68. vol. 2, app. 3.
69. Nureyev, Nureyev, pp. 96-7.
70. Percival, Nureyev, pp. 55-6.
71. vol. 2, app. 3.
72. Sheymov, Tower of Secrets, pp. 92-3. Probably because of the deep lingering hostility to Nureyev among the KGB old guard, he was not rehabilitated in Russia until September 1998, five years after his death in exile. See “Russia reinstates Nureyev,” The Times (September 23, 1998).
73. vol. 6, ch. 5, part 5.
74. Percival, Nureyev, p. 99.
75. vol. 6, ch. 5, part 5.
76. vol. 2, app. 3. Both Nureyev and Makarova were also the targets of numerous KGB active measures designed to discredit them.
77. k-10,155.
78. k-10,154.
79. Ministère Public de la Confédération press release (January 18, 1999). The Swiss press release made no reference to the documents from Mitrokhin’s archives used to locate the cache.
80. k-5,382.
81. k-10,156.
82. k-10,158.
83. k-10,157.
84. k-10,158.
Chapter Twenty-three
Special Tasks
Part 2
1. vol. 3, pakapp. 3.
2. The earliest reference to Department V (the letter “V,” not the Roman numeral) noted by Mitrokhin was contained in order no. 00197 of October 7, 1965 instructing other FCD departments with agents suitable for use in time of war or international crisis to hand them over to Department V. The Department had probably been founded not long before. vol. 2, app. 3.
3. vol. 3, pakapp. 3.
4. k-16,408.
5. k-26,317.
6. The earliest subsidies recorded by Mitrokhin were 135,000 dollars in February 1968, followed by 100,000 dollars in March. Mitrokhin’s notes on Greek Communist Party files for 1967, however, are very thin and it is likely that the first subsidies to the underground Party were handed over in Budapest during the later months of 1967. k-26,319.
7. k-16,69.
8. See above, chapter 18.
9. k-27,61.
10. k-16,69.
11. k-27,61.
12. k-3,28.
13. k-3,23,24,29.
14. k-3,28; k-26,315,318,323,325,326,384,387,390,394.
15. k-26,322. The Iraqi Communist Party also deposited its archives in the Soviet Union for safekeeping; see volume 2.
16. k-14,531. The location for operation ZVENO was studied by the illegal YAKOV and the agent ROBBI of the Vienna residency. YAKOV was Gennadi Mikhailovich Alekseyev, based in Switzerland, who had assumed the identity of a Swiss man, Igor Mürner, who had died in the Soviet Union. In 1973 YAKOV was arrested by the Swiss authorities, who were unable to prove charges of espionage against him. He served two years in prison for using false identity documents (k-5,193; k-24,236). Mitrokhin is unable to identify ROBBI. Other KGB officers (at least three, and possibly all, from Department V) involved in preparations for operation ZVENO were Yu. V. Derzhavin, A. D. Grigoryev, B. N. Malinin, Ye. S. Shcherbanov, B. S. Olikheyko, A. S. Savin, Kovalik, and Ye. A. Sharov (k-14,531).
17. k-16,408.
18. vol. 7, ch. 15
19. vol. 3, pakapp. 3. Vol. 7, ch. 5, para. 35 gives the location of PEPEL as Istanbul, but neither reference identifies the type of special action employed in PEPEL. Mitrokhin did not see the PEPEL file. The 1969 report also noted that the 1955 requirement for the Thirteenth Department to steal Western military technology was out of date; this had become the primary responsibility of FCD Directorate T (Scientific and Technological Espionage).
20. O’Riordan’s history of the Irish members of the International Brigades, Connolly Column, was printed in East Germany (though published in Dublin), and gratefully acknowledged the assistance of the Soviet agent and British defector to East Germany, John Peet.
21. The text of O’Riordan’s appeal for weapons for the IRA is published in the appendix to Yeltsin, The View from the Kremlin, pp. 311-16. In December 1969, shortly before the split which led to the emergence of the Provisionals, a secret meeting of the IRA leadership approved a proposal by Goulding to establish a National Liberation Front including Sinn Fein, the Irish Communist Party and other left-wing groups. Coogan, The Troubles, p. 95.
22. Bishop and Mallie, The Provisional IRA, p. 88.
23. Eight memoranda on the subject by Andropov on the IRA appeal for arms are published, in whole or part, in the appendix to Yeltsin, The View from the Kremlin, pp. 311-16.
24. vol. 7, ch. 7; vol. 8, ch. 9; vol. 6, ch. 5, part 5.
25. On the FLQ, see Granatstein and Stafford, Spy Wars, pp. 206-10.
26. vol. 8, ch. 14.
27. Even Granatstein and Stafford, two of Canada’s leading historians of intelligence, conclude that the CIA document, “if authentic… does suggest strongly that the CIA was operating in Quebec”; Spy Wars, p. 209.
