This is a good point at which to draw our first conclusions. The FSB subsequently claimed that training exercises were being held in Ryazan, but this is contradicted by the following circumstances. On the evening of September 22, after the sacks of explosives had been discovered in the basement of the apartment building, the FSB made no announcement that training exercises were being held in Ryazan, that the sacks contained ordinary sugar, or that the detonating device was a mock-up. The FSB had a second opportunity to issue a statement concerning exercises on September 23, when the news agencies of the world carried the story of the failed terrorist attack in Ryazan. The FSB did not issue any denial, nor did it announce that training had been taking place in Ryazan. As of September 23, the Prime Minister of Russia and Yeltsin s successor in the post of president, Vladimir Putin, still supported the FSB version of events and sincerely believed (or at least pretended to believe) that a terrorist attack had been thwarted in Ryazan.
Let us imagine just for a moment that training exercises really were taking place in Ryazan. Could we possibly expect the FSB to say nothing all day long on September 23, while the whole world was buzzing with news of a failed terrorist attack? It s impossible to imagine it. Is it possible to imagine that the Prime Minister of Russia and former director of the FSB, who, moreover, has personal links with Patrushev, was not informed
51
52
about the exercises ? It is quite impossible to imagine it, even in your wildest dreams. It would be an open gesture of disloyalty to Putin by Patrushev, after which one or the other of them would have had to quit the political arena. The fact that at seven o clock in the evening, on September 23, 1999, Putin did not make any statement about training exercises taking place in Ryazan was the weightiest possible argument in favor of interpreting events as a failed attempt by the FSB to blow up an apartment building in Ryazan.
The mayor of Moscow, Yury Luzhkov, who has pretty good contacts among the departments of the armed forces and law enforcement, was not informed about any FSB exercises in Ryazan, either. On the contrary, on September 23, the Moscow authorities gave instructions for intensive precautions to be taken to prevent terrorist attacks in the capital, primarily because in the opinion of representatives of the agencies of law enforcement, the composition of the explosive found in Moscow and Ryazan, and the way it was planted, were similar. The Moscow police were given instructions to thoroughly check all premises, including non-residential, from top to bottom, and to carefully inspect every vehicle carrying goods into the city. In Moscow, the events in Ryazan were seen as a prevented terrorist attack.
But the most remarkable thing of all is that not even Rushailo, who headed the commission for combating terrorism and supervised the Whirlwind Anti-Terror operation, knew anything at all about exercises in Ryazan. Oleg Aksyonov, head of the information department of the MVD of Russia, later said: For us, for the people of Ryazan, and the central administration, this is a total surprise; it was treated as a serious crime. On September 23, in his capacity as press secretary for the MVD, Aksyonov met the press several times. To Rushailo s shame, Aksyonov announced that, having familiarized himself with the situation, the minister had ordered that all the basements and attics in Ryazan should be checked once again in the space of a day and that vigilance should be increased. Aksyonov emphasized that the implementation of the order was to be closely monitored, since people could pay for a minor slip-up with their lives.
Even on September 24, when he addressed the First All-Russian Congress for Combating Organized Crime, Rushailo spoke about the terrorist attack that had been thwarted in Ryazan and said that a number of serious miscalculations have been made in the activities of the agencies of the interior and that harsh conclusions had been drawn.
Having pointed out the miscalculations of the agencies that had failed to spot the explosives being planted, Rushailo followed Putin in praising the people of Ryazan who had managed to foil the terrorist attack. The struggle against terrorism is not the exclusive prerogative of the agencies of the interior, said Rushailo. A significant role in this matter was allotted to the local authorities and administrations, whose work, however, also contains significant flaws. Rushailo recommended to his audience the immediate creation of interdepartmental monitoring and that would travel to the regions to check the implementation of decisions on site and to provide practical assistance. He pointed out that in the MVD such work was already being carried out and there had been definite improvements, such as the foiling of the attempt to blow up the apartment
52
53
building in Ryazan. The thwarting of new terrorist attacks and the punishment of the guilty parties in crimes already committed is the main task facing the MVD of Russia at the present stage, Minister of the Interior Vladimir Rushailo emphasized with pride in the one thwarted terrorist attack he already had to his credit-in Ryazan.
If the minister himself regarded the Ryazan episode as a foiled terrorist attack, then what can we say about the regional UVD? The appeals composed in revolutionary style simply begged to be set to music: The war declared by terrorism against the people of Russia continues. And this means that the unification of all the forces of society and the state to repel the treacherous foe is the essential requirement of the present day. The struggle against terrorism cannot remain a matter only for the police and the secret services. The most striking possible confirmation of this is the report of an attempt to blow up an apartment building in Ryazan which was thwarted thanks to the vigilance of the public. On September 23, in Ryazan& while checking the basement of an apartment building a police detachment discovered an explosive device consisting of three sacks of hexogene and a timing mechanism set for half-past five in the morning. The terrorist attack was thwarted thanks to the inhabitants of the building, which the criminals had chosen as their target. The evening before, they had noticed strangers carrying sacks of some kind into the basement from a Zhiguli automobile with its license plate papered over. The residents immediately contacted the police. Initial analysis of the contents of the sacks showed that they actually did contain a substance similar to hexogene mixed with granulated sugar. The sacks were immediately dispatched to Moscow under guard. Following expert analysis, the staff at the FSB laboratory will give a final answer as to whether this was an attempted terrorist attack or merely a diversionary ploy.
