by Mehlo, Noel
Lt. Jack Shea, Aide-de-camp to General Cota wrote of the near point blank naval bombardment by the U.S.S. Texas’ main battery and other vessels of US Navy of the D-1 Draw. “The concussion from the bursts of these guns seemed to make the pavement of the street in Vierville actually rise beneath our feet in a “bucking sensation.” This bombardment occurred just north of B Company 2nd Platoon. The Texas had moved to within 3000 yards from shore for this bombardment of six rounds at 1223 hours. She was supported by several destroyers that moved close enough to shore to bottom out as they fired. This barrage ended the German resistance and fire from WN 71 and WN 72. By the middle of the morning prisoners had been taken not only from the 126th Regiment but from all three regiments of the 352d Division.”4
Of the area in and around Vierville in the morning and afternoon of D-Day, Corporal Gale Beccue wrote "We have been observed throughout the afternoon. A man traveling alone drew sniper fire, but any concentration brought the mortars and artillery”.12
With the addition of 2nd Platoon, Colonel Canham found himself in a situation where he had a 1,500 yard front to cover, and a total of 35 to 40 men to cover that front from counterattack to the south. The Rangers informed him that his men were stuck on the beach and strewn out across the landing zones from Dog Green, White and Red. The men expected a German armored counterattack. They found themselves falling into poor spirits.
The Piprel boys retreated to Vierville ending up at the farm of Louis Le Terrier known as the Ormel Farm on the road to Damigni. This route was a main north south route used by the Germans to move men and materials in order to reinforce or resupply the coastal defenses. The boys were at the farm when they later encountered their first Americans about a half hour after they had arrived. The soldier offered a pack of Lucky Strike cigarettes to the French civilians. The group of civilians remained at the farm taking cover in a stable on the grounds. It is likely these boys were at the farm while B Company, 2nd Platoon protected the southern flank of Vierville for Colonel Canham.11
One of the outpost positions for the platoon was at an intersection of the gravel road and the paved main route leading south from Vierville. The chateau faced the gravel road. Blacky Morgan with his BAR and Weast with his M1 Garand rifle manned the position. The Germans at the Chateau made the next move. They exited the structure and loaded wounded onto an old two wheeled horse-buggy, then formed in a column of 2’s to move out. There were two men pushing and two men pulling. They proceeded toward the crossroads with weapons slung over their shoulders. They were repositioning and clearly were not aware of the Rangers presence. 2nd Platoon waited until the 35-40 men were well within range at a distance of ten yards. Then the Rangers stepped out of their concealed positions, challenging the Germans. All of the Germans immediately surrendered. Weast wrote “Now, with this kind of a situation, what in the hell do you do with prisoners?”2
The captured soldiers were gathered together in an orchard and a man was put on them to guard them. Attempts were made to interrogate the prisoners, leading the Rangers to realize their guests were mostly not German. They recorded that one or two of the NCOs were German, but the remainder of the men were Hungarians, Romanians, Russians and other nationalities. The German NCO was described as middle-aged and happy to be a prisoner. He relayed to his captors that he was concerned of a German counterattack. The Rangers sent out numerous patrols in groups of two to three men to look for additional friendly forces and to detect German activity in their immediate vicinity. These patrols went out on the flanks, south to Louviers and back to Vierville. The Rangers received word the beaches had been closed to additional landings, adding to their sense of dread. Weast described the men as having “very bad spirits.”2 They fully expected a German armored attack. It appears as if the members of the platoon had no idea that the expected armored counterattack had been broken by U.S.S. Texas earlier. 2nd Platoon found themselves engaged in multiple skirmishes around the CP the remainder of the day near the Ormel Farm.
