by Chris Brown
35. Typical pre-war ‘atap’ house of the kind found in kampongs (villages) the length and breadth of Malaya and Singapore. (Author’s collection)
36. Typical pre-war shop-houses of the kind found throughout Malaya and Singapore. (Author’s collection)
On the night of 7/8th, patrols from 22nd Australian Brigade had managed to cross the strait and reconnoitred about 5 miles of coastline between Sungei Malayu and Sungei Pendas. They had identified a considerable concentration of Japanese infantry units, but little in the way of artillery and no landing craft at all; however, they had not been able to move much more than a mile inland and had been unable to penetrate as far north as Sungei Skudai. The landing craft were certainly being prepared for the assault, but not in the areas to which the patrols could penetrate.
By the morning of 8 February Malaya Command intelligence was confident that a major Japanese attack on the north-western coast between Sungei Berih and Kranji was imminent, but their conclusions were not shared with Bennett’s headquarters until sometime after 1500hrs. Bennett made an immediate and urgent request for an aerial reconnaissance of what he assumed – rightly – to be the Japanese forming-up area, but there were simply no aircraft to be had, and even if there had been there was very little chance that a reconnaissance mission would have been successful in the face of Japanese air superiority. The best that could be done was to fire a number of speculative concentrations based on the information obtained by the patrols and reasonable deductions. None of this had any discernible impact on Japanese preparations.
THE BATTLEFIELD:
WHAT ACTUALLY HAPPENED?
Failure to stop Japanese Twenty-Fifth Army in Malaya did not mean they were undamaged by the campaign. Casualties among the infantry particularly had been considerable, though many of the tanks that had been put out of action had been repaired and returned to units by 8 February. The Japanese lines of communication had stretched beyond capacity despite use of captured vehicles. General Yamashita was forced to pause for a week in Johore to stockpile materials, get engineering equipment to the front and reorganise his units before making an attack.
His plans had to include a role for Guards Division. The division had not acquitted itself especially well in the campaign so far, and Yamashita’s main assault would be conducted by the 5th and 18th Divisions, but the prestige of the Guards Division and the influence of their commanding officer at home obliged Yamashita to put them into the fight, so he decided to use them in an assault on the eastern aspect of the battle as well as the west. The attack was not redundant in that it would help to prevent the Allies from reinforcing the defenders in the Western Area, where the main attack would be pressed, but it would also reduce the availability of landing craft and other resources to support the 5th and 18th Divisions. In total, Yamashita had a force of about 30,000 men. He was heavily outnumbered, short of food and ammunition, and was not absolutely confident about the attitude of the commander of the Guards Division, Major General Nishimura.
A Desperate Situation
At first glance, Percival appears to have been in a relatively strong position. A wide stretch of water lay between him and the enemy, quite a lot of the coast was covered with mangrove swamp which would be virtually impassable to tanks or transport, and each passing day was an opportunity to add to the pillboxes and gun positions around the island, as well as giving a little more time to rest and reorganise his forces. In reality, his position was already desperate. His force of thirty-eight infantry battalions, three machine-gun battalions and nine field artillery regiments was much less than the sum of its parts. Huge amounts of equipment were lost in the campaign – not just materiel destroyed in combat, but large quantities that had been abandoned due to premature blowing of bridges, failures of transport or that had been captured by rapid Japanese advances. One Japanese unit was already using captured British artillery pieces before the attack on Singapore took place.
Many units had lost heavily during the retreat, and although some manpower shortages could be made up by transferring administrative staff, drivers, cooks and others to the rifle companies, the competence of the unit as a whole was undermined. Percival was further hampered by a determined lack of co-operation on the part of Sir Shenton Thomas and conflicting instructions from Wavell and London. On the one hand he was expected to carry on the fight to the last bullet, on the other he was required to prevent the Japanese from acquiring any supplies and equipment if the island should fall. These two objectives were mutually incompatible. If he was going to fight he would need all the arms, ammunition, food and other materiel that he could muster.
