by Mehlo, Noel
Task Force B; 2nd RN INF BN, C Company (69 men) under command of Capt Ralph Goranson, was ordered to land to west of D-3 draw and assault guns at Point de la Percée beyond west edge of Omaha beach. Task Force C; Remainder of PRG, (665 men) under Rudder were to land at Point du Hoc or Omaha Beach dependant upon success of Task Force A. They were to receive a signal to provide direction one way or another. If landed on Omaha, orders were to turn west and make for Point du Hoc to relieve Force A.19
Some components of the planning the attack on Normandy were under the prevue of the British Combined Operations Directorate. This organization oversaw the British Commandos, Royal Navy landing craft and Combined Operations as a whole. It was this organization that oversaw the development of what is known as the “funnies” such as the swimming tanks, the flail tanks, and other unique weapons systems. These types of new systems were tested at the Combined Operations Experimental Establishment by the Miscellaneous Weapons Development of the Admiralty in Devon near Bideford England at a facility referred to as “Westward Ho”.
First of all, the group developed and tested a system for grapnel hooks that was mounted on the LCAs that combined technology from a two inch rocket launcher and a “J-Projector.” Research suggests that a J Projector was a type of depth charge launcher. The new system was capable of firing a grapnel with attached rope to cliff heights of around 200 feet in height. The rope was attached by a wire strap and the length of rope was to be stored in boxes aboard the vessels. They developed three configurations of rope ascension devices including:
¾ inch smooth ropes mounted in the forward launchers
Rope with small wooden toggles attached every few feet for the middle launchers Rope ladder to be fired from the rear launchers
Another lightweight handheld version of launcher was developed for Rangers ashore as a backup in the event the main launchers failed. The men carried coils of rope to supplement the launchers. They were trained in free climbing and the use of daggers to climb. The tubular steel ladders came in sixteen foot sections with 110 feet of ladder to be carried per LCA.20 It was here that the .30 caliber M1919A4 machine guns were replaced with Browning Automatic Rifles (BAR) as the primary weapon in the Automatic Weapon Squads due to weight and difficulty in climbing with the heavier weapon.13
Rudder was concerned at the lack of the delivery of some of his assault equipment, such as the DUKWs as early as April 23, and he paid a visit to General Huebner. The DUKWs arrived while at Swanage. The Rangers happily accepted the DUKW vehicles equipped with the London fire brigade ladders and two synchronized machine guns. The operators of the weapons were given specially designed throat microphones. A half-inch steel plate armor was affixed to protect the gunner as was a safety belt to attach him to the ladder. Every third round was a tracer bullet that allowed the gunner to have better accuracy. The DUKWs had crews of seven men, manned primarily, but not exclusively from Companies D, E and F. They named them Swan 1 through Swan 4.20 In the second week of May, ten men from the 234th Engineer Battalion joined the PRG to train with the men. These men were assigned as the drivers and operators of the DUKWs. Their names were: Doughty, Ahart, Hall, Tibbets, Tindell, Revels, Sluss, Mead, Armbuster and Shoaf. Ranger Bill Stivison trained the other Rangers on the use of the dual machine guns atop the extension ladders.17
In an exercise two of the DUKWs were brought near each other with their ladders fully extended. The men of each Ranger battalion was told and expected to climb up one ladder, make a midair transition to the second ladder and descend while carrying full pack and assault load-out. Raaen indicated in communications with Black that the tops of the ladders could sway as far as 15 feet apart while performing this training exercise. It was a go, no go exercise for the men. The DUKWs carrying the ladders were also equipped with hydraulic jacks on the port and starboard sides to stabilize the vehicle once ashore.20
I interviewed JR Copeland a few times while researching this book. He discussed the Army Duck (DUKW) trucks with 100 foot extension ladders incorporated into the training. He said that they used two trucks each with the ladders extended. In one exercise, all of the Rangers had to ascend one ladder, jump across to the other ladder and come down the second ladder. He recalled one of the men in his own squad that attempted the climb, but could not make it from one ladder to the next. He remembered having to stay out until very late at night trying to get the Ranger to complete the task. After the man could not do it, he had no choice but to report it up the chain of command. He didn’t know what became of the man, but that man was gone from the Rangers the following day.
