Chaired by Alexandre Parodi, the Delegation and COMAC debriefed Chaban-Delmas following his return from London. General Hary, whose role was to assume command of all police, security and fire services, was concerned that COMAC intended the insurrection to begin as soon as possible, and Chaban-Delmas’ advice, that the Paris FFI (P1) should avoid acting prematurely, was exactly what Hary wanted to hear. Furthermore, when Chaban-Delmas met General Gaffey, then Patton’s deputy, on 13 August near Le Mans, before bicycling to Paris, Gaffey told him the Allies would not reach Paris for another fortnight. COMAC wanted their uprising, while the GPRF’s representatives advised them to wait.35
Although Jean de Vogüé now inclined to Chaban’s viewpoint, COMAC’s other two leaders protested: “If you wait too long you will let the opportunity pass us by.”
“If you go too soon you will compromise everyone and expose the city’s population to the risk of a massacre,” said the Delegation.
Furthermore the number of available weapons had barely improved since July. Rol-Tanguy liked to think they had over two thousand three hundred armed men out of twenty thousand willing résistants, while Colonel Lizé, the chief of the FFI’s Seine Department, put the figure more conservatively at no more than two thousand, which meant a weapon for one man in ten. Arming the rest required enough weapons for an infantry division; which could hardly be wrested from the enemy.36
“The military delegates who pretend to command Paris in the name of Koenig’s petulant staff in London know that we only have four heavy machinguns,” FTP leader Charles Tillon said angrily. “Of the seventy-seven thousand appalling little sub-machinguns, those cheaply produced Stens, sent by SOE in London, only a hundred and fourteen have reached us here.”37
Commandant Dufresne (Raymond Massiet), representing the Department of the Seine, gave a more detailed resumé of the weapons situation. Of the four heavy machine-guns, one was an old Hotchkiss with limited ammunition. Of the so-called machine-guns, around twenty were either British Brens or the equivalent French MAT 29. There were only 562 rifles, of which many were only hunting calibres, and a lot of pistols.38 This meant that the only armed force in Paris of any size was the Police. Even then, initiating an insurrection without the Allies being considerably closer would be a grave error. Parodi preached caution.39
When COMAC, the CPL and CNR reconvened elsewhere for further discussions, André Tollet offered the text of a proposed affiche calling Parisians to arms, but Leo Hamon insisted this was premature without more weapons. Colonel Ély, representing Parodi, continued to recommend prudence. COMAC, however, remained committed to an armed insurrection aimed at hampering the Wehrmacht’s retreat. While Parodi continued to advise prudence, Georges Bidault recognised that COMAC could not be held back and that it would be impossible to separate the rest of the Resistance—or Parisians generally—from these hotheads if they went ahead.40
18 August 1944
ON THE FOLLOWING MORNING, COMAC, THE CPL AND CNR met again in a modest apartment in Vanves. For the FTP and communists, it was imperative to launch an insurrection as soon as possible. Much of the Parisian Left consisted of the city’s ancillary and industrial workers. For several days they had witnessed the Germans departing with everything they could carry. Supposing that German looting became demolition not only of fine buildings but water and sewage works, gas and electricity stations, meant that then, as always, the working class would suffer most. If the Germans were forced to leave Paris “avec l’épée dans les reins”—“with the sword at their kidneys”—they would have fewer opportunities to demolish the place. In Rol-Tanguy’s view, lack of weapons was insufficient reason for failing to act; Allied weapons supply should have been more generous. He had been asking them for long enough.41
“The time has come to launch the insurrection,” said Rol-Tanguy. “If you won’t join us, we’ll go it alone.”
“But what about weapons?” came the predictable question from Leo Hamon, who remained a moderating influence.
“We’ve got six hundred,” replied Rol-Tanguy, smiling slightly.
“That seems to me a bit weak for launching any word of an order for insurrection,” replied Hamon.42
Even then André Tollet thought Rol-Tanguy overestimated how many weapons he had. “He wasn’t even sure himself,” Tollet later told Francis Crémieux.
