Expecting to die, Taittinger and his friends spent the day in Room 22, remembering how many famous Frenchmen had been imprisoned there. Looking down into the courtyard, Taittinger noticed that the Préfecture’s defenders included a Martiniquais sergeant whose runner was merely a boy. This lad became adept at using Joliot-Curie’s special Molotov cocktails to destroy German vehicles. “His tactic was simple,” wrote Taittinger. “Holding the petrol bomb behind his back, he approached a German vehicle, whose crew believed him harmless. When close enough he threw the bottle, which exploded, then threw himself on the ground to see what happened next. When the Germans left the vehicle they were gunned down by other résistants. This youth destroyed several lorries and a half-track in this fashion; he was the main, if not the only, true combatant inside the Prefecture. One of our guards assured us that almost all the wrecked vehicles gathered in the courtyard were this young man’s handiwork!”13
MONOD, ROUMAJOU AND GALLOIS left Saint-Nom-La-Bretèche at first light. The lanes seemed deserted. Threading their way back through the villages of Villepreux, Trou-Moreau and Bois d’Arcy, eventually they reached the crossroads with the GC 104. Again truculent Germans appeared from nowhere. One forced Monod to slow down by throwing a bicycle on the car’s roof. Then a tall officer appeared, angily pointing towards Pontchartrain.
“If you value your lives,” said the officer, “turn left immediately.” Then, gesturing northeastwards, he said firmly, “Paris is that way.”
Arguing was clearly pointless. They turned back past Villacoublay and called at the hospital in Perray-Vaucluse where Monod knew Doctor Bonnaud. He guided them to Villiers where they learnt that Captain Georges, the FFI commander around Corbeil, had encountered Americans near La Ferte-Alais.
Captain Georges agreed to help and transfered them to a camionette which would hopefully draw less attention. Despite the urgency, extraordinarily they stopped for lunch at the Patte d’Oie, a restaurant in Mennecy, whose owner arranged a private dining room where they could talk. Gallois now intended to ask the Americans for nothing less than a significant tank force, preferably Leclerc’s, to march on Paris immediately. After a substantial meal, they toasted Gallois with champagne. Outside, the local FFI arranged a little parade to cheer Gallois on his way.
Afterwards Gallois was taken in hand by Captain Georges’ group. Shaking Monod’s hand, Gallois promised that he would ask for Leclerc to be sent to Paris.14
DURING 20–21 AUGUST, von Choltitz understood that, with Nordling’s truce in force, the police would resume their normal role. He also thought the arrangement sufficiently useful to Army Group B to be able to tell Field Marshal Model’s emissary, “On this matter the situation on the ground is decisive; there remains no other guarantee that can be made to prevent German troops from being fired upon.”15
The usually intransigent Field Marshal Model, knowing he had nothing to reinforce Paris, tolerated these compromises but nevertheless wanted preparations made to blow the city’s bridges. When General Blumentritt raised this matter on Model’s behalf, von Choltitz insisted that the Wehrmacht still needed the bridges, though only around 15% of retreating German traffic passed through Paris. Between Army Group B and von Choltitz’s HQ at the Hôtel Meurice, several officers, such as General Speidel, played for time while appearing assiduous in their duties.16
When Hitler complained that demolitions had not begun, Model replied that the existing twenty-thousand-man garrison was insufficient to suppress a significant uprising, and that preparing fallback positions northeast of Paris was a higher priority. Hence, while Hitler wanted to destroy Paris, neither Model nor Kitzinger attached much importance to his orders. When von Choltitz sent a communiqué saying that “the Ile de la Cité has been taken over by terrorists and turned into a defensive strongpoint; given the lack of artillery no appropriate countermeasures can be taken”; he then covered himself by demanding artillery and a contingent of Feldgendarmerie, the traditional sign of a general keeping a grip on his command. Army Group B offered him artillery and an engineer battalion—even though von Choltitz already had sappers twiddling their thumbs doing nothing—but wanted to swap elements of the 48th Infantry Division for 88mm guns which were already in position. A combination of von Choltitz’s obfuscations and Allied pressure turned Paris into a low priority.17
As disenchanted as he was, an incident which singularly disaffected von Choltitz was the arrival in his office that morning of two SS officers wanting to requisition the medieval Bayeux Tapestry—which depicts the Norman invasion of Saxon England—from the Louvre.