As night fell, the Rangers of the platoon contemplated what to do with the prisoners who clearly outnumbered them. There was serious discussion about just shooting the prisoners. Ching remembers this and relayed his memory of it to me. The cooler heads of the more senior NCOs quelled this discussion. The men were bedded down for sleep in the orchard laying side-by-side. The Rangers communicated to a few of the prisoners who spoke English that they couldn’t see the men, but they could hear them. If any of them made noise or motions, the Rangers would machine gun the whole group of them with the BARs. The Rangers posted a BAR man at the head of the sleeping formation. Weast recorded “They got the message loud and clear, and they lay there and believe me, those were some damn quiet enemy. Didn't hear a tick all night long from these people.” Ching the told me the prisoners were marched to the beach the following morning. None of the B Company, 2nd Platoon Rangers slept the night of June 6.2
At 1700 the main Ranger force came up and plans for an attack were started, then called off later in the evening. Colonel Canham decided not to press the effort along the coastal highway toward Pointe du Hoc, since the 5th Rangers constituted the larger part of his forces for defense of Vierville. {Omaha Beachhead pg 94} Colonel was still trying to collect intelligence on the disposition of his forces. The Ranger patrols reported back to him as they came across friendly forces, and gathered up straggling soldiers as individuals or in a couple instances groups of up to five men. These men were consolidated, taken to the Command Post and added to the defensive perimeter protecting this portion of the beachhead. “At 1830, Lt. Colonel Metcalf, CO of the 1st Battalion, 116th reached the CP For the first time Colonel Canham, CO of the 116th Infantry, learned of the high casualties to the 1st Battalion, 116th on Omaha Dog Green. He also learned his 2nd and 3rd Battalions were located near St. Laurent, some two and one half miles to the east.” (Raaen – 1981) The majority of men to be brought in were soldiers who had shown leadership and initiative to advance inland on their own. Like S/Sgt McIlwain, Colonel Canham had suffered a wound to an arm earlier in the day. McIlwain remained with the platoon for several hours, until finally the men had to almost fight him to get him to go back to the medics. Canham was not bandaged very well. He looked rough, but in a move demonstrating great leadership, he remained at his post to maintain command and control over the tenuous situation south of Vierville. These Rangers came to respect him deeply per all accounts.
“But Colonel Cannon was one hell of a man. He had a hell of a situation there. As I say, here he was according to the projections, we were supposed to expect German armored counter attacks, and here he was with probably, I know less than 50 men, and 1500 yards of front, and of course, the word had gotten around apparently that nothing more was coming in on the beaches, and what had come in was either sunk or stalled on the beach, so you can damn well imagine the mental anguish this poor bastard was enduring” wrote Weast.2
Of the firefights that the men found themselves in with German forces, the Rangers realized an advantage the
Figure 271: Map from Free Vierville website showing American advances and German defenses on D-Day on western Omaha Beach overlain on BIGOT map. (Free Vierville website) Germans enjoyed over them. The German ammunition used smokeless powder. After a four round burst of fire from a BAR, the U.S. forces found their weapon left a cloud of smoke announcing their position. The Germans remained hidden unless the muzzle flash was observed. “At nightfall the Vierville area was the weakest part of the beachhead. The 5th Ranger Battalion, remnants of the 1st Battalion, 116th, and a few small elements of engineer units and of the 2d and 3d Battalions (a group from Company K arrived in the evening and was used for headquarters security) were holding defensive positions west and southwest of the village.”4 The first vehicles, tanks of the 743rd Tank Battalion, reached Vierville from the beach just before sunset, around 2200 hours.6
S/Sgt Hull and his B Company, 2nd Platoon members had largely survived their ordeal on D-Day. I finally had uncovered the true story a
bout my grandfather and what he contributed to D-Day through understanding the actions of this platoon. S/Sgt Hull was not a replacement. He was a respected member amongst a very special group of men who did something amazing. The 5th Ranger Infantry Battalion was at the right place at the right time and helped their beleaguered brothers of the 29th Infantry Division survive at a moment when they were needed the most.
Evidence of the German assessment opposing the U.S. Rangers on June 6 was stated in a recollection by Karl Wegner, Grenadier Regiment 914 who faced off against the Rangers at Pointe du Hoc. He had earlier that day faced members of the 29th Infantry Division and Rangers in the Vierville area before being reassigned to the Pointe. He wrote:
“Our group was kept together as a heavy MG team under the direct command of the ZugFührer. I was still Nr 1, Willi Nr 2 and Helmuth was now our Nr 3, the ammunition carrier and rear security. We were told that a new gun commander would be given us. Helmuth’s wound gave him much pain but he steadfastly refused to go to the Verbandplatz {aid station}. We cleaned it and changed the bandage when we could. Since this morning, we were opposing the Americans’ famous Rangers. They were far better soldiers than us. We couldn’t make any headway against them and they were too few in number to make a big attack against us. If they did it would have been bad for us.”9
The day was not without cost. Overall the Company Morning Report listed the following casualties on D-Day: SSgt William F. Reilly, Tec 5 Elmo E. Banning, Tec 5 Clinton O. Read, Pfc Nickolas Wassil, and Pvt Raymond F. Wilhelm as killed in action. S/Sgt James R. Copeland, S/Sgt Walter N. McIlwain, Sgt Dalton L. Boudreaux, and Tec 5 Ashley R. Kimball as severely wounded in action. Clayton E. Gardner was listed as Severely Injured in Action (SIA). The members of B Company, 2nd Platoon had fared better than most units engaged in their sector in terms of casualties. S/Sgt Copeland, PFC Bernard Akers and S/Sgt McIlwain had been wounded. 2nd Platoon had lost PFC Elmo Banning.
