114. Brook-Shepherd, The Storm Birds, p. 260.
115. vol. 2, app. 3.
116. k-5,504.
117. Hanson, Soviet Industrial Espionage, pp. 10, 23.
118. Wolf, Man without a Face, p. 182.
119. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 641-2.
120. Andrew and Gordievsky (eds.), Instructions from the Centre, pp. 37, 49-50.
121. Recollections by Oleg Gordievsky of Gorbachev’s address; Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, p. 621.
122. Garthoff, “The KGB Reports to Gorbachev,” pp. 228-9.
123. Brook-Shepherd, The Storm Birds, p. 260.
124. Andrew and Gordievsky (eds.), Instructions from the Centre, pp. 40-9, 115-17.
125. The fullest account of the Ames case, and the only one to benefit from interviews with Ames himself, is Earley, Confessions of a Spy. On the agents betrayed by Ames, see pp. 143-5. According to the SVR, several of the Western agents named by Ames had already been identified from other leads.
126. Interview with Shebarshin, Daily Telegraph (December 1, 1992).
127. Gates, From the Shadows, pp. 424-6.
128. Andrew and Gordievsky (eds.), Instructions from the Centre, pp. 212-17. Operation RYAN was not finally canceled until Primakov became head of foreign intelligence in October 1991; Richelson, A Century of Spies, p. 421.
129. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 627-8. Andrew and Gordievsky (eds.), Instructions from the Centre, pp. 217-18.
130. Shebarshin’s foreign postings had included a term as main resident in India from 1975 to 1977.
131. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 620-1.
132. “Intelligence Service Divorces from the KGB,” Izvestia (September 24, 1991).
133. Interview with Shebarshin, Daily Telegraph (December 1, 1992).
134. On the Soviet economy in the Gorbachev era, see Brown, The Gorbachev Factor, ch. 5.
135. BBC, Summary of World Broadcasts, SU/0955 (December 24, 1990), C4/3ff; SU/0946 (December 13, 1990), B/1.
136. Interview with Shebarshin, Daily Telegraph (December 1, 1992).
137. BBC, Summary of World Broadcasts, SU/0946 (December 13, 1990), B/1. Much the same conspiracy theory had been expounded in a secret circular to residencies almost six years earlier; Andrew and Gordievsky (eds.), Instructions from the Centre, pp. 152-9.
138. Andrew and Gordievsky (eds.), Instructions from the Centre, pp. 218-22; More Instructions from the Centre, pp. 125-8.
139. Kryuchkov continued to advance this preposterous conspiracy theory and to complain that, though he submitted a file on the case to Gorbachev, he repeatedly reneged on a promise to look into it. Remnick, Resurrection, p. 86.
Chapter Fourteen
Political Warfare
1. Marx, Theses on Feuerbach, no. 11.
2. “Chief Conclusions and Views Adopted at the Meeting of [FCD] Heads of Service,” ref. 156/54 (February 1, 1984); Andrew and Gordievsky (eds.), Instructions from the Centre, pp. 30-44.
3. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, p. 629.
4. On Modin, see chapter 9.
5. See above, chapters 9 and 12.
6. An extract from the report appears in Yeltsin, The View from the Kremlin, appendix B, pp. 307-8.
7. Golson (ed.), The Playboy Interview, p. 135.
8. Posner, Case Closed, p. 371; Summers, Conspiracy, p. 36.
9. Hurt, Reasonable Doubt, p. 124.
10. Yeltsin, The View from the Kremlin, appendix B, p. 308.
11. Dobrynin, In Confidence, p. 111.
12. Yeltsin, The View from the Kremlin, appendix B, p. 308.
13. The best and fullest account of Oswald’s period in the Soviet Union is in Mailer, Oswald’s Tale. Mailer had access to many of the voluminous KGB files on Oswald, which include transcripts of conversations in his bugged flat in Minsk and surveillance reports from KGB personnel who followed him wherever he went, even spying on him and his wife through a peephole in the bedroom wall to record their “intimate moments.”
14. Childs’s warning about Oswald’s letter was cited in a report by KGB chairman Semichastny to the Central Committee on December 10, 1963, of which an extract appears in Yeltsin, The View from the Kremlin, appendix B, p. 307. Yeltsin identifies the CPUSA informant as “Brooks,” but does not reveal that this was the CPUSA alias of Jack Childs. For the text of Oswald’s letter to the CPUSA of August 28, 1963, see Mailer, Oswald’s Tale, pp. 594-5.