“Weapons? One would simply have to find them. One could take them from the enemy; once the start-time for the insurrection was decided, the enemy would be on his back foot.”43
Rol-Tanguy had already drafted and printed a general mobilisation order, ready to paste up around Paris. Other affiches, produced by the CGT and CFTC, calling for a general strike, were also appearing. According to André Tollet, paralysing industrial action was more what the CPL had in mind than an armed insurrection. Pierre Bourget writes that armed insurrection was never agreed with the CPL. So had the “extremists” among the Resistance forced the hand of others?44
Long regarded as the hot-head responsible for the Paris insurrection, Henri Rol-Tanguy is often quoted as saying, “Paris is worth two or three hundred thousand dead!” as though he would gladly have provoked a blood-bath. After the war, however, Rol-Tanguy protested vehemently that he never said such a thing.* His biographer Roger Bourderon emphasises that Rol-Tanguy, who maintained connections to both the Americans and Resistance groups elsewhere, fully understood the risks they might be running and did his best to mitigate them. Two days previously Lieutenant Mallet, an FFI officer from Brittany, arrived at Rol-Tanguy’s Malakoff hideout to establish a link with Paris. Such initiatives were not unusual even among left-wing résistants.45 That same day, Rol-Tanguy ordered Commandant de Varreux (nom de guerre: Brécy) to reach the Allied lines. As an FFI intelligence officer, de Varreux was well qualified to update the Americans on events in Paris and how they could support the insurrection when it began. Tragically Brécy never reached the Allies; nearing Étampes his vehicle was shot up by an Allied aircraft. Unfortunately Rol-Tanguy and his staff did not find out for some time. Brécy took several hours to die but, before he did, he told some résistants to send a message to London requesting that a radio liaison team be sent to Paris.46 Hence Rol-Tanguy’s decision-making before unleashing the insurrection was perhaps more responsible than has previously been recognised.
Rol-Tanguy’s lair in Malakoff was inadequate for the forthcoming days of action, so new premises were found at 66 Rue de Meaux in the 19th Arrondissement, an elegant street dominated by the usual Parisian seven-storey terrace buildings comprising apartments over shops and businesses. It was not quite central but the communications were good enough. Other resistance offices were also concealed there.47
DE GAULLE’S ORDER FOR INSURRECTION in all large cities had reached the Delegation. So too had Charles Luizet, who arrived in Paris the previous day. A dark, bespectacled man in his early forties, Luizet’s role was to replace Amedée Bussière as Prefect of Police. Luizet had been at Saint-Cyr with Leclerc but subsequently turned towards the diplomatic and admininstrative side of soldiering, finding himself an attaché in Tangier when France fell in 1940. Hit by the same “gut refusal” as other early Free Frenchmen, Luizet immediately placed himself unconditionally at de Gaulle’s disposal. His first instructions were to remain at his post to assure liaison with Frenchmen arriving as refugees in French North Africa. Next he created an intelligence réseau running agents on General Charles Nogues’ staff, thereby providing the London French with useful intelligence.48 After the Torch landings Luizet became de Gaulle’s new Prefect of the Tiaret region. Next, Luizet’s burgeoning track record ensured his appointment as Prefect to newly liberated Corsica.49
Luizet took off from Croydon on 2 August expecting to land at a secret airstrip in the Ain. But though the RAF pilot searched for landing lights, none were visible, so the flight continued to Corsica while a possible betrayal of the Ain Maquis was investigated. From Corsica, Luizet went to Algiers, then Italy. Hence Luizet only arrived in Paris on 17 Augu
st, sharing a lorry with Francis-Louis Closon, de Gaulle’s new Regional Commissioner for the North. While being shaved in a barber’s shop, Luizet learnt that the police were on strike. Meeting Parodi, Luizet aired de Gaulle’s concerns that either Laval’s machinations might outwit the Resistance or the FTP and COMAC might frustrate the GPRF’s efforts to reinstate the Republic. Luizet and Parodi agreed that, until Leclerc arrived in Paris, they should secure as many government buildings as possible. In the meantime a split in the Resistance had to be avoided. Concerns that the FTP and COMAC might act prematurely were superseded now that de Gaulle had given his own insurrection orders; they could not be held back much longer.50
Jacques Chaban-Delmas sent a message to General Koenig in London. “In Paris all the preparatory conditions for insurrection exist. Local incidents are on the rise, whether they are provoked by the enemy or even by impatient Resistance groups who’ve had enough of their troubles along with bloody reprisals on which the Germans seem able to decide and carry out. The disappearance of the Police due to their strike can only facilitate the unleashing of the insurrection. In consequence, if the military situation permits, it is necessary that you should intervene with the Allies to demand the rapid occupation of Paris. If this is impossible it is urgent in the first place to warn us by cable so that we can act accordingly; in the second place to warn the population officially via the BBC in order to avoid another Warsaw. Quartus (Parodi) and Algebre (General Ély) are in agreement with me on all these points. Respects. Signed Arc (Chaban-Delmas).”51
At de Gaulle’s request Allied aircraft dropped leaflets over Paris. Entitled Tous les Fronts (All Fronts), the first page read, “Here is the news. The French authorities in Algiers communicate to the French population the following instructions: In Brittany all Frenchmen must co-operate with the FFI in destroying any enemy groups and isolated garrisons who try to rejoin those ports still in enemy hands or to disengage towards the east. Government employees should take their orders from those authorities trusted by the Resistance and who are the representatives of the Provisional Government of the French Republic. Special instructions will be given for Paris and the Paris area. Join the FFI, follow the advice of their officers: the national uprising is the prelude to the Liberation.”
