But Abetz had bought von Choltitz some time, during which he set about devising a new accommodation with the Resistance. First von Choltitz wanted French patriots, as he described the FFI, to keep within a zone of central Paris which German forces would undertake not to enter. This area, an irregular rectangle of around fifteen hundred metres by eight hundred, would include the Ile de la Cité and Ile Saint-Louis, and two bands of territory, one on the right bank up to the Rue de Rivoli, and the other on the left bank as far as the Boulevard Saint-Germain.
Second, les patriotes françaises would only be allowed out of these areas if they were travelling either from west to east, or east to west, since that was the same direction as German forces retreating through Paris.
Third, German forces entering Paris would keep to predetermined routes through the city in order to reduce violent incidents.
Fourth, les patriotes françaises must agree not to erect further barricades except within the area described above.62
Although he recognised how difficult von Choltitz’s position had become, Nordling saw immediately that it was pointless offering the Resistance such terms. First they would have to evacuate the area between the Hôtel de Ville and the Préfecture. Second, senior résistants would regard “ghettoization” as a potential trap, whereby FFI-controlled areas could subsequently be destoyed Warsaw-style. Shaking his head, Nordling showed von Choltitz’s proposals to Saint-Phalle, who confirmed the Resistance would never consider such terms.63
But later that night von Choltitz telephoned Nordling, wanting a response. Nordling immediately explained why von Choltitz’s terms would be unacceptable to the Resistance and not worth presenting. Amazingly, von Choltitz offered to send a tank to fetch Nordling from his consulate so they could discuss the matter face to face. Nordling refused, saying that it would be unsuitable for a neutral consul to ride in a German combat vehicle. Then, in a moment of wishful thinking, Nordling claimed that the truce was still “en vigueur” and the Germans had no good reason to recommence hostilities.64
CAPTAIN GEORGES DROVE GALLOIS through La Ferte Alais and along quiet backroads, avoiding German checkpoints which had sprung up in the area. On reaching the Chalmette valley they saw American troops on the far side, at the edge of a wood. Taking a potentially lethal calculated risk that a camouflaged German machine-gun nest beside a hayrick would not dare disclose its position by shooting at them, Captain Georges’ driver manoeuvred the camionette so that it remained unnoticed until they were almost upon the American lines, and then put his foot down. Moments later they were surrounded by GIs. It was now early evening. After handing Gallois over to an American officer, Captain Georges bid him an emotional farewell.65
Following a brief interview with a battalion intelligence officer, Gallois was taken to the US Third Army HQ at Courville, arriving after dark. There he was questioned by Third Army’s Resistance expert, Lieutenant Colonel Powell, who decided the occasion justified waking Patton. Gallois was taken to the tent of un monsieur who appeared with unbrushed hair and his shirt open, the collar of which bore the three stars of a US lieutenant general.
“Je vous écoute”—”I am listening,” said Patton.
Gallois gave Patton a resumé of the situation in Paris, the arguments for intervention rehearsed with Robert Monod, and what they needed from the Allies.
“You should consider,” said Patton, “that such vast operations as we are undertaking are not conceived lightly nor without deeply thought-through plans which we must follow to the letter. Nothing else that might happen, whether anticipated or unexpected, can change these plans, certainly if such events are not of extraordinary importance.
“Our objective is Berlin and our wish is to end the war as quickly as possible. The immediate taking of Paris is not in our planning and we are not going to Paris, because the capital is not a military objective and its taking is not important for us. On the contrary, taking Paris would be a burden because we would have to ensure the supplying of a large population and the immediate repair of lots of things destroyed by the Germans. We are trying to destroy German armies, not take cities. You should have waited for orders from the Allied High Command before launching your insurrection and not taken the initiative yourselves.”66
“All right, General,” said a crestfallen Gallois. “So it’s a ‘No.’ So, what do I do now?”
“It’s for you to answer that question, not for me,” Patton replied crisply.
“I think the only thing that I can do is return to Paris to advise my superiors of this refus from the American Army.”
“That sounds like the best solution,” said Patton.
“Before I return, can I ask a great favour of you?” said Gallois.
Patton nodded.
