In August the administration’s new toughness led a journalist to remark that recently “the Jacksonian qualities of Abraham Lincoln have been more than ever apparent.”19 This cheered the public, which, though discouraged by McClellan’s failure, took heart from the president’s leadership. Shortly after the Seven Days battles, Frederick Law Olmsted told Lincoln that in “the general gloom, there are two points of consolation and hope. … One, is the trustworthy, patriotic devotion of the solid, industrious, home-keeping people of the country; the other, the love and confidence constantly growing stronger between these people and their president.”20 Echoing Olmsted’s analysis, a correspondent for the London Times informed his readers that “the President is the most popular man in the United States. Without education or marked ability, without the personal advantage of a fine presence or courteous manners, and placed unexpectedly in a position of unparalleled difficulty and danger, he has so conducted himself amid the storm of passion that rages around him as to have won the good opinion of everybody.”21 Also in London, Charles Francis Adams concluded that Lincoln’s obvious integrity inspired the confidence so essential for victory.
That good opinion was held even by political opponents, including an influential Illinois Democrat who said: “it has been a hard struggle for me to come to the support of a Republican Administration. It has been a hard struggle for the Democratic party. We were afraid of Mr Lincoln, but his firm, honest, patriotic course has won our hearts, and now nine out of every ten of us, every where, would vote for him. He has resisted factions, and shown that he can be President himself, and the President of all the people. I have two sons in the war, and am now ready to go myself.”22 The New York Commercial Advertiser rejoiced that the president would ignore “the promptings of his kindly nature” and that “the sword of justice will be wielded with a vigor and earnestness that will convince the rebels and the world that he is terribly in earnest.”23
But in some circles Lincoln’s popularity slipped. A few New Yorkers were saying that although he was “honest and true” and “thoroughly sensible,” nevertheless he lacked “the decision and the energy the country wants.” The administration, they felt, “does not lead the people,” but rather the people had “to keep up a toilsome vis a tergo [i.e., a force acting from behind], and shove the government forward to every vigorous step.” Wall Street attorney George Templeton Strong came to share Wendell Phillips’s judgment that “old great-uncle Abe” was “a first-rate second-rate man.”24 Another New Yorker reported that Lincoln’s friends were concluding that he had only one desirable quality, “honesty of intention,” which was more than offset by the lack of decisiveness and “firmness of character” that the times required: “He leans on his subordinates to such a degree that they control his actions.”25 Others condescendingly referred to the president as “a Man of only medium capacity” who was “too amiable to be firm, & too conscientious to be as savage, as the crisis requires.”26 A judge in Maine warned that the country would perish “unless the President can be made to feel that here is war—internecine war—& the only remedy is subjugation.” Let Lincoln “be made to see that the Dantonian maxim—audacity, audacity, & yet more audacity—is all that can save us.”27 More bitterly, a Wisconsin Republican sneered: “A respectable mule could do better than Lincoln—the former could only bray, while the latter only ‘blabs.’ ”28
The cabinet also drew intense criticism. “We must have a new, distinct, earnest policy, or the country is ruined, & I do not believe such a policy possible with the present Cabinet,” insisted Maine Governor Israel Washburn. “A war cabinet united in policy & purpose, will give us the right Commanders.”29 Another resident of the Pine Tree State lamented that Lincoln and the nation “are on the road to destruction from a weak cabinet,” whose members had “neither the ability nor the comprehensive will to grasp the troubles of the nation, and Congress has failed equally in the great emergencies.”30 William T. Coggeshall, secretary to Ohio Governor William Dennison, likened the cabinet to “a collection of powerful chemicals—each positive, sharp, individual—but thrown together, they neutralize each other and the result is an insipid mess.”31
Overhaul: Restructuring and Relocating the Army
The failure to bag Stonewall Jackson, along with McClellan’s inability to take Richmond, prompted Lincoln to restructure the military command. He asked Ambrose E. Burnside to replace Little Mac at the head of the Army of the Potomac, but that Rhode Island general “said the responsibility was too great—the consequences of defeat too momentous,” and so he declined. He did, however, agree to take charge of a corps.32
The president was more successful in his quest to appoint a general-in-chief empowered both to issue commands and give advice (and who also might help insulate Lincoln from criticism.) The aged, infirm Ethan Allen Hitchcock had quit after a brief stint as military advisor to the president and secretary of war. John Pope, fearing with good reason that as commander of the Army of Virginia he could not succeed unless McClellan were forced to cooperate, told Lincoln that “he should assign an officer as General-in-Chief of the Armies, who should have the power to enforce his orders.”33
