I am a life-long peace activist, after all. I live six miles from Capitol Hill. It’s a 12 minute metro ride. Door to door, it’s a half hour trip. I worked as a congressional press secretary myself back in the 1990s. I know how Congress works. I know how to schedule meetings with staff.
When I hear this nonsense in TV sound bites about how poorly Assets performed before the War, I have learned to roar with laughter.
Am I a punch line? Or a punching bag? Or both?
I can only say that the truth feels much more tragic, because it so intimately relates to my own lost hopes for the Iraqi people.
Before my trip to Baghdad in March 2002, the finish line looked so close. By April and May of 2002, it appeared more distant. None of our successful arm-twisting in Baghdad was sinking into the Washington mindset. “Think tanks” spewed endless misinformed conference papers. Congress appeared to grasp none of the facts about Iraq’s current status. It was not difficult to conclude that information about Baghdad’s cooperation was not reaching Capitol Hill.
OK. I could fix that. How hard could it be?
By mid-May, 2002— almost a year before the Invasion— I began a round of meetings on Capitol Hill to bring top Republican and Democrats up to speed on the substantial gains from our back channel talks. This was good stuff after all.
Throughout May, June and July of 2002, a healthy smattering of House and Senate offices got the good news that Andy Card had already received: The CIA had built a substantial framework for peace that protected all major U.S. concerns in any post-sanctions period. Hallelujah!
As part of the sit down debriefings, senior staffers got copies of the most important Andy Card letters, detailing Iraq’s response to 9/11 and its efforts to cooperate with U.S anti-terrorism policy. They were fully informed of efforts to safeguard U.S. interests at multiple levels—including some objectives not yet identified by Congress.
My first stop was Senator Carl Levin’s office, days after I returned from Baghdad. I was confident the Michigan Democrat and Chair of the Senate Armed Services Committee would be thrilled to hear of Iraq’s promise to purchase one million American automobiles every year for 10 years. Or how U.S. corporations would enjoy preferential contracts in telecommunications, health care and pharmaceuticals. That would translate to thousands of high paying union jobs and equipment purchases for Michigan, Indiana and Ohio. The Rust-Belt of America, so aptly named for its faded industrial glory, would receive some of the most substantial benefits from America’s share of this peace dividend. Iraq’s commitment would have to be publicly ratified before the international community, giving American workers a measure of protection. There’s no question that Senator Levin’s constituents would have benefited enormously from long term economic development multipliers.
Given Michigan’s large Arab-American population, I also expected excitement from Sen. Levin’s staff for our progress targeting genuine terrorist cells, as opposed to frightened taxi drivers and plumbers in the general Arab population, who have nothing to do with terrorism. The vast majority, in fact.
Neither rendition, nor water-boarding nor the Patriot Act would have been necessary instruments of our success. Nobody had to worry that funds would be seized from legitimate Islamic charities engaged in community building, financing schools and health clinics for the poor, providing food for widows and children—all those good things that encourage hopefulness in the community. Nor would Americans worry about deploying the National Guard to Buffalo, New York, a shocking prospect that White House officials actually debated during this same time period.
And since “real” terrorism financing comes from global heroin trafficking, we would have tackled that other monster— the global profits of illegal narcotics—at the same time. We could have crippled heroin profits for those cartels on a global scale. (Except apparently Congress does not understand how one pays for the other.)
My conversation with Senator Levin’s staff was dynamic and far reaching—with great implications for Washington on so many levels. Notably, his staffer surprised me by revealing the Office had been debriefed about the comprehensive peace framework already. His staff was familiar with different parts of it.
That gave me hope as I continued my rounds.
Senior staff for Senator Debbie Stabenow’s office, also serving Michigan, got the same private debriefing. Ultimately, both Senator Levin and Senator Stabenow opposed the Iraq War Resolution in October, 2002. However neither Senator informed Michigan voters about these substantial opportunities for addressing so many urgent problems, like job creation for the local community.
I carried the good news to Senator Wellstone’s office— that much beloved and unabashed Liberal Democrat from Minnesota. Senator Wellstone provided a strong voice for peace until his tragic death in a mysterious airplane crash.