He also made a number of poor policy decisions. He put far too much faith in the sparse chain of fortified positions around the coast. There was a failure to use all of the assets available, including eighteen light tanks. The vehicles were lightly armed, poorly armoured and positively obsolete, but if they had been moved around the island extensively before the Japanese landing they might possibly have boosted confidence. His plan was to attempt to defend the island from any angle but still retain a large reserve to repel the invasion. However, he had inadequate plans or transport to bring the reserve into battle quickly or effectively, and he was further impeded by a lack of wireless equipment, much of which had been lost on the mainland and extensive damage had been done to the military and civil telephone lines through Japanese bombing and shelling. He had very real intelligence about the enemy’s intentions and Japanese shelling forced the abandonment of all the airfields in the northern part of the island, though by the time the Japanese landed there were only ten Hurricanes and handful of Buffalo fighters still operational – hardly enough to deter bombing raids, let alone provide any support for the troops on the ground.
First Action
7 February Japanese troops seize Pulau Ubin and land on Singapore Island.
8 February
Japanese troops land on Singapore Island in considerable numbers.
Japanese landing forces press inland to the village of Ama Keng.
2200hrs Battle commences in the Sarimbun beach area between Japenese forces and 22nd Brigade.
The first action of the battle for Singapore took place on the night of 7/8 February, when Japanese troops landed on Pulau Ubin, an island about 5 miles long lying in the eastern channel of the Johore Strait. Curiously, although the neighbouring island of Pulau Tekong Besar was garrisoned by 2/17th Dogra Battalion to protect the two coastal batteries there (Sphinx battery with two 6in guns and Tekong Besar battery with three 9.2in guns), Pulau Ubin does not seem to have figured in the general defence plan for Singapore at all. It was unprotected other than by patrols from the 4th Norfolks, which were immediately withdrawn to Changi.
From dawn onward shelling and air attacks increased steadily, with several air strikes being mounted on the positions held by 22nd Australian Brigade in Western Area. By the early afternoon the Japanese artillery bombardments had become more focused on headquarter assets and virtually all communications within the brigade area had been thoroughly disrupted by dusk. Both Bennett and Percival formed the opinion that this was not an indication of an immediate attack, but rather the beginning of a prolonged bombardment that might last for some days before the Japanese attempted a landing. Neither were particularly concerned, believing that there would be opportunities to restore communications and repair defences. On account of this assumption, no special effort was made to disrupt Japanese preparations with artillery. This was not entirely irrational. Ammunition supplies were limited and would be required for infantry support once the battle was joined; furthermore, the lack of verifiable targets would mean that any artillery fire would be highly speculative and probably very wasteful.
37. Restored 6in gun position at the excellent Siloso Fort Museum, Sentosa, Singapore. (Author’s collection)
Battle commenced in the Sarimbun beach area, when Australian troops of Brigadier Taylor’s 22nd Brigade fired on landing craft and requisitioned civilian boats carry
ing elements of the Japanese 5th and 18th Divisions sometime after 2200hrs on 8 February. By midnight it had become apparent that the Japanese were attempting to land in considerable strength all along a wide front from Tanjong Murai to Tanjong Buloh. The first wave of over 4,000 infantry landed safely with good artillery support and was able to make decent headway through the gaps between the Australian positions, exploiting many small inlets and river mouths. Brigadier Taylor had issued orders that searchlights were not to be used until such time as the enemy were clearly engaged in a major landing, for fear that the lights would be put out of action almost as soon as they started operating. However, a large proportion of the lights that were available had already been disabled by artillery and mortar fire from Johore and from the Sarimbun beachhead, which the Japanese had secured in the first hour or so of the battle. The few that had survived were never put to use due, among other reasons, to the fact that communications between the searchlight units and the different battalion headquarters had been destroyed during the preliminary bombardment and air strikes.
Assault on Singapore.
Although fire plans had been made with a landing in mind, the disruption of signals made it impossible for the infantry battalions to call for the artillery support they required if the Japanese were to be slowed down let alone stopped on the beaches, but in fact the available support consisted of only three batteries (29th, 30th and 65th) and was not adequate to the task of delivering bombardments all along the brigade front, a distance of over 5 miles.
