4. Can you indicate the name of your friend who in your opinion is an FSB agent?
5. Can you prove that your friend was a member of the FSB?
6. Who else in your opinion was connected with this operation? In your opinion were these people employees or agents of the Russian special services?
7. Does the name Laipanov mean anything to you and what relationship does Laipanov have to you?
8. Describe in detail your actions after your acquaintance phoned you at night on your mobile and told you there was a fire at your storage premises, until the time when you fled from Moscow.
9. Can you remember the number of your mobile phone and the telephone number (numbers) of your friend? What was his home address, where and when and how often did you meet with him? How can we find him now? 10. State in detail exactly which services you telephoned and warned about possible explosions, what exactly you told them, exactly which addresses you gave, whether you gave your own name and the reason why you were calling. Describe these calls in as much detail as possible, indicating the time of day, the date and the circumstances in which the calls were made. 11. From which telephone did you call? What answer did the operator give you? (telephone service operator) (emergency services operators). 12. Are you acquainted with Krymshamkhalov and (or) Batchaev? If yes, how and when and in what circumstances did you make their acquaintance? What was the connection between you? At what intervals did you meet? 13. What do you know and can tell us about these men? 14. From your testimony it follows that you did not know there was explosive in the storage premises you had rented. Do you confirm this? 15. Do you know exactly what explosive, what type of explosive and what quantity was located in your storage premises? 16. When exactly was it delivered, can you remember the schedule of these deliveries, who exactly delivered it? Can you state the surnames of these people?
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17. If you are correct in believing that your friend was an FSB agent, who in your opinion was behind him and to what end was this operation planned and carried out? 18. What do you know today about the involvement (or non-involvement) in this operation of the FSB or any other special services of the Russian Federation or any other states? When and to what end was this operation commenced? 19. Can you prove that you knew nothing about the preparation of the terrorist acts? 20. Can you name people who could have or definitely did take part in this operation? 21. What response could you give if any of these people testified in a face to face confrontation that you were aware that there was explosive, and not sugar, in the storage premises rented by yourself. 22. What response could you give if any of these people testified in a face to face confrontation that he was under your command and received his instructions concerning the transport of the explosive from you? 23. Are you a relative of the R. Gochiyaev who was convicted a few days ago and are you connected in any way with his arrest and conviction?
The answers to all the questions are ready, you can discuss them in detail at the meeting with Tsoriya. [Written by A. Gochiyaev.] Aug. 04.02
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Appendix 20
DECLARATION
On March 5, 2002 I, Nikita Sergeevich Chekulin, the former acting director of the scientific Research Institute Roskonversvzryvtsentr of the Ministry of Education of Russia, made a statement criticizing Russian officials for having concealed facts and prevented the investigation of the system of theft of explosive substances, their illegal distribution on the territory of Russia and also the illegal export from the country components of jet-propelled projectiles and rockets.
Over the last year I have not received any reply.
During this time certain of the mass media have spread slanderous assertions about me on the basis of materials supposedly received from the Federal Security Service and supposedly stamped secret.
No denials from the FSB were forthcoming.
At the same time officials of the FSB, MVD and the Public Prosecutor s Office, in response to requests from State Duma Deputy S.A. Kovalyov, provided him with false information relating to my statement.
Thus for instance the Deputy General Public Prosecutor Kolmogorov in a letter of August 13, 2002, referring to the check supposedly carried out by the FSB, claims that army unit No. 92 919 and the Roskonversvzryvtsentr Research Institute supposedly have never had and do not have anything to do with each other.
I am in possession of authentic documents which confirm the facts of the systematic signing of contracts between the commander of army unit No. 92 919, Shatov, and the director of the Roskonversvzryvtsentr Research Institute, Shchukin, for the supply of explosive substances beginning from 1997. I have data on the payments made from the account of the Research Institute to the account of the army unit concerned, information on the volumes and types of explosive substances supplied, included those sent abroad, in 1998, 1999 and 2000.
On March 5, 2002 I first made public the fact that there were indications of the theft of 5 tons of hexogene slabs from this same army unit No. 92 919. But they were not investigated at all. These named examples and others demonstrate that Russian officials are, as previously, performing actions in clear contravention of Russian law in investigating the facts stated by myself.
The analysis I have carried out of the statements made by official spokesmen for the Russian special services concerning the origin of the explosive substances used in the
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detonations of apartment blocks in 1999 makes it possible to conclude that they are unreliable.
London, March 5, 2003 Nikita Sergeevich Chekulin
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Appendix 21 The Terrorist Attacks of 1999: What Explosives Were Used?