“The Louvre is in the hands of the Resistance,” said von Choltitz impatiently, pointing eastwards along the Rue de Rivoli from his balcony. “Ask them for the tapestry.”18
ONCE PROSCRIBED NEWSPAPERS and new Resistance journals like Franc-Tireur, Le Parisien Libéré and Combat, became available to anyone prepared to venture onto the streets. Strikes and the breakdown of utilities meant that this was the first time in four days that Parisians could obtain printed news. Franc-Tireur announced in a six-column article, “The two glorious days of August 1944. Paris fights! Paris frees herself! The people of Paris rise up! An epic saga continues at the Préfecture de Police! The Germans are leaving the capital. The flag of the Resistance flies over the Hôtel de Ville.” Another article reported General de Gaulle’s arrival at Cherbourg and how eight French departments had been liberated through “joint effort” between the Allies and the FFI. A third article crowed that Pétainists “will not escape popular vengeance”.19
Even though the Resistance was too weak to conclude its Insurrection unaided, Franc-Tireur bumptiously slanted their articles. “After violent combat lasting forty-eight hours, the German authorities asked for a truce, recognising that they would otherwise be unable to evacuate their troops, and in order to avoid unnecessary bloodshed and be able to destroy documents. This temporary truce was agreed and the order to cease fire was given by represenatives of the Provisional Government.”
Historian Pierre Bourget later wrote, “It would be difficult to be more inexact in so few words! The Germans never demanded anything; a form of ceasefire had been proposed by Nordling who, with diplomatic subtlety, allowed the Resistance to believe that it resulted from a German initiative (rather than) Choltitz, whom representatives of General de Gaulle in Paris had solicited. But it was only partially observed and never at any time did the Germans consider this pause in the fighting, to which they had agreed, as anything other than a means to facilitate their evacuation of the capital.”20
“MORE QUESTION OF A TRUCE?” wrote Jean Galtier-Boissière. “Au contraire. I witnessed the construction of a large barricade across the Boulevard Saint-Michel on the rise of the Boulevard Saint-Germain. They were piling on benches from public squares, old bedsteads, coffee plants, tree grilles, a little of everything really. On the Rue Saint Jacques there was another barricade, but more regularly constructed using paving stones and sandbags taken from the Metro.”21
Barricades effectively sealed off all routes onto the Ile de la Cité. When some Germans commandeered an ambulance to trick their way across the Pont Saint-Michel, every French gun turned on them. None survived their trickery. “It was impossible to spare the ambulance,” Monsignor Brot wrote regretfully.22
To save the collapsing truce, Alexandre Parodi arranged to meet Colonel Henri Rol-Tanguy. “On this occasion the meeting took place at the Hôtel de Ville,” Rol-Tanguy told Bourderon. “Parodi asked me to agree with the Germans on specific routes for their retreating forces. The relevant departments of the Préfecture of the Seine had already advised which routes were suitable for large armoured vehicles. Parodi justified his demands on the basis of very alarming intelligence reported by Chaban, in particular the number of heavy tanks in Paris in case the truce failed. Parodi would say later that he was very concerned by this information, which was in fact inaccurate, having been passed on by Nordling. This could only have been a bluff by Choltitz who was risking everything
. No worthwhile intelligence that we had received at the Denfert CP allowed us to give this any credence; in fact the opposite, it confirmed that the enemy was pulling back towards specific strongpoints. This was not the time to allow him freedom of manoeuvre. Besides, we knew that it was the enemy’s intention to retreat, avoiding the capital, in order to regroup further east. In short I refused to agree to play traffic policeman along their lines of retreat and replied drily to Parodi, ‘C’est joué!’”23
LECLERC’S ADJUTANT, JACQUES WEIL, visited Bradley’s HQ hoping to get the 2e DB transferred to a corps nearer Paris. While waiting for Weil’s return, Leclerc wondered if the Americans were retaliating for his refusal to obey General Gaffey a few days before. In the meantime he wrote to de Gaulle explaining his decision to send Guillebon’s patrol towards Paris. “I cannot sadly do the same with the bulk of the division owing to considerations of fuel supply and also not wanting to overtly violate the rules of military subordination.”24
Since this advance guard was being sent on Leclerc’s own initiative, their mission had to be kept secret from the division’s US liaison officers, the charming Major Robert Loumiansky and Captain Plutschak. Who could keep them out of the way? Captain Alain de Boissieu knew better than most what was at stake. Since he was recovering from an injury sustained helping comrades escape a brewed-up Sherman, entertaining these Americans was perfect light duty for him.