At different locations the landing forces suffered heavy casualties and in some places troops were only landed successfully after a fierce struggle, but the front was far too extensive to be held by a single brigade and the Japanese were able to secure the landing areas, infiltrate between the scattered posts along the coast and press inland toward the village of Ama Keng. This would develop a salient that would divide 22nd Brigade in two, with 2/18th Battalion and 2/20th Battalion to the north and 2/19th to the south. It would also threaten the position of the brigade headquarters, just a few hundred yards to the south of Ama Keng, and the position of 29th Battery only a further half mile south.
The Japanese made incredibly quick headway and caused a great deal of confusion, which was amplified by the absence of reliable communications within 22nd Brigade. A little before midnight, Brigadier Taylor was able to make some sense of the tactical picture and communicated his view to General Bennett’s headquarters. His brigade reserve had been committed to the fight and he was convinced that the situation could only be retrieved by a major counter-attack at dawn. To this end, Bennett gave him command of another battalion (2/29th Australian), ordered fire on the Skudai estuary in Johore (which had been identified as a major route for Japanese reinforcements) and asked Percival’s headquarters for all the air support that could be mustered. However, by this stage the RAF’s offensive capacity had been reduced to a mere fourteen aircraft (four Fairey Swordfish and ten Hurricanes) still based on the island.
Bennett had formed a ‘Special Reserve battalion’ of over 400 men from Royal Army Service Corps personnel and others and at 0300hrs he put them and elements of 2/4th Machine Gun Battalion under Taylor’s command. The reserve battalion had been formed over the previous week and had had little time for training or to develop the cohesion that is vital for effective infantry units, but in any case, the forces now at Taylor’s disposal were completely inadequate to the task of mounting a major counter-attack over a front of some miles. Although Taylor’s tactical instinct was probably correct – that an immediate counter-attack would have been the preferable course of action – it was not a realistic proposition under the circumstances. Several units and sub-units of his brigade were at risk of being surrounded, and he did not have sufficient strength to secure their positions.
A Force Divided
9 February
0100hrs 22nd Brigade forced to retreat to the point of not being able to present a united opposition.
0300hrs All three battalions ordered to retire to pre-planned fall-back positions.
0500hrs Reinforcements arrive for 22nd Brigade.
0715hrs 2/18th Battalion attacked at Ama Keng.
0930hrs 2/18th Battalion forced back to RAF Tengah.
2200hrs Firing ceases; first elements of 4th Regiment of the Japanese Guards Division land.
In a matter of a few hours the Japanese managed to sever communications between 22nd and 27th Australian Brigades. 22nd Brigade was forced to retreat and by 0100hrs on 9 February they were unable to present a united opposition to the Japanese advance, now supported by a second wave of troops landing in the north-west. Elements of 22nd Brigade became isolated and were forced to surrender despite Taylor committing such reserves as he had to hand. Fighting was fierce everywhere along the front. Casualties and prisoners reduced Australian 2/18th Battalion to below half numbers. By 0300hrs each of the three battalion commanders had given orders for their units to retire to pre-planned fall-back positions. The actions through the night of 9 February rather encapsulate the story of the whole Malayan campaign: a pattern of Japanese forces infiltrating between Allied units and making daring attacks, obliging Allied units to retire to another position, which in turn forces neighbouring units to conform to a new ‘line’ and supporting units to withdraw in order to make space for new arrivals. During the campaign on the mainland, repeated withdrawals had had the apparent value of allowing units to regroup and sometimes gain a little time to prepare new positions while the Japanese reorganised for a further advance. Now that the battle had been carried on to Singapore itself there was simply no physical space for manoeuvres of that ilk.
