Additional crossing points were also very much on the mind of 10/Field Ambulance which had established a forward dressing station in the school house at Bucy-le-Long. Shortly after crossing with 11 Brigade, the Field Ambulance was joined by Sergeant David Lloyd-Burch, ‘we went across the river on a pontoon bridge, the Germans had a commanding view of the river and the flat country from the hills in the distance. Two ambulance wagons were hit getting into Bucy’. Lloyd-Burch had highlighted what was to become a recurring problem for the ambulance units over the next three weeks: the constant shelling from German artillery batteries made the evacuation of the wounded an almost impossible task during the hours of daylight. All that could be done for the plight of the wounded was to make life as comfortable as possible until darkness and the arrival of the ambulance convoys. Evacuation was made even more demanding by the condition of the bridges in the early stages of the campaign which were not really capable of supporting wheeled traffic and the unavoidable congestion on the winding road which ran west-east between Bucy-le-Long and Ste Marguerite. Once the road bridge at Vénizel had been repaired, however, a footbridge was added just downstream whilst on 20 September two more pontoon bridges were built at Moulin des Roches and Missy.
With 10/Field Ambulance firmly installed at Bucy-le-Long, the school house became the main receiving centre for casualties on the 4th Division front, whilst the little church at Ste Marguerite, which stood on the north side of the main street, now acted as the main dressing station for all three infantry brigades. Additional medical staff from 11/Field Ambulance eased the situation a little but the nature of the injuries – mainly from shell fire – was often extensive and put both staff and medical supplies under pressure. It was found, for instance, that the size of the 1914 issue field dressing was woefully inadequate when it came to dressing the wounds inflicted by the razor sharp splinters from high-explosive shell fire. Not only that but also the work of locating, dressing and evacuating the wounded from open ground was severely hampered by continuous shell fire and sniping by the enemy. For the RAMC it was just a taste of what was to become the norm for the next three years.
It was from Bucy that the precarious nightly evacuation of the wounded took place in the horse-drawn ambulance wagons based at La Carrière l’Evecque Farm, just north of Septmonts. A mile further back, at the extensive Château Ecuiry near Rozières, the staff of Number 6 Clearing Hospital opened what was to become the centre for the evacuation of wounded from the left flank of the BEF, mirroring the role Braine was to perform on the right flank. Yet the journey from Vénizel to Rozières by horse-drawn ambulance was slow and tedious and for the badly wounded a painful and uncomfortable experience. Steep roads liberally covered with mud demanded a doubling of the number of horses required to pull each ambulance and the long suffering horses found this more arduous than during the retreat. It was only the arrival of three motor ambulances on 17 September which eased the problem and reduced the journey time significantly.
Nevertheless, enemy shell fire continued to inflict casualties in the British positions. Cecil Brereton was badly wounded on 14 September when German counter battery fire found his gun position:
We had just got the order to advance again to support the infantry attack, and had sent for our wagons, when the first shell came along. In about 8 minutes the Hun had completely got the range and we were fairly for it. A direct hit on one of Loch’s guns finished most of the detachment and a direct hit on one of my guns then finished me and most of my detachment and also poor Wallinger who was observing for his Howitzer battery from behind my limber.’75
Earlier in the day the Seaforth Highlanders lost their commanding officer, 45-year-old Lieutenant Colonel Sir Evelyn Bradford. Bradford, a celebrated Hampshire county cricketer, was commissioned in 1888 from Sandhurst and killed by a single shell as he inspected the ground in front of the battalion over which it was expected the advance would continue. It has to be said that German shelling was highly accurate and very destructive. Lieutenant Geoffrey Prideaux, an officer with the 1/SLI, was in Bucy-le-Long on the morning of 15 September:
‘The Germans hit a house opposite the church with a high explosive shell of large calibre, completely demolishing the house. It also set on fire the East Lancs’ machine-gun limber, which happened to be standing under cover of the house, and killed one horse and wounded another very badly … the road up to the trenches was blocked with debris in many places, and the church was hit. A wall had been blown down across the road in one place, and a big tree in another place. On my way up I saw a howitzer battery which had taken up its position on the hillside in a field due west of La Montagne Farm, completely put out of action by German 8.4” howitzers. The shells fell amongst the guns with surprising accuracy, in one case lifting an ammunition wagon up in the air and dropping it upside down.’76
What Prideaux had witnessed was some very effective counter-battery fire directed overhead from a Rumpler Taube of the Imperial German Army Air Service. The howitzer battery in question was from XXXVII Brigade whose guns had crossed the river before dawn on 13 September and engaged enemy batteries to the north. By noon both the 31/and 55/Battery positions had been spotted by a Taube and although they too came under heavy shell fire and lost seventeen men killed, it appears none of the guns were damaged. At around 2.00pm on the 15th the German spotter aircraft was back, the brigade war diary recorded the ensuing bombardment:
‘Shortly after this the batteries were subjected to a heavy fire from heavy guns …40 to 50 shells falling amongst the batteries in five to ten minutes. During the firing 31 Battery lost 16 killed, 12 wounded and 33 horses, one shell falling amongst the men, who had been moved under cover of a sunken road, killed 12 and wounded 9.’77
Both batteries were forced to retire to the wooded area northeast of Vénizel Bridge. 31/Battery alone had lost over 30 per cent of its manpower.