A letter was caringly prepared and sent to the parents of Elmo Banning by the members of his 2nd Section of 2nd Platoon (Figure 272). This moving letter was sent to me during my research by PFC Banning’s nephew, Mr. Elmo Banning. It contains many of the signatures of the men who served with PFC Banning from their time at Camp Forrest as noted in Chapter 5. The signatories were: PFC Francis Healey, Sgt Peter L. Cardinali, S/Sgt Joseph Surrowitz, Cpl Paul L. Winslow, PFC Thomas Devlin, PFC Randall Ching, PFC Dalton L. Boudreaux, S/Sgt Edward J. McEleney, PFC Harvey M. Montgomery, PFC (illegible), Tech/Sgt Chester B Warich (Platoon Sergeant). I believe the discrepancy in time recorded in the letter to be a typo not taking into account a transition from English time to local French time as explained to me by General Raaen. The time of death of Elmo Banning appears to have been at 0930 hours in relation to the times used throughout this chapter. The facts of the letter otherwise support the events attributed to his death in the fields near WN 70. In studying the letter, I estimate that based on the handwriting, it was likely written by Sgt. Boudreaux.
Figure 272: Letter sent by members of B Company to family of Elmo Banning upon his death (Courtesy of nephew Elmo Banning) From a strategic perspective, and not a tactical one, the previously thought out plan for Operation Overlord on Omaha Beach had worked. This is in consideration of the tremendous human loss, the communications failures and the other challenges of combat on that day. The American forces had done better than the projected casualties reported to Eisenhower by the Allied planners prior to invasion. This stands in contradiction to the feelings and remembrances of many of the men who had to fight their way off the beaches that day. I recognize this is little comfort to the men who lived it and to the families who suffered the consequences of it. The Rangers on Pointe du Hoc destroyed their objective at great cost. The 5th Rangers enacted their Secondary objective of landing on Omaha Beach and protected the flank of the 29th Infantry Division at Vierville Sur Mer as planned after higher command saw the danger unfolding for the beachhead. “The decisive factor was leadership. Wherever an advance was made, it depended on the presence of some few individuals, officers and noncommissioned officers, who inspired, encouraged, or bullied their men forward, often by making the first forward moves.”4 The smaller tactical changes that evolved on D-Day such as the change in orders for the Rangers to protect the southern flank of the beachhead at Vierville also played a part of the overall strategic plan, and ultimate victory of the Allies in the Normandy campaign. Colonel Schneider used his combat experience to ensure that the secondary objective could be met to land on Omaha Beach and attack overland through Vierville. Derived from Taylor’s Notes, Figure 273 illustrates the actual movements of the 5th Ranger Infantry Battalion, B Company through D-Day.
Figure 273: Map by Lt. Colonel Taylor illustrating Force B and Force C movements on D-Day (Courtesy of General Raaen) Hitler exemplified his arrogance and lack of military understanding “When Hitler, on 6 June, received word of the invasion he was about to appear at a reception near Salzburg of the new Hungarian prime minister. Hitler came in to the meeting with a radiant face and announced "It's begun at last." He was confident that all measures were being taken to meet the crisis, and that by 13 June counterattacks would wipe out any beachheads.4 He obviously never met an American Ranger. Enemy power had been frittered away in stubborn defensive action by small groups, which were nowhere able to do more than delay our advances. There is enough evidence to suggest that the 352d units were committed piecemeal, in battalion strength or less, and that companies and battalions of different regiments were intermingled. Elements of the 915th Regiment, for example, were identified east of Bayeux, in the Omaha sector, and near Isigny. Such disposition would not lend itself to coordinated attack in sizable force. In any event, there were few indications of the aggressive defense called for by German tactical doctrine.”4
The day was summarized for the Rangers to me in this single account received in response to Cornelius Ryan’s work on The Longest Day.13 Everyone was very tired, very dirty, and some were still hungry and sleepy. Everyone was happy, though, because we did what Hitler said was impossible for us to do... I was very glad when I heard our whole nation had turned out for prayer. God will always honor people who are willing to acknowledge Him. Every prayer was an acknowledgement that humanity realizes the need of something greater than themselves to control the great catastrophe of warfare and bloodshed. The only way to have universal peace is for the individual to have peace in his heart. Jesus Christ is so full of peacefulness and compassion that He will give it to us a hundred times over if we will only accept and obey His will.