I visited the Black Caucus, including Rep. Elijah Cummings, and several other key representatives from Maryland, including former Rep. Connie Morella (GOP) and Rep. Chris Van Hollen, who both represented my tiny hamlet of Takoma Park. In fairness, Rep. Van Hollen—who defeated Morella— was newly sworn into office weeks before the Iraq invasion. He faced a steep learning curve, and our meeting included a group of 20 local anti-war activists. There was not an appropriate moment to debrief his staff about the peace framework. However Rep. Van Hollen hit the ground running, with a strong showing of support for the peace community.
His predecessor, Rep. Connie Morella, got the Andy Card papers in May of 2002. As a mark of her wisdom, Rep. Morella was one of only six Republicans in the House of Representatives to vote against the War Authorization bill. Courageously, she bucked the party machine and voted with her constituents, something Marylanders like me greatly appreciated. It took guts to go against Karl Rove and my dearest cousin, Andy Card. Rep. Morella deserves real praise for that, too.
Outrageously, some of the most aggressive attacks on Assets engaged in Pre-War Intelligence came from a handful of House and Senate offices that received my debriefings—and lied about it afterwards. For example, the chief of staff and legislative director for former Rep. Jane Harman, ranking Democrat on the House Intelligence Committee, received copies of the Andy Card letters, including the peace framework, with a request to share them with Rep. Harman.
As it happens, Rep. Harman and I are both alumnae of Smith College, one of the Seven Sister women’s colleges in Northampton, Massachusetts. Smith prides itself on building women’s leadership. If not for Smith College, I would not have carried the confidence to fight so hard in my battle ahead with the Justice Department.
Imagine my astonishment, therefore, to open the Smith Alumnae Quarterly, and read criticism from Rep. Harman, attacking Assets before the War. Rep. Harman gave speeches throughout the foreign policy community, criticizing Assets for failing to develop a Peace Option to War— in essence trapping Congress into following White House policy. That’s exactly what I had done. And senior staff in her office knew it.
Rep. Harman was not alone in repackaging the truth.
Ah but to my face, those Congressional staffers smiled, all peachy and nice. They might have strongly desired to shut me up— like Senator Lott and Senator McCain in February, 2004, resulting in my arrest on the Patriot Act. But they were not so uncouth as to threaten me to my face.
Quite the opposite, staff for Senator Don Nickles of Oklahoma, Majority Whip for the Republican Party and Rep. JC Watts of Oklahoma thanked me graciously and generously for gathering new leads on the Oklahoma City Bombing, including efforts to acquire financial records on Al Qaeda. I felt deeply gratified by their praise—which doesn’t mean they did not complain to the FBI afterwards.
Senator Lott’s and Senator McCain’s staff were very polite, too—And they got me arrested thirty days after I requested to testify.
Those Pre-War meetings occurred in mid-June, 2002.210 And so the question of who sicked the FBI on me—the Democrats or the Republicans— becomes highly intriguing.
By July 2002, som
ebody in those Congressional offices complained to the FBI.
Shockingly, instead of turning its focus onto terrorist finances, as I expected, the FBI turned its sights on me, and launched a major investigation of my anti-war activities.
We know the timing, because the FBI was forced to turn over wire taps211 for 28,000 phone calls, 8,000 emails and hundreds of faxes after my arrest. FBI phone taps started in mid-July, 2002—five months after my trip to Baghdad in March, 2002—but just a few weeks after I started making the rounds on Capitol Hill.
Surveillance photos prove the FBI or National Security Agency captured my meetings with Iraqi diplomats in New York in February, while the trip to Baghdad was planned. If the Feds believed I was breaking the law—instead of organizing my trip the way I thought I was supposed to—the FBI would have registered a phone tap and email capture immediately, as part of a criminal investigation. Nobody did so for another five months. That screams volumes that my trip to Baghdad was no big deal.
It’s crucial to understand that ordinarily the FBI applies for a wiretap separately from the National Security Agency. The NSA had tapped my phones for years, going back to the 1993 World Trade Center attack. But those wire taps would not automatically get shared with the FBI, unless the Intelligence Community referred my activities for a criminal investigation.
