“That’s not urgent,” declared Abetz dismissively. “During the last twenty-four hours the military situation has changed radically. The German position is brilliant. We can discuss the prisoners later.”79
Nordling’s chest heaved with exasperation. Anyone knew that German hopes of victory were clutching at straws. Struggling to remain calm, Nordling pleaded for the principal of the ENS.
“That school,” Abetz replied in a hostile tone, “is a den of murderers. It ought to be burnt down. The Gestapo is much too lenient towards such people. I’ve heard from the Gestapo about this teacher and he won’t be released.”
“Well, I hope there won’t be a repetition of what happened at Caen,”80 replied Nordling. “[Your people] shot a hundred Frenchmen without trial!”
“Put your self in the place of the prison governor,” replied Abetz. “Ask yourself what you would do if you had over a thousand bandits to evacuate? … No evacuation could have happened with the required security. There was no alternative but to shoot them.”
As Abetz explained the brutal logic of Nazi thinking, Nordling breathed heavily. Moments later Abetz became more agreeable and consented to meet Nordling the following day.81
After further disappointment from Laval, Nordling approached Cardinal Suhard. Like many priests Suhard possessed a naive goodness which led him to make errors which tougher souls like Toulouse’s Archbishop Saliege or Adam Sapieha, the Polish Archbishop of Cracow, might have avoided; Henriot’s funeral being a good example. However, Nordling believed that Suhard had “great influence” over the Vichy government whereas Suhard probably reckoned his influence counted for very little. Nevertheless, wearing a black robe with red piping and a red skull cap, Suhard welcomed Nordling to 30 Rue Barbet-de-Jouy.* As Nordling catalogued the political prisoners sufferings and expounded his worries, the sixty-seven-year-old Suhard shook his white-haired head. “We agree on all these points,” said Suhard, taking Nordling’s hand. “Make use of me.”82
AROUND DAWN, AS GIRARD DROVE LECLERC to GT Dio’s positions at Meurcé, they came across a junior officer semi-catatonic after seeing comrades killed in action the previous day.
“You’re only thinking about burying your dead,” said Leclerc, before telling the young officer to pull himself together.
Leclerc was also deeply affected by seeing his men die, but such was the price of liberation. Nor was he concerned for his own safety; when a German soldier bolted across the road in front of them, Girard pressed on the accelerator, Maurois fired his Thompson into the bushes, but Leclerc merely laughed.83
German units around Alençon often consisted of “supply troops, maintenance platoons and tanks under repair”—well-worn Mk IVs from the Panzer Lehr Divison. Albeit exhausted along with their crews, their 75mm PAK guns outgunned most Allied tanks. Even though collapse stared them in the face, the Wehrmacht’s stern Feldgendarmerie threatened dishevelled soldiers with summary execution if they did not stand and fight. Field Marshal von Kluge, recognising the danger developing on his southern flank, ordered that panzerfausts should be issued to any soldier capable of using one.84
Near Dio’s PC several stationary vehicles were halted at a crossroads. “Why aren’t they moving?” asked Leclerc impatiently, tapping his cane on the ground. The rush of incoming shells and men ducking in ditches gave him his answer. The shellfire came from the 2e DB’s own artillery to the south. They had reached the limit of their artillery cover; meaning they were moving fast.
As the Germans fell back northwards into La Hutte, Captain Savelli’s reconnaissance detachment encountered a fresh roadblock. However, with the division advancing on every thoroughfare available, such obstacles were quickly circumvented. For Leclerc, however, the 2e DB’s progress still seemed too slow as bottlenecks developed along narrow sunken lanes. On the other hand, advancing over open ground was risky. The 12e Cuirassiers lost several Shermans between La Hutte and Fye. For mostly unblooded crews, seeing their tanks turned literally upside down, as happened to the Sherman Paimpol, was quite unnerving.