Acting on the advice of Pope and Winfield Scott, Lincoln decided to feel out Henry W. Halleck, the brusque, rigid, testy commander of armies in the West. There U. S. Grant and Pope had won substantial victories for which Halleck unfairly received credit. (Old Brains, as Halleck was called, had demanded that he be put in charge of the entire Western Department “in return for Forts Donelson and Henry.” On March 11, he received that post.)34 The president was favorably disposed toward Halleck, for he admired the general’s Elements of Military Art and Science and realized that he needed a West Pointer to fill that post. He also approved of Halleck’s military leadership in St. Louis, and declared that he “has Websterian brains.”35 On July 2, Lincoln summoned the general to Washington for a consultation. That evening, Halleck coyly responded that although he was reluctant to leave his army in Mississippi, nevertheless “being somewhat broken in health and wearied out with long months of labor and care,” he would find a trip to the capital “exceedingly desirable.”36 A week later, he stated that he “could advise but one thing—to place all the forces in North Carolina, Virginia, and Washington under one head and hold that head responsible for the result.”37 Such willingness to take responsibility pleased Lincoln, who was growing ever more exasperated by McClellan’s reluctance to do so.
The president decided to appoint Halleck general-in-chief without a personal consultation. On July 11, the day after Lincoln returned from Harrison’s Landing, he issued an order naming Old Brains to that post, explaining to Charles Sumner that during the visit to the Army of the Potomac his “mind became perfectly perplexed” and he “determined right then and there to appoint a Commander-in-Chief who should be responsible for our military operations” and “determined further that General Halleck should be the man.”38 Three days later Lincoln wired Old Brains: “I am very anxious—almost impatient—to have you here.”39 Leaving Grant in charge of the army around Corinth, a Mississippi city that Halleck had captured with little bloodshed, Old Brains repaired to Washington, arriving on July 23.
The general had grave reservations about his new position, whose duties and powers were ill-defined. Though pleased by the honor that his elevation represented, he wanted to avoid entanglement in the bitter dispute between Stanton and McClellan, nor did he relish dealing with political intrigue and civilians ignorant of logistics. He also regretted losing the autonomy he had enjoyed as a department commander. In late July, he confessed to McClellan, “I hold my present position contrary to my own wishes … I did everything in my power to avoid coming to Washington; but after declining several invitations from the President I received the order of the 11th instant, which left me no option. I have always had strong personal objections to mingling in the politico-military affairs of Washington. I never liked the place, and like it still less at the present time. … I greatl
y feared that whatever I might do I should receive more abuse than thanks.”40 McClellan, who had not been consulted in the matter, regarded the appointment of Halleck “as a slap in the face.” Old Brains was a man “whom I know by experience to be my inferior,” Little Mac told his wife.41 “Of all the men whom I have encountered in high position Halleck was the most hopelessly stupid,” McClellan later wrote. “It was more difficult to get an idea through his head than can be conceived by any one who never made the attempt. I do not think he ever had a correct military idea from beginning to end.”42
Lincoln’s choice of Halleck, though understandable, was a blunder. The president was evidently unaware that in the western theater Old Brains had demonstrated the selfishness, hypercaution, reluctance to assume responsibility, deceitfulness, incompetence, and pettiness that would render him an ineffective general-in-chief. The appointment of Halleck was viewed as Lincoln’s admission of his own failure to perform the office of general-in-chief adequately. The journalist Whitelaw Reid remarked that “it became a more straightforward acceptance of the responsibility than was expected from Mr. Lincoln.” Reid thought it a shrewd move, placating West Pointers who believed civilians should not try to run military affairs. It was also interpreted as a gentle way to replace McClellan without offending his many supporters, who would be pleased to see Stanton’s influence reduced. Radical Republicans, however, were not pleased; they had denounced Halleck’s 1861 order forbidding runaway slaves to enter his lines. Lyman Trumbull considered Halleck “a good organizer but a poor fighter, judging from his movements before Corinth.”43 (After maneuvering the Confederates out of that Mississippi city, Halleck divided up his army so badly that it was able to accomplish little.)