N.S. Chekulin Former acting director of the Scientific Research Institute Roskonversvzryvtsentr of the Ministry of Education of Russia
ANALYSIS OF THE ACCOUNTS OF THE SOURCE
OF THE EXPLOSIVE MATERIALS USED TO BLOW UP
RESIDENTIAL BUILDINGS IN 1999
The initial version: hexogene On September 10, 1999 the newspaper Moskovsky Komsomolets published material about the explosion on Guryanov Street, in which it said: Yesterday an anonymous caller phoned the Interfax office and declared, speaking with a Caucasian accent: What happened in Moscow and Buinaksk is our response to the bombing of the peaceful villages of Chechnya and Dagestan . That was how the Chechen-Dagestani version of events first came to light.
At about the same time the mayor of Moscow Yury Luzhkov was announcing from the television screen that Chechens were undoubtedly involved in the bombings.
In a television interview after the explosion on Guryanov Street the Director of the FSB Patrushev stated that an analysis of the explosive material used had discovered traces of hexogene and TNT.
On September 10, 1999 the Moscow and Moscow Region department of the FSB announced that the collapse of the entranceways of the house on Guryanov Street occurred as a result of the detonation of a high-explosive mixture with a mass of about 350 kg. the explosive device was situated at street floor level. Chemical investigations of items removed from the scene discovered on their surfaces traces of& hexogene and
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TNT.
On September 15, 1999 the head of the Ministry of the Interior s Central Office for Combating Organized Crime Kozlov confirmed that at Guryanov Street it was not a home made pyrotechnical mixture, but industrial explosive that was used.
On September 23, 1999 the head of the engineering and technical section of the Ryazan Region UVD (Office of the Interior), senior lieutenant Yury Tkachenko, carried out an express analysis of the substance discovered in the house on Novosyolov Street in Ryazan. According to Tkachenko s report the gas analyzer indicated fumes of a hexogene type explosive. Then this expert confirmed this conclusion repeatedly in video and audio recordings.
TNT.
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On September 23, 1999 the MVD press center issued an official statement concerning what was fo
und in Ryazan on Novosyolov Street: In investigating the substance in question the presence of hexogene fumes was discovered. At the same time the MVD emphasized that an explosive device was disarmed.
The second version: an identical explosive On March 16, 2000 the first deputy head of the operational investigations office of Department T of the FSB, General Shagako, announced at a press conference: The constituents of the explosive substances which were discovered in the basement premise on Borisovskye Prudy Street in Moscow, and also the constituents of the explosive substances which were discovered in the town of Buinaksk on September 4, 1999 in a ZIL-130 automobile, unexploded, they are identical, i.e. the composition of these substances includes ammonium nitrate and aluminum powder, in particular cases there are admixtures of hexogene and in particular cases there are admixtures of TNT.
Then Shagako stated that two months earlier in the Urus-Martanov region of Chechnya the FSB had discovered a center for training demolition specialists, and 5 tons of ammonium nitrate had been discovered on the territory of the camp. Also found here were activating mechanisms similar to the mechanisms that were used in the explosions that I have already listed& the activating mechanisms discovered in the ZIl-130 automobile, in the town of Buinaksk and also the activating mechanisms discovered in the basement premises in the city of Moscow on Borisovskye Prudy Street, in the course of a criminal investigation were proved to be identical.
Shagako went on to list identical items: Casio watches, single-colored wires and other things that were found in Khattab s camps.
At the same press conference FSB General Zdanovich asked a rhetorical question: Have there been any cases of theft of this explosive from the state factories where it is produced using specific technologies? And he answered himself: I can say immediately that there have not, at least our investigation is not in possession of any such data.
The third version: hexogene-free
On March 20, 2000 during the recording of an NTV program with the author Nikolaev, FSB General Zdanovich stated that hexogene was not used either in Ryazan or in the other cities in Russia in the bombings of apartment blocks. The program was broadcast on March 24.
On December 22, 2000 Moskovsky Komsomolets published an interview by the correspondent Alexander Khinstein of the head of the operational investigations office, the deputy head of the FSB s Department T, General Mironov. In the interview a new FSB version of the explosions that had taken place was given.
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Khinstein s question: We have touched on the subject of the Moscow explosions. Is it possible to say with certainty how these terrorist acts were prepared?
Answer: Yes, all the elements have already been put in place. Some of the perpetrators of the crime have been arrested. The main ones are being sought. We know in addition how this explosive was produced, who was issuing the orders& It is interesting to note that even before the explosions in Moscow and in Buinaksk the same technology had been developed in other places, for instance in Tashkent. The mixture of components there was exactly the same. We believe that a similar explosive has been used to commit terrorist acts in Africa.
General Mironov confirmed that in the terrorist acts in Moscow and Volgodonsk Casio watches were used.
