The formation of the Jana Sangh and the other affiliates mobilized new groups into the ‘family’. The decision to establish labour and agricultural affiliates, for example, represented attempts to enhance the influence of the world view of the RSS among a much larger part of the population. This move also influenced the RSS itself. The RSS cadre tended to espouse the interests of the groups among whom they worked, and they in turn shaped the views of the RSS. As the cadre assumed a more activist orientation, they began to relate questions concerning national integration with social and economic issues. This activism inevitably led the RSS and its affiliates to take a more direct role in political events, and to confront political authorities (as demonstrated by their support for Jaya Prakash Narayan’s Total Revolution in the mid-1970s). However, the RSS continues to display a reluctance to maintain a sustained opposition to the government. Indeed, it has done so only when government action seemed to threaten its continued survival.
The Hindu symbol system of the RSS is used increasingly to justify the mobilization of groups who consider themselves economically and socially disadvantaged. Hence, the support for indigenous languages versus English, for the small-scale entrepreneur versus big business and nationalized industry, for increasing the influence of the worker in the work place, and for collapsing the distinctions which clothing, entertainment, sport and income make between the powerful and the ‘common man.’ This shift has caused internal tensions inside the Jana Sangh and the BJP, which showed up in Balraj Madhok’s conservative rebellion against the Jana Sangh leadership.
The Jana Sangh and the BJP—the most mobilization- oriented affiliates—have been most successful electorally among Hindu groups undergoing rapid social change and moving towards more intensive internal communication and sharper external boundary definition (e.g., Hindu refugees from Pakistan, urban Hindus in Punjab, non-Christian tribals in Bihar, brahmins in Maharashtra). The Hindu symbol system of the RSS could be used to justify the integrative process among such groups. The Jana Sangh and BJP have been able to mobilize substantial support from such groups when there was a perceived social and political disadvantage in relation to other groups.
The RSS leadership has always tried to avoid day-to-day involvement in the activities of its affiliates. Had the RSS leadership been drawn directly into politics, or into the work of the other affiliates, they would have lost the aura of detachment which provides them their legitimacy as teachers, ‘cultural’ commentators and arbitrators. Moreover, they genuinely fear that the central values of the RSS would be seriously compromised by the compulsions of bargaining in the political arena.
This fear of involvement in politics brings to mind Max Weber’s discussion of an ethics of ultimate ends and an ethics of responsibility.2 RSS theorists argue that politics, as presently practised, involves morally questionable means and therefore should be kept at a certain distance.3 Those swayamsevaks who ‘work in the world’, by participating in the affiliates or other organizations, are required to wrestle with ethical paradoxes forced on them by an imperfect world. This tension between the ethical absolutism of the RSS and the relative ethics of the affiliates has resulted in a sense of moral superiority among RSS leaders, when compared to those who work in the affiliates, for the latter are required to assume responsibility for the potentially ‘evil’ consequences of their actions. There are RSS leaders who do not see the two ethical standards as moral opposites, but as supplementary to each other. They supported the formation of the affiliates, against the opinion of ethical absolutists like Golwalkar, who agreed reluctantly and out of expediency to sanction them. Nevertheless, ethical absolutism remains a powerful force among the leaders of the RSS and its affiliates. Many of the Jana Sangh and BJP cadre who were interviewed expressed misgivings about the strategies and policies employed to mobilize support, and there existed among them a certain ambiguity regarding the legitimacy of their political vocation.
However, the RSS—the major socializing agency for the cadre in the Jana Sangh and the BJP (as well as for other RSS affiliates)—has exerted influence over both policy and personnel selection without abandoning its apolitical orientation. Full-time RSS workers (i.e., the pracharaks) delegated to the affiliates maintain effective control by determining who will be recruited and advanced up the ranks. As the gatekeepers in the recruitment process, they ensure that the cadre reflect and reinforce the core values of the RSS. The growth of the affiliates has forced them to begin training their own full-time workers, a trend encouraged by the RSS. The RSS, itself experiencing an unprecedented expansion, is now reluctant to loan out pracharaks. This development has probably not undermined the bonds which link these organizers since available evidence suggests that those full-time workers trained by the affiliates tend to come from an RSS background.
The socialization process for many of the affiliates’ recruits starts during adolescence when they join the RSS. Young swayamsevaks who do not respond to the nationalist belief system of the RSS or exhibit the requisite leadership characteristics either leave it or are not given greater responsibility. Those that do remain during this sifting process develop strong bonds with their fellow swayamsevaks. Other members of the RSS become, to borrow a phrase from George H. Mead, the ‘significant audiences’ whose opinions are valued, whose appreciation is sought, and who are important sources for duty and pride.4 To remove oneself from colleagues (or to be removed from them), as Vasantrao Krishna Oke discovered, is to risk losing a part of one’s self-identity. The cement which binds the swayamsevak to the affiliate is, we believe, the emotional ties he has developed with other RSS colleagues who have shifted to the affiliate. Indeed, we believe that these personal bonds play a much greater role in tying the RSS member to the affiliate than any ideological or policy issues. This relationship is further strengthened by continued association with them in the affiliate’s work and in RSS activities.
