by Adi Ignatius
As I started to organize the drafting of the 13th Party Congress Political Report, my vision was to further advance major policies and strategies for reform, but also to formulate a theoretical basis for carrying it all out. Since the reforms had been put into practice after the Third Plenum of the 11th Party Congress, productivity had grown, the speed of development had increased, people’s living standards had risen, and our nation had become much stronger. These were widely accepted facts.
Yet what was the theoretical basis for carrying out reform? There had been no explanation, and many cadres and citizens were concerned. On the one hand, they did their best to support reform and to actively carry it out, but on the other hand they did not feel secure, fearing that policy could swing in another direction. Reform needed to be powerfully backed up with theory.
In practice, the reform of those years was, to be frank, the rejection and correction of the planned economy, the exclusivity of public ownership, and the single method of wealth distribution that had been enforced since the 1950s. The practice of reform had proven that this had been correct and necessary. It had also proven that the practice of implementing orthodox socialist principles in the style of the Soviet Union was excessive for China’s level of socioeconomic development and productivity. This was a leftist mistake. Only if we restored appropriate policies and approaches more suitable for China could we save China. This was the essence of the matter.
Nevertheless, we had practiced socialism for more than thirty years. For those intent on observing orthodox socialist principles, how were we to explain this? One possible explanation was that socialism had been implemented too early and that we needed to retrench and reinitiate democracy. Another was that China had implemented socialism without having first experienced capitalism, and so a dose of capitalism needed to be reintroduced.
Neither argument was entirely unreasonable, but they had the potential of sparking major theoretical debates, which could have led to confusion. And arguments of this kind could never have won political approval. In the worst-case scenario, they could even have caused reform to be killed in its infancy.
While planning for the 13th Party Congress report in the spring of 1987, I spent a lot of time thinking about how to resolve this issue. I came to believe that the expression “initial stage of socialism” was the best approach, and not only because it accepted and cast our decades-long implementation of socialism in a positive light; at the same time, because we were purportedly defined as being in an “initial stage,” we were totally freed from the restrictions of orthodox socialist principles. Therefore, we could step back from our previous position and implement reform policies more appropriate to China.
Most important, it was not a new statement. As I mentioned above, it had already been quietly accepted without controversy in the resolutions of the Sixth Plenum and the 12th Party Congress. It was now merely being used as the basis for the theoretical articulation of reform. It would not provoke fierce debate and should be easy to accept.
The first time I revealed these ideas in a public context was at a Central Committee Secretariat meeting in May 1987. I said that we must pay attention to the assessment that we are in an “initial stage of socialism.” All policy issues of reform could be resolved in accordance with this.
Later I formally asked the drafting group to use “initial stage of socialism” as the theoretical foundation for the 13th Party Congress report. Then I wrote a letter to the Politburo Standing Committee and the Five-Person Group about this approach. This was the same letter I mentioned above that I sent to Deng Xiaoping outlining the idea. Deng Xiaoping, Chen Yun, and Li Xiannian all replied or phoned to express their approval.
The basic approach for building socialism with Chinese characteristics was embodied in three things: making economic development the central focus, upholding the Four Cardinal Principles, and upholding the Reform and Open-Door Policy. They were the three components that formed the general direction after the Third Plenum. During the process of drafting the report, it was proposed that we sum up these priorities with the colloquial phrase “one central focus, two basic points.”
The idea of making economic development our “central focus” had already been asserted at the Third Plenum of the 11th Party Congress in 1978: “From this day forward, we renounce class struggle as the central focus, and instead take up economic development as our central focus.” This had been reiterated in Party documents and speeches.
The concept of “Upholding the Four Cardinal Principles and Upholding Reform” had also been consistently emphasized since the Theoretical Discussion Conference of 1978 and the Third Plenum of the 11th Party Congress, but never before were these three things connected together as the major components of the Party’s general direction. Upholding the Four Cardinal Principles and upholding reform had already appeared as two separate components in the draft of the “Resolution to Build a Spiritual Civilization” in 1986. Most people had the impression that the principle of the Third Plenum was reform. I proposed a revision to the principle of the Third Plenum of the 11th Party Congress so that it would include the Four Cardinal Principles; we should not give attention only to one side while overlooking the other. The phrase “two basic points” had not yet come into use.
The first time I formally stated that these two principles were interconnected and couldn’t exist without the other was in my speech at the Celebration Assembly of the Spring Festival on January 30, 1987. Before this, I had used the same language in my talk with leaders of the Hungarian Communist Party on January 19, 1987, which had been released to the press.
The intention of my speech at the Celebration Assembly was to ease fears that the Anti-Liberalization Campaign would reverse the principles set by the Third Plenum. In order to extinguish such fears, I said that the Third Plenum had included both aspects: the Four Cardinal Principles and reform. Anti-liberalization had a specific meaning: to oppose the abandonment of the Four Cardinal Principles. Therefore, the campaign did not imply any change to the Third Plenum principle and was in fact meant to implement it more thoroughly. This time, the “two basic points” were meant to underline that the Party’s principle defined by the Third Plenum of the 11th Party Congress had also included the Four Cardinal Principles, so we should not talk only about reform.
