by Chris Brown
Gordon Bennett
Born at Melbourne in 1887, Bennett served courageously and with distinction in the First World War. He fought at Gallipoli and in France, and acquired a CB, CMG and DSO, rising to the rank of brigadier at the age of 29. After the First World War he worked in textiles and as an accountant before becoming a senior local government official and the President of the Associated Chambers of Manufactures of Australia in 1933. He was appointed major general in the Australian Reserve forces in 1930. He was a fierce critic of Australian defence policy in general and published several articles attacking both the policies and the personnel of the Australian Army in 1937. Partly on account of those articles and partly because it was widely believed that he was not a suitable person to have a command that would involve co-operation with senior British officers, he was not appointed to a command in the Australian force in North Africa – he was just as critical of the British hierarchy as he was of his Australian superiors.
Constantly at odds with his colleagues, subordinates and superiors, Bennett was extremely critical of regular officers, but was appointed to command Australian 8th Division and posted to Singapore in February 1942. In this role he was adamant that his force should be kept intact rather than being split up to support other formations as needed. Unlike his superior, Percival, Bennett chose to abandon his post and escaped to Australia. Although he received a warm welcome from his political superiors, his actions were not appreciated in the Australian Army and by 1943 his career was effectively over; by mid-1944 he had been moved on to the reserve list. He published a book, Why Singapore Fell, which was highly critical of all of his colleagues.
12. Lt Gen. Percival and Maj. Gen. Bennett.
The Malay Regiment and the various local volunteer units were, naturally, better used to the climate, but they were few in number and, like the rest of Malaya Command, were bedevilled by shortages or obsolescent equipment. Local recruitment did not extend to the large Chinese population until the very end of the campaign, when the battle was already lost.
Pre-war Australia had several reserve forces divisions that were expanded rapidly on the outbreak of war in 1939. Few of the officers, even at brigade and battalion commander level, were professional soldiers. Most 8th Division troops volunteered after the fall of France in June 1940 and had, therefore, been in uniform for more than a year at the beginning of the Malayan campaign.
The Australian policy of giving troops their basic training at home, rather than continuing the process once they arrived overseas, meant that the troops were trained for and in the location to which they were posted. In general this was a sensible policy since it did lead to good standards overall, but it meant that replacements joining the division in the later stages of the battle had not been either fully trained or acclimatised. An infantry division is designed to act as a team, and 8th Division never received its third brigade. Furthermore, though there was a policy that Australian forces should always act as clearly defined entities, operational requirements and questionable policies forced the two brigades to operate separately, thus arguably compromising organisation in battle. There had been relatively little brigade- or divisional-level training to integrate the units properly, so it is unclear how much difference dividing the formation really made once the campaign was underway, but it clearly did not help. Equally, there had been no serious corps-level training at all with the formations of Malaya Command, so none of the divisional or brigade headquarters were fully competent to run battles.
The situation was not helped by the divisional commander, Gordon Bennett. Bennett had served in the First World War, commanding a battalion and later a brigade with some skill, and had served as commander of a militia division before the war. His success in the Great War perhaps helped to encourage his total confidence in his own abilities in 1941–42.
His lack of belief in his fellow commanders – though not entirely misplaced – undermined confidence in Percival and Heath throughout Malaya Command. Abrasive and over-confident, he managed to alienate most of his brigade and battalion commanders, especially the regulars, since he was strongly prejudiced in favour of reserve officers like himself. Bennett held strong views about the nature of operations required, but was not adept at ensuring they were actually mounted. He had no confidence in Percival at all and was willing to go behind his commander’s back or over his head to avoid doing anything he did not want to do.