On the second page of this leaflet there was a photograph captioned “Un vrai de vrai—Leclerc!” (“The real thing—Leclerc!”), showing the 2e DB commander with his men, “who are actually fighting west of the Seine”.52
THAT AFTERNOON, WHILE BEING DRIVEN along the Rue le Sueur past that flamboyant cul de sac, the Place Avenue du Bois, Nordling saw SS armoured cars escorting a smart open topped coupé in which sat Karl Oberg accompanied by a buxom German woman whom Nordling assumed was his cook. The car was loaded with provisions and two SS rode shotgun. Nordling found it a repulsive spectacle.53
Nordling spent those last twenty-four hours before the Insurrection negotiating with prison directors. Soon Fresnes’ only inmates were German soldiers on disciplinary charges. At Romainville, however, things remained problematic; the uncooperative Major Achenbach saying he could not obey General von Choltitz since he was linked to 20 July. Although this accusation was probably based on SS gossip, it was also true.54
In all, however, 3,363 prisoners had been released. Of these, 963 were released by Amedée Bussière on orders from Laval shortly before he left the Matignon. The rest owed their freedom to Raoul Nordling and the supporting efforts of Swiss Consul René Naville. To these totals must be added eight hundred and fifty inmates of a prison train halted at Péronne whose commander accepted the Nordling-Huhm convention without demur. Many of these résistants would fight again in the coming days.55
But Nordling had not given up on Romainville. Early on 19 August von Choltitz sent staff Colonel Heigen to confront Achenbach. Heigen’s authority immediately secured Nordling’s entry to the main compound where the prisoners seemed reasonably healthy. Once again, however, the Georgian SS guards appeared drunk and unpredictable, exacerbating Nordling’s concern for the women and children. Like many Hôtel Meurice staff, Heigen was no Nazi and sufficiently unimpressed by Achenbach and his Georgians to threaten them with transfer to the Eastern Front. Heigen also reminded Achenbach that, following Oberg’s departure, he came under General von Choltitz’s authority. Even then Achenbach insisted on seeing an order signed by Choltitz himself. Nordling and Heigen immediately visited the Hôtel Meurice where von Choltitz signed the order they needed. They returned to Romainville followed by ambulances. The Georgians, clearly nettled by Heigen’s threat, fired warning shots, but Nordling was undeterred and soon controlled the jail. But he had less luck at the Hôpital de Saint-Denis where SS guards warned him off while herding their prisoners to a railway siding. Himmler had personally ordered the train’s departure. Many of these prisoners died en route to Germany, but Nordling had done all he could. He would soon play his greatest role yet.56
* Rol-Tanguy told Francis Crémieux that this story originated with the book Is Paris Burning? by Larry Collins and Dominique Lapierre, which came out in the 1960s.
Chapter 5
Marianne Rises, 18–21 August
18 August 1944 (continued …)
AT 11PM, ON A NIGHT AS DARK AS INK, Paul de Langlade arrived at Leclerc’s CP at Fleuré. Gaffey’s attack, Gribius told him, was on again, albeit in a revised form. Langlade’s men would act as flank guard for US 90th Infantry Division’s push towards Chambois, Sainte-Eugénie and Aubry-en-Exmès. GT Langlade would advance towards Omméel east of Chambois, and prevent German traffic from using the D13 and D16 highways to reach Rouen’s Seine crossings.