They used free hand, smooth rope, knotted rope, toggle rope and steel ladder sections. The grapnel could dig into the ground on the tops of the cliffs once it landed and weight was applied to it. “The Rangers tested every available means of overcoming cliff obstacles.” The Rangers also worked out the amount of combat load for the men to carry on their climb. This included weapons and ammunition. Each rifleman would carry sixteen clips of ammo, two hand grenades, and two antitank grenades. The other soldiers were likewise appropriately equipped.17
A member of the U.S. Navy, Harold F. Plank provided a testimony to the BBC in July 2005 concerning his involvement with the Rangers as a Naval Shore Fire Control Party. In this, he described the training at Swanage with the Rangers. He would go ashore at Point du Hoc and assist the Rangers by directing naval fire support for the assault. He joined the 2nd Ranger Infantry Battalion in Swanage. He described that the first of the training involved setting up the climbing apparatus from the top and then simply climbing up and down the ropes and apparatus. It was after that the men used the landing craft and went more completely through the exercises, eventually timing the ascent. He described how the rocket launchers and grapnel hooks were added to the training. These grapnels were attached to coiled ropes in boxes located behind the rockets. When the grapnels landed on the cliff tops, the men pulled on the ropes to get the grapnels to dig into the upper surface of the cliff. He described climbing on cliffs in various places, and on differing types of cliffs and cliffs of different heights, including the Isle of Wight. He said, “This was quite rugged work.”21
Another account of Ranger activities came through research involving the HMS Amsterdam (Figure 202). This 350 foot vessel was first built in 1930, and saw service as a passenger ferry before the war. During the war, she was requisitioned by the Ministry of War and pressed into service as an LSI. The vessel was camouflaged and was capable of carrying six LCAs suspended by davits on her port and starboard sides. She was similar to the other LSIs used by the Rangers in many respects. In a report of this ship, it was said that she participated in mock landing drills with Rangers from February onward until D-Day. She took Rangers to Swanage and anchored offshore, while the Rangers boarded their LCAs and go ashore and practice cliff scaling.
Figure 202: HMS Amsterdam (IWM) Lt Eikner, 2nd Ranger Infantry Battalion commented after the war concerning their training: “I can assure you, that when we went into battle after all of this training there was no shaking of the knees or weeping or praying; we knew what we were getting into; we knew everyone of us had volunteered for extra hazardous duty; we went into battle confident; of course we were tense when under fire, but we were intent on getting the job done. We were actually looking forward to accomplishing our mission.” Another account of a non-ranger’s opinion of the Rangers encountered at Swanage was written by Stephen Ambrose: “Lt Walter Sidlowski, an engineer, marveled at the Rangers. “My guys had always felt we were in good shape physically, but watching the rangers using most of their time double-timing, with and without arms and equipment, pushups and various other physical exercise whenever they were not doing something else, was cause for wonder.” These accounts were taken from oral histories held at the Eisenhower Center in New Orleans.22
The British government documented the cliff training the Rangers did for future use for special warfare soldiers. The images and methods used below come from three sources. T
he first is from a video, The Way Back; Produced by the A.F.P.U and R.N. Film Section; Imperial War Museum (IWM).23 The second source of information was a pamphlet prepared by the Chief of Combined Operations called, Combined Operations Pamphlet No 24, Cliff Assaults, dated August 1944 that uses the Ranger Training at Burton Cliff in particular as the basis for the text.24 Lastly, a document prepared by the Chief of Combined Operations called, The Combined Operations Staff Notebook, BR 1293 detailed the logistical side of these types of operations for training and real assaults.25
A number of Combined Operations included cliff assaults as part of the assault plan during World War II. Objectives included in these assaults included such items as the seizure of coastal defense batteries, disrupting communications and turning the enemy’s flank away from the main assault force. The element of surprise was deemed to be a critical element to the success of these assaults in terms the cost measured in lives. The Combined Operations Command determined that after careful study, only as much as ten percent might be conducive to proper beach exits for conventional forces. The remainder of coastlines are often backed by cliffs ranging from low and sloping to high and vertical. Doctrine of the era suggested when the defender has the benefit of strong geological barriers to assault, they are afforded the opportunity to economize their forces along their sectors of coastline. This means that areas with beach exits are able to be given proper attention in defensive works, under the assumption that the attacking force will not assuage them along fortifications enhanced by cliffs. If the enemy has reason to suspect a cliff assault, then they will likely spread their forces thinly to protect the entire coastline, which also presents an opportunity for the attacker.