Organisation
Infantry units throughout the British Empire and Commonwealth conformed to a common organisation. Each battalion had four rifle companies divided into four platoons and each platoon into three ‘sections’ of ten men. The standard firearm of all the Allied infantry, British, Indian and Australian, was the Lee-Enfield .303 calibre rifle. A reliable and accurate bolt-action weapon with a ten-round magazine, the Lee-Enfield was far superior to the Japanese Arisaka. In addition to the Lee-Enfields, each section had a Bren light machine gun. The Bren – like the Lee-Enfield – was a fine piece of equipment. The magazine could take thirty rounds, though it was common practice to load with only twenty-eight to reduce strain on the magazine spring and prevent jamming. Experience in France in 1940 had shown the need for another automatic weapon at section level. The Sten gun had been invented to fill this need along with large purchases of Thompson sub-machine guns from the United States, but many units in Malaya Command did not receive either in adequate quantities due to the demands of other theatres.
VICKERS
The Vickers gun was adopted by the British Army in 1912 and became the standard machine gun for all the Commonwealth countries. It was gas operated and the barrel was cooled by a water-filled jacket. Despite the tropical heat, the Vickers gun performed admirably in Malaya and Singapore. The gun fired the same .303 calibre bullets as the Lee-Enfield rifle and the Bren gun, but from 250-round canvas belts. Each battalion had a machine-gun platoon usually with four weapons and with six to eight men per gun; two to operate the weapon and the others to carry ammunition and provide protection for the gun team.
13. The Vickers machine gun was the standard for all Commonwealth countries. This one in use in Malaya, December 1941.
In theory, each infantry battalion also had a machine-gun platoon with Vickers .303in machine guns and a mortar platoon with 3in mortars. These were both good-quality weapons, but again the demands of other theatres had taken precedence and several battalions did not have their full complement. The battalion-level anti-tank weapon was the Boyes anti-tank rifle, a 0.5in bolt-action weapon, which was completely obsolete in Europe and North Africa against German and Italian vehicles, but could still make an impression on some of the lighter Japanese armoured cars and tanks.
One of the peculiarities of the British approach to combat was the Bren carrier. This lightly armoured tracked vehicle was put to innumerable uses, but its chief function was to provide rapid intervention and support for the rifle companies. Although a good deal of the tactical practice of an infantry battalion revolved around its carrier platoon, many units in Malaya Command did not have their full complement and some had none at all.
A great weakness in Malaya Command was communication. There was little wireless equipment and a good deal of what was available was not very effective. Laying cables for field telephones was slow and cumbersome and the cables themselves were very vulnerable to artillery fire.
14. A Bren light machine gun on a tripod mount; a rare configuration. (Joost J. Bakker)
BREN CARRIERS
More Bren carriers were produced than any other armoured vehicle in history. Initially issued in small numbers to infantry battalions as transport for heavy equipment such as mortars, by late 1941 every battalion was supposed to have a ‘carrier platoon’ with 2in mortars and Bren guns to provide rapid support as required. Few of the infantry battalions in Malaya Command had their full complement of carriers and some none at all.
Artillery
The artillery element of Malaya Command suffered from the same problems as the
infantry. Most of the field artillery regiments had been issued with the excellent 25-pounder gun/howitzer, but because of the demands of the North Africa campaign several units had only two batteries of eight guns rather than three. The anti-tank regiments were, in the main, at full strength with forty-eight 2-pounder guns each. The 2-pounder was reasonably accurate and had a good rate of fire, but was relatively slow to deploy. Like the Boyes rifle, it had been made obsolete by the rapid development of armour in European armies, but it was capable of holding its own against Japanese tanks and armoured cars.
The most significant weakness on the ground lay in the complete absence of tanks. British tanks were not particularly well armoured or well armed, though many models were mechanically reliable. The various Vickers light tanks and the Matilda and Valentine models had proved to be entirely inadequate against the Axis forces in the desert, where a high degree of visibility often meant a British vehicle could be knocked out of action long before it was close enough to engage effectively, but these same vehicles would have been on a par with their Japanese counterparts. The lack of tanks was not caused by demands elsewhere, but had been a matter of policy. Although General Bond had asked for at least one regiment of medium tanks as early as 1940, there was a near-universal assumption that tanks could not operate in the terrain of Malaya.
