by Paul Hynes
Japan might never surrender, it was not an appealing prospect, but having fought them for over five years he knew it was one that could be incredibly likely. It was this knowledge that ensured that, when he received Kenjii Doihara’s urgent message, the famously grandiloquent general was left speechless.
Though in his brutal reign over Manchuria he had found it useful to learn several dialects of Chinese and some Russian, Doihara could not speak English. The message he would thus send Mac Arthur had had to be written for him as he dictated and read over the radio to Mac Arthur by a member of the Swiss delegation officially acting as intermediaries in the rather bizarre conditions of Japan’s second attempt at surrender.
From Peter Probst’s polite but direct voice, betraying a Swiss accent even over the static, the offer was read out twice. Though without much of the emotion that might have been intended to accompany the document, the weight of its words bore down heavily on MacArthur nonetheless, as the statement was slowly orated.
”Before we proceed to other matters, I will first reveal the facts that are most likely not known to the United States of America. It is in good faith that I, General Kenjii Doihara, commander of the First General Army, speaking through an intermediary, reveal them to you, in the hope to create a basis of trust, and to underline the magnitude of the present situation.
On August 15th, 1945, Emperor Shōwa was kindnapped by a number of fanatical military officers with the backing of War Minister General Korechika Anami. Anami subsequently installed himself as Prime Minister with the Emperor as his Prisoner and has ruled through a reign of terror, crushing anyone who would offer surrender.
On February 10th, 1946, two submarines set sail from the port of Niigata. They are large enough to carry floatplanes that can bomb the western coast of the United States similar to our raids against the Pacific Northwest in 1942. How these missions differ is that whilst those bombers only carried incendiaries, the Submarines currently making their way towards the United States are armed with Bubonic Plague, Cholera, and other pathogens. When I was stationed in China we were forced to examine the work of the men who produced these viruses, if their effects are as nightmarish as they were upon the Chinese citizenry, I fear we may unleash upon your nation a horrible trauma that might last decades after this war has ended. Both are moving towards San Francisco, you must move all possible Naval forces to prevent their attacks in the event we cannot recall them.
On February 12th, 1946 a coalition of individuals from all aspects of Japanese society acted on their unwillingness to see genocide in retaliation against the Japanese people provoked by the insanity of one man and his ego. Whether we originally agreed with the war against America or not we now find ourselves able to stare into the reality we face if the struggle continues, only to find that it is an abyss. Anami has subsequently been killed, soon to be replaced by a joint government of both myself and Yoshijirō Umezu with the sole aim on a peace that can be agreeable to the United States but also that ensures the survival of the Japanese nation. To further this aim we offer complete disarmament and cooperation with an American occupation authority on the basis that:
1) The Emperor will not be forced into abdication or tried for war crimes. Whilst we acknowledge there are some aspects of Japanese society which may need to be altered for the post-war era, the Japanese people cannot continue without their Emperor for he is as integral to our society as our lands and oceans. To surrender without this assurance might as well be welcoming our genocide.
2) The Soviet Union be removed from Hokkaido and prevented from occupying any further Japanese territory. We can trust the United States to operate in a manner which is respectful of human rights, we cannot in good conscience trust the Bolsheviks in the same manner, nor will we leave our people under them to find out for themselves.
3) That in recognition for our services, myself and a small party of others be allowed to leave Japan in exile, with the understanding that we were misled by deluded patriots in our actions before this incident, and that in its wake we be absolved of those same actions
As this message is relayed several events are in motion, events which could decide whether or not I will be leading the next Japanese government, or a man even more fanatical than Anami. Awaiting your response I urge you to consider the one factor that must matter most to any good general. I refer, of course, to the lives of your men. Both you and I realise that my forces will be defeated when you land on the Kanto Plain in the coming weeks. The question is how many more of your men might I take with me General? We have been defeated on Kyushu, but only at great loss and suffering to both sides, the same shall occur on Honshu if you do not make the historic decision, and join me in ending this bloodshed before it reaches its crescendo. For though I have warned you about the Submarines headed for San Francisco, and can assure you that not further raids would take place, I cannot make the same assurance about further biological and chemical attacks.
Time is of the essence General, choose now to end this madness, or forever live in the knowledge that you could have saved tens of thousands of American lives but ultimately chose to send them to their deaths for the egos of our governments!”
Despite Mac Arthur’s reputation for often responding to requests with extravagant soliloquy, his response to Doihara was unusually direct and business-like. He plainly stated that both Doihara’s first and last terms where in contradiction to the Potsdam declaration, where it had been stated that war criminals would not escape justice and that the Allies would reserve the right to build a democratic Japanese state with or without the Emperor. He added that though the Soviet Union were not a signatory, they were now an allied power against the Japanese and that this had to be taken into consideration in the wake of a Japanese surrender. It was harsh condemnation of every demand Doihara had made, but MacArthur did not explicitly refuse, instead indicating that he would give a second reply within the next few hours.