The FBI took no such action. Instead—by coincidence I’m sure, the FBI started its phone taps exactly when the Senate Foreign Relations Committee planned a series of hearings on Iraq in late July, 2002.212
That timing suggests the FBI wanted to monitor what Congress would learn about the realities of Pre-War Intelligence, which contradicted everything the White House was preaching on FOX News and CNN.
In which case, the Justice Department discovered that I told Congress a lot—and Congress rewarded the White House by pretending that I had not said a word.
But phone taps don’t lie. Numerous phone conversations with Congressional offices show that I identified myself as one of the few Assets covering Iraq.213 Some of my calls described the peace framework, assuring Congressional staffers that diplomacy could achieve the full scope of results sought by U.S policymakers.
Other conversations warned how Imams in Baghdad threatened to tear American soldiers apart, limb from limb, if the U.S invaded Iraq. On my trip to Baghdad in March, 2002— one year before the invasion— Iraqi Imams threatened to use suicide bombs, and swore that even Iraqi women would launch a powerful resistance to any U.S Occupation. Over and over, Iraqi Imams promised it wouldn’t matter if the people hated Saddam. They hated the United States much more, because of the brutality of sanctions, which had destroyed Iraq’s society and economy. There would be hell to pay if the United States tried to occupy Baghdad.
FBI phone taps captured it all, making a lie of complaints that Assets failed to warn U.S. leaders off this catastrophe. My phone calls were loaded with pleas to turn back from disaster.214
Ironically, a large part of my debriefing focused on the need for leadership on Capitol Hill to bring the CIA and the FBI together to launch the Terrorism Task Force inside Iraq. Most Congressional staffers could spout flaming rhetoric with regards to anti-terrorism policy. But they could not grasp necessary strategies for achieving results on the ground. Their eyes took on a blank glaze when I described how the FBI and the CIA would have to engage in inter-agency cooperation, in order to secure those financial records from Iraq. And of course, I explained the value of identifying the cash pipeline.
Closing down the financial pipeline for terrorist activities should have been a top priority for Republicans and Democrats alike. And let nobody forget, those monies come from heroin trafficking, a network that runs from Afghanistan and the Bekaa Valley in Lebanon to Colombia. Genuine terrorist organizations are heavily interconnected with those smuggling cartels. That’s where their operating dollars come from.
I expected Congressional staffers to seize the opportunity with gusto. I expected them to rally enthusiastically to the challenge. Indeed, it remains a mystery why any responsible government official would not grab the chance to investigate those accounts, and track the flow of cash in and out of them.
Unconscionably, Republicans preferred to deprive Baghdad of an opportunity to cooperate with global anti-terrorism— with dire consequences. Failure to act allowed that cash flow to remain active and accessible in other conflicts to this day— in Iraq, Pakistan and Afghanistan. It probably financed attacks on Mombai, savaging Pakistan’s peace with India. Indonesia is experiencing a low-grade insurgency against Islamic rebels. The list goes on.
Above all, heroin trafficking has financed the Taliban’s War in Afghanistan against U.S. Armed Forces. Profits from opium production account for why a rag tag militia of Afghan mountain fighters has prevailed over the combined military strength of the United States, Britain and 42 NATO governments, which boast the most sophisticated weapons on the planet.
To put that in context, Afghanistan rakes in about $3 billion a year from opium production, supplying 85 percent of the world’s raw ingredients for heroin, morphine and other opiate mixtures.
According to the UN World Drug Report of 2010, heroin commanded a global market value of $55 billion, and a trafficking network that employs 1 million people.
Notably, the year of 9/11—2001—saw Afghanistan’s lowest opium production since the 1980s— approximately 100 tons, thanks to the Clinton Administration’s successful programs paying Afghan farmers to stop opium harvests. Under President Clinton, opium production was almost eradicated—a superbly successful anti-drug policy that likewise cut off financial resources for armed conflict.