28. vol. 8, ch. 14.
29. k-24,365.
30. “Soviets Protest to Argentina After Envoy Foils Kidnaping,” Washington Post (March 31, 1970).
31. vol. 4, indapp. 3.
32. Rob Bull, “Defector Bares ‘Secret’ Past,” Vancouver Sun (April 5, 1976).
33. vol. 4, indapp. 3.
34. Interview with Robert Gates by Christopher Andrew (March 14, 1994).
35. See above, chapter 22.
36. k-24,365.
37. k-24,365.
38. k-24,365.
39. See below, chapter 24.
40. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 524-5; Barron, KGB, pp. 110, 431ff; Brook-Shepherd, The Storm Birds, pp. 197-9.
41. Kalugin, Spymaster, pp. 131-2.
42. Bennett and Hamilton (eds.), Documents on British Policy Overseas, series 3, vol. 1, pp. 388-9.
43. Gordievsky, Next Stop Execution, p. 184.
44. Bennett and Hamilton (eds.), Documents on British Policy Overseas, series 3, vol. 1, pp. 337-43, 359.
45. Bennett and Hamilton (eds.), Documents on British Policy Overseas, series 3, vol. 1, p. 389n.
46. Barron, KGB, pp. 413-15. Kuzichkin, Inside the KGB, p. 81.
47. Kalugin, Spymaster, pp. 131-2.
48. Gordievsky, Next Stop Execution, p. 184.
49. vol. 6, ch. 1, part 1; vol. 6, ch. 5, part 5. It is, of course, impossible to exclude the possibility that plans to cripple Baryshnikov were contained in a file not seen by Mitrokhin.
50. Studies of the split between Officials and Provisionals include Bell, The Secret Army, ch. 18; Bishop and Mallie, The Provisional IRA, chs. 7-8; Coogan, The IRA, chs. 15-17; Coogan, The Troubles, ch. 3; Taylor, The Provos, ch. 5-6.
51. Smith, Fighting for Ireland?, pp. 88-90.
52. O’Riordan’s letter to the Central Committee and Andropov’s memorandum on operation SPLASH are printed in the appendix to Yeltsin, The View from the Kremlin, pp. 314-16. According to Yeltsin, the file on SPLASH in the archives of the General Secretary does not indicate whether it was implemented. The files noted by Mitrokhin, apparently withheld from Yeltsin, show that it was and identify the boat used in the operation. vol. 7, ch. 15, para. 2.
53. vol. 7, ch. 15, para. 2.
54. O’Riordan informed the Central Committee, “I will take no part in the transport operation, and my role will only involve transferring the technical information about this to Seamus Costello.” Yeltsin, The View from the Kremlin, p. 314.
55. Bishop and Mallie, The Provisional IRA, pp. 221-2; Smith, Fighting for Ireland?, p. 90; Coogan, The Troubles, pp. 276-80. The Irish National Liberation Army (INLA), founded as the military wing of IRSP, became arguably the most violent of the republican paramilitary groups. Its victims included Airey Neave, MP, Conservative spokesman on Northern Ireland, killed in 1979 by a bomb, activated by a mercury tilt switch, which was planted in his car in the Palace of Westminster car park.
56. k-27,393; vol. 6, ch. 5, part 5.
57. Hodges, Intellectual Foundations of the Nicaraguan Revolution, p. 228.
58. vol. 6, ch. 5, part 5. On Piñeiro, who in 1974 became head
of a new Departamento Americano of the Cuban Communist Party’s Central Committee, which took over responsibility for assistance to Latin American revolutionary movements, see Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, p. 514.
59. vol. 6, ch. 5, part 5.
60. Pezzullos, At the Fall of Somoza, p. 58. Shelton’s reports were widely regarded in diplomatic circles as reflecting only Somoza’s views. On at least one occasion, his political officer, James R. Cheek, used the State Department’s “dissent channel” to contradict his chief. Jeremiah O’Leary, “Shelton being Replaced as Ambassador to Nicaragua,” Washington Star (April 19, 1975).
61. Pastor, Condemned to Repetition, p. 39.
62. vol. 6, ch. 5, part 5.
63. Booth, The End and the Beginning, p. 142, Pezzullos, At the Fall of Somoza, pp. 116-17. Shelton was replaced as ambassador in April 1975.
64. vol. 6, ch. 5, part 5.
65. On the three main factions within the FSLN which emerged in 1975, see Booth, The End and the Beginning, pp. 143-4; Hodges, Intellectual Foundations of the Nicaraguan Revolution, pp. 233-55.
66. On Fonseca’s link with the USSR, see volume 2.
67. k-27,393.