When the inhabitants of Fye imprudently rang their church bells to signal their liberation, German shells rained on the village, killing a twenty-one-year-old girl in the château park. Liberation meant more than throwing flowers at les Leclercs. The villagers gently removed every dead crewman from the 12e Cuirassiers’ destroyed Shermans, and gave them dignified funerals and burial in their own churchyard.85
Leclerc decided to lead GT Dio’s advance towards Champfleur from his command tank, Tailly. “Towards mid-day,” wrote Pierre Krebs, “we saw the general arrive, and the general did not look happy. He wasn’t discouraged, that was not his style; rather he looked exasperated seeing that the men around appeared both discouraged and cowed. There had been losses around Fye and Rouessé-Fontaine, where two squadrons of my regiment had been engaged. At this moment the general created what he called ‘sub-group Rouvillois’.” Chef d’escadrons (cavalry major), Rouvillois was a petit-co of Leclerc’s from Saint-Cyr. Leclerc’s steadying influence brought a good result, and soon villagers delightedly peeked out of their homes, offering cider and calvados. Leclerc nodded that his men could drink cider but not calvados.86
Alençon, the 2e DB’s first significant objective, remained ten kilometers to the north and, although the US 5th Armored Division made similar progress, Leclerc was anxious that his men were both seen in action and also remaining fit to march on Paris.
IN RESPONSE TO PIERRE LAVAL’S PROPOSALS, Abetz reported that Berlin would permit Edouard Herriot’s return to Paris to reconvene the National Assembly. Laval hoped this would reassure the eighty-seven mayors of the Department of the Seine. A sizeable proportion were left-wingers elected before 1939 who were nevertheless grateful to Pétain for the 1940 armistice. During the Occupation, they mostly acquitted themselves honourably: maintaining stability, ensuring food supplies and resisting unreasonable German demands. But several now feared being thought of as collabos, particularly those representing industrial areas with a hard left electorate. As strikes increased, they worried that escalating incidents might bring German reprisals, so news of Herriot’s impending release brought a sense of relief. Laval was back among them, just like the good old days, charming, reassuring, vulnerable, only wanting to maintain the republic’s institutions, to keep the peace and avoid civil war. Clapping and cheering, they avowed their confidence in him.87
12 August 1944
AT AROUND 2AM CHRISTIAN GIRARD was woken by an enemy shell whistling past and he kicked off his sleeping bag. The next shell set a half-track alight, illuminating other vehicles parked nearby, a gift for a German artillery observer. Other shells followed, indicating that a German mortar crew had targeted their position. Once shaken awake, Leclerc quickly deduced that they were that near the German frontline, a small advance would punch through it.
“Gachet,” Leclerc called. “Go and see what Colonel Noiret is up to.”88
Noiret’s sub-group had halted for the night at Saint-Gilles, merely three kilometres from Alençon. Given the proximity of the mortar crew that shelled them, Leclerc decided it was time to seize the initiative. Despite Boissieu’s advice to take the Scout Car, Leclerc jumped into Gachet’s Jeep and set off for Noiret’s position escorted by Sammarcelli’s M8s.89
The 12e Cuirassiers’ Captain Gaudet had halted his squadron after his men destroyed a formidable German artillery emplacement. They were exhausted; Gaudet himself crashed out in a dreamless slumber. Suddenly he was being shaken awake by his North African batman.
“Mon Cap’taine,” said Ait Abbat. “The General, he’s here.”
Leclerc looked down at him.
“Get going,” said Leclerc, smiling slightly. “Back on the road! We’re going to Alençon!”
“Everyone back in their tanks,” said Gaudet. “We’re leaving immediately.”90
Not for the last time that August, Leclerc found a young résistant offering his services as a guide. Nineteen-year-old Raymond Ciroux left Alenç
on the previous day. His two years as a clandestin included arrest by the Gestapo, but he escaped before being shot. Since Alençon and the forests to its north represented the southern “shoulder” of the pocket enveloping the German forces, one might have expected stronger defences. But Ciroux* confirmed Leclerc’s suspicions that German defences were patchy and that little stood between themselves and Alençon’s central Pont Neuf, which the Germans left unmined. Once his Chad infantry invested the area, Leclerc walked onto the bridge and held a conference with Crépin, Repiton-Préneuf and Guillebon, guarded by “Small”—the diminutive HQ bodyguard—with rifle and bayonet fixed.91
“Seal off all roads into Alençon,” Leclerc ordered.
From his new map room overlooked by a large portrait photograph of Pétain, Leclerc planned the 2e DB’s next attack, which, he feared, might upset his American superiors. Remnants of the 9th Panzer Division sheltering in the Forêt d’Écouves could only be an obstacle to XV Corps’ advance. The Americans’ planned air strike on the Forêt de Perseigne, east of Leclerc’s axis, suggests that neither the Americans nor Leclerc believed US 5th Armored Division would reach the pretty market town of Sées, east of the Forêt d’Écouves, as fast as they did. Leclerc, meanwhile, decided to envelope the Forêt d’Écouves from both sides. But elements of 5th Armored bypassing the Forêt de Perseigne met only light resistance, then advanced into Sées with sinking fuel gauges. Without proper liaison between the two armoured divisions an enormous traffic jam was inevitable. Leclerc, however, continued with his plan, giving Pierre Billotte his first combat orders since 1940.
