by Adi Ignatius
15. In these two meetings, the question of how to respond to illegal student organizations was brought up many times. Comrade Zhao Ziyang said, “In many places where local official student associations cannot win majority support, reelections can be held. They should not be afraid of stepping down and letting others take over as a result of elections.”
16. On May 9 and 10, a symposium on Contemporary Socialism Studies was held in Beijing. It was proposed in the meeting that socialist reform must overcome barriers on the way to a market economy and democracy; that issues of socialist democracy, freedom, and human rights were all of importance and significance. Zhao Ziyang met with comrades participating in the symposium and said, “The main lesson we must learn from this student protest is that we must speed up the process of political reform.” The May 12 issue of the People’s Daily published a headline story that covered the meeting, titled “Reform Must Overcome Barriers on the Way to Market Economy and Democracy.” In actuality, it provided theoretical grounds for the turmoil, and assisted in the escalation of the turmoil.
17. On the afternoon of May 16, Comrade Zhao Ziyang met with Gorbachev. As soon as the conversation began, he said. “On issues of importance, the Party still needs Deng Xiaoping to be at the helm. Since the 13th Party Congress, whenever we deal with major issues, we always inform Comrade Deng Xiaoping and seek his guidance.” He also said that this was the first time he had ever revealed this Chinese Communist Party decision. The day after the talks, the slogans used in the street protests converged on attacks on Comrade Deng Xiaoping. Slogans such as “Overthrow Deng Xiaoping!” and “Support Zhao Ziyang!” flooded the street protests and Tiananmen Square.
18. On the evening of May 16, the Politburo Standing Committee held an emergency meeting. Comrade Zhao Ziyang suggested telling students that the April 26 editorial was in error. He suggested that it be said that the draft of the editorial had been sent to North Korea for his approval, and that he bore full responsibility. He repeatedly said that the April 26 editorial had problems for which an explanation was essential, and that without taking this step, no progress could be made. If the situation were not turned around, there would be no way out.
19. On the afternoon of May 17, the Politburo Standing Committee held another meeting. Comrade Zhao Ziyang continued to uphold his incorrect position while the majority of comrades on the Standing Committee ardently opposed him. They believed that continuing to back down would result in major nationwide upheaval and inconceivable consequences. Comrade Deng Xiaoping ardently supported the position of the majority of the comrades on the Standing Committee. To bring an end to the turmoil, the meeting resolved to call in a part of the military to station itself in Beijing and martial law was imposed on certain districts of the city. Zhao believed, on the contrary, that imposing martial law would lead to grave consequences. He stated that he was unable to carry this out.
20. After the Politburo Standing Committee meeting of May 17, Comrade Zhao Ziyang ignored the resolution of the Standing Committee and dared to immediately propose to resign. He asked Bao Tong to draft a letter of resignation, which he then signed and sent out immediately. The next day, after being criticized by Comrade Yang Shangkun, Zhao retrieved the letter.
21. The Politburo Standing Committee meeting of May 17 set the major strategy of the Central Committee. Comrade Deng Xiaoping had specifically emphasized the need for every comrade at the meeting to seriously maintain strict secrecy. However, Comrade Zhao Ziyang told Bao Tong and his secretary Zhang Yueqi, “The Standing Committee meeting this afternoon has made a resolution. I was sharply criticized in the meeting. I originally proposed a relaxation of the stand taken in the April 26 editorial, to make matters more manageable, but my proposal was turned down. The Standing Committee criticized me, saying that my May Fourth speech had aggravated the situation. I voiced my reservations over the issue.” He also told Bao Tong that Li Peng had accused Bao Tong of revealing secrets. After Bao Tong returned to [his job at] the Research Office of Political Reform, he immediately called together some of his staff for a meeting. He said that somebody had accused him of revealing secrets and that he might be relieved of his position soon and placed under investigation by the Central Committee. He bid them farewell. He revealed to a few people that there had been a difference of opinion between members of the Standing Committee and that Zhao’s proposal had been rejected.
22. On May 18, Zhao Ziyang wrote a letter to Deng Xiaoping, continuing to appeal to change the designation of the nature of the events made in the April 26 editorial. In the letter, he stated that of the students’ demands, the critical issues that needed to be addressed in order to end the hunger strike were the removal of the labels and the changing of the designation made in the April 26 editorial, and the acknowledgment that their actions were patriotic: “I have considered this carefully, and feel that we must, however painful it is, resolve to make this concession.”
23. In the early morning hours of May 19, Comrade Zhao Ziyang visited the students holding the hunger strike in Tiananmen Square. He told the students that the issue over the nature and responsibility of the demonstrations would be resolved eventually. He also said, “You are still young, and have long futures ahead of you, unlike us; we are already old and do not matter anymore.” He thereby revealed that there were differences among the Party’s highest level of leadership and that he might be stepping down.
