‘In the foreground was an open field, and on the right-hand side a wood, the end of the Bois des Grelines, running up the hillside. About 300 yards in front of me was another small wood, and a gap of about 50 yards between it and the Bois des Grelines. Through the gap it was possible to see that the ground sloped down and then up again in an open space about 800 yards across. In this dip the ground appeared to run up a little into the Moussy spur … all the hillside was thickly wooded and beyond these woods, and about a mile and a half away, the ground sloped up again to the Chemin des Dames.’127
The wooded nature of the ground and the haste in which the attack was planned was a recipe for confusion, William Synge continues the story:
‘In front of us the wood got even thicker, but there was an overgrown path leading through it. There was a lot of argument here, as to who was on the right line and who was not. It seemed to me that D Company ought to have been higher up, and A [Company] lower down. However, as both company leaders concerned were senior to me, they followed each other along the narrow path, whilst I waited for my commander to come up and give me orders.’
The battalion war diary describes the King’s advance taking place on both sides of the road from Moussy to the canal towards what Captain Hudson, the battalion adjutant, describes as the Marval Ridge.128 This would confirm Synge’s recollection that they were on the eastern side of the canal and approaching the ridge above les Grelines Farm which leads directly onto the Chemin des Dames. In his account Hudson acknowledges that the Berkshires got in front of them and describes how the King’s worked along the edge of the Beaulne Spur to the point where they came under fire from behind. After reporting to his CO, Lieutenant Colonel William Bannatyne,129 who was with D Company, Hudson was sent to find Major Charles Steavenson commanding B Company, who also had part of C Company with him:
‘[They] were being fired into from behind. I went back to try and find out what it was and found our infantry were firing into the Germans who had not been cleared off the ridge above and behind our advance. A Company had pushed on, on the right, in the open; all through the advance the companies had been under very heavy rifle and artillery fire from field guns and big howitzers. C Company had got badly handled on the right and Major S. had managed to pull them back, to B Company.’130
Hudson’s assessment of the situation was probably the correct one; the enemy fire from the edges of the Beaulne spur was the result of the King’s getting too far ahead of the the KRRC troops who were on the right flank. However, William Synge was unsure as to who was firing at them, ‘someone said that it was our own people who were firing down on us from the hill top. Whether this was so I do not know, and probably never will know’. Whoever it was – friend or foe – the King’s were now under fire from German infantry to their front and from the rear. Synge tells us his company then withdrew but at some stage during the advance an attempt was made to take the trenches on the ridge ahead of them, this time with the support of a platoon of 2/Worcesters. The attack was unsuccessful:
‘It was impossible to get on until the high ground on our right had been cleared and Major S. then pulled the whole of the companies back. As the fire from behind made it nearly impossible to get forward … Capt. Tanner and Ferneran were wounded. We took 5 Germans prisoners. Our losses were 2 officers killed and 90 [other ranks] killed and wounded.’131
Even so, after crossing the canal just south of Braye, the Berkshires got a toehold on the small spur which runs down from the Chemin des Dames east of the village and by noon had two companies engaging a well dug-in German 28 Reserve Regiment established on the steep slopes rising to the Chemin des Dames road. Under heavy fire Alan Hanbury-Sparrow, who confesses freely to his fear of being killed, is driven on by what he terms as a ‘duty’ prompting him to, ‘take the initiative’:
‘You hesitate, hesitate, hesitate – doubtful, doubtful. You don’t know what you’ll do. Ten black devils chant, “You’ll be killed” and ten red devils curl their lips and sneer, “You’re afraid of being killed.” What will you do? One way or the other you must make the choice, now, at once, instantly.’132
At length the order reached him to retire and he noted with some anger that the men of his platoon were quick to obey it. Yet even as the brigade fell back in the face of a well dug-in enemy, Douglas Haig, in consultation with Major General Charles Munro the GOC 2nd Division, was planning a late-in-the-day push up the Beaulne spur in the hope of gaining the ridge before nightfall. It was an advance which was planned in conjunction with the 1st Division – considered in more depth in Chapter 9 – and as far as the infantry battalions of 5 Infantry Brigade and Brigadier General Richard Haking was concerned, it achieved its objective. Haig described the advance in the I Corps War Diary:
‘The forward movement began about sunset, and the men, of whom many had been fighting hard since before daybreak, answered readily to my demand. They were met everywhere by very heavy rifle and gun fire. The 4th (Guards) Brigade found itself pinned down by a counter attack against the exposed left, and again the danger on this flank checked a great part of the line. The 1st Division on the right gained some ground, but could not maintain itself in the face of the opposition encountered. Only in the centre, the 5th Brigade moving along the eastern slopes of the Beaulne ridges, was able to get forward and continue its advance until it reached the ridge about Tilleul de Courtcon. In the dark General Haking failed to get in touch with the 1st Division, but his patrols found German outposts on both flanks. He consequently drew back his troops under cover of darkness to the neighbourhood of Verneuil.’133
Moving ahead with 5 Brigade was Lieutenant Colonel Northey and half the 1/KRRC which reported reaching the Chemin des Dames at Tilleul de Courtcon from where they moved west to Malval farm. On arrival, instead of finding British troops, ‘they tumbled into a mass of Germans collecting near a large signal lamp’.134 The war diary gives no further information except to say they withdrew at midnight to Verneuil. The 2nd Battalion Highland Light Infantry (2/HLI) were also on the Chemin des Dames ridge at midnight but quite where and at what time the Worcesters gained the ridge is clouded by their war diary account which reported their retirement at about 9.00pm after taking a few German prisoners – all pointing to a general confusion taking place in the darkness. It was during the early part of this advance that a Highland Light Infantry reservist, Private George Wilson, single-handedly captured a German machine gun, turning it on the enemy before returning to his company with both the weapon and its ammunition. His award of the Victoria Cross took the total number of VCs won by the infantry on 14 September to three.
Nevertheless, despite the failure of 3 Brigade to establish a presence on the Chemin des Dames, a substantial body of British troops from 5 Brigade did set foot on the ridge that night, a feat which throws up a number of questions, not least of which is why did General Haking order a retirement all the way back to Verneuil and not seek to consolidate the line further forward? In mitigation it has to be said that being on a rain swept Chemin des Dames ridge in the dark would not have been conducive to establishing clear communications between bodies of tired troops. Haking presumably felt isolated – as indeed he was – and without support on his right from 3 Brigade he was in a precarious position, however, he appears not to have encountered any serious opposition apart from the German outposts. So was this an opportunity lost or a necessary tactical withdrawal? One wonders what the officer commanding 11 Brigade – Brigadier General Hunter-Weston – would have done in these circumstances.
The Guards Brigade was on the move by 4.50am and after a march of 2 miles, ‘in the pouring wet’, they were over the pontoon bridge by 8.30am. Here a disgruntled Major Bernard Gordon Lennox felt he, ‘had to wait a long time before getting across as various artillery and other units had to get across [before us]’. The 2/Grenadiers were the leading battalion and moved off towards Soupir leaving the remainder of the brigade to cross behind them. Major Gordon Lennox:
‘In Soupir
we turned to our left, and after about a mile or so, turned up the hill. It was not known whether these wooded heights were held or not – it was our job to find out – we soon did. No. 1 and ½ of No. 2 [Company] formed the vanguard, and on barely reaching the top the advance party was fired on: we pushed on and two more platoons of No. 2 were sent forward. Being second-in-command I had to stay behind. Pretty steady firing was now going on, and we – the main body – got heavily shelled as we came up the road, the Dutchmen apparently having the range to a nicety. At the top of the hill was the farm of La Cour de Soupir – a building we were to become intimately acquainted with during the next few days – held or rather occupied by a regiment, which shall be nameless.’135
The ‘nameless’ regiment was of course 2/Connaught Rangers which had occupied the farm and pushed out their outposts onto the high ground around Point 197 at la Croix sans Tête. At the time of the Connaught’s arrival at the farm there had been no sign of any Germans in the vicinity. The Connaughts’ war diary recounts the arrival of the Grenadier Guards four hours later:
At about 9.30am a small party of the Guards Brigade under an officer forming the point of their advance guard arrived at the farm, but no more of the brigade arrived until about 11.30am. At about 10:00am a message despatched at 9.25am by motorcyclist was received from HQ 5 Brigade, to whom the movements of the Battalion had been reported, stating that it would be sometime yet before the Guards Brigade could arrive and instructing the OC CRs not to leave his position until they were up and had securely occupied the high ground about La Croix sans Tête. The Battalion was ordered to close on Moussy as soon as that position was secure.’136
