Hitler’s counterattack did not materialise. German morale was collapsing with tanks being abandoned even before they ran out of petrol, and soldiers often preferring to surrender than to continue fighting in a useless cause. The Feldgendarmerie established “catch lines” to gather up Hitler’s dishevelled soldiery and reform them into usable formations. Pushing into the “pocket”, 2e DB patrols often encountered small battle units consisting of Luftwaffe, Wehrmacht and SS personnel.125 Two British officers who drove through the pocket in a Jeep told Langlade that they saw the insignia of up to twenty German divisions on abandoned vehicles. These divisions included the Atlantic Wall’s non-élite personnel who were hopelessly outclassed when facing the Allied onslaught.126
For Spahi Commandant Roumiantzoff, the sight of US artillery shells exploding in Argentan’s southern banlieues, which straddled several main roads essential to the Germans’ retreat before sheltering in the Forêt de Gouffern to the east, fired his lust for action. Born a White Russian, Roumiantzoff was fiercely patriotic for his adopted country. When he called for volunteers for a raiding party, enough men came forward to crew three M8 armoured cars. They penetrated Argentan via the railway bridge, quickly coming upon German troops. Firing their machine-guns at any target that presented itself, the Germans were too surprised to fire back. On the Spahis drove, firing at everything, sewing panic until they reached the town centre. Even there, among the massive clutter of a routed army, no one fired back. They stopped outside the mairie, climbed the tower and hoisted the Tricolore. The Germans reacted by sending Panthers into central Argentan. But the Panther crews could not engage the Spahi M8s without endangering more German soldiers.127
At noon Leclerc’s CP was inundated with urgent messages that a battlegroup from 116th Panzer Division under Hauptmann Jess was hiding in the Bois de la Perdrière northwest of the Forêt d’Écouves. Consisting of at least four tanks, half a dozen Hanomags and armoured cars, Jess’s force ventured out from its woody lair like a conger eel to keep the Nationale 808 open for German troops struggling to escape the pocket. For over twenty-four hours Jess was a demon in GT Langlade’s rear, harassing every sub-group until eventually he ran out of petrol. Deciding to die like Napoleon’s Old Guard, Jess formed his vehicles into a square which was obliterated by artillery.128
Around Écouché, GT Billotte faced remnants of the 2nd Panzer Division feeling their way to the pocket’s opening, trying to avoid trouble. Though moving quietly, they ran straight into a sector held by Granell’s platoon of la Nueve. Dronne ordered Montoya’s platoon to reinforce Granell, supported by a troop of Spahi M8s and a troop of 501e RCC Shermans. Once within range the German column came under murderous fire. When the action ended Dronne interrogated the injured commander of a Panzer Mk IV. “This defeated and dying fanatic was the symbol of what we were fighting,” wrote Dronne. “To veteran Republicans of the war in Spain, veterans of Free France and French youngsters, recently recruited, he represented the true enemy. We could only hate such fanaticism. But at the same time we could not help feeling a grudging respect for his courage.”129
For Dronne, waiting at Argentan seemed extraordinary. “The High Command lacked audacity,” he wrote in his carnets. “The Americans were very cautious and very slow. Their only top soldier who truly had the dash and mentality for using armoured forces was Patton.”130
But neither Bradley nor Montgomery believed their forces were strong enough to close the gap. Whichever divisions performed that deed risked getting chewed up; the last thing Leclerc wanted to happen to the 2e DB.
15 August 1944
CHURCHILL SAW NO REASON FOR IT, but Eisenhower insisted that Operation Dragoon should go ahead. When the inhabitants of France’s Cote d’Azur awoke on the Feast of the Assumption they saw an invasion fleet bobbing at anchor in the August morning sunshine, carrier-based Hellcats whizzing overhead, and grey landing craft disgorging troops along Fréjus’ expansive beaches. General Jacob Devers’ US 6th Army Group was coming ashore. It consisted of General Alexander Patch’s US Seventh Army and General Jean de Lattre de Tassigny’s French First Army—the old Armée d’Afrique—including the 1e and 5e DBs which, like Leclerc’s 2e DB, were entirely equipped by the US rearmament programme.
