by Adi Ignatius
With hundreds of thousands of people involved, it’s impossible for there to have been no extreme or one-sided comments. Things appear extremely grave if you select only the ten most extreme statements being expressed by all of the people involved. I am not sure what was behind Li Ximing and Chen Xitong’s behavior: either their old mentality of class struggle was at work or they had other ulterior motives.
The student demonstration was deemed an “organized and carefully plotted political struggle,” and was documented as such in the minutes of the meeting. Li Peng, Li Ximing, and Chen Xitong were the ones initially responsible for this.
On April 25, Li Peng and [President] Yang Shangkun reported to Deng Xiaoping about the Politburo Standing Committee meeting. Deng Xiaoping had always tended to prefer tough measures when dealing with student demonstrations because he believed that demonstrations undermined stability. After listening to their report, Deng immediately agreed to label the student demonstrations “anti-Party, anti-socialist turmoil” and proposed to resolve the situation quickly, in the manner of “using a sharp knife to cut through knotted hemp.”
When I had visited him on April 19, he had agreed with my position. On the 25th, after being briefed by Li Peng and Yang Shangkun, he had changed his mind to agree with their assessment. After all, it coincided more closely with what he had really believed all along.
Deng’s discussion with Li Peng and others on April 25 was supposed to be an internal affair. However, Li Peng decided to disseminate the contents of Deng’s remarks that very evening to Party cadres of all levels, and paraphrased their talk in the editorial that he had the People’s Daily publish on April 26, publicly designating the student demonstrations as “premeditated and organized turmoil with anti-Party and anti-socialist motives.”
Before my visit to North Korea, neither Li Peng nor the cadres in Beijing mentioned these viewpoints to me. Immediately upon my leaving Beijing, they quickly held a Politburo Standing Committee meeting and gained support from Deng Xiaoping. This constituted a departure from the previous position and the principles adopted by the Standing Committee.
Deng was not happy about how Li Peng had made his remarks public. Deng’s children were also displeased that Deng had been put in the position of being in direct confrontation with the public. As I was preparing a speech for the commemoration of the May Fourth Movement,* [Deng’s daughter] Maomao called [Zhao adviser] Bao Tong, who was drafting the text, to suggest that the speech include remarks about how much Deng loved and protected young people.
Later, on May 17, at the meeting at Deng’s home in which the decision was made to impose martial law, Deng demanded of Li Peng, “Don’t repeat what you did before; don’t reveal that it was I who made the decision to impose martial law!” Li Peng said repeatedly, “I won’t! I won’t!”
It was obvious that some people were attempting to use the extreme words of a few students to aggravate the situation and push the government to the point of direct confrontation. With the implementation of reform, it should not have been such a big deal that students criticized leaders. They were just expressions of frustration and were not a challenge to our entire political system.
However, selectively gathering all the personal criticisms and reading them aloud to Deng made for a tremendous insult to the old man. These people selected sporadic extreme opinions of a tiny minority of students and represented them as the major trend of the movement, which they claimed was directed specifically against Deng Xiaoping himself. Deng tended to think in a certain way that was formed during the years when class struggle was the primary objective, so as soon as he heard Li Peng’s report, he reacted accordingly. I am afraid this is one of the major reasons for his decision.
While I was in North Korea, the minutes of the Standing Committee meeting of April 24 and Deng Xiaoping’s remarks reached me through the embassy. I replied by telegram: “I completely agree with Comrade Deng Xiaoping’s decision regarding the policy toward the current turmoil.”
When I received these documents, I had to respond, and I was not in any position to express disagreement because I was abroad and had no direct knowledge of the situation at home. However, I did not express my views on the minutes of the Standing Committee meeting. Upon reading Deng Xiaoping’s remarks, I did not think that any immediate actions would be taken against the students. My first thought was that another campaign against liberalism might begin, possibly on an even greater scale than before (it hadn’t occurred to me that the student protests would not subside, because I had not thought of them as a major problem). [A new campaign could] damage the momentum that the reforms had gained since the 13th Party Congress [held in October/November 1987], especially in political reform. That’s because Deng believed that the student demonstrations were the long-term results of the lax execution of the Anti–Bourgeois Liberalization Campaign.
However, after the publication of the April 26 editorial, the situation immediately changed, and the confrontation escalated. Students were angered by the editorial’s wording and political accusations. “Anti-Party,” “anti-socialist,” “premeditated plot,” etc., were terms that had not been heard in years, so they provoked intense emotions. Those who were moderate before were then forced to take sides with the extremists.
After I returned from North Korea, I invited several people from universities over for discussions. All of them talked about this situation. Upon the publishing of the April 26 editorial, many people were highly displeased, including those in various government departments. Many exclaimed, “How did we end up with that thing?!”
The number of demonstrators on the streets on April 27 had swelled to ten thousand. The harsh words of the editorial made students feel that their actions might lead to a crackdown. Some even left wills and letters of farewell for their families before taking to the streets.
