* Lord Biffen later told the author that Lord Hailsham had agreed with him, but had not said so in Cabinet. There is no other evidence for this, and it sounds surprising, but it is true that Hailsham, who was often bellicose, was also mercurial.
† John Weston (1938–), educated Sherborne and Worcester College, Oxford; Director of International Security Policy, FCO, 1981–5; UK Permanent Representative to NATO, 1992–5; UK Permanent Representative to UN, 1995–8; knighted, 1992.
* Throughout the Falklands War, the Task Force kept Greenwich Mean Time, ‘Zulu’ in military shorthand. This meant that the British services’ working day in the South Atlantic began much earlier than the Argentine, which was generally considered an advantage.
* In fact, the lightly armed Marines resisted fiercely. The Argentine casualty figures are disputed. Freedman records 1 Argentine death and 3 wounded but others put the death toll as high as 5 (Freedman, The Official History of the Falklands Campaign, vol. ii: War and Diplomacy, p. 7; ‘Sir Rex Hunt’, Daily Telegraph obituary, 12 Nov. 2012). The Marines suffered no casualties.
* By no means all Conservative MPs were as robust as those who spoke up at the 1922 meeting. Three days later, Jopling drew up a report of backbenchers’ attitudes. It mentioned several, including Julian Critchley and Chris Patten, who felt that an attempt at recapture was too dangerous (‘the military difficulties are insurmountable’), Ian Gilmour, who said, ‘It will make Suez look like common sense,’ and Kenneth Clarke, whose view was summarized as ‘Hopes nobody thinks we are going to fight the Argentinians. We should blow up a few ships but nothing more.’ (Report by Michael Jopling to Francis Pym, 6 Apr. 1982, THCR 1/20/3/2, fascicule no. 4.)
* These dynamics were lost on the US Secretary of State, Al Haig. Haig initially refused to believe that Carrington had resigned on principle. Instead he pleaded with Nicko Henderson (and later with his wife Mary) for the ‘real reason’ that had led Mrs Thatcher to sack him. (Interview with Stanley Orman.)
* In the original, the dormouse does not, in fact, get smaller. He simply gets put into the teapot.
* Bill Deedes, who was temperamentally of a Butlerish disposition, recorded a conversation with his proprietor, Lord Hartwell, when he returned to the offices of the Daily Telegraph after the service: ‘Tell him (a) PM at risk. (b) Expedition is a farce.’ (Lord Deedes, diary (unpublished), 5 Apr. 1982.)
† As the Fleet departed, the Deputy Secretary to the Cabinet, Robert Wade-Gery, came in by ship by Portsmouth Head from a continental holiday. He had been out of touch with all news and had no idea what was happening. The next day, he found himself made secretary to the War Cabinet. (Interview with Sir Robert Wade-Gery.)
* Anthony Parsons (1922–96), educated King’s School, Canterbury and Balliol College, Oxford; Ambassador to Iran, 1974–9; UK Permanent Representative to UN, 1979–82; special adviser to the Prime Minister on foreign affairs, 1982–3; knighted, 1975.
† Not everyone in the French diplomatic corps shared Mitterrand’s sense of solidarity. In a memo dated 7 April the French Ambassador to the UK, Emmanuel de Margerie, described Mrs Thatcher as ‘Victorian, imperialist and obstinate’, with a ‘tendency to get carried away by combative instincts’ (Document, BBC Radio 4, 5 Mar. 2012).
‡ Jacques Attali, who acted as interpreter for the conversation, recalled that whenever Mrs Thatcher was reminded of the call in later times, tears would come into her eyes (interview with Jacques Attali).
* She put the manuscript to good use in her memoirs. Most of her autobiography was ghosted, though with her extensive co-operation and complete approval. The Falklands account, almost uniquely in the book, is essentially in her own words, which are vivid and often emotional. As will be seen, however, the published version toned down or omitted some of her private observations, as well as her frequent emphatic underlinings.
