by Mehlo, Noel
Figure 311: Operation Overlord (the Normandy Landings), 6 June 1944, The 15 inch guns of HMS WARSPITE bombarding German positions around Caen during the invasion of Normandy (Admiralty Official Collection) The 2nd Infantry Division attacked on August 25. They fought vigorous battles with the Germans. By August 30, the 2nd had captured a total of 3,039 prisoners. As the Americans forces drove the Germans inward toward Brest, the fighting became more and more savage as the Germans began a house-to-house defense.
On August 28, Companies A and C of the 5th Ranger Infantry Battalion were attached to the 2nd Infantry Division and moved to the northeast of Brest for operations in support of the Division near Guipavas, France. They moved out on the 29th along with Company E who were assigned to the 2nd Infantry Division on that day to maintain communications between the 2nd Infantry Division and the 8th Infantry Division. This left Headquarters and Headquarters Company, B Company, D Company and F Company to fight on separately for a time in early September.
By August 31, the 29th Infantry Division, 116th Infantry Regiment found itself being shelled by artillery from multiple directions. The Germans were shelling the Allies using the heavy guns of the coastal forts south and west of the Allies who were attacking Brest toward their east. As a result of these attacks on their flanks and rear areas, the 29th Infantry requested reinforcements. Their help would be the 2nd and 5th Ranger Infantry Battalions. Although the 29th had suffered over 90 percent casualties since D-Day, the more experienced men among them knew the Rangers were just the outfit to sort out the artillery issues inflicting additional carnage to their ranks.
The 29th found itself embroiled in bitter fighting northwest of Brest in the vicinity of Hill 103, Ilioc, and La Trinté beginning on August 29. The 175th Infantry Regiment was the main attacking force engaged for Hill 103, while the 116th Infantry Regiment moved southeast to the right flank of the 175th in an effort to advance toward La Trinté. This village straddled the vital east-west coastal road, D789 from Brest to the Le Conquet peninsula, and was considered of vital importance to capture. Three miles to the east of La Trinté were the German submarine pens in the port of Brest. The road could serve as an important avenue of attack toward this major objective.
The 29th was no stranger to bitter fighting would suffer massive casualties in this six day engagement. The 116th Infantry Regiment suffered 469 casualties, while the 175th Infantry Regiment lost half that number in what was called the most intense infantry combat during the battle for Brest. Part of the shortcomings faced by these men was a severe shortage of artillery ammunition to the area by the Army supply system. The Americans had advanced so quickly in the last weeks of August, which the VIII Corps hadn’t been able to bring the supplies up from the Normandy supply points quick enough to keep up with the advance.
“During the first half of the Brest campaign the nearest ammunition supply dump was nearly a hundred miles back on the road to Normandy, and the long extension of supply lines from their original landing area at Omaha Beach resulted in slim ammunition allowances for the artillery batteries. Later, before the end of the campaign the problem was partially solved when LSTs bearing supplies and ammunition commenced landing at Morlaix, on the north coast of Brittany.”15
In addition to the ammunition shortages, the 116th found itself on the far right flank of the whole allied assault. In their positioning, they had German forces to their south to the coast. There Germans then had forces at all of the coastal forts and other strongpoints further west. This enabled the Germans to shell the 116th from three sides, and left their flanks open to counterattack from Germans who were easily within two miles of their vulnerable position. Colonel Phillip Dwyer was in command of the 116th. He found that he had to ignore the forts in attacking forward to La Trinté. During his effort to advance on Friday, September 1, he found that his regiment’s forward progress was hindered greatly by the defenders. At 1000 hours he reported to General Gerhardt that the 116th was “getting artillery fire from all directions.” The advance of the regiment ground to a halt with many discussions between Dwyer and his commander as a result to try to figure out the best way out of the jam. On September 1, Gerhardt approached Major General Troy Middleton, the VIII Corps Commander for reinforcements to seal up the exposed right flank of the 29th Infantry Division.
