called together a group of interested swayamsevaks and representatives from 76 trade unions in July 1955 to lay the groundwork for a new labour movement.69 They decided to form the Bharatiya Mazdoor Sangh (BMS).
Between 1955 and 1963, the BMS maintained a low profile while its leaders developed an ideology and an organizational structure. The organization began to move into a more activist phase when in August 1963 the BMS cooperated with the Hind Mazdoor Sabha (HMS) (the labour affiliate of the Socialist Party) to organize Bombay’s bank workers. After 1963, the BMS expanded rapidly. According to BMS records, it grew from 30,000 members to 425,000 members between 1963 and 1969. Its greatest success was among white collar workers, though it also did well among textile and transportation workers. Like the other RSS affiliates, it was most successful at mobilizing support in Hindi-speaking states.70
Like the Vidyarthi Parishad, the Mazdoor Sangh argues that it has an Indian approach to labour union activity. According to BMS theorists, other labour unions in India are based on a conception of a class struggle which is incompatible with Indian culture.71 According to Dattopant Thengadi, the most prolific Bharatiya Mazdoor Sangh writer, both capitalism and communism are incapable of bringing about good life in any society. Capitalism exploits workers for the sake of profit and places them at the mercy of the laws of supply and demand. Communism, he argues, places excessive emphasis on material gratification, and it tends to rob man of freedom by placing all economic power in the hands of a few political figures.72 Both capitalism and communism, according to Thengadi, fail to explain man’s fundamental needs because they explain human problems in terms of material conditions rather than in terms of the deeper inner needs of each individual. Consequently, any movement that seeks to change the human condition for the better must concern itself with the psyche of man. Thengadi suggests that an economic system must be devised which makes use of a person’s ‘natural’ aptitudes.73
G. S. Gokhale, another BMS theorist, argues that workers with similar aptitudes should be grouped together into occupational ‘families’, with each ‘family’ determining the working conditions, occupations, duties and goals of the branch of the productive process with which it is associated.74 Both Thengadi and Gokhale view society as an organism which functions best when it is able to organize people into socio-economic units which motivate them to contribute their maximum efforts for the well-being of the larger society. They also suggest a more ‘natural’ political order in which representation is based on the socio-economic ‘families’ rather than the present system of geographic representation.
The Bharatiya Mazdoor Sangh has consistently opposed the nationalization of industry. In its place, the BMS calls for the ‘labourizing’ of industry.75 A ‘labourized’ industry is one in which the workers control the industry in which they contribute their labour. Placed in the larger theoretical framework, each occupational ‘family’ owns and manages its own industry. Regarding complex industries involving more than one occupational ‘family’, each ‘family’ shares in the ownership and in the decision-making process.76 Gokhale predicts that the ‘labourizing’ principle, which combines self-interest and national interest, will result in fewer strikes, greater discipline among workers, and higher productivity.77 Thengadi advocates extending the ‘labourizing’ principle to Indian agriculture. He argues that the village-based cooperative is not a revolutionary concept. Indeed, it is based on the traditional agricultural system. He believes that ‘labourizing’ agriculture would reduce rural conflict and give the landless and tenant farmers a greater stake in rural society. However, this proposal has received little support either from the RSS or from the other affiliates.78
Regarding rural India, neither the RSS nor its affiliates have been very successful in mobilizing rural support, though efforts to do so have been made. The BMS organized the Bharatiya Rayat Sangh, an association of farmers, in 1971. This organization attempted to organize the landless, tenants, and small farmers, but with little success. On 4 March 1979 a national body of farmers, the Bharatiya Kisan Sangh, was formed. It claims to have 215,000 members in 14 states, though Thengadi candidly admitted in 1982 that the new organization had not really made much of an impact.79
To emphasize its nationalist orientation, the BMS has adopted a set of symbols intended to distinguish it from rival unions, who allegedly derive their theoretical frameworks from foreign sources. The official flag is the bhagva dhwaj, ‘the universal flag of Dharma’.80 May Day observance is regarded as dangerous since it is a ‘symbol of class struggle and national disintegration’.81 It has been replaced by Vishwakarma Jayanti, in memory of Vishwakarma,82 the mythological god of architects who according to legend was the creator of all arts, handicrafts and industry.
By the early 1970s, the Bharatiya Mazdoor Sangh had become assertive, if not militant. Joining the communists and other trade unions in the successful 1973 strike against the government-controlled Life Insurance Corporation of India, it participated for the first time as an equal partner in a joint union strike. This self-confidence was again demonstrated the next year during the violent nationwide railway strike when it was represented on the trade union team that negotiated with the government.83
During the Emergency, many of the BMS cadre participated in the underground movement managed by the Lok Sangarsh Samiti. Indeed, in November 1976, Thengadi, then general secretary of the BMS, resigned to take over as general secretary of the Lok Sangarsh Samiti.84
Following the 1977 electoral victory of the Janata Party against Mrs Gandhi’s Congress party, the BMS was under pressure to merge with other non-communist labour unions, analogous to the merger of the constituents who established the Janata Party on 1 May 1977. BMS leaders met during 10–11 April 1977, at Delhi to discuss a united trade union with their counterparts in the Hind Mazdoor Sabha and the Hind Mazdoor Panchayat, two socialist unions loosely linked to the socialist group in the Janata Party.85 The Bharatiya Mazdoor Sangh laid down four conditions for the merger: (1) independence from political parties, (2) rejection of the notion of class struggle, (3) acceptance of Vishwakarma Day as the national workers’ day, and (4) refusal to use the red flag as the banner of the union. The negotiators arrived at a consensus on the first three, but were deadlocked on the fourth.86 However, the BMS ultimately decided against merger probably to avoid getting dragged into the contentious question of RSS members holding office in the Janata Party, which had become one of the most divisive issues within the ruling party. This controversy, which involved the right of RSS members to belong to the Janata Party, would probably have become an issue in any union merger involving the BMS since the socialists were the major advocates of denying RSS members the right to play a significant role in Janata Party affairs.
Table 1: Membership of Central Trade Union Organizations
*Government verification as of 31 December 1980.
Source: Government of India, Research and Reference Divisi
on, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, India: 1985 (New Delhi, Allied Publishers, 1986), p. 491.
During the 1977–79 Janata Party period, the BMS expanded rapidly, increasing its membership from 800,000 in 197787 to about 1,600,000 in 1980.88 Indeed, it claimed to be the second largest national trade union after the Indian National Trade Union Congress affiliated to the Congress party.
RSS AND THE HINDU RELIGIOUS ESTABLISHMENT
The divisions within the Hindu ecclesiastical community and its lack of unified purpose, according to RSS analysts, have hampered the effort to create a unified Hindu society. Golwalkar, with this concern in mind, invited a selected group of religious leaders to Bombay in late August 1964, to discuss ways in which the various Hindu sects and movements could work more closely with each other. At that meeting, the delegates established the Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP); and Shivram Shankar Apte, an RSS pracharak, was elected its general secretary. The delegates specified three objectives for the new organization: (1) to consolidate and strengthen Hindu society; (2) to protect and spread Hindu values, ethical and spiritual, and to make them relevant in contemporary society; and (3) to establish and strengthen the links among Hindus living in different countries.89
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