24. On the evening of May 19, the Party’s Central Committee and the State Council held a meeting of cadres in Party and political organizations to announce the decision made by the Central Committee to take resolute measures to stop the turmoil. Before the meeting, the Politburo Standing Committee had attempted repeatedly to persuade Comrade Zhao Ziyang to participate in this meeting, but Zhao refused. This, therefore, revealed his intention to openly split with the Party.
25. On May 19, the Party Group of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress wrote a request for instruction to the Politburo Standing Committee, in which it was suggested that Comrade Wan Li, in view of the crisis situation, terminate his state visits overseas and return home. On May 21, Hu Qili asked Comrade Zhao Ziyang how to reply to the request. At the time, Zhao had already applied for a leave. Without consulting with Comrade Li Peng, who was in charge of the affairs of the Central Committee and had been assigned foreign affairs duties, he took it upon himself to agree to send a telegram to Wan Li requesting that he return ahead of schedule.
26. On the morning of May 21, Zhao Ziyang told Yan Mingfu that if the student demonstrations dragged on, and continued for a long time, there was no way to predict the consequences. The only way to ease the situation was to hold a National People’s Congress Standing Committee meeting.
27. On May 21, Zhao Ziyang also told his secretary Li Yong, “I think we should hold another Politburo meeting” and asked Bao Tong to draft a speech for him.
[Item 28 is not mentioned in the recording.]
29. Comrade Zhao Ziyang has emphasized that there should be less control over and less intervention into literature and works of art.
30. A few people who have stubbornly maintained bourgeois liberalism through the years have been praised, entrusted with heavy responsibilities, and protected by Zhao Ziyang. Among these were [liberal scholar] Yan Jiaqi and [head of Zhao’s economic reform think tank] Chen Yizi, who became important figures in plotting the turmoil and organizing conspiratorial activities during this turmoil. After the suppression of the counterrevolutionary riot, these people fled overseas, and continue to carry on ferocious activities opposing the Chinese Communist Party and China’s socialism. Bao Tong, who had always been trusted and given important responsibilities by Zhao, attacked Li Peng and other leaders of the Party and the state after the announcement of martial law, together with Chen Yizi and others.
The above are the so-called “facts and evidence” to support the judgment against me of “supporting turmoil” and “splitting the Party” found as a result of the length
y investigation. Even if one were to overlook how many of the thirty items contradict the facts, even if they had all been factual, in my view, they were still not enough to support the judgment made against me.
2
Zhao’s Lonely Struggle
The Communist Party launches a long-term campaign to essentially erase the Tiananmen incident from history. A first step involves restricting the liberties of the former General Secretary who had opposed the crackdown—neutralizing him as a political force. After Deng dies, in 1997, Zhao writes a letter to the Communist Party making one final appeal to his former colleagues—many of whom had once supported his position—to reverse the harsh official verdict on the Tiananmen incident. But China’s politics have moved in a new direction. Zhao’s replacement, Jiang Zemin, who owes his position to the events of 1989, presumably sees the letter as a challenge to his power and retaliates by putting further limits on Zhao’s freedom.
After the investigation ended, they continued to subject me to house arrest, limiting my personal freedoms.
While the investigation was being conducted, they detained me at home for a whole three years. With the investigation over, my personal freedoms should have been basically restored. I had already raised the issue of restoring my personal freedoms when Qiao Shi and Song Ping came to announce the end to my investigation. They did not say anything at the time except to suggest that expanding my freedoms should be gradual so that the impact would be mitigated.
In fact, as soon as they announced an end to the investigation, they immediately set down six rules to limit my activities. However, while they imposed the six rules, they never showed them to me nor spoke to me about them face-to-face—possibly because they felt guilty and feared being caught with evidence that could be exposed to the outside world and get international and domestic media attention.
Instead, they instructed the Security Bureau of the General Office and my household staff to carry them out. Of course, the comrades working in my house were forced to obey orders from above. But because they were not supposed to say that these were rules imposed by their superiors, they often nagged me with made-up excuses. Because they were acting so unreasonably, for a period of time there was often friction and confrontation between me and them. Later, I discovered that they were not to blame, because they were only carrying out instructions from above.
I felt that they should have told me specifically what the rules were—what was allowed and what was not—so I could understand. For example, after the investigation was over, I asked to take a trip to Guangdong for the winter because of my trachea problem, which causes me to cough severely in the dry northern winter but is much improved in the southern climate. They responded by saying that [Hong Kong’s last colonial governor] Chris Patten was attempting to extend democratic elections [across the border from Guangdong] in Hong Kong, so the situation was very delicate; therefore, it was not convenient for me to go to Guangdong.
I thought that was ludicrous! Whatever Chris Patten was doing in Hong Kong was a matter of diplomatic affairs; what did that have to do with my being in Guangdong? But they insisted by saying, “You shouldn’t go to Guangdong, but it is okay for you to go to Guangxi, Yunnan, or Guizhou.”
I decided to go to Guangxi, but just as I was preparing to leave, they added another stipulation: that I was limited to the city of Nanning in Guangxi. In fact, after I arrived in Nanning, they used every means possible to block me from going anywhere else.