“I am a Frenchman and you have been very honest with me,” continued Gallois. “But before returning to Paris with the disappointing news that I must bear, I would like to see a French uniform. I would like to speak to a French general. I would very much like to see Leclerc.”
“Leclerc is not under my orders,” said Patton. “I don’t know where he is but I will go and see what I can do.”
In fact, Leclerc’s men had hardly moved since Haislip’s XV Corps relinquished the 2e DB to Gerow’s V Corps under Hodges. Patton decided to send Gallois straight to Bradley’s Eagletac HQ. He also sent an orderly to find a bottle of champagne and two glasses.
“Not too exhausted to make a long journey?” asked Patton, uncorking the champagne.
“Absolutely not,” replied Gallois.
Patton filled the glasses.
“À la France et la victoire! ” said Patton, his eyes twinkling.
Gallois gulped back the golden liquid. Then he began the long drive to General Bradley’s Eagletac HQ at Laval. Gallois looked at his watch. It was 3.30am on 22 August; his information about Paris was nearly three days old.67
22 August 1944
AT EXACTLY 8AM ALEXANDRE DE SAINT PHALLE visited Nordling. The truce’s disintegration profoundly worried Saint Phalle, and the terms for its reinstatement offered by von Choltitz the previous evening made him fearful. Unprompted, Saint-Phalle concluded that the Americans should come as soon as possible. Nordling agreed.68
Meanwhile, events at the Hôtel Meurice demonstrated how justified Saint-Phalle’s concerns were. Von Choltitz had received renewed orders to destroy Paris. “The preliminary text,” von Choltitz later wrote, “alluded to the gravity of the situation on the Western front, exhorting the soldiers to oppose the unremitting onslaught, and not to give way but to redouble their energy. The order then continued, expressing the intention of the Supreme Command to hold the line Pontarlier-Plateau de Langres-Troyes, using Seine-Paris as a pivot. It is particularly recommended to the General commanding Gross-Paris, to take account of the decisive importance of the city as the hinge of this new front.” Then von Choltitz quotes, “Paris is to be transformed into a pile of ruins. The General commanding should defend the city to the last man and perish, if necessary, in the rubble.” On reading these last two sentences von Choltitz felt ashamed. What struck von Choltitz most was the tone of “Paris is to be transformed into a pile of ruins”, which contrasted so absurdly with the unemotive language in which General staff officers were trained to write orders.69
“Look at this,” he told his adjutant, Colonel Hans Jay.
They shook their heads. Von Choltitz telephoned Lieutenant General Hans Speidel, a friend of the injured Field Marshal Rommel, now chief of staff at Army Group West HQ at Cambrai.
“Thank you for the lovely order,” said von Choltitz sarcastically.
“Which order is that, General?” Speidel replied.
“Well, the demolition order,” said von Choltitz. “Here is what I am to do. I must lay three tons of explosives in Notre Dame, two tons in Les Invalides, a ton in the Chamber of Deputies. I must blow up the Arc de Triomphe because it obstructs my line of fire …”
Speidel breathed deeply at the other end.
“I am acting with your knowledge and agreement, yes, dear Speidel?”
Speidel hesitated. “Yes, General.”
“So it’s you who have given this order?”
“No, it isn’t us,” replied Speidel. “It’s the Führer who must have given that order.”
“Listen,” said von Choltitz. “It’s you who have transmitted this order and you who will answer to History.” Gathering steam, von Choltitz continued. “I will tell you what I have stopped; the Madeleine and the Opera, we were going to annihilate those. Then, when it comes to the Eiffel Tower, I am to blow it up in such a way that it makes a tank trap behind the blown bridges.”
At that point, Speidel, a decent man, connected to the 20 July conspirators who would soon face Gestapo investigation, spotted the irony in von Choltitz’s voice.
“General,” said Speidel as he signed off. “How lucky we are to have you in Paris.”70
Von Choltitz spoke several times with Speidel during the following week; it was some comfort that another general understood his unenviable position. Von Aulock was holding the Paris perimeter as best he could. “But,” von Choltitz wrote, “the defence force was only observing. Logistics troops were beginning to leave.”71
Later that morning Nordling thought von Choltitz appeared stressed. Nordling was not feeling particularly well himself. Both were chubby, middle-aged men. Neither would get through the week’s events with his health unaffected.72
“Do you see any way of reasoning with the Resistance?” asked von Choltitz.