Whilst artillery support was welcomed, batteries which were sited too close to the infantry trenches inevitably drew fire and caused further casualties. Gerald Whittuck watched a battery of French 75s come into action in front of his trenches and despite, ‘some wonderful shooting, drew fire onto us. We were unluckily just outside our dugouts when they opened fire first’. The first salvo killed Lieutenant Arthur Read78 and the second severely wounded 21-year-old Lieutenant Arthur Newton. ‘Four men were killed and eight wounded’, wrote Whittuck, ‘but I managed to get stretchers up when the shells were not quite so thick. We buried Read and four others the same night, a parson reading the service’.
Thus as night fell on 15 September the 4th Division held the edge of the high ground from a point south of Chivres running north of Ste Marguerite to La Montagne Farm from where the line moved westwards to Point 151 east of Crouy. South of the river was 19 Infantry Brigade less the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders whom General Haldane had brought up to Bucy-le-Long as a reserve. The XXIX Brigade guns were all south of the Aisne and firing at extreme range against German batteries which were cleverly concealed and difficult to locate. 125/ and 127/Batteries were in action near Sermoise but after 126/Battery crossed the river and attracted a hail of shell fire, it too was withdrawn across to the south bank. The XXXVII Brigade guns which were subjected to the severe mauling witnessed by Geoffrey Prideaux were now under the cover of the wooded area north of Vénizel, whilst the XIV Brigade guns were about Bucy-le-Long.
The Chivres spur which dominated Condé and its bridge continued to be a thorn in the side of the British attack. The eighteen heavy guns which the Germans had positioned on the spur provided their gunners with an almost uninterrupted view on either side and allowed them to fire on the British positions accordingly. It was the opinion of many that it was the failure to storm this promontory that not only decided the battle on the left flank but made a significant contribution to the ultimate failure to break the deadlock.
Chapter 6
The Centre Left – 5th Division
When we arrived in the village we were told the most
harrowing tales of how it was shelled every day and sniped into continuously.
Lieutenant Cyril Helm – describing his first impressions of Missy
Readers will recall that Sir Charles Fergusson’s 5th Division began crossing the Aisne on the night of 13 September at Missy and Major General Hubert Hamilton’s 3rd Division at Vailly. The crossing at both points was greeted by German artillery fire from batteries situated on the Chivres spur, in particular one battery near the Fort de Condé and two further north at Les Carrières and although the British artillery was quick to respond, their guns were soon under heavy counter-battery fire themselves. On the high ground above Ciry, Major Cecil de Sausmarez, commanding 108/Heavy Battery, was responding to the enemy fire:
‘Saw Germans on opposite bank of Aisne apparently very busy. Got onto a target and switched to a place north of wood surrounding Condé Fort from where hostile battery appeared to be firing … Shells soon began to fall to with 100 to 200 yards of us. I went to a field on the right where Major Livingstone-Learmonth79 (65th Howitzer Battery) had his observing post to confer with him. On my way back I saw shells bursting close to my observing party … The shells which were from large howitzers began to burst all round.’80
In the face of this bombardment from German 8-inch howitzers, Sausmarez pulled the battery back 600 yards leaving nine horses killed. He was fortunate that not a single man was touched. Nevertheless the German heavy howitzers appeared to have had the upper hand and from their positions north of the river clearly outranged all the British artillery with the exception of the heavy batteries.