68. The file seen by Mitrokhin records only Fonseca’s request to visit Moscow. Though he saw no file on the trip itself, it is unlikely that the request was rejected.
69. Pezzullos, At the Fall of Somoza, pp. 117-19. On KGB relations with the Sandinistas, see volume 2.
70. t-7,135; vol. 2, appendix 3.
71. Kuzichkin, Inside the KGB, pp. 111-12.
72. Kalugin, Spymaster, pp. 238-9.
73. Kalugin, Spymaster, pp. 152-3.
74. vol. 2, app. 3.
75. Kalugin, Spymaster, pp. 152-9. Cf. Wise, Molehunt, pp. 195-7.
76. vol. 2, app. 3. The Line KR officer Vladimir Nikolayevich Yelchaninov (codenamed VELT), posted to the New York residency in 1978, also spent much of his time trying to track down defectors; vol. 6, app. 2, part 5.
77. Bereanu and Todorov, The Umbrella Murder, pp. 34-7, 70-3.
78. Kalugin, Spymaster, pp. 178-83; Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 644-5. Bereanu and Todorov, The Umbrella Murder, adds usefully to previous accounts of Markov’s murder but also introduces some implausible speculation. For an illustration of an earlier version of the weapon used to kill Markov, a KGB poison pellet cane of the 1950s, see Melton, The Ultimate Spy Book, p. 152.
79. Interviews with Alpha group veterans, broadcast in Inside Russia’s SAS (BBC2, June 13, 1999).
80. vol. 1, ch. 4.
81. Westad, “Concerning the Situation in ‘A,’” p. 130. Dobbs, Down with Big Brother, pp. 11-12.
82. See above, chapter 15.
83. vol. 1, ch. 4. Mitrokhin’s account contains only a brief allusion to the attempts to poison Amin’s food, which appears to have been the Eighth Department’s preferred method of assassination. According to Vladimir Kuzichkin, who defected from Directorate S a few years later, the first choice of assassin was an Azerbaijani illegal, Mikhail Talybov, who was bilingual in Farsi and had spent several years in Kabul with Afghan identity papers forged by the KGB. Equipped with poisons from the OTU laboratory, Talybov succeeded in gaining a job as a chef in the presidential palace. But, according to Kuzichkin, “Amin was as careful as any of the Borgias. He kept switching his food and drink as if he expected to be poisoned.” Kuzichkin, Inside the KGB, pp. 314-15; Kuzichkin, “Coups and Killings in Kabul,” Time (November 22, 1982); Barron, KGB Today, pp. 15-16. A further, unsuccessful attempt to poison Amin took place at a lunch given by him for his ministers on December 27 (Dobbs, Down with Big Brother, p. 19).
84. Westad, “Concerning the Situation in ‘A,’” p. 130.
85. “The Soviet Union and Afghanistan, 1978-1989,” p. 159.
86. Westad, “Concerning the Situation in ‘A,’” p. 131. The invasion plan was approved by the Politburo on December 12.
87. vol. 1, ch. 4.
88. Dobbs, Down with Big Brother, pp. 18-19.
89. vol. 1, ch. 4.
90. vol. 1, ch. 4.
91. vol. 1, ch. 4.
92. vol. 1, app. 2.
93. vol. 1, ch. 4.
94. On Kikot’s previous career, see k-24,87,89; k-12,376; k-8,590.
95. vol. 1, app. 3.
96. Childs and Popplewell, The Stasi, pp. 138-40, 156-7; Gates, From the Shadows, pp. 206-7; Wolf, Man Without a Face, pp. 271-81. On Carlos’s contacts with the KGB, see volume 2.
97. vol. 7, ch. 15.
98. Gates, From the Shadows, pp. 338-9.
99. Andrew and Gordievsky (eds.), Instructions from the Centre, pp. 82-5. 100. Accounts of the August coup include those in Stepankov and Lisov, Kremlevsky Zagovor; Albats, The State within a State; Remnick, Lenin’s Tomb; and Gorbachev, The August Coup. Though Kryuchkov and other leading plotters were arrested after the coup, their trial was repeatedly postponed. By early 1993 all had been released. They were given formal amnesties by the Russian parliament elected in December 1993. 101. k-16,408.
Chapter Twenty-four
Cold War Operations against Britain
Part 1
1. There is no support in any of the files seen by Mitrokhin that for the implausible theory that a major Soviet agent remained at work in MI5 after the demise of the Magnificent Five. Mitrokhin’s notes contain no reference to Sir Roger Hollis, director-general of MI5, the most senior of the MI5 officers wrongly accused of being a Soviet agent. The Hollis story is now thoroughly discredited (Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, p. 27).
2. On Norwood’s early career, see above chapters 7 and 8.
3. vol. 7, ch. 14, item 17.