Nordling said General de Gaulle was the only man the FFIs might obey.
Von Choltitz wrote that he “thought that someone should try to contact him”.73
This was another key moment when von Choltitz’s deep disillusionment over Hitler’s war amazed Nordling. In his memoirs von Choltitz clings to practical motives: “I decided to influence the opposing chief in person in a last effort to calm the Resistance. As always, the interests of different parties were converging towards the same point: I wanted to save my soldiers from further losses and the French interest was to preserve their capital.”74
Nordling asked von Choltitz if he would authorise someone to cross the lines to negotiate with the Allies.
“Why not?” replied von Choltitz.75
Nordling later said, “A chance offered itself to von Choltitz to give Germany a more humanitarian face, which he seized.”76
AT THE PRÉFECTURE, Saint-Phalle met Alexandre Parodi, Roland Pré and Charles Luizet in the latter’s office. They were joined by Henri Rol-Tanguy and Maurice Kriegel-Valrimont representing COMAC. When Parodi put forward von Choltitz’s proposals, Kriegel-Valrimont and Rol-Tanguy rejected them immediately, as Nordling predicted. They were glad Nordling’s truce was terminated following the CNR’s decision, and that affiches were being printed proclaiming “aux barricades”. Saint-Phalle thought Kriegel-Valrimont and Rol-Tanguy were raising the spectre of another Commune, when Paris fell under mob rule following Napoleon III’s defeat by Bismarck’s Prussians. But for the moment, Saint-Phalle wanted their agreement for Nordling to cross the German lines and beg Eisenhower to march on Paris.77
“Nordling will tell the Germans that he is presenting himself to the Allied generalissimo in order to negotiate the [German] retreat,” said Saint-Phalle.
The résistants agreed that Saint-Phalle should go but refused to change their own plans.
That afternoon Parodi held a meeting at the Matignon for provisional ministers who had taken control of government buildings since the 19th. He told them the truce was over and that they should leave their ministries in the hands of a “local clandestin” where possible or else abandon them. Everyone was aghast.
“Is that an order?” asked Courtin, the caretaker minister at the Treasury.
“I am the Delegate General of the Government,” replied Parodi, slapping the table. “It’s a formal order.”
But Parodi’s order was unenforceable; most government buildings remained in Resistance hands. The Treasury building was occupied by one hundred and fifty résistants with only ten rifles, six pistols and a case of grenades between them. With fourteen kilometres of corridors, Courtin’s résistants estimated that not even the SS would fight for the Treasury room by room. They stayed put.78
The final declaration was different from Parodi’s order:
Council of Ministers 22 August.
Information received from the Allies remains imprecise. The Allied High Command has received different accounts of the situation in Paris. Combat continues.
I appeal for attention to be paid to the danger presented by the retreat of German troops on Paris. We must reduce the risk of reprisals being made against public buildings occupied by the Resistance. It is recommended that general secretaries take security precautions appropriate to their circumstances and which vary according to local dispositions and protection forces available to them.79
BEFORE THE TRUCE ENDED things appeared calm around German strongpoints. Their vehicle park near the Madeleine remained undisturbed, though Resistance officials still using the truce’s white flag might be searched, les Fridolins being friendlier towards those who spoke German. However, on the Place Saint-Augustin tanks circled menacingly accompanied by trucks carrying German sailors who, like the SS, believed the Wehrmacht needed stiffening after 20 July. “Depending where they were, the Germans did not systematically open fire on civilian vehicles,” wrote Pierre Bourget. “It is one of the most striking contrasts of the Insurrection; there were zones where the Germans remained totally passive and others where they displayed more aggression, witnessing extraordinary cruelty.”80
Troops retreating through Paris could not understand what all the fuss was about, until they reached central hotspots.
“What devilry!” said a German officer on reaching a fuel depot.
“What happened?” asked Robert Wallraf.
“Well may you ask,” replied the officer. “Don’t you see? All these bullet holes in my car! One grazed my leg. The swines! We were driving calmly along beside the Seine when suddenly we got this from all sides. You can’t see anyone. They fire from windows and roofs. Where are my vehicles? These swines won’t even have their skins! We should have gone round. What’s happened to the others?”