The 5th Division artillery had lost heavily at Le Cateau on 26 August. Holding the right flank of II Corps on and around the Montay spur southwest of Le Cateau, they lost a total of twenty-seven guns to enemy action. By far the hardest hit in terms of losses was XXIII Brigade which left sixteen of its guns behind and XV Brigade which was reduced to just eight guns. But it was not only guns which were lost. At least 22 officers and 180 NCOs and men were killed or captured in addition to 257 horses that became casualties. 108/Battery was more fortunate, positioned close to the Bois Marronnier near Reumont it was to the south of the main action and only lost one of its heavy 60 pounders – not to enemy action but to a French drainage ditch which overturned the gun and its limber! At nearly 5 tons in weight and with the German Army expected any moment, there was no time for any attempt at recovery.
Back on the river at Missy, 13 Brigade was slowly establishing itself on the north bank. By dawn on 14 September both the Royal West Kents and 2/KOSB were across the Aisne and entrenched on the northern bank, taking up a position between the damaged bridge and the village of Missy. Jim Pennyman, the KOSB machine-gun officer, recalled the crossing vividly and the scene which greeted him on the other side:
‘The engineers [59/Field Company] had made a raft which had a nasty trick of sinking, and when we got there we found three drowned men being brought round by Sergeant Major Fuller. For some reason, the Germans weren’t opposing the crossing so the boat went back and forwards unmolested. I got leave to take my party across at once, as it would soon be light, and I thought we might be wanted. As soon as I landed I did a scout round on my own and found as follows: On our left the broken bridge, and a road to the village of Missy. The village was half a mile off and, I think, in the hands of the Germans. Immediately to the right of the bridge was an old farm house with a depression behind it which afforded a certain amount of cover. All along the river bank was a thinnish wood thirty yards wide, sloping down to the river …to our front we could see about half a mile of open park like country and then wooded hills, which we knew to be full of Germans.’81
Lieutenant Palmer of the West Kents was soon soaked through by the rain as his battalion crossed over amid the ricochets from enemy rifle fire which he recorded were, ‘unpleasantly thick’. The crossing was not without incident. Second Lieutenant Kenneth Godsell, working with 17/Field Company at the Moulin des Roches crossing point, had problems with Brigadier Gleichen’s horse, ‘Silver’, which, ‘jumped out of the raft and swam up and down the middle of the river for over ten minutes whilst the batman threw fits on the bank’. It was perhaps a much needed moment of amusement in a situation which was somewhat uncertain for all concerned.
At Missy, Captain Robert Dolbey, the KOSB medical officer, felt their position, ‘was a perilous one from a military sense’. The two 13 Brigade battalions were only in occupation of the Missy road and the wooded area on the north bank. ‘Both our flanks were in the air’, wrote Dolbey, ‘we had no line of retreat save the damaged bridge, why we were not rushed we could never understand’. Pennyman agreed and felt that the ‘position was an extremely unpleasant one’ and if it came to retirement they would have to swim for it.
According to Godsell’s diary, at 8.45pm on 14 September a section of the 2nd Bridging Train (2/Bridging Train) finally appeared at Moulin des Roches to construct a pontoon bridge capable of taking heavy traffic which, to Godsell’s delight, was in place by midnight. The two bridging trains had been sent up to the front by train from Le Mans on 9 September and after detraining at Chaumes two days later, began the march towards the Aisne. Each of the two bridging trains carried forty-two pontoons on specially adapted wagons and on the march was pulled by some 350 horses. Cumbersome and requiring a great deal of road space, the two bridging units had, like their steam-driven namesakes, spent an inordinate amount of time and effort being ‘shunted’ around northern France since their arrival in late August.