Regards
(Signed) Ralph E. Davis Co. F, 2nd. Ranger Inf. Bn.
18 BATTLE, RECOVERY, REPLACEMENTS AND REFIT
The beach and exits had opened up in the late afternoon of D-Day, evening and overnight hours. The Rangers and 116th Infantry had been joined by tanks of the 743rd Tank Battalion overnight. The morning of June 7 began with the Americans maintaining an uneasy foothold on the area near Vierville as compared to the advances made by the Allies in other areas. The southernmost extent of this toehold was held in part by the 5th Ranger Infantry Battalion, B Company, 2nd Platoon. Lt. Colonel Schneider had designs on moving west along the coastal road to Pointe du Hoc to relieve Colonel Rudder’s force on June 6.
A plan was formulated by General Norm Cota, 29th Infantry Assistant Division Commander, Colonel Canham and Schneider. Members of the Rangers and tankers moved out to the Point at 0730 hours. As the column moved west, the Germans counterattacked from the south. Canham and Schneider were concerned with the security of the area around Vierville, so Companies B, E and A Company, 1st Platoon and F Company, 1st Platoon remained behind to help protect the village from German counterattack as the Americans strengthened their position throughout the day. While the other remaining companies cleaned our snipers in Vierville, B Company remained in position to the south and west of town. They engaged enemy forces throughout the day. The Germans shelled Vierville between 1800 and 1900 hours. About 1900 hour
s, the Germans counterattacked from the south through the chateau grounds south of town before being checked by the Rangers and 116th Infantry. A half hour later, 3rd Battalion of the 116th Infantry moved into position, and the German activity ended. In Intact, General Raaen wrote “the last threat to Vierville was over”.1 B Company ran patrols in the area, only having to mop up snipers. The 5th Ranger Infantry Battalion forces in Vierville defended the south and western flanks of the town overnight.
On June 8 at 0600, these Rangers formed up in advance of the 116th Infantry’s march west to St. Pierre du Mont. By this time additional U.S. forces had landed and took over in Vierville, while additional U.S. units began to fight south from town.2 The June 8, 1944 B Company Morning report indicated that B Company arrived at Point du Hoc at 0800. This clarified the bit of first-known information to me concerning my Grandfather from the beginning of the book. He did in fact see Pointe du Hoc, but his fight to get there was an entirely different path than our family previously believed. The company remained at the Point until 1200 when the men moved west to the sluice gates just east of Grandcamp-les-Bains, arriving at 1330 where they assisted in the assault on the entrenched Germans in the town. By many veterans’ accounts, the action at Grandcamp was more intense than that of D-Day.
The City of St. Lô was the major objective of the 29th Infantry Division during the Normandy Campaign. St. Lô is the capital of the French department of Manche. It is approximately 20 miles south of the coast lying almost due south of the Vire River delta and the town of Isigny. One of the principle tributaries of the north-south running Vire River is the Aure River that runs east-west and joins the Vire just west of the town of Isigny.3 Tactical and strategic maps of the day show the Aure River as a flooded area. The 352nd Division had constructed dams and other features to flood a two hundred foot wide swath in the river valley. The only river crossing with a bridge was in Isigny. The capture of the town and bridge therefore became a major objective for the operation. In the short distance from Point du Hoc to Grandcamp, the Normandy coast transforms from the rugged cliffs at the point to gentle coastline consistent with the mouths of rivers as they enter the sea. The overarching topographic features here are the gently sloping valleys that border the streams and rivers of the area.