Khinstein s question: Shortly after the explosions quite a few different accounts appeared of how exactly the hexogene was delivered to Moscow?
Answer: Today we ve worked out the entire route& In Chechnya there were two sabotage training camps: foreign instructors trained fighters in Serzhen-Yurt and in Urus- Martan. At these bases there was a special installation for producing the explosive mixture in large quantities. Its components included ammonium nitrate, aluminum powder and sugar. About fifteen tons were prepared: they used five and ten were confiscated by us. As far as we know, it was made by fighters of Uzbek Nationality. The explosive was specially transferred to Kislovodsk and based there, and from there in a heavy-duty van they delivered it to Moscow together with sacks of sugar. They distributed it round several addresses. Two of these addresses everybody knows:
Kashirskoe Chausse and Guryanov Street&
On May 14, 2002 the full text was published of an answer sent from the General Public Prosecutor s Office, signed by Kolmogorov, in response to an inquiry by State Duma deputy Kulikov concerning the results of the investigation into the criminal cases initiated on the basis of the explosions in Moscow and Volgodonsk, and also concerning the FSB exercises that took place in Ryazan in the fall of 1999. Kolmogorov signed a statement from his subordinates, which stated: As a result of a complex of investigative actions and operational investigative measures exhaustive proof was obtained that the acts of terrorism being investigated were committed by an organized criminal group consisting of illegal Chechen armed formations under the leadership of A. Sh. Gochiyaev and which also included Yu. I.
Krymshamkhalov, T.A. Batchaev, A.O. Dekkushev, D.V. Saitakov, Kh. M. Abaev and a number of other individuals.
Not one of the individuals named is a Chechen by nationality.
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The General Public Prosecutor s Office does not adduce any information concerning the name of the explosive substances used, their origin and the means of their delivery.
Against this background the position of the General Public Prosecutor s Office regarding the verification of the events of the so-called Ryazan exercises is highly indicative.
Kolmogorov can think of nothing better than to give a detailed description of an explosive substance that was not found in Ryazan. His letter states in particular: The expert explosives analysis carried out in connection with the case has established that the sacks contained saccharose-disaccharide based on glucopyranose and fructoranose. Traces of high-explosive substances (TNT, hexogene, octogen, TEN, nitroglycerine, tetryl and picric acid were not discovered in the substance under investigation.
That is to say, seven possible names of explosive substances - no more and no less. The names given do not include ammonium nitrate, aluminum powder or dust, sugar,
industrial oil or plastic explosive.
The letter from the General Public Prosecutor s Office also contains one other piece of testimony: The police detachment that arrived in response to the call discovered in the basement of the house indicated three sacks containing a white, friable substance and a device consisting of three Crown electric batteries, an electronic watch and a 12-calibre hunting cartridge, resembling an electro-detonator& In view of the fact that the objects found bore a resemblance to the home-made explosive devices used in the explosions in Moscow, it was decided to evacuate the residents of the building, and the FSB Department of Russia s investigative section for the Ryazan Region initiated a criminal case on the basis of indications of a crime as stipulated in articles 30 part 3 and 205 part 1 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation (attempted terrorism).
The fourth version: sugar
On September 9, 2002, on the third anniversary of the explosion on Guryanov Street Rossiyskaya Gazeta published a new interview with Ivan Mironov, still in the same post.
Answering the very first question the general said that he did not see any need to engage in polemics with Boris Berezovsky, since In two years the investigation has gathered enough incontrovertible evidence of the guilt of concrete individuals to construct a single precise and logically motivated version of the Moscow terrorist acts. According to Mironov s version the main organizer and executor of the explosions was the Karachaevan Achemez Gochiyaev.
Mironov s answer concerning the motives for the crimes in Moscow and Volgodonsk is interesting. The general answers: Khattab was pursuing the goal of creating a second front . It was planned to use general terror to draw the peoples of the entire Northern Caucasus into the military action, to set, say the Ingushetians and the Ossetians against each other and totally intimidate Russia so that Russians would not feel safe anywhere.
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At this point we should
revert to Mironov s answers to a similar question in December 2002. Then he highlighted the version of vengeance by the Karachaevans for the death of their fellow-fighters who had invaded the territory of Dagestan. The second point is purely political. The fighters wanted to demonstrate their ferocity and decisiveness, to punish absolutely innocent people for the start of military action.
Mironov s answers to questions about the composition of the explosive mixture used are extremely important. He said: this composition is used in geological work. We know the proportions of ammonium nitrate, aluminum powder and ordinary industrial oil, which is added as a binding agent. In addition they added dry TNT and as an explosion initiator they used plastic explosive to heat up the main mass.
Alexander Litvinenko Page 41