Middleton immediately issued orders to deploy four companies from the 5th Ranger Infantry Battalion to the 29th Infantry Division to clear the coastal forts. This all happened within a two hour period, as the Rangers were notified to move out by noon. Author Joseph Balkoski wrote: “those Ranger reinforcements amounted to only about 250 men. But the 5th Rangers were superb fighters, a fact that Gerhardt readily grasped because that outfit had landed alongside his 29ers on D-Day at Omaha Beach, and it had carried out its mission on that dreadful shoreline with impressive determination.”4
Once the Rangers arrived near Locmaria-Plouzané, Sullivan was briefed on his mission. The Ranger mission was to assault nearly due east along the coast, taking or neutralizing each of the five forts in succession. Sullivan was told that is the Rangers could do this quickly, then the 116th Infantry Regiment’s burden of fire into their flanks and rear could be lessened. Sullivan was given the latest intelligence estimates that indicated each fort was manned by a garrison that greatly outnumbered his own forces. Raaen told me “I am sure we would have been notified of the failure of HMS Warspite to knock out the forts a week earlier”. He was aware that if the Rangers couldn’t assault these by land, then a seaborne assault would be attempted. This awareness passed down to men such as PFC Ching through the rumor-mill.
Major Sullivan, now commanding the 5th Rangers borrowed some trucks. This is referred to throughout the various 5th Ranger Company Morning Reports. For the campaign at Brest, the 5th Ranger Battalion, B Company was under the command of 1st Lt. Bernard M. Pepper, and was organized into two platoons. The 1st Platoon was under the command of 1st Lt. Stan Askin. The 2nd Platoon was under the command of 1st Lt. Louis Gombosi.
Telemetre = Baraques = Mortier = mortar Soutes = bunkers Fosse soutes = infirmerie = Projecteur = Seeziel batteries = seeziel - batteries
encuvements flak-batterie =
encuvements flak battery
Figure 312: Map of German Fortifications at Fort de Toulbroc’h (from L’enfer de Brest, Page 18)
rangefinder
barracks pit bunkers
infirmary
projector
On September 1, the U.S. 100th Bomb Group (Heavy) reported overcast conditions at 28,000 feet in the vicinity of Brest. On September 2, they recorded a morning shower. On September 3, they reported clear weather. On September 2, the RAF Lancaster Bomber, No 5 Group bombed ships in Brest harbor in clear visibility. Historical weather records indicate the weather in Brest to have been fair and warm on September 1, fair and warm with a late day shower on September 2, and dull in the morning with afternoon clearing on September 3. There was a full moon on September 2, sunrise was at 0737 hours and sunset was at 2057 hours. The average early September temperatures for the area are a low of 53 degrees Fahrenheit and a high of 66 degrees Fahrenheit
The 5th Ranger Infantry Battalion, less Companies A, C and E, received orders and was attached to the 29th Infantry Division for operations at 1200 hours on September 1. The individual companies were alerted to move out at 1207 hours while trucks were readied. The Rangers moved out by truck from their position at Trégarantec (MGRS 104164), located southeast of Ploudaniel-Lesneven at 1500 hours. They travelled south approximately 30 miles and arrived at their bivouac position near Kerionoc at MGRS 842973 at 1630 hours per several of the Company Morning Reports. The battalion records indicate the arrival time at 1730 hours. This location is just north of the French Route du Conquet (D789) about 8 km west of the westernmost edge of Brest. The four Companies sent out patrols and established a defensive perimeter around their command post. The mission of these patrols was to seek any enemy forces in the area that might engage the Rangers that night
on order to protect the bivouac area. At 1800 hours the 29th Reconnaissance Troop was attached to the 5th Ranger Infantry Battalion to assist them. D Company encountered enemy troops approximately one mile to the southeast of the command post in an area just west of Kerneis (MGRS 857963). They captured three enemy prisoners and the remainder of the reported thirty or so Germans withdrew. None of the other patrols encountered enemy forces on September 1. The Rangers took four casualties on September 1st. The casualties recorded in the Battalion Journal as S/Sgt William Harvey, Tech 5 Walter Schroh, Pfc Stanley Berger and Pfc Charles Robbins for the day. I believe these men were from A, C or E Companies as none of these men were listed as casualties in the B, D, F or HQ Company Morning Reports for the day. They were reported to have been evacuated to the 23rd Infantry Aid Station. The 23rd Infantry assaulted Brest from the east as part of the 2nd Infantry Division. Other Rangers would be reported to have been evacuated there in the coming days. The telephone code name for the battalion was “Marauder White.”
Figure 312 shows a map from a French book that I purchased called L’enfer de Brest; Henri Floch & Alain Le Berre; Heimdal Publishing. This map is important because it details the German defenses at Fort de Toulbroc’h. The layout of the fort’s defenses is critical in understanding the actions involved.