15. Japanese anti-tank rifle. Developed in the First World War, anti-tank rifles were largely obsolete before 1941, but were capable of penetrating the light armour of the few Allied armoured cars in Malaya. (Author’s collection)
16. Battlefield Archaeology. An example of the Japanese anti-tank rifle. The tropical climate means that most material degrades very quickly. (Author’s collection)
17. 25-pounder field guns at Sentosa, Singapore. (Author’s collection)
25-POUNDER GUN
The 25-pounder was the standard field artillery piece of the Royal Artillery and with Commonwealth armies throughout the Second World War; it remained in service until the 1960s and well beyond in other countries. Each field regiment was equipped with twenty-four guns divided into three batteries of eight, each comprising two troops of four and they in turn consisted of two sections of two guns each. Strictly speaking, the 25-pounder was a ‘gun/howitzer’ since it could fire in both the lower register (0–45 degrees) and the upper register (45–90 degrees). The gun provided sterling service in Malaya despite the hot and damp conditions, though several regiments had only two batteries instead of three.
2-POUNDER AT GUN
The 2-pounder was the standard British and Commonwealth anti-tank gun at the beginning of the Second World War. Although it was originally designed to be mounted in tank turrets, the army sought a surface mounting so that it could be used by anti-tank regiments or anti-tank platoons in infantry battalions. The carriage adopted had three legs, two of which folded up under the gun whilst in transport. Those two legs and the wheels had to be moved to position the gun for action, which made it difficult to deploy quickly, but once it was ready the gun could traverse easily through 360 degrees. By late 1941 the 2-pounder had been outclassed by German and Italian tanks but it was quite capable of penetrating the relatively thin and poor-quality hulls of the Japanese Chi-Ha and Ha-Go.
There was a modest supply of armoured cars, mostly Marmon- Herringtons and Lanchesters, but these were slow and lightly armoured. None of them mounted anything heavier than a machine gun and were therefore clearly incapable of standing up to Japanese tanks. The problems were multiplied by an almost total deficiency in training. The Indian 3rd Cavalry had their horses replaced with armoured cars but had had virtually no training at all, with the result that almost all of their vehicles were written off before they could go into action. In addition, because of the assumption that Malaya was not suitable territory for armoured conflict, none of the infantry units had had any worthwhile training in dealing with armoured attacks; many soldiers had never even seen a tank before they encountered them on the battlefield.
The assumptions about the ‘impenetrable jungle’ and the impracticality of armoured warfare were simply ridiculous and should have been challenged by the senior officers in Malaya Command. Armies in general – and tanks in particular – travel along roads primarily, only deploying to countryside when obstructed by the enemy, and although there were few roads running east–west across the country, there were fine highways running south from Thailand to Singapore. Tactical assumptions made once the campaign started were often just as bad. Wavell’s instructions to Percival that he should fight the ‘main battle’ in areas where his ‘superior artillery’ could be used to advantage were not superficially unreasonable, but rather depended on the belief that the Japanese artillery was not capable of effective counter-battery work. In practice, poor communications, poor training, a failure to ensure adequate supplies of ammunition and the inability to stem Japanese advance undermined the premise. After the lengthy retreat down the peninsula, the troops were not confident in combat and became increasingly unlikely to make a determined stand. Often, when they did stop the Japanese advance, they were obliged to retire because of threats to their flanks or breakthroughs against other units that might result in encirclement. A number of withdrawals occurred due to misleading orders or to the perceived need to maintain the integrity of formations as viable combat assets.
18. Rubber plantation. The endless rows of trees had a depressing effect on many troops. (Author’s collection)
LANCHESTER ARMOURED CAR
The first Lanchester armoured cars entered service with the British Army in 1929. Lanchesters had a nominal top speed of about 50mph and a range of about 250 miles. They were armed with two .303 Vickers guns and one 0.5 calibre Vickers. In North Africa, Lanchesters proved to be obsolete and a considerable number were sent to India and the Far East. The story goes that Colonel Ian Stewart of the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders found that there were some in store on Singapore and promptly ‘acquired’ them and put them to use in exercises with his battalion.