The April 26 editorial not only agitated the students, but also left those in various government departments, organizations, and other political parties in a general state of discontent. They found it incomprehensible and were displeased or even angered by it. They believed that the students had acted out of a sincere concern for important matters of state and the fate of reforms, and had expressed their views on some hot social issues, all out of goodwill and patriotism. The government not only failed to express support or provide guidance, but with the harshly worded editorial took a stand in opposition to the students, labeling them with the political tags “anti-Party” and “anti-socialist.” The reaction from intellectuals was especially critical.
The government’s response boosted popular sympathy and support for the students. Video recordings showed that wherever the students went, crowds lining their passage applauded and welcomed them. Some even joined in the protests. Even the police who had lined up to form a blockade made only superficial attempts to stop them, and then let everyone pass. Some of the prepared roadblocks were opened up as soon as the students arrived, as if they’d never meant to stop them in the first place.
Many senior cadres grew quite worried about the student demonstrations. After Deng Xiaoping’s remarks, they were afraid that the escalating confrontation would result in bloodshed. Again and again, they warned the Central Committee to show restraint and to avoid using force. [Influential Party elder] Peng Zhen phoned the Central Committee’s General Office directly several times to say that under no circumstances should force be used. He hoped the Central Committee would not aggravate tensions.
One exception was [Party elder and chairman of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference] Li Xiannian, who after hearing Deng’s remarks, phoned Deng and said, “We must make the decision and be prepared to arrest hundreds of thousands of people!” I admit I can’t attest to the accuracy of this. [Another Party elder and vice president of China] Wang Zhen also proposed arresting more people.
Faced with tens of thousands of demonstrators and the entreaties of all these senior cadres, those who had been determined to quell the demonstratio
ns, such as the Beijing Party Committee and Li Peng, were suddenly at a loss as to how to proceed. This was certainly a positive thing. The students had anticipated a crackdown, but when it didn’t happen they returned to their schools celebrating their victory and were left feeling more encouraged and fearless than ever.
Because Deng’s remarks had been sent to school administrations and the editorial had been published, many members of Party organizations, university presidents, and teachers had initially made intensive efforts to prevent students from taking part in the demonstrations, pleading with them not to take to the streets. When the students returned unharmed, these people felt humiliated. They did not like feeling that they had been misled. They had put themselves out for nothing.
[Beijing mayor] Chen Xitong and many others like him shared this feeling. At the Politburo Standing Committee meeting on May 1, Chen Xitong was full of anger as he presented his report from the Beijing Party Committee. He said that the school officials all felt as though they’d been “sold out.” I condemned his remarks and asked him, “Who has sold out whom?”
The large-scale demonstrations of April 27 made a few things clear. The original intention of the April 26 editorial’s designations “anti-Party, anti-socialist” was to deter the students. The result, however, was the opposite: the demonstrations had grown bigger. This showed that the old ways of political labeling that had worked before were no longer effective.
Second, since Deng Xiaoping’s internal remarks of April 25 had been disseminated widely, the students were aware that Deng was in support of the editorial. They went out to protest anyway, proving that even the symbol of the paramount leader had lost its effectiveness.
Third, the Beijing Municipal Government had just announced a new regulation for demonstrations that imposed strict limits and countermeasures, but this had also been ignored, making the new regulation as good as a piece of wastepaper. Even the police blockades had failed.
Once I’d grasped the circumstances after my return to Beijing, I realized that if the situation were to continue without a reduction in tensions, a violent solution was almost a certainty. The situation now was entirely different from what it was before April 27, because the students had grown fearless. They believed that the government had already used all the means at its disposal, all of which had proven ineffective, leaving only the mobilization of the military. Yet the students could not imagine that the government would actually mobilize the army against them.
When I passed through [the northeast city of] Shenyang on my way back from North Korea, I was given a report on the responses of Shenyang officials to Deng Xiaoping’s remarks. They had expressed doubts: “Can measures of this kind still be used?” They told me that many people were critical of Deng after hearing his remarks.
Hence, upon my return from North Korea, the situation had grown perilous. Large-scale bloodshed had become all too possible.
3
Power Struggle
As the protests escalate, the political stakes get higher. Zhao returns to Beijing and tries to calm things down. Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev’s pending visit to China gives protesters leeway, since the Party isn’t likely to crack down violently on the eve of this trip. Hard-line Premier Li Peng opposes Zhao’s effort to deal leniently with the situation, and both sides try to win over paramount leader Deng Xiaoping. Tensions escalate when Shanghai officials shut down a bold newspaper that they feel has gone too far in its reporting on the protests.
I have described above how, during my visit to North Korea, the guidelines laid out to deal with the student demonstrations were changed by Li Peng and others at home. Now I will address the struggle between the two sharply conflicting approaches to the student demonstrations that occurred after my return from North Korea.