The 5th Ranger Infantry Battalion began the task of conducting reconnaissance of Fort de Toulbroc’h on Saturday, September 2 in the early morning. The four remaining companies of the battalion moved south from their bivouac positions in accordance with the Battalion mission to gain contact with the 116th Infantry Regiment, seal up their exposed flank, and straighten out the lines. The first task was to maneuver the companies into position to accomplish their assigned missions. In the early morning, F Company took up position east of Kerneis along Route de Mengant (MGRS 858960). This coastal road position overlooks a ravine. It allowed the company to stop any German counter-attack or reinforcement from the forts located further to the east. There was little German interference in the Company F movements. Early in the morning, B Company 1st Platoon commanded by Lt Stan Askin was ordered to a position just south of Lesconvel on the high ground at the head of a ravine leading to the coast. Lesconvel is located just south of D789, south of Locmaria-Plouzané. This position more or less allowed the platoon a view of the entire battlefield. Once there, they were to await further orders. They faced little resistance in their movements. D Company moved to a position west of Kerneis and prepared to hold (MGRS 852960) meeting little resistance. At 0948 hours on September 2, D Company, took three prisoners and reported a possible thirty additional Germans to capture located west of Kerneis (MGRS 852965). At 0948, the Battalion S-2 requested coordinates for a bomb line. By 1035 hours, D Company had moved west toward Kervaër (MGRS 843965) and reported no opposition. The 29th Infantry Division reported a new bomb line to the Rangers that ran east-west through the 955 grid reference line and east of the 84 grid reference line on the map at 1045 hours. By 1055 hours, D Company had captured two additional prisoners, and was trying to find the disposition of the enemy. At 1100 hours, B Company reported in that they were moving into position south of Lesconvel. D Company reported no change in their status at 1105 hours. At 1100, B Company reported that they would send new coordinates, finally reporting the coordinates of 842963 at 1111 hours. Company B also reported they were in position halfway between Lesconvel and Kervaër (MGRS 842963).
Company D had interrogated their POWs and reported back to Headquarters at 1130 hours that the prisoners reported 60 enemy soldiers at MGRS 860861 which is northwest of Kerneis and F Company’s position. At 1135 hours, B Company reported that three enemy soldiers ran into a dugout about 500 yards in front of their position. At the same time, D Company reported no change in their status.
At 1148 hours, B Company sent a recon patrol consisting of 2nd Platoon down the ravine to the beach. This is the ravine that is just northwest of Fort de Toulbroc’h north along the 84 grid reference line and ends up with two branches at its head, one near Languifor’ch and one north of Kervaër. The patrol encountered no opposition. The Battalion Unit Journal reported that “The second platoon of Company B; commanded by Lt Gambosi, was then ordered to make a reconnaissance in force of the draw running roughly along the 84 grid line.” At 1156 hours, B Company reported no change in status. At 1159 hours, D Company reported they were moving up (south) from their present position. Lt Gombosi was instructed to continue on plans as instructed, while keeping the Battalion Commanding Officer informed at 1204 hours. B Company, 2nd Platoon was to provide critical intelligence gathering concerning the fort.
B Company reported being shelled at 1215 hours. This reference to B Company was likely 1st Platoon. They had identified the firing positions of one of the guns to their right. Headquarters asked for the coordinates of the location under attack. At 1230 hours, B Company reported the location was the crossroads at the coordinates provided at 1130 hours. At 1305 hours, B Company was still being shelled. At 1327 hours, the Battalion received word from Companies A, C and E that they had expended 375 rounds of .30 caliber ammo and 14 rounds of 60 mm Mortar. Captain Wise had become a casualty. At 1329 hours, Company B sent a casualty back to the rear, but it is unknown who this man was or which platoon he was in. Two minutes later D Company reported no change to their status. B Company reported the artillery fire was lightening up at 1405 hours.