Although elements of 2/18th Battalion managed to make their way to their new position at Ama Keng, they were attacked again a short while after sunrise (about 0715hrs). Despite hard fighting and a counter-attack in conjunction with the engineers of 2/10th Field Company, the battalion could not hold their position and by 0930hrs had been forced back to the airfield of RAF Tengah. Meanwhile, most of 2/19th Battalion had become seriously disrupted by near-continual combat through the night. Many of the troops had become detached from the battalion and were turning up as far back as the 8th Division headquarters area at Bukit Timah, some 3 miles or more east of Tengah. The remaining battalion of Taylor’s 22nd Brigade, 2/20th, had been heavily engaged by overwhelming numbers all along its front and had been forced to retire from its positions in the Namazhe estate and then separated from the remainder of the brigade by Japanese troops moving inland along the line of the Sungei Sarimbun. Shortly after dawn, the battalion attempted to rejoin the brigade by moving south toward Ama Keng only to find that their path was blocked by strong Japanese forces. The battalion was now broken up into small parties, some of which moved east to cross Sungei Kranji then headed south. Some elements were able to make their way to the brigade headquarters, now at Bulim, but all of the battalions had sustained heavy losses through a mixture of combat and disruption, and the brigade was no longer an effective force.
Although Bennett had authorised reinforcements for Taylor’s command, the battalion allocated, 2/29th, had not been in a position to move immediately to his aid. Some of the battalion were in a position on the Woodlands Road about halfway between Mandai and Bukit Timah; a considerable portion was engaged in training elsewhere. It took some time to concentrate the battalion and consequently they did not arrive at Tengah until about an hour before dawn on 9 February. Taylor now had three units from outside his own brigade under his command: the Jind Battalion from 44th Indian Brigade, 2/29th from 27th Australian Brigade and the Special Reserve Battalion that Bennett had assembled over the previous week. He deployed the Jinds and 2/29th on a line running from just north of Tengah to the north of Sungei Berih, where one company of 2/19th Battalion was still in position at the village of Choa Chu Kang. Taylor clearly intended to reorganise his own battalions behind these units, but was given the additional task of mounting a counter-attack by 2/29th, with the intention of push
ing the enemy back beyond Ama Keng. The proposition that one infantry battalion would be able to throw back the scale of force that had already put an entire brigade out of the battle was clearly unsustainable, but was not put to the test. By mid-morning, well before the time set for the proposed attack, Taylor’s position was threatened by Japanese units that had moved east and then south to compromise his right flank.
Brigadier Paris’ 12th Indian Brigade were brought in to reinforce the Australians, but communications with 8th Division headquarters at Bukit Timah were now non-existent and Taylor had no means of ascertaining General Bennett’s intentions or the condition of neighbouring formations. Thus he and Paris agreed that 12th Brigade should deploy between Bulim and Keat Hong at the northern end of the Jurong Line – a series of half-prepared positions running north from the head of Sungei Jurong. Aware that 22nd Brigade could now be in danger of being cut off either by direct attacks on its own positions around Bulim and Tengah, or if the Japanese were able to dislodge 12th Brigade, Taylor decided to rationalise his line by adopting a position running south from Bulim to the Jurong Road, thus conforming to the Jurong Line. By the time the move was initiated, the Japanese, like the Australians, had been in near-continuous action for more than fifteen hours and were now tired and short of ammunition, and the nature of their attack – infiltrating between the Australian positions – meant that several of their battalions had become scattered and disorganised. Although Taylor’s troops were subjected to several air strikes and some artillery fire, they were able to take up their new positions largely unimpeded and some progress could be made toward regrouping the battalions. Although his actions were unauthorised – and he received a stern warning from Bennett accordingly – Taylor had had little choice but to retire if his brigade was not to be destroyed, but his withdrawal was completely contrary to the orders received from his senior officer and to the general principles on which the battle was supposed to be fought. The only hope for success was to fight a battle of attrition that would inflict so many casualties on the Japanese that they would be forced to withdraw, regroup and make a new attempt. With hindsight it is easy to conclude that the battle for Singapore had already been lost some time before, but Taylor’s decisions ceded ground to the Japanese at no cost at all – and not only within his own sector of responsibility. The neighbouring formation, 44th Indian Brigade under Brigadier Ballentine, would be in danger of becoming isolated if it was not re-deployed to take account of Taylor’s movements.