15. Posner, Case Closed, disposes of many of the conspiracy theories. Norman Mailer, the author of the best-documented study of Oswald, admits that he “began with a prejudice in favor of the conspiracy theorists” but finally concluded both that Oswald “had the character to kill Kennedy, and that he probably did it alone.” The most difficult unsolved question is not whether Oswald shot the President but why he did so. Oswald was both a self-obsessed fantasist and a compulsive liar. There is general agreement, however, that he had no personal hostility to Kennedy himself. The best clue to Oswald’s motives is probably that provided by the Intourist guide who first introduced him to Russia. “The most important thing for [Oswald],” she recalls, “was that he wanted to become famous. Idea Number One. He was fanatic about it” (Mailer, Oswald’s Tale, p. 321). In Dallas on November 22, 1963 Oswald seized the opportunity to become one of the best-known Americans of the twentieth century.
16. Marzani was born in Rome in 1912 and emigrated with his parents to the United States in 1923. After graduating from Williams College, Mass., in 1935, he worked for a year in publishing, then studied at Exeter College, Oxford, from 1936 to 1938. According to his KGB file, while at Oxford University (perhaps during the 1937 long vacation) he served in an anarchist brigade in the Spanish Civil War, then joined the Communist Party. On his return to the United States (probably in 1938), he became a member of the CPUSA, using the Party alias “Tony Wells.” In 1942 Marzani joined the Office of the Co-ordinator of Information (shortly to become OSS, which contained a number of other Communists and Soviet agents). When OSS was closed in September 1945, Marzani’s section was transferred to the State Department. According to his KGB file, Marzani was first recommended to the New York residency by its agent, Cedric Belfrage (CHARLIE), who during the Second World War worked for British Security Co-ordination in New York (vol. 6, ch. 14, part 2). On his transfer to the State Department, Marzani signed a sworn statement that he did not belong to, or support, “any political party or organization that advocates the overthrow of the Government by force or violence.” When later discovered to be a member of the CPUSA (officially considered to advocate that policy), he was sentenced in 1948 to two and a half years’ imprisonment. Marzani gave some details of his pre-war and wartime career in testimony to the Senate Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and Other Internal Security Laws on June 18, 1953, but cited the Fifth Amendment and declined to answer the main questions put to him.
17. vol. 6, ch. 14, part 2.
18. Boffa, Inside the Khrushchev Era, p. 227.
19. The total advertising budget funded by the KGB during the seven-year period 1961-8 was 70,820 dollars. vol. 6, ch. 14, parts 1, 2.
20. Kalugin, Spymaster, p. 45. Marzani published over twenty books and pamphlets, written either by himself or by authors he had selected, on subjects chosen by the KGB. Several concerned the Vietnam War. Other active measures organized by Marzani included an attempt to discredit Stalin’s daughter, Svetlana Alliluyeva (codenamed KUKUSHKA), after her flight to the United States in 1967. The KGB helped to refinance Marzani’s publishing house after it was seriously damaged in a fire in 1969. During the early 1970s, however, the KGB became increasingly dissatisfied with Marzani. According to Mitrokhin’s later notes on his file:
The [New York] Residency began to notice signs of independent behavior on the part of NORD. He began to overestimate the extent to which the Residency depended upon him, and deluded himself in thinking that he was the only person in the country capable of carrying out Soviet intelligence tasks.
Since 1974 NORD has been living in Puerto Rico; it has been difficult to communicate with him there, and he lost many intelligence opportunities.
(vol. 6, ch. 14, part 2)
21. Joesten, Oswald, p. 4. (Page references are to the English edition.)
22. Joesten, Oswald, pp. 119, 149-50.
23. Joesten, Oswald, pp. 143, 145. In the second edition, Joesten acknowledged “substantial aid” from Marzani in the “research and writing” of an appendix criticizing the Warren report (Joesten, Oswald, p. 159n.).
24. Even the sympathetic Mark Lane later wrote somewhat critically of Joesten’s book: “I had met with Carl Marzani, read proofs of the book at his request, and made some few suggestions. It was a very early work, written before the Warren Commission’s evidence was released; therefore, while timely, it was of necessity somewhat flawed and incomplete” (Lane, Plausible Denial, p. 44n).
25. vol. 6, ch. 14, part 3.
26. Joersten, Oswald, p. 3.
27. Lane, Plausible Denial, p. 23.
28. vol. 6, ch. 14, part 3. There is no evidence that Lane did realize the source of the funding.
29. vol. 6, ch. 14, part 3; t-7,102. Borovik doubtless did not identify himself to Lane as a KGB agent.
30. Lane, Plausible Denial, pp. 4, 19. Posner, Case Closed, pp. 414-15.
31. Posner, Case Closed, p. 453.
32. vol. 6, ch. 14, part 3.
33. Posner, Case Closed, pp. 454-5.
34. vol. 6, ch. 14, part 3. Mitrokhin gives the text of the forged letter in Russian translation. For the original version, see Hurt, Reasonable Doubt, pp. 235-6. On Oswald’s dyslexia, see Mailer, Oswald’s Tale, appendix.