If the defender finds themselves in a situation where a cliff assault is likely, the manner of the defense will almost always favor the attacker. They either sufficiently fortify the beaches, or fortify the cliffs, and either scenario affords the attacker the advantage. “If the enemy attempts to guard the cliffs, he must weaken the defense on the main beaches. If he leaves the cliffs undefended a bridgehead can be established over the cliffs on his flank by special troops. The installation of cliff climbing apparatus will then enable non-specialist infantry to pass through the cliff bridgehead in sufficient numbers to capture the main beach from the flank.”24
The British, and Americans working along with them set about to develop a process to analyze the needs of a given assault. The first thing to consider was the type of cliff to be overcome. The Allies determined that no cliff is unassailable through their work at intelligence analysis. All that is needed are the right men, proper equipment and good planning. Cliffs were broken into two types irrespective of their geological classification, and planners developed studies as how to best defeat them as obstacles. The two types of cliff to assault area: 1) Cliffs of soft rock which are vertical overhanging and 2) Cliffs of hard rock which slope at an angle of less than seventy-five degrees of horizontal. The techniques of assault for each is different. Two concepts of ascent were described and must be considered in the assault of these obstacles, namely scaling and climbing. Scaling uses mechanical aids to overcome vertical cliffs. Climbing on the other hand, requires very little in the way of climbing apparatus, and is used to ascend hard and sloping cliffs. The end result on D-Day was that the majority of the 2nd Ranger Infantry battalion like the three companies at Point du Hoc scaled the cliff, while the 5th Ranger Infantry Battalion climbed the bluffs on Omaha Beach. To determine what method should be used, each cliff was carefully studied. The nature of the rock, nature of the sea action upon the exposed rock, and the sea level over time were three factors used to determine cliff confirmation. The same type of cliff might be produced by different combinations of these factors.
While the ability to overcome a cliff was derived based on the two factors mentioned above, the geologic classification is still important when planning an assault. Geologically speaking, cliffs are found in two main groups, stratified and unstratified. Stratified cliffs may be formed of limestone, sandstone, slate or volcanic ash consisting of a series of parallel layers. These layers tend to form blocks when they break up. The layers might be horizontal, steeply incline toward or away from the sea. Cliffs with horizontal, or nearly horizontal layers, are usually vertical or nearly vertical, and a part from landslide or talus, are either easy or difficult to climb in relation to their uniformity. The development of a stratified cliff over time will help determine how easy or difficult it will be to climb. An unstratified cliff is usually of volcanic origin, or produced under volcanic influence. These cliffs typically are made of granite, basalt, gneiss and quartzite. The rocks in these cliffs are hard and form high cliffs in exposed positions. Over time, these cliffs tend to form diversified pinnacles and shafts. A stratified cliff will typically result in a more or less straight coastline, while an unstratified cliff will result in an irregular coastline including coves and points.