John Hay quoted “a Western friend”—probably Lincoln—who remarked that Halleck “is like a singed cat—better than he looks.” (In recommending a candidate for admission to the bar, Lincoln once said: “He’s a good deal smarter than he looks to be.”44 He made a similar observation while introducing a supplicant to Stanton: “This woman is a leetle smarter than she lets on to be.”)45 The short, stout, carelessly dressed Halleck was indeed unprepossessing. One observer was “greatly disappointed in his appearance. Small and farmer-like, he gives a rude shock to one’s preconceived notions of a great soldier.”46 A journalist described him memorably as an “oleaginous Methodist parson dressed in regimentals.”47
But John Hay admired Halleck’s “great head,” well stocked with “vast stores of learning, which have drifted in from the assiduous reading of a quarter of a century.” The general, said Hay, “is a cool, mature man, who understands himself. Let us be glad we have got him.”48 Grant called Halleck “a man of gigantic intellect and well studied in the profession of arms,” and Edward Bates told a friend: “We have great hopes of Halleck.”49 The Chicago Tribune described him as “a closet general who in his library will be able to give celerity and potency to military movements which in the field he would be powerless to direct.”50 Noah Brooks admired Halleck’s “plodding, patient, impervious character.”51
Others were less sanguine. According to Gideon Welles, Halleck was “a man of some scholastic attainments, but without soldierly capacity,” a “dull, stolid, inefficient, and incompetent General-in-Chief” who “earnestly and constantly smoked cigars and rubbed his elbows.”52 Though Chase deplored Halleck’s inaction after the victory at Corinth, he nonetheless hoped that the general would “come & act vigorously.” But, he confided to his daughter, “my apprehensions … exceed my hopes.”53
Halleck’s first assignment in his new role was to help determine what ought to be done with the Army of the Potomac. Should it be left at Harrison’s Landing or united with Pope’s army on the Rappahannock? Should McClellan be retained in command? Lincoln instructed the new general-in-chief to visit the army and learn Little Mac’s views and wishes. He was also to inform the Young Napoleon that only 20,000 reinforcements could be supplied and that he must either attack Richmond with those additional forces or withdraw and join Pope. In late July, Lincoln told Halleck “that he was satisfied McClellan would not fight” and authorized him to remove Little Mac if he saw fit.54 Halleck confided to his wife that the president and the cabinet “have lost all confidence in him [McClellan] & urge me to remove him from command.”55
Lincoln also wanted Halleck to formulate strategic plans and coordinate the movement of all Union armies. When asked what would be done with McClellan’s army, Lincoln replied: “You forget we have a general who commands all the armies and makes all the plans to suit himself—ask him!”56 With some justification, Halleck complained that because the president and the cabinet had approved everything he proposed, “it only increases my responsibility, for if any disaster happens they can say we did for you all you asked.”57 Lincoln probably counted on the general to take charge of the Army of the Potomac, unite it with Burnside’s troops at Falmouth, and attack Lee while Pope covered Richmond. When Halleck delivered the presidential ultimatum to McClellan, Little Mac said he could possibly take Richmond with 30,000 more troops but not with only 20,000 more. He soon changed his mind, however, and reluctantly agreed to try with 20,000. A day after Halleck left, the Young Napoleon reversed course yet again: he would need 50,000 more men, not 20,000!