While the Normandy front sucked most German troops northwards, Devers Army Group landed mostly unopposed. Recently installed heavy-duty defences, like those commanding the salt-flats at Hyères, were quickly circumvented. Some landing places were peaceful enough for hoteliers to offer drinks as the troops came ashore, resulting in Operation Dragoon sometimes being called “the Champagne Campaign”. Inland the sun-drenched village squares of la France profonde found another reason to ring their church bells aside from the ancient Christian festival and processions led by statues of the Madonna.
NORTH OF THE FORÊT D’ÉCOUVES, throughout the previous night, prisoners kept coming in. For Raymond Dronne their eclectic provenance, “confirmed that the greatest confusion reigned in the Germans’ ranks, that every unit had become mixed up and suffered enormous losses, that Allied aircraft attacked them incessantly”.131
German theatre commander Field Marshal von Kluge spent the night at a small château with Sepp Dietrich’s I SS Panzer Corps HQ. “Most unpleasant,” said Kluge, describing the worsening German position. That morning he drove into the pocket to evaluate the situation for himself; and lost contact with OKW for most of the day.132 His radio messages to OKW, begging to withdraw to the Argentan-Falaise line, were picked up by Ultra and sent to General Bradley, who now doubted his decision to close the pocket further east. In fact Bradley worried more than he needed; Allied intelligence consistently over-rated German strength.133
Somehow German signals intelligence heard Allied radio traffic asking after von Kluge’s whereabouts; intercepts which convinced Hitler that Kluge was trying to contact the Allies. According to Kluge’s son in law, Dr. Udo Esche, Kluge considered surrendering on 15 August and “went to the front lines but was unable to get in touch with the Allied commanders”. Since Montgomery’s intelligence chief warned that some kind of offer might come from Kluge, Hitler’s suspicions were realistic.134
Meanwhile, in a field outside Montmerrei, among camouflaged vehicles, the 2e DB’s senior chaplain Père Houchet set up a makeshift altar to celebrate Assumption Day. Leclerc’s staff stood in the front row. With the Normandy campaign almost over and news of the Provence landings on everyone’s lips, Leclerc’s men speculated about Paris.
“Are we going to let the Americans go into Paris before us?”135
Leclerc pursed his lips. At his Fleuré CP an American broadcast unit caught up with him.
“How does it feel to be back in France?”
“How can we explain our feelings after stepping onto the soil of la Patrie a few days ago?” Leclerc replied, “This soil that we left four years ago, leaving France under the boot of the enemy, with all that this means to each and every one of us. We have returned as combatants after struggling for four years under General de Gaulle. We are rediscovering the faces of our fellow countrymen who salute us enthusiastically from the midst of their ruins. We can only guess what they have suffered. In the name of my officers, my non-commissioned officers and my men, my first duty is to salute those French who never despaired, who helped our allies, facilitating our victory. I admire them and congratulate them. For ourselves, the end is in sight as we come at last to take part beside them in the great fight for our liberation. Vive la France! ”136
Two hundred kilometres east, at Warlus in the Department of the Somme, Madame la comtesse Thérèse de Hauteclocque137 and her children were approaching the village square, intending to decorate the church for the evening’s big Assumption service, when she was hailed by the proprietress of a small restaurant. Leclerc’s broadcast was on the radio. The fact that Thérèse’s husband had become the famous General Leclerc was a longstanding open secret. Despite intermittent threats of eviction from the Vichy authorities, nothing happened beyond some ugly i
ncidents. Although she had a sporadic correspondence with her husband while he was in Africa, this was the first time she had heard his voice since he left her to join de Gaulle in 1940.138
Unaware that among the millions of French citizens hearing his broadcast was his beloved wife, Leclerc returned to division business. After General Haislip arrived to update Leclerc on Patton’s latest decisions, General Gerow’s premature visit to Langlade’s CP made sense. The 2e DB and the US 90th Infantry Division were to stay where they were. Girard watched the effect of this news upon Leclerc. Though Haislip remained a friend to Leclerc for months to come, nevertheless, “The General is furious,” wrote Girard.139
“I have a mission to accomplish for you,” Leclerc told Haislip, “but I have another in my pocket.”140
Leclerc drafted a letter to General Patton: “I wish to make clear the following to you. My officers and my men were persuaded by the Allied command that, after going to such pains to transport us from Africa to England and then to France, after we have been placed under your orders, you could not possibly refuse us the great recompense for us French, of being the first into Paris. We are ready to do whatever you ask of us, but to see other comrades return in our place into our capital city would, for my officers and men, be the greatest disappointment you could possibly impose upon us. We don’t want anything else and don’t want more than twenty-four hours, because both before and after we wish to fight under your orders. If this honour is refused us, I would ask of you that I am relieved of my command.”141
Then Leclerc ordered one of his division’s Piper Cub aircraft to take him to Patton’s HQ where Bradley was conferring with Patton over the situation developing around Argentan. Fulminating, Leclerc gave Patton his letter.