* Two days later, having called in Michael Palliser to thank him on his retirement, Mrs Thatcher asked him to serve as her ‘chief of staff for the Falklands’ (interview with Sir Michael Palliser). But his job was not Ismay’s. It turned out to be more a matter of long-term planning of Falklands issues, and besides, Mrs Thatcher, who associated him with Foreign Office ‘wetness’, did not really listen to his advice.
* Mrs Thatcher’s lack of knowledge in the field meant that she was almost incapable of reading naval maps. Michael Havers, who had served in the RNVR, understood these maps well. He and she would spread them out on the floor and she would firmly point out the Falkland Islands in quite the wrong place. He would then find them for her. (Interview with Philip Havers QC.)
* Jeane Kirkpatrick (1926–2006), served as Ronald Reagan’s foreign policy adviser in his 1980 campaign and later in his Cabinet; first woman to hold the post of US permanent representative to the UN.
* In this view, he disagreed with much of the early advice he received from the Pentagon (interview with Lord Renwick).
* Vernon Anthony ‘Dick’ Walters (1917–2002), lieutenant general, US Army; Deputy Director, CIA, 1972–6; Roving US Ambassador for Special Missions, 1981–5; US Permanent Representative to UN, 1985–9; US Ambassador to Germany, 1989–91.
* The Ambassador, John Louis, was on leave in Florida when the invasion took place and was initially advised by the Embassy that he need not return. This changed with the onset of Haig’s shuttle, but Louis was unable to reach London until Haig had already left.
* Brian Fall, Pym’s private secretary, had experience in taking notes of what Haig had said at meetings, and recalled that his words had often seemed ‘completely meaningless’ (interview with Sir Brian Fall).
* As was often the case in her manuscript writings, Mrs Thatcher left out the question mark.
† Parsons liked to relate that Mrs Thatcher, maddened by him setting out his case with the phrases ‘On the one hand’ and ‘On the other hand’, said to him, ‘Tony, I am so glad I don’t belong to your class.’ ‘Which class is that, Prime Minister?’ ‘The class that cannot make up its mind.’ (Private information.) But in fact she greatly admired his handling of the situation and the telegrams he sent her about it. He became her favourite Foreign Office person.
* Augusto Pinochet (1915–2006), Commander-in-Chief, Chilean armed forces, 1973; led coup against President Salvador Allende, September 1973; President of Chile, 1974–90; reviled by many for his human rights record, Pinochet was also, however, credited with restoring order and prosperity to his country. In 1988, he inaugurated a gradual restoration of democracy. In 1998, he was detained in London as a result of an attempt by a Spanish judge to have him extradited to face charges for crimes such as torture and murder. Lady Thatcher protested vehemently against his treatment. He was eventually released on grounds of being unfit to stand trial, and returned to Chile, where he died, under house arrest, several years later.
* The military-to-military relationship between the two countries was so close that, from the beginning of the conflict, US officials would grant many British requests without seeking permission from their superiors. Those closer to the top of the chain of command, on both sides, often failed to realize just how much help the US was providing.
† To Mrs Thatcher’s fury, the former Labour minister Ted Rowlands had revealed past British readings of Argentine telegrams to Parliament in the first debate on 3 April.
* One factor that strengthened Mrs Thatcher’s hand in resisting American conciliatory suggestions was that the United States itself was reluctant to guarantee the settlement which it sought. Britain kept asking America to be ready to provide forces to supervise any interim agreement that might be negotiated, but America, fearing the difficulty of getting Congressional approval, would never make a clear commitment.
* This was chance: the Chief of the Defence Staff is drawn, on a usual but not invariable rotation, from each of the three services. The Falklands War saw the first time when the CDS was definitely above the other service chiefs. Under the old system, the three Chiefs had been equals, though with the CDS p
rimus inter pares, and all would have been represented in war cabinets. The new system simplified matters, though it might have worked badly, causing the RAF and the army to feel left out, if Lewin had not been so good at his job.