35. vol. 6, ch. 14, part 3.
36. Hurt, Reasonable Doubt, p. 236. Hurt refers to the letter as the most “singular and teasing” document to have emerged relating to the period immediately before the assassination.
37. vol. 6, ch. 14, part 3.
38. Lane, Plausible Denial, p. 187. KGB active measures probably encouraged, rather than accounted for, the Howard Hunt conspiracy theory.
39. Andrew, For the President’s Eyes Only, pp. 311-12.
40. Also influential was the report of the House Select Committee on the JFK and King assassinations. Its draft report in December 1978 concluded that Oswald acted alone. Flawed acoustic evidence then persuaded the committee that, in addition to the three shots fired by Oswald, a fourth had been fired from a grassy knoll, thus leading it to conclude in its final report of July 1979 that there had been a conspiracy. It pointed to mobsters as the most likely conspirators. Posner, Case Closed, pp. 475-86, appendix A.
41. Andrew, For the President’s Eyes Only, pp. 401-7, 410-11, 421. In private Church later admitted that his study of CIA assassination plots convinced him that the real rogue elephants had been in the White House: “The CIA operated as an arm of the presidency. This led presidents to conclude that they were ‘super-godfathers’ with enforcers. It made them feel above the law and unaccountable.”
42. vol. 6, ch. 14, parts 1, 2, 3; vol. 6, app. 1, part 22.
43. On Agee’s resignation from the CIA, see Barron, KGB Today, p. 228.
44. Kalugin, Spymaster, pp. 191-2. The KGB files noted by Mitrokhin describe Agee as an agent of the Cuban DGI and give details of his collaboration with the KGB, but do not formally list him as a KGB, as well as DGI, agent. vol. 6, ch. 14, parts 1, 2, 3; vol. 6, app. 1, part 22.
45. Agee, Inside the Company, p. viii. (Page references are to the Bantam edition.)
46. vol. 6, app. 1, part 22.
47. Agee, Inside the Company, p. 659.
48. The London residency eventually became dissatisfied with Cheporov, claiming that he “used his co-operation with the KGB for his own benefit” and “expressed improper criticism of the system in the USSR.” k-14,115.
49. vol. 6, app. 1, part 22.
50. Agee, On The Run, pp. 111-12, 120-1.
51. Agee, On The Run, p. 123.
52. vol. 7, ch. 16, para. 46.
53. The defense committee also took up the case of an American journalist, Mark Hosenball, who had also been served with a deportation order. Unlike Agee, however, Hosenball had no contact with the committee and took no part in its campaign. In the KGB files noted by Mitrokhin there is no mention of Hosenball, save for a passing reference to the work of the defense committee.
54. Agee, On The Run, chs. 7, 8; Kelly, “The Deportations of Philip Agee”; vol. 7, ch. 16, para. 45.
55. On the residency’s tendency to exaggerate in its influence on protest demonstrations, see Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, p. 586.
56. At a private meeting of the Parliamentary Labour Party on February 17, 1977, however, the Home Secretary, Merlyn Rees, implied a KGB connection. Tony Benn’s diary vaguely records that the gist of Rees’s comments was that Agee and Hosenball “had been in contact or whatever with enemy agents or something.” According to Benn, Rees “got quite a reasonable hearing from the Party.” Benn, Conflicts of Interest, pp. 41-2.
57. vol. 6, ch. 14, parts 1, 2, 3; k-8,607.
58. Agee, “What Uncle Sam Wants to Know about You,” p. 113. (Page references are to the 1978 reprint in Agee and Wolf, Dirty Work.)
59. vol. 6, ch. 14, part 1; vol. 7, ch. 16, para. 46.
60. Agee, “What Uncle Sam Wants to Know about You,” p. 114.
61. Agee, On The Run, pp. 255, 280-1.
62. vol. 6, ch. 14, part 2.
63. Agee, On The Run, p. 255. Codenames of some of the RUPOR group in vol. 6, ch. 14, part 2. Mitrokhin’s notes record that the group included “former CIA employees” apart from Agee, but do not identify Jim and Elsie Wilcott by name.
64. Agee, On The Run, pp. 276-82.
65. The document was also sent anonymously to the British journal Leveller, which published extracts from it in August 1979. vol. 6, ch. 14, part 2.
66. Agee, On The Run, p. 304.
67. vol. 6, ch. 14, part 2.
68. vol. 6, ch. 14, part 2.
69. Agee, On The Run, p. 306.
70. vol. 6, ch. 14, part 2.
71. Agee, On The Run, chs. 13-15.
72. vol. 6, ch. 14, part 1.
73. vol. 6, ch. 14, part 1.
74. “Miss Knight Pens Another Letter,” Washington Post (August 4, 1966).