“Stop conducting yourself like a child, General!” said Patton. “I do not accept that divisional commanders tell me where they want to fight. In any case, apart from anything else, I’ve left you in the most dangerous place.”
Patton also pointed out that other armoured division commanders were equally frustrated.
“You see Wood?” said Patton in French, referring to the commander of US 4th Armored Division. “He’s even more fed up than you are.”
Witnessed by Bradley, Patton reassured Leclerc that the 2e DB was earmarked to go into Paris, the question being when.142
Patton later wrote that he told Leclerc “in my best French that he was a baby!” However, Patton also wrote, “We parted as friends.”143
The southern shoulder of the pocket was a ringside seat for watching the German rout. “Above all,” wrote Paul Repiton-Préneuf, the 2e DB’s chief intelligence officer, “there was the surge coming from the west, this flood of units en sauve qui peut, ignorant of their situation, who came crashing into our positions. Some of them pulled themselves together, gathered up their equipment and mounted attacks; Carrouges, Boucé and Écouché were hit hard. We stopped them, then we ceased firing for the pleasure of going forward and gathering up prisoners. We saw there remnants of seven or eight divisions, including Waffen SS personnel.”144
At Carrouges, Leclerc’s longest serving battle-group commander, Louis Dio, had a whole German battalion parade past him into captivity.
“I hope we’ll soon be going to Paris,” remarked young Wallerand de Hauteclocque while dining at his uncle’s CP.
“Mais, moi aussi! ” replied Leclerc, smiling. “I would like to go there too!”145
FROM 15 AUGUST THE PARIS POLICE WENT ON STRIKE. Two days previously the Germans disarmed the Gardiens de la Paix in the Asnières and Saint-Denis regions. When news of this reached Paris the three police resistance groups, Front National de Police, Police et Patrie and Honneur de la Police, met at a house in the 3rd Arrondissement’s Rue Chapon to discuss their predicament; if the police were on strike, keeping their weapons with them, then the Germans could hardly disarm them. Several senior non-police résistants were also present, including André Carrel and Roger Prou-Valjean from the CPL and Colonel Henri Rol-Tanguy who was invited by Serge Lefranc.146 All parties supported the strike but were nevertheless concerned that such action might enable the Milice to supplant the police. When the SD disarmed the police of Clermont-Ferrand, Milice leader Joseph Darnand advised them to submit to German demands. In Paris there was little sign that senior police officers would resist. Edmond Hennequin, collabo director general of the Municipal Police, ordered the Gardiens de la Paix of Paris to continue as usual while offering reassurance that the German measure only applied to units like the Gendarmerie and the Garde Mobile who had automatic weapons. “You can calm your men,” SS Major Neifeind told Amédée Bussière. “They will neither be disarmed nor arrested.”147
After the grim events involving the Milice at the Santé prison during July, and noticing that the Gestapo and other German security organisations were preparing to leave, Police résistants were unconvinced. When Hennequin drew up an order to be read out in all police stations at evening assembly, appealing to their sense of duty just as Langeron had done in 1940, but finishing with “No defiance will be tolerated”, his words fell on deaf ears. The police were collabos no longer.148
“This decision was very important and satisfied me unreservedly,” Rol-Tanguy later told Roger Bourderon. “It placed the Paris Police alongside the FFI and lifted the worry of an eventual conflict between them. I understood perfectly the objections of some of my comrades like André Tollet and André Carrel regarding the Police, but I did not share it because I reckoned that in the decisive hours that lay ahead we had to do everything to be on the same side. In any case they had already shown some willingness; despite orders they did nothing to intervene against the demonstrations on 14 July. That was an encouraging sign.”149
Emboldened by this development, Rol-Tanguy called upon all law enforcement organisations, including the prison service, to stand beside the Resistance and refuse all German orders. The strike order was drawn up and distributed. It announced that “Those Policemen who do not obey this strike order will be regarded as traitors and collaborators.” Further down it also said, “On no account should our comrades allow themselves to be disarmed.”150