HQ sent a message at 1425 hours and asked B Company if they were advancing on the fort. B Company replied to HQ at 1430 hours that they were not advancing yet. Twenty-five minutes after that, Colonel Watson, Assistant Commander, 29th Infantry Division visited the 5th Ranger Infantry Battalion command post to check on progress. There was no change in status between B and D Companies through 1512 hours. Company B, 2nd Platoon had carried out its mission and gone into position in a ravine north of Kervaër at 1525 hours. D Company continued to report no change in status. At 1530 hours, the Battalion XO reported that C Company had not heard from the 23rd Infantry Regiment. He decided to withdraw the company from the front line. Companies B and D reported no additional changes in status through 1630 hours. During this time B Company, 2nd Platoon was moving in force down the ravine toward the beach. Arriving at the water at 1650 hours they reported they had reached the beach back to HQ (MGRS 841952). At this point, 2nd Platoon split into two elements. The first element was the 1st Section, under Lt. Gombosi who worked their way along the coastal road (trail) along the cliff bluff toward the fort. Gombosi would recon the position along this route to assess the defenses on the western edges of the fort.
The second element was 2nd Section under Section Leader S/Sgt Herbert Hull. He had been listed as the Platoon Sergeant by this date according to the September 4 Company B Morning Report. His section retraced their steps up the main ravine until they came to an east-west ravine leading to Kervaër. This patrol consisted of twelve men. Their mission was to recon the perimeter of the fort’s northwestern defenses (Randall Ching Interviews). They skirted the perimeter of the fort in accordance with their mission.
Back to the north, B Company, 1st Platoon under Lt. Stan Askin was ordered to relocate to more tactical position at the intersection of Route Kervaër and Route de Toulbroc’h (MGRS 847957) shown on the military maps as Road Junction 67 (RJ 67). The Road Junctions on the maps of the area are noted by numbers. “The numbers actually represent the altitude in meters above sea level. If you understand contours, you will see that the RJ numbers reflect the contour elevations.” (General Raaen – correspondence) Their orders were that upon receiving the signal, they would attack southward to the fort along Route de Toulbroc’h. Company D was moved to RJ 74 shown on the military maps at the intersection of Kerhallet Penandour Kerhoalac'h and Route de Toulbroc’h. Company D’s orders were to send one platoon south in support of Lt Askin, and to hold their other platoon in Battalion reserve. At 1750 hours, D Company reported meeting stiff resistance by the road junction just off Route 69 at MGRS 847957. At 1755 hours, B Company, 1st Platoon
reported meeting enemy forces in the direction of Company D to their north. These would be the same German forces engaging D Company reported five minutes earlier. Based on reports, the Germans were in force in a corridor between the fort itself, Kervaër, and Kerhallet Penandour Kerhoalac'h (Route 69). B Company, 2nd Platoon reported running into the enemy at 1810 hours north of Kervaër (MGRS 844958). Again these were probably the same German forces that had made contact with D Company and with B Company 1st Platoon earlier. D Company reported no change in their situation at 1830 hours. At 1903 hours, D Company reported that B Company, 1st Platoon was held up on Route de Toulbroc’h (MGRS 847959) by attacking Germans. Lt. Askin kept up the fight and continued south.
At some point during the next hour, Lt. Gombosi, having worked along the coastal trail reached the perimeter of the fort, I believe near the télémètre shown on the German defense map in Figure 312. This was just west of the pentagon shaped historic fort and just north of the northernmost gun batteries at the fort. The likely time Gombosi entered the fort was between 1845 hours and 1930 hours. The Battalion After Action Report recorded: “Lt Gombosi was in position just outside the fort. He requested permission to attack, since he had observed no enemy within. The permission was granted, and he advanced. At 1915 hours, HQ Company reported to the companies that one platoon of B Company was already in the fort area and gave orders to “Watch who you fire upon.” The approach along the cliffs were to the left of the fort pictured in Figure 313.
Figure 313: Fort de Toulbroc’h as seen from sea looking roughly northeast. Rangers approached along cliff to left (patrimoine.region-bretagne.fr) Recalling from Chapter 1, all that was previously known about S/Sgt Hull getting wounded was that a wire was tripped, he put his hand up and down, it went off but he was hit. He then reportedly lay in the field for three days before the medics got to him and he was put on a plane to England. The original note said that he got gangrene in the knee but that it got better. When presented with this information in 2012, General Raaen, began to vaguely recall and place the incident, allowing us to reconstruct the events that occurred. These recollections by Raaen led to his being able to assist me in placing S/Sgt Hull in B Company, 2nd Platoon. Eventually facts began to piece together as records were searched and stories collaborated. A major breakthrough came in 2013 when PFC Ching stepped forward with his information.