In this connection, the department of the interior for the region wishes to remind citizens yet again of the need to remain calm and take an organized, business-like approach to ensuring one s own safety. The best reply to the terrorists will be the vigilance of us all.
All this requires is to look a little closer at the people around you, pay attention to strangers noticed in the entrance way, in the attic, or the basement of your building, to abandoned automobiles parked directly beside apartment buildings. At the slightest suspicion phone the police.
Do not on any account attempt to examine the contents of any suspicious boxes, bags, and other unidentified objects, which you may find. In such situations you should restrict access to them by other people and call the police.
The establishment of house committees to organize the protection of buildings and surrounding territory during the night will also serve to reduce significantly the likelihood of terrorist incidents in our city. Remember, today it depends on every one of us just how effective the fight against evil will be. -UVD Information Group.
53
54
Unfortunately for him, on September 23,1999, General Alexander Zdanovich, head of the Center for Public Relations of the FSB of Russia, was due to appear in the television program Hero of the Day on the NTV channel. Thanks to this, we have yet another important piece of evidence that the FSB was planning to just sit it out and allow the people of Ryazan and the journalists to swallow the version of events as a failed terrorist attack by Chechens. It is obvious that prior to Zdanovich s appearance, the FSB had no intention of making any statement about exercise
s. Their calculations were simple enough: the police had not found any terrorists from the FSB or the car. The story of the thwarted terrorist attack was still working, and, best of all, it suited everyone, since even Rushailo could claim a share of the credit for thwarting the bombing.
Zdanovich had, however, been instructed by his bosses to try feeling out the public reaction to the fairy tale about exercises, in case something went wrong or there was a leak of information about the FSB s involvement in the terrorist attack in Ryazan. Note how gently Zdanovich began hinting that no actual crime had been committed in the attempt to blow up the house in Ryazan, as if trying to convince people that there was nothing to get excited about. The press secretary of the FSB declared that the initial report indicated that there was no hexogene in the sacks discovered in the basement of one of the apartment blocks in the city, but that they contained something like remotecontrol devices. Nor were there any detonating mechanisms, although it was now possible to confirm that certain elements of a detonating mechanism had been discovered.
At the same time, Zdanovich emphasized that the final answer would have to be given by the experts, his colleagues from the FSB laboratory in Moscow, who were Patrushev s subordinates. Zdanovich knew perfectly well just what final answer would be given by the FSB experts: it would be the one their boss ordered them to give (this answer would be communicated to us only after a certain delay, on March 21, 2000, a year-and-a half after the foiled terrorist attack, and just five days before the presidential election).
But even so, at the beginning of the program Hero of the Day, Zdanovich was not in possession of any information to the effect that the FSB had apparently been carrying out exercises in Ryazan. He did not even hint at the possibility that training exercises might be involved. In his interview, Zdanovich did express doubts that the sacks contained explosive and that there was a live detonating device, but there was not a single word about any possible exercises. This discrepancy was yet another indication that the secret services had planned a terrorist attack in Ryazan. It is simply not possible to imagine that the leadership of the FSB had kept information on exercises already completed in Ryazan a secret from Zdanovich.
The evening of September 23 brought yet another absurdity. The Novosti news agency broadcast a recording of the NTV interview with General Zdanovich and announced that the Intercept search plan for the white VAZ-2107 automobile was still continuing. A lot of things about this entire story are unclear. In particular, the witnesses gave different descriptions of the color and make of the automobile. Doubts had even arisen about whether the car s license plate had been papered over. At the same time, as the press
54
55
center remarked, the search for the car was being continued in order to reconstruct an objective picture.
Despite Zdanovich s assurances that there had been no explosive or detonating device, the Ryazan UFSB was still unable to reconstruct an objective picture. On September 24, the morning newspapers carried details of how the terrorist attack in Ryazan had been foiled, but still no statement from the FSB about exercises.
Not until September 24 did FSB director Patrushev finally decide to issue a statement about the exercises which had been held in Ryazan. What could have made Patrushev shift tactics in this way? Firstly, the main clues, three sacks of explosive with a live detonating device, had been delivered into Patrushev s hands in Moscow, which was good news for Patrushev. Now he could substitute the sacks and confidently assert that the provincials in Ryazan had made a mistake, and the results of their analysis were wrong. There was also bad news: the Ryazan UFSB had detained two terrorists.