“You’ve waited four years. Here’s your chance to avenge what the Germans did to you,” said Leclerc. Billotte’s battlegroup would pass through Sées and then north of the Forêt d’Écouves to cut the Nationale 24.92
Jacques Branet’s squadron was parked along roadsides south of Alençon when the order came. Heading northwards into the town they passed several 12e Cuirassiers Shermans, burnt out from the previous night’s fighting, calcinated bodies still in their hulls; a sickening reminder of the grim end awaiting unfortunate tank soldiers. Passing through Alençon, Branet saluted Leclerc at the bridge before turning northeast. They passed a burning German tank on the east side of the Forêt d’Écouves and in the distance a convoy of German vehicles rolled eastwards between unenclosed fields. Branet’s squadron fired, setting lorries and half-tracks alight. Soon Germans were surrendering and being passed to the rear.
Reaching Sées, with its attractive sandstone houses, elegant mairie and double-spired abbey, the 501e RCC was engulfed in an inter-divisional traffic jam with General Lunsford Oliver’s 5th Armored Division. Ecstatic townsfolk served cider as the carousel of olive green vehicles descended into chaos. Recognising the danger should the Germans counterattack, Branet was relieved to be ordered northwest towards Argentan. Even so, the crowd obstructed his departure. The Americans attributed the Sées traffic jam to Leclerc’s inexperience. GT Billotte has been accused of preventing 5th Armored from reaching Argentan before the 116th Panzer Division could prepare defences.93 Conversely, if Leclerc had kept his division west of the Forêt d’Écouves, there is nothing to say that 9th Panzer Division might not have attacked US 5th Armored’s west flank.
Leaving Sées, Branet recognised that 9th Panzer Division’s shellfire was too dangerous to be ignored. With tanks tail to tail along the road to Argentan, German anti-tank guns sited in the Forêt d’Écouves would have a field day unless dealt with. Led by Spahi armoured cars, Putz’s sub-group bounded into the forest’s north side, firing at any position capable of sheltering Germans until they reached the central Croix de Medavi. Soon Leclerc arrived in his command tank Tailly.
“Putz,” said Leclerc, “Infiltrate further south. Try to link up with Langlade. If you can’t, then relieve any pressures he’s facing.” Then he turned to Branet, “Branet, pursue only your original mission. Head for Écouché via Le Cercueil, La Bellière and Francheville. If darkness suspends your mission, hole up in a village, but tell me. Do your best.”
Branet returned to his squadron to give the order to turn about.94
Led by Elias’ platoon, la Nueve headed northwest towards Saint-Christophe-le-Jajolet, several kilometres north of the Forêt d’Écouves. A small show of German resistance obstructing their path was scattered by a burst from the lead half-track’s .50-cal machine-gun. Two Germans were killed while another six surrendered. In the village itself Elias’ men captured vehicles carrying exhausted German infantry who gladly surrendered. For another hour Dronne and Buis carried all before them until meeting resistance at the hamlet of Vieux-Bourg. After pausing to evacuate prisoners and wounded, they found by 3pm that they were five kilometres south of Argentan.95
German resistance became tougher, inflicting several losses on Commandant Buis’ Shermans. Dronne’s Spaniards dismounted their half-tracks to guide Buis’ remaining tanks down winding lanes. By nightfall Dronne and Buis were on the outskirts of Écouché, surveying gentle slopes of wheat fields and sumptuous green meadows. A few hundred metres northeast a long traffic jam of German vehicles, bumper to bumper, was fleeing the closing Allied pincers. Forming up in a line, Dronne’s Spaniards in their half-tracks and Buis’ Shermans advanced, firing all the way. “It was the most incredible butchery that I had ever seen,” remembered José Cortés. “German vehicles were thrown in the air like dismembered toys. Those who were further away, on seeing that they didn’t stand a chance stopped immediately and put their hands up.” But a large German armoured car rushed towards them firing furiously. Keeping steady, Dronne’s Spaniards turned their heavy machine-guns on the advancing Panzerspähwagen, putting it out of action, killing two of its crew and capturing the rest.96