The Grenadier officer noted in the Connaught war diary was probably 19-year-old Second Lieutenant John Pickersgill-Cuncliffe. With him was Major Gilbert Hamilton commanding No. 1 Company and Captain Cholmeley Symes-Thompson, with half of No. 2 Company, who had been sent out as flank guard on the left where the ground rises steeply above the road.137 Whether all the Grenadiers remained at the farm or continued uphill is unclear, but Cuncliffe and his platoon certainly were ahead of the main body when the attack began. Nor do we know for sure if it was his warning or that of the Connaught outposts which Major Sarsfield received at about 10.30am alerting him to a large body of German infantry approaching the farm. Sarsfield’s response was immediate and the Connaughts were deployed east and west of the farm:
‘The attack was supported by artillery fire and pushed forward with great vigour. The enemy endeavoured to turn our right flank by moving through the woods and, against our centre and left he advanced across the open ground in very large numbers. By 10.30am approximately, in spite of his losses which were very heavy, he had almost succeeded in turning our right flank and, most of our men who were holding the position close to the farm on the west having been killed and wounded, the enemy had succeeded in pushing forward to within 100 yards of the farm.’138
As the German infantry advanced towards the farm, the Connaught outposts around Point 197 were driven in along with Lieutenant Cuncliffe and his men. During the initial clash with the leading elements of the enemy the young officer was wounded along with several of his men who were taken prisoner, although it appears Cuncliffe was left lying on the battlefield.
At the farm the situation was beginning to get a little desperate on the right flank in the wooded slopes of the Bois de la Bovette. In response Major George ‘Ma’ Jeffreys, who was in temporary command of the Grenadiers, sent three platoons of No. 4 Company up to support Hamilton whilst Lieutenant Colonel Fielding sent 3/Coldstream up to the farm, supported on the right by the whole of the Irish Guards under Major Herbert Stepney. The first indication that Major Jeffreys had of the Coldstream Guards moving up to the farm was when they passed the Grenadiers’ headquarters. Jeffreys then met Lieutenant Arthur Smith the Coldstream adjutant:
‘[He] told me that Major Matheson,139 their commanding officer, was moving up to Cour de Soupir. I went and met Matheson on the road by the farm. One company of the 3rd Battalion Coldstream had come into action west and northwest of the farm and with our No. 2 had driven back the Germans, who withdrew some hundreds of yards on this side.’140
It was during a later conversation with Matheson that Jeffreys was told of the death of John Cuncliffe who had been shot dead by a German officer as he lay wounded on the ground. The incident was verified by men of his platoon who had been taken prisoner when the Germans advanced and subsequently abandoned when the situation was reversed. Jeffreys in his diary account tells us this German officer was shot immediately by the advancing Coldstream.
But the battle was not yet over. Pressure now came onto the left flank and German infantry was only held off by Nos. 1 and 2 Companies of the 2nd Battalion Coldstream which were sent in support. The 2/Coldstream were, up to this point, being held in brigade reserve but it wasn’t long before their companies were sent forward to bolster the right flank defences, leaving a mere two platoons in reserve. The fighting in the wooded area on the right flank was rendered more difficult by the steep edge of the spur which fell away sharply into the Braye valley below. Bernard Gordon Lennox was sent up to rally the Grenadiers and try to work round the left flank:
‘I found two platoons of my own company under ‘Goose’141 all right, then we went further off to the right to see if we couldn’t get round the enemy’s left. We were pulled up by a steep ravine, and we had to go some way round to get over it: a steep climb brought us onto the other side of the valley and here we found the Irish Guards and some Coldstream and Nos. 3 and 4 Companies Grenadier Guards all mixed up. It was here that the Irish Guards and Coldstream Guards paid a heavy toll in officers. There were some damnable snipers up in the trees and kept on sniping the officers. Poor Guernsey and Arthur Hay were killed at almost the same spot, and several others wounded: Dick Welby slightly in the shoulder, ‘Goose’ had also been wounded in the right hand, but these two stuck to it manfully. Sally Walker142 and Harcourt-Vernon143 also had wounds.’144
Although this action cleared the ridge to the right of the firing line there was no further appreciable advance made here but at least contact was made with Major Edward Armitage and the men of A and D Companies of the KRRC.