The swayamsevaks included in the survey, as noted in Chapter 5, tended to perceive political participation as an extension of their former RSS activities. For the more committed, participation was gratifying not necessarily for the material rewards or the power that are potentially theirs, nor even the policy positions espoused by the party. The political task, like the ‘cultural’ task in the RSS, was to mobilize people to support the belief system of the RSS. But perhaps most gratifying was the opportunity to continue association with colleagues who had gone through RSS training. Indeed, if this were not so, the Jana Sangh, which was seldom able to distribute patronage and power, could not have elicited such sustained commitment on the part of its cadre.
Clearly, there were many in the organizational and parliamentary wings of the Jana Sangh—and BJP—whose motivations were not based on ideological commitment or personal bonds to old comrades, a fact which party leaders acknowledged and which concerned them. They attempted to keep such people in check by elevating the most committed (i.e., the full-time pracharaks) to the more important decision-making positions, and especially to the critical position of organizing secretary. These former full-time RSS workers monitored party activities and formed the steel frame of the party bureaucracy. They collectively served as the gatekeepers for recruitment and advancement, the formulators of party consensus, and the key communicators between different levels of the party, and between the party and the RSS.
The affiliates, because they depend on the RSS to train organizational workers, often have to depend on the RSS to begin work in new areas and among new groups. For example, Jana Sangh leaders pressured the RSS to take a more active role among the Scheduled Castes and the tribals, and in rural areas. There was even some pressure to open its ranks to Christians and Muslims. During the 1977–80 Janata period, some of the senior Jana Sangh figures at the centre, in an effort to protect the Jana Sangh group’s secular credentials (and thus make it more acceptable to its alliance partners), openly put pressure on the RSS to adopt a more liberal attitude towards non-Hindus. The BJP, as it seeks to build an organizatio
nal structure, is trying to prove its good standing in the ‘family’ of affiliates in order to insure the availability of skilled party workers.
When neither the RSS nor the affiliate can supply a member of the ‘family’ with cadre in sufficient numbers, it is forced to turn to other sources. Its first preference is likely to be other RSS affiliates. When even that is not sufficient, it must look further afield; that happened on a large scale during the early years of the BJP. But that accommodation to ‘outsiders’ aroused complaints regarding ‘indiscipline’ among party leaders, which was the proximate cause for tightening up the party structure in 1983. Accordingly, the party decided to regulate organizational recruitment and advancement more closely to ensure greater conformity with what were considered legitimate behavioural and ideological norms. In short, preference is likely to be given to swayamsevaks. But the dilemma facing all the affiliates is that organizational cohesiveness may get in the way of mobilization objectives. So far, no affiliate has been willing to weaken the symbiotic links between it and the RSS in any substantial way.
The reluctance of the brotherhood of pracharaks to weaken the symbiotic links been the RSS and the affiliates can be traced, in our view, to two objectives of prime importance to them: (1) A sense of community must be maintained among the pracharaks, and (2) the affiliates’ commitment to their ‘mission’ (i.e., applying the world view of the RSS to their area of work) must be sustained. The RSS training and its ideology pay special attention to the importance of group solidarity. Those swayamsevaks who become pracharaks have demonstrated the greatest commitment to each other and to the ideology. The pracharaks’ sense of community is sustained by working together on a ‘mission’ in the affiliates. The RSS itself provides frequent occasions to reinforce interpersonal bonds (e.g., daily shakha programmes, camps, periodic meetings of pracharaks from all affiliates, rituals). In addition, the sacrifices demanded of pracharaks enhance the value of the brotherhood. Most are bachelors who have opted to live under austere physical conditions.5 Many have also severed virtually all their ties with their own families. Recruiting a substantial number of ‘outsiders into the key positions of the affiliates would dilute the distinctiveness that makes the organizational cadre a community, as well as undermine the organization’s commitment to the ‘mission’ of the brotherhood.6 To reduce the chances of this occurring, the brotherhood has constructed highly centralized structures and kept key positions in their own hands, enabling them to regulate entry and promotion throughout the organization. Increasingly, as the affiliates are forced to train their own full-time workers, they have tried to sustain their sense of community in the RSS brotherhood by giving preference to other swayamsevaks.
Regarding its ‘mission’, the RSS brotherhood considers itself the vanguard of a movement to restructure the domestic order in authentically indigenous terms and without the help of external legitimizing agents or ideologies. It has ideological comrades in many other Third World countries where similar movements have become very attractive as symbols of the reassertion of the dignity of people who feel they have been exploited. Like these comparable movements, the Hindu revivalism advocated by the RSS has a populist orientation which opposes concentrations of power and wealth as disruptive of the social solidarity required to sustain the political and cultural autonomy of India. Moreover, such concentrations of power and wealth are viewed as advancing the cause of such ‘foreign’ ideologies as capitalism and communism. With the continued challenge to traditional norms and social structures, the RSS message is likely to remain a potent competitor for the loyalty of people seeking a new ordering principle in their lives that does not require a complete rejection of indigenous symbols and beliefs.