75. vol. 6, ch. 14, part 1. On Hoover’s contacts with Knight, cf. Gentry, J. Edgar Hoover, p. 409.
76. vol. 6, ch. 14, part 1.
77. DeLoach, Hoover’s FBI, ch. 4.
78. DeLoach, Hoover’s FBI, p. 62.
79. vol. 6, ch. 14, part 1.
80. DeLoach, Hoover’s FBI, ch. 9. The expurgated text of Sullivan’s anonymous message to King, opened by his wife Coretta, is published in Theoharis, From the Secret Files of J. Edgar Hoover, pp. 102-3.
81. See below, chapter 17.
82. King, Why We Can’t Wait; Colaiaco, Martin Luther King, Jr., ch. 5.
83. vol. 6, ch. 14, part 2. The other civil rights leaders selected as targets for active measures were A. Philip Randolph, Whitney Young and Roy Wilkens.
84. vol. 6, ch. 14, part 2.
85. Colaiaco, Martin Luther King, Jr., p. 183. Moscow disapproved, however, of the Black Panthers (whom Carmichael joined in 1968), the Black Muslims and other black separatist groups who lacked what it believed was a proper sense of solidarity with the worldwide struggle against American imperialism.
86. DeLoach, Hoover’s FBI, p. 247.
87. vol. 6, ch. 14, part 2.
88. vol. 6, ch. 14, part 2. The file noted by Mitrokhin does not record the outcome of operation PANDORA. On present evidence, it is impossible to be certain which, if any, of the attacks on black organizations blamed on the Jewish Defense League were actually the work of the KGB.
89. vol. 6, ch. 10; vol. 6, ch. 14, part 1. The Soviet Union boycotted the Los Angeles Olympics in retaliation for the American boycott of the Moscow Olympics four years earlier.
90. US Department of State, Active Measures, p. 55.
&nb
sp; 91. Dobrynin, In Confidence, p. 176.
92. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, p. 539. Dobrynin, In Confidence, pp. 235-6.
93. Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, p. 256; Isaacson, Kissinger, p. 612. On the KGB targeting of Jackson and Perle, see vol. 6, ch. 14, part 1.
94. Isaacson, Kissinger, pp. 612-15.
95. Dobrynin, In Confidence, p. 269.
96. vol. 6, ch. 14, part 1.
97. On the Centre’s short-lived hopes of using Brzezinski’s Soviet contacts to exert influence on him, see above, chapter 8.
98. Andrew, For the President’s Eyes Only, p. 433.
99. Dobrynin, In Confidence, p. 375.
100. vol. 6, ch. 14, part 1.
101. vol. 5, section 10.
102. vol. 5, section 10.
103. Andrew, For the President’s Eyes Only, p. 455. Vance resigned as Secretary of State after opposing the unsuccessful mission to rescue the Teheran hostages in 1980. 104. vol. 6, ch. 14, part 1.
105. Reagan, An American Life, p. 33.
106. vol. 6, ch. 14, part 1.
107. Dobrynin, In Confidence, pp. 459, 470, 523. Cf. above, ch. 8. On RYAN, see Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 583-605, and Andrew and Gordievsky (eds.), Instructions from the Centre, ch. 4.
108. Order of the KGB Chairman, no. 0066 (April 12, 1982). vol. 4, indapp. 3, item 47.
109. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 590-1.
110. Reagan, An American Life, pp. 329-30.
111. vol. 6, ch. 8, part 3. As well as deceiving Sekou Touré, Seliskov also made an unsuccessful attempt to recruit the CIA station chief during his visit to Conakry.
112. vol. 6, ch. 8, part 3.
113. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, p. 630. Active measures in the Third World will be covered in more detail in the next volume.
114. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 630-1.
115. Interview with Shebarshin after his retirement, Daily Telegraph (December 1, 1992).
116. Order of the Chairman of the KGB, no. 107/OV. (September 5, 1990).
117. Yeltsin, The View from the Kremlin, appendix B, pp. 306-9. Among those former KGB officers who continue to propagate the old JFK conspiracy theories is Oleg Nechiporenko, who twice met Oswald in Mexico City in October 1963 and was later concerned with active measures involving Philip Agee. After his official retirement from the KGB in 1991, Nechiporenko made a number of appearances on the American lecture circuit, published his memoirs in English and was interviewed by Dan Rather in a CBS special on the JFK assassination. Nechiporenko, however, has become confused by the distinction between the original version of the KGB conspiracy theory of the assassination involving oil magnate H. L. Hunt and a later version which targeted Watergate conspirator E. Howard Hunt. His book, Passport to Assassination, which argues that the “billionaire E. Howard Hunt played a special role” in the assassination, confuses the two Hunts. Nechiporenko also claims that the CIA was probably involved. Passport to Assassination, p. 135.
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