Upon Halleck’s return to Washington, the administration debated whether to remove the Army of the Potomac from the Peninsula. Lincoln opposed doing so, while Chase emphatically urged that such a step was necessary to strengthen the nation’s credit. General Winfield Scott, a Virginian, reportedly said “that no army can exist on the James River after August 15. It must advance, retreat, or perish, poisoned by malaria.”58 As Lincoln wrestled with this momentous question, his old friend Leonard Swett called on him and reported that the president “is in great trouble & care weighs heavily upon him.”59
When McClellan claimed that he had only 80,000 troops as opposed to Lee’s 200,000, it became obvious to Halleck that the Army of the Potomac could not safely remain on the Peninsula but must unite with Pope. (In fact, the Army of Northern Virginia numbered only 75,000.) Given the alleged disparity between Union and Confederate forces, it appeared necessary to withdraw the army from the Peninsula. And so on August 3, Old Brains ordered McClellan to transfer to Aquia Creek, where he would be near Pope. Little Mac objected heatedly but to no avail. Halleck was so worried about Pope’s army that he could hardly sleep.
Lincoln may have erred in approving Halleck’s recommendation, which was backed by Pope, Stanton, and Chase. During the president’s visit to the army in early July, he had polled the corps commanders about withdrawing from the Peninsula. Edwin V. Sumner said it could be done, “but I think we give up the cause if we do it.” Similarly, Samuel P. Heintzelman insisted it “would be ruinous to the country.” Fitz John Porter concurred. William B. Franklin believed it advisable to fall back to the Rappahannock, while E. D. Keyes was noncommittal, saying only that a transfer could be accomplished quickly. McClellan opined that it “would be a delicate & very difficult matter.”60 Two years would pass before the Union army would draw so close to Richmond again. But if Lee really did have 200,000 men, he could overwhelm Pope, then turn and crush McClellan. Military doctrine stipulated that forces be concentrated lest they be conquered piecemeal.
Slowly the Army of the Potomac withdrew from Harrison’s Landing, thus formally concluding the Peninsular Campaign, during which 25,000 Union soldiers and 30,000 Confederates were killed, wounded, or missing. At least 5,000 more succumbed to disease.
Knocked into Last Year: The Second Battle of Bull Run
When Lee realized that the Army of the Potomac was pulling back, he launched a new campaign, driving north toward Pope’s 45,000-man Army of Virginia. If he could reach it before McClellan did, which seemed distinctly possible, the Confederates might achieve a smashing triumph. Lincoln wondered if Little Mac would move fast enough to prevent such a calamity. On August 19, the president told John A. Dahlgren: “Now I am to have a sweat of five o
r six days. The Confederates will strive to gather on Pope before McClellan can get around, and his first corps is not in the Potomac yet.”61 That same day Chase reported that Lincoln was “uneasy about Pope.”62 In fact, the first units of the Young Napoleon’s army did not join Pope until August 23, twenty days after the order to do so was issued. During that time, Halleck complained to his wife, “I can[’]t get Genl McClellan to do what I wish.”63
In July, while lingering at the capital awaiting Halleck’s arrival, Pope had committed some blunders. Shortly after the retreat of the Army of the Potomac from the gates of Richmond, he issued a boastful address to his men: “I have come to you from the West, where we have always seen the backs of our enemies; from an army whose business it has been to seek the adversary and to beat him when he was found; whose policy has been attack, and not defense. … I hear constantly of ‘taking strong positions and holding them,’ of ‘lines of retreat,’ and of ‘bases of supplies.’ Let us discard such ideas. … Let us study the probable lines of retreat of our opponents, and leave our own to take care of themselves.”64 This message was widely ridiculed by the public and resented by soldiers in the Army of the Potomac. Colonel Herman Haupt spoke for many when he said “Pope has made a fool of himself in his first paper,” which “is all bombast, stuff and nonsense, and is a virtual declaration of war between him and McClellan, destroying all harmony of action.” Prophetically, Haupt speculated: “I should not be surprised if both should be superseded and some one else put over the two.”65
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