The Combined Operations Command determined that based on this type of information, no cliff was insurmountable given the necessary equipment. The height, composition and slope of a cliff determined the best method to overcome it. The time required to assault a cliff was found to be dependant on the method employed and the standard of training for the troops conducting the assault, with more emphasis on the training than the cliffs themselves. The tactical considerations of the mission outweighed the cliffs themselves, and care was taken not to just choose the easiest route, with the end result being a well thought out plan of assault. In developing the assault plan, the commander had two important considerations: 1) the degree of cover from cliff top defensive fire, and 2) the suitability of the ground on the cliff top to establish and hold a bridgehead from counterattack.
The next important phase of planning was timing the assault. The timing of the cliff assault depended on the timing of the major landing. The choice of H-hour for the cliff assault must be considered from a wider tactical perspective of the overall operation. The danger of a loss of surprise is real to the overall tactics and strategy of the invasion if the timing is poorly conceived and executed between the cliff assault and the main landings. In a cliff assault the actual ascent will be easier by day than by night, but against a heavily defended coast it will be harder to get tactical surprise and the initial resistance will be greater. Another consideration in the planning of cliff assaults is that of attacking right on the heels of naval or artillery barrage. The period between the lifting of the bombardment and the time when enough men are up to establish an initial bridgehead at the cliff top, is the most vital period in the whole operation. The Combined Operations Command calculated that the cliff top bridgehead assault forces must complete the ascent within five minutes per hundred feet of cliff height, and then fully engage the enemy. The second wave of attackers should not come in until after the ascension apparatus deployed by the first wave is fully in place. This could entail that the second wave might be as much as thirty minutes after the first wave. The first wave, ideally should remain offshore until called for.
Fire support was deemed important to the success of the mission. During the initial bombardment and supporting cover fire, as much of the enemy defense in the area in the immediate vicinity of the cliff should be neutralized. Air and naval power are critical in this action and cliff top and beach communication is thus extremely important. The unit’s heavy mortars are important tools to deploy on the beach during the first phase in order to provide high trajectory fire support of the bridgehead. Due to the manpower and resources required to haul the mortars, heavy machine guns and their ammunition to the top, they should remain below until called for. It was this developing wisdom that resulted in the BARs being made replacements for the light machine guns in the Ranger companies before D-Day.
The British took notice of the use of heavy bombardment on Point du Hoc, and how the bombardment resulted in rendering the DUKW vehicles useless on that assault. The wisdom developed was that the thought of considering cost versus gain of su
ch bombardment on a target. Had the aerial bombardment not trashed the shingle and beach at the Point, then any number of other possible scenarios may have played out on D-Day. A risk of bombardment includes the possible hardening of targets to where aerial bombing becomes ineffective. The cratering and destruction of the shingle and beach were another possible issue.
The next phase of the assault included the establishment of the bridgehead. The primary element to this was speed of ascent. The secondary element then delivered the remaining fighting forces to the beachhead to continue to press the attack. The Rangers developed sufficient cliff assault apparatus as to provide for the rapid establishment of the bridgehead. The next consideration in this phase was that of creating surprise diversions. In terms of cliff assault in conjunction with a main landing, the enemy is likely to pay attention to the main landing, thus easing up some of the pressure from the area to be attacked during the cliff assault. The thought is that if both assaults are successful, then the two bridgeheads will join up in short order. Other considerations for success are weather, use of parachute troops, and alternative methods for establishing a bridgehead.
The Combined Operations Command developed several methods for cliff scaling. The methods for scaling included the use of ladders and ropes. Ladders are limited by the height of the cliff, but they are considered the best method fort ascent. Proper employment of ropes included the use of rope carrying rocket apparatus, rope ladders and climbing ropes. The four foot steel ladder is included in this category as it operates as a rigid rope ladder. The nature of the assault often helped determine what method was the best to use, and became apparent in the training phase. No method should be used alone. Each assault should employ as many methods of ascent as possible to ensure success.