To my surprise, my speech at the Celebration Assembly on the “two basic points” was opposed by some people, particularly those who were relatively conservative or rigid in their thinking. They said we could not set the Four Cardinal Principles on the same level as reform, making them equally “two basic points.” The Four Cardinal Principles were the basis and reform merely the tactic and means.
I mentioned above that a cadre, Lu Zhichao in the Department of Propaganda, even assigned the educational chief of the Central Party School to convene a meeting to discuss the idea of the “two basic points,” with the intention of criticizing the formulation. This campaign caused quite a commotion.
I was compelled to criticize this opinion at the May 13 meeting of the departments of propaganda, theoretical research, and media, along with the Central Party School. And earlier, at the meeting of the Central Committee Secretariat and the Five-Person Group, I stated that we were discussing not the direction of socialism in general, but rather the direction of socialism with Chinese characteristics. The Four Cardinal Principles provided the basic principle and foundation of our political system while reform was our general approach. Both were foundations on which we based our policies. Taking one as a principle and the other as a means was in fact a way to detract from the importance of reform. Without the approach set by the Third Plenum, with only the Four Cardinal Principles, where would socialism with Chinese characteristics be? The Four Cardinal Principles continue to be one of our basic principles, even as reform has been added.
After my speech of May 13, attacks on the “two basic points” were more restrained. At that point, the phrase “one central focus, two basic points” could be li
sted together in the Political Report of the 13th Party Congress as the three basic components of our general approach. The colloquial formula “one central focus, two basic points” was coined by Bao Tong and the rest of the drafting group during the writing process. Deng Xiaoping was impressed with this phrase, and said on many occasions, “This phrase, ‘one central focus, two basic points’ is very well put!”
There was still the question of political reform. Deng Xiaoping had said some very positive things about reforming China’s political leadership system in the past, and in 1986 even proposed proceeding with political reform. However, during the drafting of the Political Report for the 13th Party Congress, he repeatedly warned, “No matter what, there should not be anything resembling a ‘tripartite separation of powers’” and even said there should not be even “a trace of it.” During this period, when he was receiving foreign guests, he said things like “a tripartite separation of powers means each is restricting the other” or “such a system is inefficient and cannot get things done.”
Frankly speaking, if there was anything new in the area of political reform in the Political Report for the 13th Party Congress, it certainly was not because of Deng. On the contrary, he did everything possible to eliminate any traces of congressional politics and checks and balances in the Political Report. He made such comments every time we sent a draft to him for review. Even when our report no longer contained any of those things, he still repeated his warning each time. If not for Deng’s intervention, the contents on political reform could have been written much better.
The other critical issue during preparation for the 13th Party Congress was the appointment of new leaders. Even before Yaobang had resigned, Deng Xiaoping had appointed a group of seven people to be in charge of the proposal for leadership changes for the 13th Party Congress. The most critical arrangements were planning the future of some of the elders and naming the new Politburo Standing Committee [PSC].
Many people, including me, believed that Deng needed to continue as a member of the PSC because it would be difficult, while so many other elders were still alive, for it to establish its authority without him. I believed that, as long as Deng’s position in the Party as ultimate decision maker was continuing, it would be better for him to exercise his power legitimately from within the PSC rather than from outside of it.
Deng, however, insisted that if the positions of Chen Yun as first secretary of the Central Discipline Inspection Commission, Li Xiannian as President of the republic, and Peng Zhen as National People’s Congress chairman remained intact at the 13th Party Congress, it would be seen as a setback, or as the foreign media would say “a victory for the conservatives.” No matter what, we should not give people this impression. This was what Deng told me during a conversation in March 1987. However, if they were all asked to retire, it would be difficult for Deng to justify remaining in the PSC.
Deng proposed that one of them be retired completely and the other three moved into semiretirement status. That is, Peng Zhen would retire, while Deng, Chen, and Li would semiretire. What this meant for Deng was that he would be out of the PSC but continue as chairman of the Central Military Commission, Chen Yun’s position would be changed to chairman of the Central Advisory Commission, and Li Xiannian would become chairman of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference. Only one was a position with real power while the other two were honorary positions.
At first, none of these people—Chen Yun, Li Xiannian, and Peng Zhen—were willing to accept the proposal. Deng then asked [another elder] Bo Yibo to mediate with these elders. It wasn’t easy at first. It was not until July 3 that Chen Yun expressed his consent to Bo Yibo, saying that he would follow the arrangements made by the Party. Once Chen Yun conceded, the others were easier to persuade. The proposal was accepted.
After that, Deng Xiaoping met with Bo Yibo and Yang Shangkun to discuss whether, after leaving the PSC, the three elders would still manage any affairs at all or participate in making decisions on crucial issues. I don’t know the details of their discussion, but I did hear of one suggestion: that there should be only one “mother-in-law” for the PSC; there could not be several “mothers-in-law.” That is, after the three retired, only Deng should act as a “mother-in-law,” which characterized the relationship pretty accurately. Deng’s position was not to change; he was the “mother-in-law” of the PSC, but the others should not assume that role.