* There is some dispute whether this occasion, which Mrs Thatcher describes in her memoirs and in her private manuscript, took place on the date – 15 April, not 16 April as Freedman has it – she identified. Freedman concludes that she was actually referring to the War Cabinet meeting at Chequers on Sunday 25 April (see Freedman, The Official History of the Falklands Campaign, vol. ii: War and Diplomacy, p. 206, n. 7), but this does not accord with Mrs Thatcher’s memory that the meeting took place at the MOD. Her engagement diary records a 9.30 meeting at the MOD.
* Julian Bullard (1928–2006), educated Rugby and Magdalen College, Oxford; Fellow of All Souls College, Oxford, 1950–57; joined FCO, 1953; Deputy Under-Secretary, 1979–84 (also Political Director, 1982–4); Ambassador to West Germany, 1984–8; knighted, 1982.
* It was typical of Mrs Thatcher’s caution that, when writing her memoirs, she needed a good deal of persuasion to include an explicit account of this dramatic day. She worried that she might be unfair to Pym, even that she might be libelling him. She was also in a constant state of anxiety about revealing private conversations such as these. (THCR 4/3.)
* Henderson himself deserved a good deal of the credit for the popularity of the British cause in America. He appeared constantly and successfully on American television. One commentator remarked affectionately that the slightly Bohemian-looking Henderson resembled ‘a broken-down old English country house’.
* There were also earlier examples of actions not taken because of the pressure of diplomacy. According to Admiral Sir Henry Leach, a request to sink the Argentine carrier, the 25 de Mayo, was refused because it would have interfered with the progress of the Haig shuttle (interview with Admiral Sir Henry Leach).
* For Britain, however, the OAS meeting was not all bad news. Only two countries, Nicaragua and Guatemala, supported the Argentine invasion of the Falklands, and General Pinochet ordered Chile to abstain on any motion because of ‘a conviction that Galtieri’s days are numbered’. (John Heath, British Ambassador, telegram to Foreign Office from Santiago, 28 Apr. 1982, Prime Minister’s Papers, Argentina: Position of the Falkland Islands; document consulted in the Cabinet Office.)
* In another example of misplaced optimism Jeane Kirkpatrick predicted that the ‘Argentines will find a way to avoid war through a face-saving device in some forum perhaps by the weekend’ (National Security Council Minutes, 30 Apr. 1982, NSC 00048, Box 91284, Exec Sec, NSC: NSC Meeting Files, Reagan Library, Simi Valley CA).
* Perhaps sensing this, General Galtieri broadcast to his nation the following day, speaking of ‘the British empire’, and, paying an unintended compliment, complaining of ‘the unspeakable boldness of the invader’.
* Denis, who accompanied his wife to Milton, was less ecstatic. On being shown a painting by Stubbs of leopard cubs, his only comment was: ‘Looks like it needs cleaning.’ (Conversation with Sir Philip Naylor-Leyland.)
† Mrs Thatcher had been warned by Enoch Powell, whom she saw privately during the conflict, that bombing raids were rarely as successful as reported. She wanted to hear what he had to say and, of course, had no fear that he would take her job. ‘You’re the only person I can talk to,’ she told him. (Interview with Mrs Pam Powell.)
* Henry Leach was present at Chequers but, not being a member of the War Cabinet, was not invited to the meeting, to his irritation. He had to stay in the main drawing room drinking with Carol Thatcher. (Interview with Sir Henry Leach.)
* The British decision not to attack the Argentine destroyers after hitting the Belgrano annoyed Admiral Woodward; ‘each of them is likely to return with four Exocet,’ he cabled to Fieldhouse. ‘… I request early political recognition that there is a war going on down here.’ (Lawrence Freedman, The Official History of the Falklands Campaign, 2 vols, Routledge, 2005, vol. ii: War and Diplomacy, p. 302.)
* In that week’s Spectator, the political columnist Ferdinand Mount wrote that the sinking of the Belgrano made it essential to call a ceasefire. This was a courageous thing for him to say in the circumstances, since he had already accepted an offer to succeed John Hoskyns as head of the No. 10 Policy Unit. Mrs Thatcher raised no protest at Mount’s article, and he took up his new job as agreed.
* This gave the blusterous Haig little pause for thought. He believed that everything she wrote about him in her memoirs was wrong: ‘I assume that she was just so busy that it was ghost-written and guided by a couple of turkeys around her.’ (Interview with Alexander Haig.)