“There are strongpoints where you will always be safe,” said Wallraf.
“Strong points! Schiesse upon your strong points,” said the convoy officer. “I want to regroup my men and vehicles and get them safely to the Gare d’Orsay.”81
Although von Choltitz claimed the necessity of keeping the roads open, the number of troops retreating through Paris was diminishing, the available routes were being closed, and those that remained passable were easily blocked by damaged vehicles. Yet on this matter von Choltitz apparently remained stern, telling junior officers to “follow orders without discussion. I will shoot with my own pistol any officer, clerk or simple soldier who tries to flee Paris.” Yet, that same day, after discussions with Swiss Consul René Naville, von Choltitz sent a hundred and forty lorries to Verneuil l’Étang to collect flour for Parisian bakeries. “Early afternoon,” wrote Naville, “I arrived with Dr. Morsier to see General von Choltitz. He made no objection to the proposed action. He himself immediately gave the orders to make this possible, promising us that no lorry carrying a Wehrmacht pass would be obstructed by German troops.”82
FOLLOWING ROL’S “AUX BARRICADES! ” these impromptu defences multiplied. “Along the avenues with large trees, wood cutters, some certainly novices lifting an axe for the first time, cut through their trunks,” wrote Parisian commentator Charles Lacretelle. “The trees would crash down, their green mass falling across the road and blocking it while … assistants in this handiwork shouted appreciatively, ‘They can come now, Les Fritzs, they won’t pass.’”83 Some barricades, like the images in Victor Hugo’s Les Miserables, rose as high as first floor balconies, their size almost becoming pointless. After a priest from St Germain des Prés admirably
directed the construction of his local barricade he was asked to supervise others.84
Commandant Dufresne (aka Raymond Massiet) wrote, “Across the scope of the capital, except in the western arrondissements, the battle continued throughout the 22 August.” This observation was supported by Pierre Sonneville: “In the rich quartiers where it was possible to minimise the consequences of rationing and live a life close to normal, the general desire was to get through it all with the minimum of damage.” After Rol-Tanguy eased him off P1’s staff, Sonneville’s role became liaison, cycling around Paris with paniers stuffed with banknotes.85
Alongside mushrooming barricades, FFI numbers increased from around three thousand five hundred on 19 August to more like five thousand. Weapons remained inadequate, hence anything captured from the Germans constituted a modest victory. But not all captured weapons were suitable for untrained hands; when a PAK 75mm anti-tank gun was captured along with its limber at the bottom of the Boulevard Saint-Michel, Gardiens from the Préfecture sensibly removed it.86 Lack of training among the FFI became a serious problem. That same morning three Gardiens, patrolling near the Préfecture in a requisitioned taxi, suffered “friendly fire” which killed Gardien Avriac. They diverted their mission to the overspill mortuary at the little convent on Rue Charles Divry.87
For most FFI, local leaders were their only recognised authority figures, so whether they recognised Nordling’s truce depended on whose command they followed: Rol-Tanguy, Lizé or the Préfecture. Around mid-day Charles Luizet ordered fifteen Gardiens to announce via loudspeakers that combat would be resumed.88
Many FFI had fought continuously since 19 August. A groupe-franc chief from the 1st Arrondissement began on the 18th, jumping on a German motorcycle-sidecar and seizing its MG42 from its mount. On the 19th, he killed a German naval officer, captured a Waffen SS soldier and “recovered” a French car. Adrien Dansette omits to say whether this man killed anyone on the 20th, if not perhaps Nordling’s truce deprived him of the opportunity. But on the 21st, with the truce en vigueur across swathes of Paris, he destroyed a German vehicle, killing an officer and two soldiers. Meanwhile at Neuilly, another plucky resistant, in a scene resembling a Godfather film, was chased into a house by a German patrol. He then escaped over the roof, regained the street from another building and captured the Germans pursuing him from behind. Then there was the Gabonais negro Georges Dukson* who prowled the 17th Arrondissement armed with a Colt 45. Once, seeing a German patrol car, Dukson lay doggo on the pavement, then leapt up and shot the Germans dead. Nicknamed the lion noir, “the black lion”, he was elected an officer.89
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