CHI-HA TANK
Designated the Type 97 from the Imperial year of 2597. The original main armament was a low-velocity 57mm gun, later exchanged for a high-velocity 47mm gun with better armour-piercing capability. The Chi-Ha was also equipped with two 7.7mm machine guns, one on the hull of the vehicle, the other mounted facing backwards from the turret – a very unusual arrangement. The turret armour was 25mm (1in) thick on the turret, which made the Chi-Ha very vulnerable to even light anti-tank weapons. The 21.7L diesel engine gave the 15-ton Chi-Ha a top speed of 24mph and a range of about 160 miles. Over 1,000 Chi-Ha tanks were built and they saw service in Malaya with 1st, 6th and 14th Tank Regiments.
19. A speeding Ha-Go Type 95 tank.
HA-GO TANK
Production of the Type 95 Ha-Go, also known as the Kyu-Go, was the most common Japanese tank of the Second World War, with over 2,300 vehicles produced between 1935 and 1943, including a field engineering crane and an amphibious version. Ha-Go tanks were at least as good as any light tank in the world when they were introduced in 1935, and were a match for the Honey (or Stuart) tanks they encountered in Burma and the Pacific in terms of speed and manoeuvrability. The Ha-Go was driven by a 14L Mitsubishi diesel engine and armed with a 37mm gun and two 7.7mm machine guns. Some hundreds of Ha-Go tanks were captured by Chinese forces at the end of the Second World War and they saw extensive service in the Chinese Civil War between the Nationalists and the Communists.
Misconceptions & Shortcomings
In addition to the problems with shortages, poor equipment and inadequate training, the Allied commanders underestimated the Japanese to a ridiculous degree. To some extent this was simply racism. The notion that the Japanese were short, were poor physical specimens generally, had poor eyesight and that their equipment was bad was compounded by faulty strategic and tactical analysis. Japan had already been at war for some years and gained a wealth of experience, but Westerners did not see Chinese forces as serious opposition. The fact that Japan had been rou
ndly defeated by the Soviet Union in 1938 and that now – at the end of 1941 – the Russians were being heavily beaten by the Germans did not mean that the Japanese were incompetent, but that was the general perception of the British military establishment.
None of this was helped by a policy position at Westminster that can only be described as wishful thinking. The assumption that there would not be war in the East ignored the possibility that Japan might see the European war as an opportunity.
By the time General Yamashita’s troops reached Johore, very little of any value had been done to prepare Singapore for a siege. Claims that Singapore was an ‘impregnable fortress’ bore no relation to reality. There were a number of defensive installations dating from the construction of the Singapore naval base. A dozen batteries had been erected and equipped with 6in or 9.2in guns, but they had all been located on the southern coast of the island, on the assumption that any threat to Singapore would come from the sea, not overland from Malaya. By good fortune it transpired that most of the guns would be able to fire to the north, but there was a severe shortage of suitable ammunition. The majority of the supply available consisted of armour-piercing shells that would be effective against ships; there was very few of the high-explosive shells required to break up attacks on land.
20. Pre-war concrete emplacement for a 9.2in gun. (Author’s collection)
In the last weeks of the campaign on the mainland some effort was made to provide defences on the northern shore, but little progress was made. It was difficult to procure labour since the civil authorities would not allow Percival to pay an adequate wage. An attempt was made to keep the preparations secret from the community for fear that there would be a decline in morale, though it was obviously impractical to maintain security with so many people working on defences. Such work as was undertaken was increasingly at risk from Japanese air attacks. When the bombers came into view, the labourers would scatter and it was very difficult to persuade them to go back to work if there was not going to be any friendly air cover. A number of concrete machine-gun positions had been built in the 1930s and a few more once the campaign started, but they were few in number and far too widely scattered.