4. Hennessy, Never Again, p. 269.
5. vol. 7, ch. 14, item 17. Myakinkov’s name was wrongly transcribed by Mitrokhin as Mekin’kov. (CBEN)
6. vol. 7, ch. 14, item 17.
7. For legal reasons neither HUNT’s real identity nor the government departments for which he worked (included in Mitrokhin’s notes) can be identified. HUNT’s first controller was V. E. Tseyrov (then also Norwood’s controller), followed by B. K. Stolenov and Yu. Kondratenko. After the mass expulsion of KGB and GRU personnel from London in 1971 HUNT was put on ice for several years as a security precaution. Contact was resumed in 1975 by MAIRE, an agent of the Paris residency. Following MAIRE’s death in 1976, the London residency resumed control in 1977. HUNT’s last two case officers were V. V. Yaroshenko and A. N. Chernayev. In 1979, following HUNT’s establishment of a small business, his wife was recruited as a courier. By 1981, however, the Centre was dissatisfied with the quality of HUNT’s intelligence and apparently fearful that he was under MI5 surveillance. Contact with him seems to have been broken at that point. vol. 7, ch. 14, item 16.
8. Blake, No Other Choice, chs. 2-5. Cf. Hyde, George Blake. Though acknowledging his affection and admiration for Curiel, Blake unconvincingly downplays his influence on him. According to Kalugin, Blake “already held far-leftist views at the outbreak of the Korean War” (Kalugin, Spymaster, p. 141.). For examples of other distortions in Blake’s memoirs, see Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 755-6, n. 117); Murphy, Kondrashev and Bailey, Battleground Berlin, pp. 217, 482-3, n. 36.
9. Murphy, Kondrashev and Bailey, Battleground Berlin, pp. 214-15 (an account based on partial access to KGB files and on the recollections of Kondrashev). Rodin was London resident from 1947 to 1952 and from 1956 to 1961; Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, p. 663.
10. See below, chapter 26.
11. k-9, 65.
12. Blake, No Other Choice, pp. 207-8. Kalugin, Spymaster, p. 141. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 755-6, n. 117.
13. The best account of the Berlin tunnel operation, based both on material made available by the SVR and on newly declassified CIA files, is Murphy, Kondrashev and Bailey, Battleground Berlin, ch. 11 and appendix 5, which corrects numerous errors in earlier accounts. Mitrokhin’s brief notes on the Berlin tunnel add nothing to Battleground Berlin.
14. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, p. 442. On Goleniewski see Murphy, Kondrashev
and Bailey, Battleground Berlin, pp. 342-6.
15. Blake, No Other Choice, chs. 11, 12.
16. Kalugin, Spymaster, p. 142.
17. vol. 7, ch. 14, item 3. Driberg had joined the Communist Party while at public school but was expelled in 1941 when, according to his entry in the Dictionary of National Biography, the Party leadership “discovered that he was an agent of MI5, to which he had been recruited in the late 1930s” (Dictionary of National Biography, 1971-1980, p. 251). Though Driberg undoubtedly gave information to Maxwell Knight, a leading MI5 officer, much remains obscure about the relationship between them. According to Knight’s personal assistant, Joan Miller, he was a bisexual who, for a time, was “crazy” about Driberg. In her view, Driberg was only “a casual agent” who would “turn in a bit of stuff” when Knight put pressure on him. (Interview with Joan Miller, Sunday Times Magazine (October 18, 1981); Miller, One Girl’s War; Andrew, Secret Service, pp. 521-2.
18. Driberg, Ruling Passions, pp. 228-9.
19. Wheen, Tom Driberg, p. 309.
20. Vassall, Vassall; Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 442-4. Andropov considered Vassall one of the KGB’s most valuable agents.
21. Driberg, Ruling Passions, p. 235.
22. vol. 7, ch. 14, item 3. Mitrokhin’s notes on Driberg’s file record that he was “recruited in Moscow… chiefly on the basis of compromising material which recorded his homosexual relations with an agent,” but give no further details of the “compromising material.”
23. vol. 7, ch. 14, item 3.
24. Watkins’s comments are quoted in Wheen, Tom Driberg, p. 328.
25. vol. 7, ch. 14, item 3.
26. Wheen, Tom Driberg, pp. 292-315. Francis Wheen’s very readable and entertaining biography of Driberg dismisses all suggestion that his book on Burgess was influenced in any way by the KGB. Though shocked by the “stench” from the “acrid piss” of stories planted in the press by MI5 and MI6 (Tom Driberg, p. 317), Mr. Wheen failed to detect any unwholesome aroma emitting from the vast array of KGB active measures. Despite the SCD’s addiction to compromise operations, it also does not occur to him that the KGB might have exploited Driberg’s sexual adventures in Moscow lavatories.
The Sword and the Shield Page 112