“Take them on a little sightseeing trip,” said Leclerc.25
“Where?” Boissieu wondered. The idea that Plutschak and Loumiansky were suddenly interested in medieval architecture seemed weird. So he guided them around the 2e DB’s first battlefields, following Jacques Branet’s route detouring the Foret d’Écouves via Sées on 12 August, following the trail of burnt-out trucks and tanks. Burial parties had yet to reach the corpses inside these charred hulks, stinking in the summer heat.26
La Patrouille (the patrol), as Guillebon’s force became known, consisted of half a squadron of RMSM M8 armoured cars under Captain Alfred Bergamin, and a squadron of Stuart light tanks under Captain Martin-Siegfried, supported by Captain Parceval’s slightly depleted company from the Chad regiment. Guillebon also had with him Chef d’Escadrons* Morel-Deville and the RMSM’s colour party, so that if they got into central Paris they could raise one of the division’s regimental flags.27
“There is nothing important keeping us in Normandy,” Leclerc told Guillebon before waving him off. “I am doing everything I can and, after your departure, I will continue to push incessantly to be allowed to go to Paris. You realise that the Allies shouldn’t enter Paris without the French Army. That would diminish the national and international importance of the event. So go as fast as possible. If some Allied unit is entering Paris, then I would want you to go in alongside them. I will join you, but in the meantime you will act in my place both towards the Allies as towards the French, with the functions of military governor.”
Guillebon saluted.
“However,” continued Leclerc, “if you can go in alone, don’t hesitate, go in!”28
AROUND 4PM JEAN GALTIER-BOISSIÈRE’S BOOKSHOP was rattled by an explosion. German tanks from the Palais Luxembourg Stützpunkt had fired at the Boulevard Saint-Michel barricade. Galtier-Boissière watched speechless as two Renault tanks, repainted in Wehrmacht sand yellow, rumbled past his window, fired and withdrew. A little later he saw a large plume of black smoke. The noise of engines came closer again. This time five Renault tanks passed Galtier-Boissière as they withdrew towards the Luxembourg. Stepping outside to close the shutters, Galtier-Boissière noticed white-clad stretcher bearers running frantically. They returned moments later carrying an elegant, agonisingly wounded youth. “His face had a green tone which reminded me of the mortally wounded of the other war,” he wrote.29
Despite Nordling’s truce stipulating that FFIs were to be regarded as combatants under the laws of war and vice versa, many Germans dreaded falling into FFI hands. Sonderführer Robert Wallraf describes the ordeal of a Wehrmacht lieutenant and two of his men captured by FFI on the south bank late on 21 August.
“Do you know how to swim, Sales Boches?” asked one of the résistants, dragging the three Germans to the river’s edge.