“What about Paris?” asked Langlade.
“It’s very much on the General’s mind,” replied Gribius.
Before Langlade visited the US 90th ID, Gribius warned him against any “real intervention” before receiving “particularly important instructions”. Arriving at the 90th’s CP in pitch dark, Langlade bumped into General Leclerc who arrived simultaneously, accompanied by Commandant Weil.
“We’ll meet the 90th Infantry’s CO together,” said Leclerc, placing his hand on Langlade’s shoulder. “You will listen to their orders. You will simply say, ‘I have understood’—you won’t ask for any explanations and you leave. Then wait for me at your Jeep.”
The plan had changed, insofar as GT Langlade was now to advance on Omméel, Mont Omméel and then Trun. Langlade listened attentively and said the words Leclerc told him.
“I have understood,” followed by a cheery “Good-bye Sir.”
Outside Leclerc spoke directly into Langlade’s ear.
“Now listen,” began Leclerc. “We’ve got to set off for Paris in forty-eight hours or we’re never going to get there. I am going to go to Bradley to get this decision stopped. When I have that, we’re going to turn about and go like hell for Paris. It is therefore essential that you do not get yourself involved in a scrap that you can’t pull out of, certainly not one causing losses. I need everyone. Do what you would do anyway, but with the caveat that you come back to me as soon as I call you and you don’t incur losses. Understand?”
“Oui, mon Général,” replied Langlade.
“Alors, au revoir,” said Leclerc before disappearing into the night.
At 2am on 19 August, at his Médavy CP, Langlade explained Leclerc’s thinking to Massu and Minjonnet, telling them to start straight away. By dawn they had bypassed the Forêt de Petite Gouffern and taken positions at Omméel, overlooking the Dives.1
The US 90th ID’s artillery destroyed designated objectives and targets of opportunity on the roads north and south of the Dives even as General Maczek’s 1st Polish Armoured Division, operating with Canadian First Army, reached the northern side of Chambois. At Exmès, from his new CP on an abrupt hill with dominating views, Langlade watched Minjonnet’s men patrol into the pocket, which pivoted between GT Langlade’s position and Polish positions a few kilometres north, while the Germans guarded the roads with anti-tank guns and
Panther tanks.2
Maczek’s position on Mont Ormel was almost a mini Monte Cassino, giving excellent fields of fire over the Dives valley. However, the Poles were not blocking an advancing army, but a retreating one desperately escaping a charnel house. For two days Maczek’s division fought grimly to confirm the Germans’ encirclement, getting badly chewed up; exactly what Leclerc wanted to avoid.
IN PARIS, WHILE LECLERC BRIEFED LANGLADE, the Resistance meeting chaired by Alexandre Parodi on the Rue de Grenelle ended. As the delegates surreptitiously departed, a Tricolore was fluttering above a nearby police station.3
On hearing from Parodi that there would be a big meeting to decide the Insurrection’s timetable, Yves Bayet decided the police should take the initiative and Charles Luizet and Henri Rol-Tanguy should co-operate. Since both men were uncontactable except by bicycle, Bayet decided to mobilise the police resistance groups himself, sending written orders to Sergeant Armand Fournet, head of Honneur de la Police, to assemble as many policemen as possible outside the Préfecture at 7am the following morning.4
To deliver Bayet’s messages before curfew, Bayet’s young liaison agent, Suzanne, pedalled her old bicycle as fast as she could. Then a slow puncture released her front tyre’s last cubic centimetres of air. As she angrily pumped away at the roadside, a BMW halted beside her and, in excellent French, a Wehrmacht officer offered help. After both failed to coax any air into the perished tyre, the German offered her a lift, dropping her near the café where she had to deliver Yves Bayet’s messages.5
At the Jardin des Plantes Sergeant Armand Fournet met the other two members of the Comité de Libération de la Police. While their collabo seniors slept, Fournet presented a fait accompli to Charles Lamboley and Léon Pierre. Both thought seizing the Préfecture was premature. Fournet, however, believed that once begun the Insurrection must keep rolling. His frustration at the Herriot operation’s cancellation kicked in. “We must wait for instructions?” he said sarcastically. “When I prepared the snatching of Herriot, I waited for them, these instructions. I received a counter-order and had to send it to my men. If it then restarts, I will look a fool. I won’t let that happen twice. You do what you like. Me, I’m in.”6
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