Appendix A
RSS ORGANIZATIONAL CHART
Sarsanghchalak
Kendriya Karyakari Mandal (Central Working Committee) General secretary Assistant general secretary
Karyalaya Pramukh (office secretary)—responsible for correspondence and expenditure of funds.
Zonal joint secretaries
Programme chairmen Prachar Pramukh—responsible for recruitment and placement of pracharaks.
Sharirik Shikshan—arranges physical exercises at shakha and camps.
Baudhik Pramukh—determines songs to learn, books to be read, topics at shakha and baudhik.
Nidhi Pramukh—arranges for collection of funds at Gurudakshina*
Vyavastha Pramukh—coordinator of activities.
Akhil Bharatiya Pratinidhi Sabha (All-India Representative Assembly). This meets once a year in Nagpur but for the last few years they have been meeting in different towns where the Sangh Parivar provides boarding and lodging facilities to 1500-plus delegates. Resolutions are discussed and voted by the Sabha. Members are elected by swayamsevaks over eighteen.
Kshetra (Zone) Pracharak
Prant (State) Sanghchalak
Karyavah
Pracharak
Committee
Pratinidhi Sabha
Vibhag (Division) Sanghchalak
Karyavah
Pracharak
Committee
Zila (District) Sanghchalak
Karyavah
Pracharak
Committee
Nagar (City) Sanghchalak
Karyavah
Pracharak
Committee
Mandal (Neighbourhood) Karyavah
Committee
Shakha
Karyavah
Mukhya Shikshak
Shikshak
Gatanayak
*Subsequent to a decision to tax gurudakshina (offerings), the RSS constitution was amended to redefine the role of Nidhi Pramukh. Shakhas themselves were vested with individual responsibility in collecting donations to enable the RSS to operate with limits of tax exemption.
Appendix B
STEPWISE MULTIPLE REGRESSION ON VARIABLES INFLUENCING ADVANCEMENT IN THE JANA SANGH
Note: Only RSS members from the sample were included in this stepwise multiple regression in order to test if RSS participation was only an intervening variable. The results suggest that RSS participation is itself an independent variable, and that it is a far more influential factor than the other variables included here.
Appendix C
JANA SANGH PERFORMANCE IN ASSEMBLY ELECTIONS
(In the following tables, ‘S’ stands for Seats, ‘C’ for Contested, ‘W’ for Won, and ‘V’ for Vote Percentage)
Sources. The 1952–67 figures are taken from Craig Baxter, The Jana Sangh: A Biography of an Indian Political Party (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1969), and Appendix II, Craig Baxter, District Voting Trends in India: A Research Tool (New York: Columbia University Press, 1969). Subsequent election results are taken from the Election Commission of India’s statistical reports. No total percentages are given in 1968–69 mid-term elections or the 1972–74 elections because of the staggered dates for those elections.
Notes. *Includes elections only in the states and Union territories in which the Jana Sangh had candidates. We have calculated the results on the basis of states as presently constituted.
**The Jana Sangh participated in an electoral alliance in the 1975 state assembly elections in Gujarat. This alliance won a majority of the seats (i.e., 86 seats) to form the state government.
***Figures for 1957 and 1962 are for the Praja Parishad.
****The Kerala assembly elections were held in 1954, 1960, 1965 and 1967.
*****Figures for 1972–74 elections were taken from the 1971 election in Delhi.
Appendix D
JANA SANGH PERFORMANCE IN PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS
(In the following tables, ‘S’ stands for Seats, ‘C’ for Contested, ‘W’ for Won, and ‘V’ for Vote Percentage)
Sources. The 1952–67 election statistics are taken from Baxter, Jana Sangh; and Baxter, District Voting Trends in India; subsequent election results are taken from Election Commission of India’s statistical reports.
Note
s. *This table includes only those states or Union territories in which the Jana Sangh ran candidates. We have calculated the results on the basis of states as presently constituted.
**Union territories as presently constituted.
Bibliography
PRIMARY SOURCES
Manuscripts
Keshav Baliram Hedgewar, by courtesy of Madhav Sadashiv Golwalkar. Letters at Hedgewar Bhavan, RSS headquarters in Nagpur.
Minutes of the Hindu Mahasabha Working Committee Meetings, 1947–49. Hindu Mahasabha Bhavan, Delhi.
Madan Mohan Malaviya Papers, by courtesy of Padam Kant Malaviya. These papers are now deposited at the National Archives in Delhi.
Vinayak Damodar Savarkar Papers, Savarkar correspondents by courtesy of S. S. Savarkar (no relation, but primary secretary). This collection is now at Savarkar Sadan in Bombay. The Nehru Memorial Museum and Library (NMML)
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