† US contingency planning for the loan of a carrier had begun earlier at the request of the Royal Navy. With the USS Iwo Jima in mind, the Americans proposed to provide a team of contractors and retired US Navy personnel to train the incoming British crew. (Interview with John Lehman.)
* Norman Fowler (1938–), educated King Edward VI School, Chelmsford, and Trinity Hall, Cambridge; Conservative MP for Nottingham South, 1970–74; for Sutton Coldfield, February 1974–2001; Minister of Transport, 1979–81; Secretary of State for Social Services, 1981–7; for Employment, 1987–90; Chairman, Conservative Party, 1992–4; created Baron Fowler, 2001.
* One unwelcome solution to the Falklands problem was proposed at this time by Mrs Thatcher’s economic adviser, Alan Walters. He sent her a memo suggesting a plebiscite on the islands which would offer £50,000 per head in return for Argentine sovereignty, or continuing British sovereignty and no money. Mrs Thatcher remembered it as ‘a rat’s way out’ (THCR 4/3).
* Parsons was one of very few officials who would stand up to Mrs Thatcher. On one occasion during the conflict the Prime Minister asked Parsons for his view but then interrupted him almost immediately. ‘First, you have to shut up,’ Parsons responded, ‘then you have to listen to me and then you have to give what I say some consideration.’ (Unpublished diary of Henry Brandon, 26 Mar. 1983, Box 11, Papers of Henry Brandon, Library of Congress, Washington DC.)
* It is significant, however, that David Goodall, the official succeeding Robert Wade-Gery as secretary to the War Cabinet, whose first day’s work was on 17 May, immediately gathered the impression that ‘We did not expect to have to make the concessions we had offered’ (interview with Sir David Goodall).
* The negative Argentine reply to the British proposals had reached Parsons late in the evening of 18 May. ‘It didn’t even address our proposals, it was just a kind of gush of rhetoric,’ Parsons later recalled. ‘I remember saying to Pérez de Cuéllar that as a result of their response a lot of young men who were alive today, in a few weeks’ time were going to be dead, on both sides.’ (Interview with Anthony Parsons, The Downing Street Years (BBC), 1993.)
* Members of the Privy Council, who are drawn from all parties, are bound by conditions of secrecy when discussing matters ‘on Privy Council terms’.
† Bill Deedes, the editor of the Daily Telegraph, who was present at the dinner for Muldoon, sat with him and Mrs Thatcher. Muldoon, Deedes noted, told Mrs Thatcher how Charles Haughey, the Irish Prime Minister, had not wanted to vote to end sanctions against Argentina but ‘ “his people” had wanted it.’ ‘PM’s scorn irreproducable [sic],’ Deedes commented. (Lord Deedes, diary (unpublished), 19 May 1982.)
‡ In her memoirs, Mrs Thatcher does not mention her unintended part in encouraging Pérez de Cuéllar to try to keep negotiation alive.
* After the official US tilt towards Britain on 30 April, the supply of US arms and matériel increased considerably. It included not just the Sidewinders, but also helicopter engines, thousands of tons of airstrip matting, Stinger ground-to-air missiles, assistance in ship repair and much else besides. ‘I think the full extent of our assistance has never been fully documented,’ recalled Richard Perle. ‘There was matériel support on a massive scale.’ (Interview with Richard Perle.) Deliveries were made both to Ascension Island and
to the UK mainland, and the British transported them thence to the South Atlantic.
† In a vain attempt to maintain friendly relations with Argentina, President Reagan sent Galtieri a congratulatory telegram to mark Independence Day. This displeased him, since it seemed hypocritical, and enraged Mrs Thatcher.
* In what was a controversial decision at the time, the Queen Elizabeth II, the country’s largest cruise ship, had been requisitioned to send reinforcements.
† On 27 May, the Vatican finally decided to go ahead with the visit to Britain.
‡ New Zealand, on the other hand, offered the use of its frigate HMNZS Canterbury, which was accepted.
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