Any artillery support from XXXVI Brigade was hampered by the early morning mist, but as Arthur Griffith pointed out, ‘the dense woods up to and over the horizon line, permitted only a very limited view being obtained from the valley bottom’. The brigade’s guns were in place north and east of Soupir and as the mist cleared the German observers on the heights above were able to direct fire onto any movement – particularly onto the British batteries. However, the appearance of a section of 18-pounder guns from 71/Battery during the late afternoon did much to improve the situation on the right and assisted in repelling a counter attack just before dusk. Noticeably these guns were practically the only artillery support 4 Brigade had all day. The guns were under the command of Lieutenant Griffith:
‘I was unable to get any view [of the enemy] from the farm buildings, so went out and found our firing line holding a low bank a short way in front of the farm and west of it. These were chiefly Coldstreams, with some other guards oddments. I was standing up looking through my glasses, and had just been shown the Germans lining a not very distant hedge, when I was hit through the arm. A sergeant tied me up and I went back to find a position for my guns.’145
Griffith was soon joined by Captain William Cree146 who took command and decided to bring the guns into the open in order to bring a more effective fire on the enemy:
‘As soon as we left the cover of the road and trees, we were promptly shelled by our own artillery, who put over about 20–30 rounds of shrapnel before we were able to stop them with vigorous signalling rearwards. Fortunately their shooting was not accurate and we sustained no casualties. Subsequent investigation proved it was the remaining four guns of our own 71st Battery which had mistaken us for German guns retiring!’147
With Cree observing from a forward pos
ition, Griffith remained with the guns some 200 yards behind the infantry firing line. Almost as soon as they opened fire the infantry, ‘for some unknown reason now retired through us’. Griffith and his battery were now left completely isolated:
‘As we were now left between the opposing lines, and the hostile shelling had become more intense, and moreover German infantry could be seen beginning to advance, the teams were ordered up, while the guns continued firing until the last possible moment … As soon as we stopped firing the German infantry advanced at the double, firing as they came, and it now became a race as to whether we should reach the cover of the trees and our lines before they reached us. However our infantry eventually grasped our predicament and their fire on our pursuers finally settled matters in our favour.’148
It had been a close run thing and the battery only just avoided being overrun by the German infantry. Griffith’s diary demonstrates a remarkable generosity towards the Guards whose late intervention came not a moment too soon! For his coolness under fire and bravery in getting the guns limbered up and out of action, Griffith was awarded the DSO. Discretion being the better part of valour, the battery was moved back under cover of the trees and came into action again shortly afterwards but not before Griffith and two men who had been wounded in the action were sent down to Soupir.
At noon, encouraged by their success in holding off the enemy, Matheson and Jeffreys felt the time had arrived to take the offensive. The German line was static in the turnip fields north of the farm and a spirited charge might just dislodge the enemy. But even before the Guardsmen had time to fix their bayonets and move forward, the Germans in the front line stood up and with white flags waving began to run forward with their hands up in surrender. George Jeffreys witnessed the event:
‘Unfortunately men of all units – Grenadiers, Coldstream, Connaught Rangers and Irish Guards – rushed forward to seize prisoners, and though both Matheson and I shouted to them to stand fast, we could not stop them and a confused mass of British and German soldiers was the result. On this mass the German soldiers in the rear at once opened fire, causing a number of casualties.’149
BEF Campaign on the Aisne 1914 Page 14