When President Bush stopped paying Afghan farmers to convert from poppy crops, opium production jumped to 3,200 tons in 2002.
Opium production skyrocketed thereafter, throughout the Afghan War, peaking at 8,000 tons in 2008, when President Bush left office.
By 2009, President Obama’s drug policies cut opium production to 7,000 tons in 2009. But the damage has been done. Though military strategists are loathe to admit it, the United States and NATO have lost the Afghan War to these ferocious rag tag fighters, who have no technology, but reap the harvests of endless cash supplies for their Jihad.
And so I stand by this criticism:
Refusing to shut down the financial pipeline shared by Jihadi fighters in Afghanistan and terrorist cells organized by Al Qaeda qualifies as the single most dangerous failure of national security by the Republican leadership.
American soldiers have died because of it. Afghan and Iraqi civilians have suffered endlessly in the cross fighting. Civilian infrastructure has been wrecked. A future has been destroyed—The U.S. came home defeated from Iraq. And after 10 years of War, the Taliban is guaranteed to dominate the political landscape after NATO pulls out in 2014.
Finally, the Republican failure has set loose a ticking time bomb that threatens domestic security inside the United States, as well. There’s a significant probability that the next major terrorist attack on America soil will receive financing through that same international financial network. It was grossly negligent— and suspicious— not to identify that financial pipeline, and shut the damn thing down.
Instead, the United States made a great show of seizing donations to legitimate Islamic charities engaged in community building. There’s a tragic sort of irony in that, because the health, education and food programs funded by those Charities provide the best deterrents against violence in the community. Those programs create a sense of future, in addition to providing for basic survival. Seizing those charitable donations is not only morally wrong, it’s desperately short-sighted. It’s the worst sort of grandstanding in Washington. It demonstrates that U.S. leaders don’t comprehend how terrorism originates, or what keeps it alive. U.S. leaders are cutting down the community infrastructure that might make it possible to stop the violence.
On top of all that, the FBI wanted to eat the CIA’s lunch. They tried to swallow up the CIA’s mi
ssion overseas. That did not sit well in Washington, and complicated possible joint ventures like this one. Instead of cooperating like Sister Agencies, the FBI sought to push the CIA out of the picture altogether, and took advantage of the CIA’s perceived failure to stop 9/11, in order to savage the competence of the agency.
That’s almost funny, in the blackest way—considering the Justice Department refused the CIA’s urgent appeals for cooperation to pre-empt the 9/11 strike throughout the summer of 2001, in the first place.
Leadership from Congress would have put those relations back on track. But it never emerged. As an Asset, I was greatly frustrated. I could see that Congress lacked the skill to carry its agenda into the real world. Cut past the rhetoric, and Congress was not the high flying, results-driven leadership it was selling to the American Heartland.
Within six months of 9/11, terrorism had become a media spectacle, a Big Top Circus of hype and drama on Capitol Hill to hold people’s attention. But none of that emotional regalia after 9/11 translated into action that would have made a difference to terrorism controls in the field. It was purely a publicity stunt.
Most aggravating of all, Congress appeared to be afraid of losing the public’s attention. CNN was calling for guest interviews. Voters held their leadership in high esteem. Beneath the veneer of patriotism, Congress was reviving the art of demagoguery. Pushed to deliver substance by somebody like myself, who understands the dynamics of anti-terrorism at the field level, Congress proved useless to provide any sort of leadership assistance, or bring the FBI and CIA together for cooperative projects.
Unfortunately, leaders in Washington quickly saw that nobody would know the difference. So the rhetoric on Capitol Hill became more aggressive after 9/11, while their performance flagged far behind.
Then in July, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee decided to hold hearings to examine U.S. policy in Iraq. The Senate Chamber was packed to overflow, but I got a seat in the audience. There I listened, dumb-struck, while Senate leaders bandied about ridiculous allegations about Iraq’s illegal weapons stocks and refusal to accept U.N. weapons inspections, in contradiction to all current facts on the ground.
EXTREME PREJUDICE: The Terrifying Story of the Patriot Act and the Cover Ups of 9/11 and Iraq Page 23