Li Peng’s decision to disseminate Deng Xiaoping’s remarks on April 25 and 26 throughout Beijing and down to local administrative levels resulted in many criticisms of Deng. This really upset Deng and his family. Deng’s family accused Li Peng of having abruptly pushed Deng to the front lines while he himself played the good guy.
Given the above situation, and because the editorial provoked large demonstrations on April 27 and widespread criticism, Li Peng felt pressured to ask [Political Secretary of the Politburo Standing Committee] Bao Tong to draft an editorial on April 29 and to request that [State Council spokesman] Yuan Mu and [State Education Commission Vice Minister] He Dongchang hold a dialogue with the students.
During the resulting dialogue session, they [Yuan Mu and He Dongchang] responded positively to many of the students’ pleas, conceded that many of the students’ objectives were the same as those held by the Party and the government, and explained that the editorial was not directed against the students. They even declared that 99.9 percent of the students were good, with only a tiny minority being anti-Party and anti-socialist. These were the measures taken to calm the students.
At the same time, they were extremely worried that the April 26 editorial might be overturned, and were especially afraid that I would not support their actions upon my return. [Director of the United Front Work Department] Yan Mingfu reported to me that Li Peng had told him that if, upon my return, I did not support the April 26 editorial, Li would have no choice but to resign. Li Peng and [Politburo Standing Committee member] Yao Yilin colluded with each other to persuade me to express my support. They repeatedly requested that I add phrases such as “opposing turmoil” and “opposing bourgeois liberalization” into the speech I was preparing for the commemoration of the May Fourth Movement. When the draft was sent to them for comments, Li and Yao both requested the addition of remarks condemning bourgeois liberalization.
Furthermore, because of the wide dissemination of Deng Xiaoping’s remarks, Deng felt that his image among young people had been damaged. Deng Rong [Deng’s daughter, also known as Maomao] told me through Bao Tong that references to Deng loving and protecting youths must be added to the speech. Under the circumstances, I did indeed decide to add to the speech one paragraph dedicated to how much Deng loved and protected youths.
As soon as I had returned from North Korea, on the morning of April 30, Li Peng rushed over anxiously to get me to call a meeting so I could listen to the report of the Beijing Party Committee. His goal was to pressure me to express support for the actions they had already taken.
By May 1, at a gathering of Standing Committee members, I was already aware of the strong reactions against the April 26 editorial. However, since I myself still knew very little about the actual situation and also to avoid a sudden reversal in policy, I did have to express some kind of approval of Li Peng’s work, at least in some vague way.
However, I emphasized that it was critical to win over the support of the mainstream. We had to distinguish the tiny minority from the mainstream, and not push the majority of people over to the opposing side. That is, we should not create a situation in which the bulk of the populace felt we were trying to repress them. No matter what the reason, we had to calmly acknowledge the fact that the view expressed by the April 26 editorial was widely divergent from the view held by the vast majority of people, especially students, intellectuals, and other political parties. I pointed out the need to conduct a wide range of dialogues. Not only should we meet with and seek the opinions of students, but also teachers and workers.
As for the designation of the nature of the events, I emphasized that we could give new explanations that built upon the wording of the April 26 editorial, by indicating that only a tiny minority was actually anti-Party, anti-socialist, and pushing for chaos. I hoped to mitigate the effects of the April 26 editorial. I also pointed out that we must advocate a return to classes because this was agreeable to the students’ parents, their teachers, and most of society. So long as classes were resumed, the situation could be stabilized and emotions would have a chance to cool down. Then all other matters could eventually be resolved.
Once back from North Korea, I tried to garner information f
rom all sides. I first called for the visual recordings of the demonstrations of April 27. On May 2, I responded to requests from leaders of other political parties—Fei Xiaotong, Sun Qimeng, and Lei Jieqiong—to convene a session to discuss the student demonstrations. On the morning of May 5, I asked the president of Peking University, Ding Shisun, and the vice president of Beijing Normal University, Xu Jialu, for a meeting. I asked them for a synopsis of the situation in their schools and for their assessments. In the afternoon, I invited myself to a discussion being held by the Central Committee of the China Democratic League for the university staff members within their organization.
After gathering information and assessing the situation, I believed even more strongly that the student demonstrations had gained widespread sympathy from all corners of society and that the April 26 editorial and the way that the Central Committee had handled the demonstrations were in contradiction to the wishes of the people. If no measures were taken to ease the tensions caused by the April 26 editorial, students would continue to fear that they were being threatened with retaliation, and tensions would continue unabated.
I also felt that if the student demonstrations could be resolved along the principles of democracy and law, through dialogue and an easing of tensions, it could possibly boost China’s reform, including political reform. On the other hand, if we were to suppress the demonstrations with violence, another Anti–Bourgeois Liberalization Campaign would be sure to follow, on an even larger scale than before. Conservatives would make a comeback and reform programs would come to a standstill or even be reversed. Chinese history would go through another period of zigzagging. The two approaches promised to result in two totally different outcomes.