Let s lend the FSB a hand in establishing the objective picture which was so zealously concealed from the people. In simplified form, the most brilliant part of the joint operation, conducted by the Ryazan police and the Ryazan Region UFSB, went as follows.
Following the discovery in Ryazan of the sacks containing explosive and a live detonating device, the Intercept plan had been announced in the city. The senior officer responsible for public relations (press secretary) of the UFSB of the Ryazan Region, Yury Bludov, announced that Patrushev s statement had come as a complete surprise to the local members of the state security services. Until the last moment, we worked across the board in close collaboration with the police, just as though the threat of a terrorist attack was real, we made up sketches of the suspected terrorists; on the basis of the results of the analysis, we initiated criminal proceedings under article 205 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation (terrorism); we conducted a search for cars and terrorists.
After the announcement of Operation Intercept, when the routes out of town were already closed off, the operational divisions of the Ryazan UVD and UFSB attempted to determine the precise location of the terrorists they were seeking. They had a few lucky breaks. Nadezhda Yukhanova, an employee of the Electrosvyaz Company (the telephone service), recorded a suspicious call to Moscow. Leave one at a time, there are patrols everywhere, replied the voice at the other end of the line. Yukhanova immediately reported the call to the Ryazan UFSB, and it was a simple technical matter for the suspicious telephone to be monitored immediately. The operatives had no doubt that they had located the terrorists. However, difficulties arose, because when the bugging technology identified the Moscow telephone number the terrorists were ringing, it turned out to be the number of one of the offices of the FSB in Moscow.
After leaving Novosyolov Street shortly after 9 p.m. on September 22, the terrorists had not risked driving straight to Moscow, because a solitary car is always noticeable on a
55
56
deserted highway at night, and the chances of being stopped at a traffic police post were too high. Any car stopped at night would be noted in the duty officer s journal, even if the people sitting in it were members of the FSB or other secret services, and the next day when the news of the explosion was announced, the policeman would be bound to recall stopping a car with three people. If there also happened to be reports by witnesses in Ryazan, they would pick up the car and its passengers immediately. The terrorists had to wait until the morning, since they couldn t leave the target area until after the explosion had taken place, and their military mission had been accomplished. In the morning, there would be a lot of cars on the highway. For the first few hours after the attack, there would be panic. If witnesses had spotted two men and a woman in a car, the police would be looking for three terrorists, two men and one woman. One person alone in a car could always give any police cordon the slip.
That this was the way things really were is clear from the report of operation Intercept in the newspaper Trud: By now the situation in Ryazan had reached red hot. Reinforced patrols of police and cadets from the local military colleges walked the streets. All road routes out of and into the city were blocked by the patrols and sentries armed to the teeth and road traffic police. Miles-long traffic jams had built up with cars and trucks moving to and from Moscow. They searched all the cars thoroughly, looking for three terrorists, two men and a woman, whose descriptions were posted on almost every street lamp post.
Following instructions received, one of the terrorists set out towards Moscow in the car on September 23, abandoned the car in the area of Kolomna, and made his way to Moscow unhindered. One of the terrorists had now escaped the clutches of the Ryazan police and taken the car with him as well. Late in the day of September 23, less than twenty-four hours later, an empty car was found by the police on the Moscow-Ryazan highway close to Kolomna, about halfway to Moscow. It was the same car with the papered-over license plates, which was used to transport the explosive, Bludov announced. The car turned out to be registered as missing with the police. In other words, the terrorists had carried out their operation in a stolen car (a classical feature of terrorist attacks).
The car had not been dumped near Kolomna by chance. If it had been stolen in Moscow or the Moscow Region, the police would have returned it to th
e owner at his home address, and it would probably never have entered anyone s head to think it might be the car used by unknown terrorists to transport hexogene for blowing up a building in a different region of the country, in Ryazan. Accordingly, they wouldn t have bothered to analyze the contents of the car for microparticles of hexogene and other explosive substances. The accomplice could go back for the two terrorists left behind in Ryazan the next day in a standard FSB operational vehicle and take them to Moscow without any risk of being caught. On the other hand, if it were discovered that the car found near Kolomna was the one used for the terrorist attack, the fact that it was abandoned halfway to Moscow would tell the Ryazan police that the terrorists had gotten away. The cordon in place around Ryazan would then be relaxed, which would make it easier for the remaining two terrorists to leave.
56
57
So now there were two terrorists left in Ryazan. From information provided by the Ryazan UFSB, we know that the terrorists stayed overnight somewhere in Ryazan and didn t spend the night of September 22 hanging about in the hallways of buildings in a strange and unfamiliar town. The conclusion must be drawn that the terrorists had arranged places to stay in advance, even if they themselves were not from Ryazan. In that case, it is clear that they had time to choose their target, which was far from random, and to prepare for their terrorist attack. When they were caught by surprise by operation Intercept starting earlier than expected, the terrorists decided to wait it out in the town.
Alexander Litvinenko Page 9