At the bridge’s mid-span they made them stand on the parapet. The lieutenant managed to keep steady but both his men lost balance and fell into the Seine. When their heads broke the surface the FFIs shot at them until they disappeared. Then they took the lieutenant to a nearby apartment and fed him after which they forced him to drink several coups of Cognac, shouting “Vive de Gaulle” with each gulp. After an exchange of prisoners, the lieutenant returned to a German strongpoint where he told his comrades that he would rather die than endure such torment again. “Many such stories circulated among us,” wrote Wallraf. “Naturally they reinforced our determination to defend ourselves against the Resistance and only to give up the fight once disciplined regular troops attacked out strongpoints.” However, Wallraf recognised that FFI excesses were a reaction to SS misdeeds. Von Choltitz’s garrison believed that FFI policy was to shoot captured SS immediately.30
Yet there were simultaneous examples of restraint. On the Rue des Saussaies, a narrow street within the government area, made infamous by the Gestapo depot, when some résistants taking over a ministerial annexe encountered a German patrol, they pocketed their pistols and claimed to be concièrges maintaining a presence. They were left alone.31
HENRI CULMANN SPENT THAT MONDAY in his office, justifying his salary by shuffling papers. Around a hundred FFI now guarded this building while, among the ministry’s employees, several fonctionnaires who, unknown to Culmann, were longstanding résistants, now proudly sported FFI brassards. The only weapons between them, however, were three shotguns, two Stens and a few revolvers. Towards the afternoon’s end, having seen Marshal Pétain’s portrait replaced by one of President Raymond Poincaré, Culmann was interviewed by the interim minister, Robert Lacoste, a militant syndicalist. “The new minister exposed to us the psychology of our new governors, divided between the needs of justice which tested men who, for four years, watched while their comrades were arrested, tortured, killed or were denounced, to have their parents shot, their homes burnt—while they lived happily at home—with no reaction to injustice after injustice.” For Culmann this tirade indicated what épuration would really mean; knee-jerk justice administered by rabble, bypassing France’s well-trained lawyers and handsome courthouses.32 Culmann listened as Lacoste explained, “The great disappointment with which he [de Gaulle] views the passivity of the French bourgeoisie and the higher sense he has of French greatness.”33
Around 6pm the fighting in the Latin Quarter calmed down, and Galtier-Boissière ventured out for news. A German fuel tanker had been blown up by a résistant’s petrol bomb, and an elderly veteran’s apartment was raked with machine-gun fire, even grazing his nose. But the Boulevard Saint-Michel barricade remained intact because, a badaud explained, it was erected in a slight dip, beneath the trajectory of a Renault 35’s puny cannon.34
LATER THAT AFTERNOON, the CNR went into plenary session in the salon of a gracious apartment opposite the Gare Denfert-Rochereau, the details of which were reproduced by French journalist Adrien Dansette shortly after the war. On arrival, Alexandre Parodi offered his hand to Roger Ginsburger, COMAC’s Villon, which was refused.
“Eh bien, Villon,” said Parodi. “You won’t say ‘hello’?”
“It is not possible to launch, then put a halt to an insurrection,” replied Villon. “You’re ruining it. Haven’t you any pride?”
While Parodi, Bidault, Chaban-Delmas and COMAC’s three Vs sat on Louis Seize chairs, others stood. Combined with August heat, the need to close windows to keep their discussions inaudible from the street, and everyone in shirt sleeves, made for a tense atmosphere. Villon questioned the validity of Nordling’s truce since the decision was taken by a majority rather than a unanimous vote as required by CNR rules, and those who drafted it had no right
to do so.35
Chaban-Delmas explained that, given the urgency and the impossibility of contacting COMAC’s members, the Delegation approved Nordling’s truce. After all, Chaban continued, the FFI possessed hardly any weapons and, according to his information from senior Allied generals, the Allies would not reach Paris for another week, which meant they needed to buy time. For these reasons, said Chaban, the Delegation requested the Allies to parachute weapons into Paris and come as soon as possible. (Even then, the most significant efforts to reach the Allies to request intervention were made by Rol-Tanguy.)36
Georges Bidault declared the truce valid, even though, owing to the difficulties of la vie clandestine, not everyone could attend the vote. The decision needed to be taken quickly and Nordling had a deadline to meet with General von Choltitz. Bidault said he took responsibility for what happened, while Parodi insisted that the welfare of Parisians was a paramount concern. In spite of this, Louis Saillant asked Bidault to read aloud the appel voted upon that morning by the CPL—Comité Parisien de Liberation,—which criticised the truce as “an enemy manoeuvre intended to stab in the back those Parisians who, for forty-eight hours, have been heroically fighting the Boches to liberate their capital”. The CPL wanted to circulate it as an affiche.
“Are you going to publish that declaration as it stands?” asked Parodi, appalled.
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