Later, however, as new situations emerged, it turned out that Deng had to consult with Chen Yun and Li Xiannian on all major issues (especially with Chen Yun). As to how Bo Yibo actually negotiated with Chen Yun and Li Xiannian, I don’t know. It wasn’t until July 7, 1987, that the issue of whether the elders should remain in power was finally settled at the meeting of the Five-Person Group held at Deng’s home.
It was in this meeting that Bo Yibo suggested I give a speech at the First Plenum of the 13th Party Congress to announce that we would continue to seek Comrade Deng Xiaoping’s guidance on major issues, and have Deng make final decisions. When Bo Yibo spoke of this, Deng expressed his view that as long as the international community knew that he would remain the decision maker, they would feel reassured, because his continuance would be taken as an indication of China’s stability. That’s why I announced to the First Plenum of the 13th Party Congress that we would continue to seek Deng’s opinion and ask him to make the final decisions.
In the same meeting of the Five-Person Group held in Deng’s home, appointments for new PSC members, President of the People’s Republic, Premier of the State Council, and chairman of the National People’s Congress were also finalized. As for the PSC, the initial proposal had included seven people, and the number had remained seven up until this meeting.
There were objections to Wan Li. He was sometimes not very careful and had offended some people, so the elders had objections about him. I heard that when the [PSC] list was being drawn up, Yao Yilin mentioned that Wan Li was the kind of person who would jump on the bandwagon in a crisis. In other words, he was a factor of instability. During the Five-Person Group meeting, Bo Yibo spoke as a representative of the Seven-Person Group, saying that the group “does not approve of Wan Li being appointed to the PSC.” Yao Yilin then identified Tian Jiyun as a problem, saying there were reports that Tian had promoted a relative who was proving problematic. Bo Yibo also identified some unresolved issues with Tian Jiyun. Under the circumstances, there was no time to investigate further. After hearing these opinions, Deng said, “Wan Li and Tian Jiyun will not be in the Standing Committee, so the list of seven people will be changed to five.”
It was at this meeting that I started to realize that Yao Yilin, who ordinarily gave people the impression of being upright and honest and had always seemed objective and fair, was in fact a calculating schemer who played nasty tricks. He did not raise the issue of Tian Jiyun earlier or later, but right at the moment when a decision needed to be made. Since doubts had been raised, the issue could only be shelved.
It was also in this meeting that the decision was made to appoint Yang Shangkun President of the People’s Republic. Deng proposed Wan Li for the position of chairman of the National People’s Congress. Wan Li modestly replied that he was no expert on law. Deng said, “You certainly can learn! Also, you can ask others to assist you.” After the decision was made, Deng was afraid that some people would not accept Wan Li as NPC chairman, since many of the elders had objections to him. He even had a talk with Wan Li to suggest that he visit the elders, one by one, to do some self-criticism and win their support. Wan Li did as Deng suggested.
The candidacy for Premier took a long time to finalize. People were worried that Li Peng was not up to the responsibility, especially in the area of economic reform, since he had previously worked in engineering, technology, and electricity generation, and had very little experience in economics. In economic reform, he had no experience whatsoever. However, Chen Yun and Li Xiannian were both very supportive of him.
Another proposal being considered was to have Yao Yilin act as Premier for a two-year transition period, since he was more familiar with economic affairs, and people had good impressions of Yao Yilin. But Deng found this unacceptable, saying that Yao was suffering from bad health and had a very narrow field of experience, as he had worked mainly on finance and trade. At the time, it was difficult to find anyone new, and they most likely would not be accepted by Chen Yun and Li Xiannian anyway. So in the end, there was no other choice but to go with Li Peng.
Since Li Peng was not familiar with managing the economy and had no experience with economic reform, Deng made a decision: “For the time being, after taking the post of General Secretary, Zhao will continue to manage economic affairs and continue to head the Central Economic and Financial Leading Group.” Deng also mentioned that Li Peng had a bad reputation among some people who claimed that he favored the Soviet Union, where he had studied. Once on a visit to Europe, he had, without checking with anyone, taken a detour through the Soviet Union. Because Deng believed that his reputation was not perfect, that he favored the Soviets, he asked that Li Peng make a public statement upon becoming Premier to dispel the doubts that people had.
As far as I know, Wan Li, who was my Vice Premier, was never proposed for the position of Premier. There were two reasons: first, Wan Li had offended a lot of people. Second, Deng wanted to find someone younger to be Premier.
When the 12th Party Congress was being planned, [Party functionary] Yu Qiuli was in charge of the leadership appointment group, under Yaobang’s leadership. All issues were reported first to the Secretariat, directly managed by Yaobang, and then reported to the elders. But things were different with the 13th Party Congress’s leadership appointment group, which was headed by Bo Yibo with the participation of Yang Shangkun, Wang Zhen, Yao Yilin, Song Renqiong, Wu Xiuquan, and Gao Yang. It was directly controlled by Deng Xiaoping. Before his resignation, Yaobang did not intervene in these matters. Afterward, neither did the Five-Person Group. Perhaps the situation was different from the 12th Party Congress because the issue of retiring the elders was at stake. For that reason, Deng took over and implemented his ideas through the Seven-Person Group.