Was Mac Arthur willing to accept? The general historical consensus is that he was at least considering Doihara’s offer expressed by his willingness to not immediately reject the insurgent general. However whether he was simply taking time to consider his options, or planned to accept will always be unknown. Within hours of Doihara’s broadcast was apparently ready to reply in some form, but Doihara was no longer there.
Matome Ugaki, the Admiral without a Navy, had been a fervent advocate of the PX plan, believing it to be a means of the Navy redeeming itself in the wake of the last three years failures. As Umezu had repeated time and time again his opposition to the planned attack, he had grown suspicious that the General might go to extreme lengths to halt the mission. As the news of the shooting came to the Supreme War Council, Umezu had proclaimed that he would take over considering his role as Chief of the Army General Staff, he would take Anami’s place, and that until the General had recovered he would suspend all planned operations, an order that would include recalling the two submarines headed for San Francisco. Overcome with rage , Ugaki openly accused Umezu of being behind the attempt on Anami’s life with the intention of cowardly surrendering to the Americans, the only other member of the Supreme War Council present, Foreign Minister Yōsuke Matsuoka also joined in the condemnation of Umezu’s apparent opportunism, devolving into a virulent argument that had to see Umezu separated from the other two men. Thus, whilst Doihara had proceeded to contact Mac Arthur on the basis had Umezu was in control in Matsushiro, all power still hinged on the unconscious man with a bullet lodged in his spine.
As the hours passed it was determined that Anami would indeed live but that he might never walk again, and that he would need rest for the next few days. The news was a relief to his supporters, and damning to Umezu as he paced impatiently waiting to hear from the outside world, when he finally did he found himself being ordered to put his hands on his head. Doihara’s offer to Mac Arthur had leaked to Matsushiro, and his mention of Umezu was terminally damning for both of them. Individuals who had not been involved in the
coup had seen the Swiss delegation drive to his headquarters and had reported their findings to Lieutenant General Toshimichi Uemura, head of the 36th Army based in Tokyo and normally under Doihara’s command. As he neared Doihara’s headquarters he found himself being blocked from entering the compound by subordinate officers, as he pressed the issue he was threatened with arrest if he did not leave, he chose to comply, now sworn to investigate further. The revelation that Doihara had been in contact with and entertained several individuals over the past months, gained from his staff operating inside Tokyo, and that he was apparently with the Swiss now. With the news of the attempt on Anami’s life now coming through, Doihara’s intentions had become all too clear. As he was busy berating the junior officer who had so aggressively turned Uemura away, an out of breath guard replied that the Lieutenant General had returned, now approaching with the tanks of the First Armoured Regiment.
Facing arrest, or potentially execution on the spot, Doihara chose to flee into the night with several co-conspirators, abandoning the Swiss delegation and any potential contact with MacArthur. With his troops driving the Swiss back into Tokyo, and the remaining staff of the Headquarters under arrest, the transcript of Doihara’s offer had been found, and was relayed back to Matsushiro where Umezu found himself also under arrest.
The attempted coup had collapsed before MacArthur had been able to answer, and Doihara could now only hope that the regime he had shaken would fall to American or Soviet guns, before he was captured, where he was sure a far less glorious death was assured for him.
East By Far East - The Soviet mission to Vietnam and the beginning of the Thai-Indochinese War
By early February, the mass use of chemical weapons in Operation Sandman, the formulation of the Japanese response, and the coup that had resulted from that apocalyptic situation had created a deeply ironic situation. Though these events had been entirely motivated by events emanating from South East Asia, in their wake Japanese and western focus had largely shifted back to events on the Japanese home islands. For the Soviet Union, this was an insatiable opportunity to further extend their revolutionary influence.
It had become increasingly clear in early 1946 that the allies were not going to directly invade Indochina, a fact confirmed by the American invasion of Kyushu. Due to this fact, the Japanese had already had contingency plans to move their sizable force into southern China before October 1945, where the struggle with the Kuomintang and the Communists was seen as far more important than holding an area which had become useless with the demise of the Japanese navy, as such the deal with the Viet Minh should not be seen in the context of a forced retreat, despite what scholars of the Communist Party of the Vietnam continue to argue.
Why had it taken the Japanese so long to enact these plans? Though the answer may partly lie in the fact that the increasingly desperate situation to the north, west, and east made the continued occupation of Indochina increasingly pointless, it was the constant frustration by Allied air and naval power that had made such an impossible task to accomplish in the past. Now however, the vast majority of allied air assets had been focused on the approaching invasion of Kyushu, and the Japanese commanders finally had the confidence to retreat out of Indochina with minimal harassment from the skies and sea. For the last time in history, vast numbers of Japanese troops marched north into southern China, an advance still plagued by a lack of fuel but one that passed by largely free of aerial attacks.