2/Bridging Train had disembarked at Le Havre on 20 August, one day later than the 1st Bridging Train which had already landed at Boulogne. Having loaded their equipment onto several trains, both bridging units were transported by rail to Cambrai where orders were received on 23 August to unload and proceed by road to Amiens. Events at Mons and the subsequent retreat had now caught up with them and instead of advancing they then had to retire with the rest of the BEF in the face of von Kluck’s First Army. One of the complaints the Royal Engineers voiced in the early months of the war centred on the apparent inability of the staff to grasp the effort and time required to carry out certain orders. There was an expectation that once an order had been committed to paper by a staff officer, the effect would be almost immediate. The war diary of 2/Bridging Train gives an indication of the time and physical effort it took to unload the pontoons and equipment:
‘Detraining began immediately but was slow owing to the difficulty of off loading the pontoon wagons sideways. Each wagon had to be lifted by hand before it could be sufficiently turned to run off the trucks … the first vehicle came off at 10pm and the last at 3am. The whole train was in bivouac at the station by 4am.’82
Both units reached Amiens by noon on 26 August – the same day that II Corps was fighting its rearguard action at Le Cateau 75 miles to the northeast. At Amiens fresh orders directed them to Rouen where the war diary wearily records them arriving on 30 September and being ordered on to Evreux where they were to entrain for Le Mans. Questionable staff work was most likely behind the reason they were not deployed to bridge the Marne at La Ferté-sous-Jouarre on 8 September; an oversight which meant that that particular burden fell on the shoulders of 7/ and 9/Field Companies.
In the space of twenty-five days the two bridging units had travelled over 700 miles by train and road and yet had still arrived two days after the first Royal Engineer field companies reached the Aisne. The arrangement at the time appears to have been to hold back the bridging trains until the first reconnaissance had been completed and then order them up as required. Thus poor staff work, together with a failure to fully appreciate the bridging logistics required to move five infantry divisions across a major river inevitably contributed to the stalemate on the Aisne. There is a strong argument to support the view that the vital heavy bridging units should have been allocated to the leading divisions and made available to bridge the river much earlier, thus enabling the infantry to cross in greater strength and creating the conditions
necessary for more co-ordinated attacks. Certainly this may have given British units the opportunity to gain a secure foothold on the Chivres spur and may have altered the course of the battle.83
Although the advance of the 5th Division ran parallel with that of the 4th Division on its left, the two British units were separated by the Chivres spur on which the German 5th Infantry Division was very securely entrenched. This promontory, referred to by Edward Gleichen as, ‘that horrible Chivres spur’, not only separated the two British divisions physically but appeared to check any attempt at coordinating their offensive planning. From very early on in the battle it became apparent that the key to any advance on the left of the British front lay in gaining possession of the spur. The high ground of the spur, with the old Fort de Condé on its summit, dominated the valleys on either side and whilst it remained in German hands, any significant advance was unlikely. Accordingly a two-pronged attack was planned for 14 September: 14 Brigade would attack from the direction of Ste Marguerite and, when Missy was cleared of the enemy, 15 Brigade was to advance and attack the spur from the southeast. Artillery support was provided in the form of XV Brigade and the heavy howitzers of 37/ and 61/Batteries, all of which had been brought up to Bucy-le-Long.
The mist and rain which greeted the troops at dawn on 14 September did not prevent the German gunners on the spur from shelling the valleys on either side as soon as it was light and against this backdrop the 1/Duke of Cornwall’s Light Infantry (1/DCLI) and the 1st Battalion East Surrey Regiment (1/East Surreys) advanced towards the wooded western slopes of the spur. The line of advance, described by the East Surreys war diarist, was, ‘open and rather across the enemy’s front and casualties commenced very soon’, but by noon both battalions were in possession of the northern edge of Missy. It was a different story on the left of the DCLI where 2/Manchesters, came under heavy fire from the direction of Chivres, the village was held by the German 52nd Infantry Regiment, (IR52) and against their resolute defence could make no further progress. The Manchesters had crossed the river the day before and been in action above Ste Marguerite in support of the 4th Division, relieving the Lancashire Fusiliers at dusk that evening. It was from their positions west of Chivres that they attempted to advance on 14 September, the war diary rather brusquely recording that the Manchesters ‘took up a position of defence on the west of Chivres wood and remained there a week’.
BEF Campaign on the Aisne 1914 Page 10