An open statement was issued simultaneously to the people of Paris. “We know the mistrust of the people of Paris for the Paris police. We patriotic policemen have also greatly suffered from this situation. The proof now exists that the people of Paris have no reason to doubt that their police can be found today at the vanguard of combat for the liberation. The only word of greeting is ‘Action’. A general strike is now in force among the Paris police until the liberation.”151
Amédée Bussière faced a fait accompli. “I was beset by all sorts of worries,” he wrote. “The Germans are there, never too late to intervene. But with what? The SS commander telephoned me. The exchange was very lively but he [Neifeind] seemed to have other preoccupations; he was constantly being interrupted by officers asking for instructions about evacuating their offices in the Rue de Saussaies. ‘It’s a bad business for you,’ said Neifeind. ‘The Military Governor of Paris is going to call you. You should give him an explanation. He will appreciate it.’”152
At the Hôtel Meurice, Bussière was greeted coolly and correctly. General von Choltitz recognised the situation’s seriousness, however much Bussière minimised it, and threatened “to take the most rigourous measures”. Bussière replied ineffectually that he would find a way to stop the strike spreading and have meetings in the six areas most affected. Von Choltitz seemed satisfied. But although the striking policemen gave Bussière a warm welcome, worn-out arguments about service and patriotism made no impression on men sickened by performing tasks that benefited the Germans.153
By late afternoon the Milice were stirring. A squad of Miliciens was sent from their temporary barracks at the Lycée Saint-Louis to take over the 5th Arrondissement’s central station near the Pantheon. After locking up a few strikers they appointed themselves as the locality’s new police force. Only a call from Bussière himself got the str
iking policemen released.154 By mid-evening on 15 August, the strike was in force across the whole city.
That same day Pierre Laval’s machinations to form a transitional government around Edouard Herriot became enmeshed with the police resistance group L’Honneur de la Police, who plotted to “rescue” Herriot and bring him under their protection. Alexandre Parodi and Georges Bidault agreed that police résistants were the perfect choice to perform this operation. Yves Bayet prepared plans and ordered a team under Sergeant Fournet to stand by. But after finalising the operation’s details with Alexandre Parodi and Georges Bidault at a café on the Place de Breteuil, Sergeant Fournet felt troubled. What if Herriot refused to co-operate? “We kill him,” suggested a colleague of Fournet’s who also attended the meeting. But, preferring to avoid endorsing a political killing comparable with the murder of Jean Jaurez on the eve of liberation, Bidault and Parodi vetoed the operation.155 This resulted in Sergeant Fournet impatiently hanging around for instructions; frustrating moments which influenced his decision making four days later.
With family loyalties split across every facet of French politics at this time, someone, somehow alerted André Enfière, Laval’s confidant (and supposed contact with OSS*), of the operation, and Laval placed extra security around Herriot. Thereafter the only way the Resistance could contact Herriot was through his old chef de cabinet who could still get into the Hôtel de Ville; he told Herriot that the Resistance could access parliamentary records and so knew which deputies and senators supported Pétain in 1940.156
As previously arranged, Nordling visited the Matignon around 5pm. Laval appeared tired and drawn while openly continuing a telephone conversation regarding Pétain’s destiny. When Pétain refused to come to Paris, Laval advised him to lose himself in la France profonde. But since the maquis controlled much of central France that option was unviable. “Tell the guards to hold on for twenty-four hours,” said Laval. “I will send my cabinet secretary with a car. It will be followed by two other cars carrying armed guards as well as my own luggage and my dog.” Putting down the receiver Laval turned to Nordling. Although he had been unable to speak to Abetz about the “politicals”‘ Abetz was due at the Matignon later that evening.
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