On reaching Tanville, Branet re-organised his column. He had, in his own words, “the best mission a cavalry officer could ever be given”. He placed Vézy’s armoured cars up front; he himself would follow in a Jeep followed by Christen’s troop of Shermans, the Hartsmann-Willerkopf, Yser, Grand-Couronné, Mort-Homme and Douaumont. Lieutenant Davreux’s troop of Stuarts followed behind. The first enemy they encountered was a horse-drawn battalion bath unit which surrendered without fuss. “What does one do with them?” Branet wondered. They were disarmed and waved to the rear.97
Two kilometres further on Branet came upon a German ambulance convoy carrying three hundred. He left a Stuart light tank to shepherd these prisoners behind barbed wire. Passing the northwest corner of the Forêt d’Écouves they found a troop of German armoured cars endeavouring to sit out the battle under camouflage. They surrendered quickly. After destroying their tyres with a Thompson, Branet ordered these prisoners to the rear. “Run,” yelled Branet, pointing southeast.98
Approaching the village of Francheville they spotted a heavy German column to their west. Instinctively, without needing an order, every machine-gun and cannon turned towards them and fired. The murderous action only lasted a few seconds. Getting down from Hartsmann-Willerkopf, Christen was joined by sergeants Bernard from the Mort-Homme and Bizien from the Douaumont. Walking jubilantly along the shot-up German column, they found four abandoned Panther tanks.99
AMERICAN HISTORIAN MARTIN BLUMENSON thought that Leclerc’s sending Billotte’s battlegroup east of the Forêt d’Écouves was possibly motivated by “je m’en foutisme”—a don’t give a damn attitude—and competitiveness towards his allies even if it meant scuppering an operation. Yet Leclerc’s history since 1940 supports the contrary argument that he was parsimonious with his men’s lives and, like everyone else, wanted to get home.100
In any case, Blumenson also concedes that XV Corps’ lunge northwards was risky enough. Its exposed west flank was vulnerable to any German general with the means to strike at it. XV Corps advanced beyond the notional halt line, and Haislip was uncertain what kind of German strength he would face in Argentan.101
British and Canadian troops fighting southwards towards Falaise faced the German Seventh Army’s front rather than its soft
er rear; consequently they made slower progress. Many units in Montgomery’s 21st Army Group had already had a long war. Furthermore, his flamboyant manner aside, Montgomery’s command style was more that of a diligent planner than a beau sabreur. The “British effort seems to have [bogged] itself in timidity and succumbed to the legendary Montgomery vice of over-caution,” wrote Bradley’s ADC, Chet Hansen.
Both Bradley and Eisenhower knew what was going on with Haislip’s XV Corps on 12 August. “I made no major move without consulting him [Eisenhower],” Bradley later wrote. “On the afternoon of 12 August, as Haislip’s forces closed on the ‘boundary’ near Argentan, Ike came to my CP to monitor Haislip’s progress, and he remained through dinner.”102
That evening, Haislip reported to Patton that he was reasonably confident of possessing Argentan by mid-day on 13 August. Aware that SHAEF wished ground forces to avoid crossing bomb-lines, Haislip also asked Patton whether an advance north of Argentan was authorised. If this was the case, Haislip would have gladly continued, but he also reminded Patton that XV Corps was becoming too thinly spread to resist German forces determined to avoid encirclement.103
The idea of two armoured divisions, one French, advancing to close the gap undoubtedly appealed to Patton’s sense of l’audace. He ordered Haislip to continue advancing towards Argentan before updating Bradley on the situation. “We have troops in Argentan,” Patton told Bradley. This was not true, though Patton soon expected it to be. Bradley, having learnt from an Ultra decrypt that the encircled Germans were preparing an eastward surge to avoid being trapped, replied, “Nothing doing.”
While Patton listened dumbfounded, Bradley explained his fears of friendly fire casualties as the Americans met up with the British and Canadians—something that never bothered the Russians when they encircled Stalingrad. “To have driven pell-mell into Montgomery’s line of advance could easily have resulted in a disastrous error of recognition. In halting Patton at Argentan, however, I did not consult Montgomery. The decision to stop Patton was mine alone; it never went beyond my CP,” Bradley later wrote.104 At 10.40pm Patton gave Haislip the order to halt where he was and consolidate his existing positions to face the threat from his left flank.
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