As the Japanese had retreated the various peoples of Indochina had already been preparing for the post-Japanese situation. Whilst the Japanese had been unable to find any prominent figures in Vietnamese society to establish a pro-Japanese regime, they had made far more progress in the western area of Kampuchea. The former French protectorate had only had a tiny garrison of Japanese troops during their occupation, and had managed to escape many of the brutalities they had exacted upon other occupied areas, local anger had mainly been directed at the Thai, who had annexed large portions of the protectorates former area with Japanese backing, and the Vichy regime, which had continued to suppress any nationalist protests. Like Vietnam, Kampuchea had had an established royal family by the time the Japanese had removed French control and thus Norodom Sihanouk, heir to the throne, had proclaimed himself King of the nominally independent state in March. Son Ngoc Thanh, a prominent and radical Cambodian nationalist had been forced to flee to Japan after being hunted by the Vichy authorities for his role in organising anti-French protests in early 1942, now almost three years later he had returned to help lead his nation as Foreign Minister, even if the privilege also involved being a Japanese satellite.
Though collaborationist, the government enjoyed a honeymoon of popularity with the Cambodian people, particularly due to their aggressive reversals of the stillborn French attempt to Romanise the Cambodian language. A return to the universally popular Khmer script granted the new regime a popular legitimacy that most other supposedly independent nations of the Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere. Despite this populist success, not all were pleased with a conservative regime which was in essence a puppet of the Japanese, and as the war grew worse for their Japanese ally, so the Kampuchean regime grew more vulnerable to criticism by both nationalists and communists, both of whom having formed an uneasy alliance of opposition around the militant Buddhist Monk, Son Ngoc Minh. Minh admired Thanh, the Monks name being combination of both his and another hero, Ho Chi Minh, the leader of the Viet Minh. However this admiration did not prevent him urging action against the government Thanh was a part of, and inspired by the news of the new American superbomb, he had instructed a group of young nationalists had broken into the Imperial Palace to demand the abdication of the King and the resignation of his government. Though swiftly put down, the coup shed a light on the need for the regime to prove it could be assertive as well as populist. Thanh became Prime Minister and set about a more ardently nationalist agenda, and ass the few Japanese troops retreated north for their last stand in southern China, this was finally enabled to put it into place, as the King and Thanh found themselves enjoying a true independence. Japanese defeat on the mainland was now seemingly inevitable, yet there was still no indication of the feared return to French control either by French or American occupation, at least not for the moment. The King was unsettled by the vacuum, claiming he felt as if he were in the eye of the world’s most violent storm. Thanh did not disagree, but in the eye of the storm the skies were clear, and through that clarity, opportunity arose.
Thus, despite having declared Japan as the “liberator of the Asian peoples” only months beforehand, the King declared his government would remove Kampuchea from the Co-Prosperity Sphere whilst also asking for a peace with the Allied powers. From outside of the Palace protestors gathered only to be pleasantly surprised by their Prime Minister and their King joining them at the head, proclaiming Cambodia’s current independence, and demanding the end of French imperial delusions. A reply was not given from any Allied power however, only the French had any significant experience in the area, and with their inability to project any real power into the Asian interior, their response remained dubious. What little forces the Cambodians had at their disposal where ready to fight against the French for their independence, but instead found themselves directed at the Thai’s to their west, out of fear that at any moment the new nationalist regime of Pridi Banomyong might take advantage of the fluctuating situation and advance east.
Having liberated themselves from Japanese control, the Free Thai Army were indeed now on the move, free from the constrains of the Japanese and the French, and with the Allies focused on a far greater enemy, the time was ripe for the pursuit of the age old aspiration that Pridi had shared with his fascist predecessor. For if the French were to dither on reclaiming their former Empire in the South East Asia, the unification of all Tai peoples was surely now a dream whose time had come.
Ever since the nation’s occupation in 1893, to the Japanese removal of the French in 1945, the sma
ll country of Laos had always seemed to slip under the radar. From its rugged terrain and dispersed population, the French saw far less potential for the area as the rest of Indochina, and though granting the territory independence was never seriously considered, governing Laos had always proven to be more expensive than anything that might have been exploited from the land or its people despite the early promises of vast wealth from early explorers such as Henri Mouhout. Laos was left underdeveloped and often self-governing, especially for those peoples such as the Lao Soung who lived in the Laotian highlands. With no major railway lines or roads to connect it to more active areas of French control, it would never experience the attempts at assimilation that often exemplified the French colonial expression, with French speaking rates lower than in any other part of Indochina.
Though Social Darwinist beliefs had motivated the French colonial administrators to view the Laotians as a lazy and decadent people who were entirely to blame for their own lack of economic development, relations between individual French and Laotians were strong, with many Frenchmen finding a great deal of attraction towards the peoples way of life. Whilst development and French population was lower than in any part of Indochina, the occurrences of French colonists ‘going native’ in the area were very common. This had led to a strong bond between the civilisations despite the official French administrations apathy and scepticism towards the region, one that would create a particularly complex situation as the Japanese removed the French colonial authority in March 1945.