After I returned to Beijing, I wanted to play golf at Chang Ping Golf Course but was told it was not permitted. I asked where such a rule had come from. They would not tell me, but continued to say that I could not go. I called security staff officer Wang Tonghai and told him I wished to make a statement. The contents of the statement were as follows:
Today the Security Bureau prevented me from going to Chang Ping to play golf. I was not even allowed to go to Shun Yi County Golf Course (also Japanese managed), where I had gone last December. I believe this is a case of the Security Bureau taking actions beyond its authority, violating the Central Committee’s intentions. They even admonished me to consider the bigger picture. I don’t know how you can explain this! Last year, during the 14th Party Congress, when Qiao Shi and four other senior comrades came to talk with me, I clearly made a request to have my freedoms restored upon the end of the investigation. As for my activities, I was willing to consider the ramifications. If there were suggestions from the central leadership, I would respect them, but I absolutely would not accept any arbitrary coercive rules to limit my freedom. At the time, the four senior comrades made no objections to my statement. I do not understand what authority the Security Bureau has to prevent me from going to play golf today. I will not accept any similar restrictions in the future.
I asked Wang Tonghai to relay this message in its entirety to his superiors.
Another time, I asked to go to Yang Feng Jia Dao Club to play pool. At first they refused, but I insisted. They said the chauffeur would not drive me. I said I could take a bus. They finally acquiesced, but they restricted it to two morning sessions a week. I went two or three times, during which I did not see anybody in the club. I learned later that they had emptied the club, preventing other comrades from being there to create a kind of “private function” just for me. Why? Because Yang Feng Jia Dao Club was a club for old senior cadres, and they were afraid that I would meet old friends and acquaintances. Of course they certainly couldn’t be so naive as to believe that upon running into these people, I would launch into provocative speeches and start organizing a network.
Concern over the alleged “impact” [of any outings] was the excuse they made to cover their plan that I never again appear in public—so people would gradually forget me, consigning me to oblivion through silence. The so-called “fear of impact” implied that the very sound of my name would cause social instability.
Perhaps they finally realized that continuing with this arrangement was not practical, and that it might be better to clarify the matter. Meng Xianzhong from the Party branch of the Central Committee General Office was sent to announce the General Office’s position, that is, the six rules for limiting my activities.
Four of the items specifically defined my limitations:
1. Guests may be received at home, but no reporters or foreigners are allowed.
2. Outdoor activities require an escort of guards from the Security Bureau. Walks in suburban parks are allowed. However, the guards must prevent visits to places that are crowded with people.
3. Considering that golf courses in the Beijing area are all managed by foreign investment companies or are joint ventures, and players on the courts are all foreigners or people from Hong Kong or Macau, it is therefore recommended that in the near future, these golf courses be avoided. As an alternative, the golf course of Shun Yi [County], operated by local Chinese peasants, can be used.
4. Traveling outside of Beijing can be arranged, but at the present time, only to inland provinces. Coastal or sensitive areas should be avoided. A detailed travel itinerary must be approved by the Central Committee.
Because these were the formal rules set by the Central Committee to limit my freedom, I responded with a letter to Jiang Zemin and the Politburo Standing Committee. My letter read as follows:
1. On June 25, the Party branch deputy secretary of the General Office, Comrade Meng Xianzhong, read several restrictions for limiting my activities that had the approval of the Central Committee. Only then did I learn that after the end of my investigation, many limits on my personal freedom continued to exist, and were being executed according to rules that had been approved by the Central Committee. I believe, however, that these rules are incompatible with the principle that the Party must operate within the bounds of the constitution and the law. They also violate the principle that “no treatment shall be used against a Party member that violates Party discipline and the law.” (See Article No. 10, “Several Rules Governing Political Life in the Part
y” issued by the Central Committee.) Therefore, I demand that the Central Committee reconsider and retract these rules.
2. The rules bar me from foreign-invested or joint-venture golf courses “in the near future.” I am also not allowed to go to coastal provinces “at the present time.” I have no idea what the terms “near future” and “present time” mean. These rules were made in October of last year; since then eight months have passed. What meaning could these terms “near future” or “present time” now have?
3. The actual restrictions to my freedom in the past half year have exceeded the boundaries of these rules. For example, if the rules bar me from coastal provinces, why was I confined to Nanning when I went to Guangxi early this year? Again, if the rules bar me from crowded areas in Beijing, why place restrictions on the times when I may go to the Yang Feng Jia Dao Club? Is the senior cadres’ club considered a crowded area? Surely, this is impossible for anyone to understand.
Naturally, after the letter was sent out, there was no reply.
They have always been very nervous when dealing with such matters. When Meng Xianzhong was sent to announce the six rules, I asked to see the document. He said he could read it aloud to me but could not give me the document. I asked the secretary to write down what he was reading aloud, which was difficult for him to forbid. When I invited him to confirm what had been written down, he refused: “Whatever you have written down is your responsibility. I will not read it.”