Boots on the Ground: The history of Project Delta
Page 15
Aircraft troubles were far from over. On May 10th the radio relay aircraft that supported the elements in the field crashed on takeoff from the FOB. The DeHaviland U1A Otter spent all day, every day, in a large and high orbit around the Project’s AO to receive and relay any radio messages from the teams on the ground. The Ashau is so steep that regular communication accomplished via line-of-sight could not be accomplished. The crew usually included a recon man to handle emergency communications with the teams. The Otter would land on the dirt air strip adjacent to the FOB and remain overnight after each days’ flights. The FOB and airstrip had two rolls of concertina wire spread around them as part of the FOB security. At some point, the two rows of wire were supplemented with a third row, placed on top of the other two. The pilot, accustomed to the two rows of wire, did not have enough altitude on takeoff and snagged the planes rear single wheel in the wire. Everyone on board was injured in the crash. SFC Larry Bartlett, the recon NCO onboard, suffered severe back injuries and was medevaced.49
On May 14th the insertion helicopter for Team 1 was hit by small arms and automatic weapons fire and crashed on the LZ. A recovery ship immediately flew in and retrieved the air crew and part of the team. A second rescue ship was shot down on the LZ attempting to pick up the remainder of the team. The air crew linked with the team and the Team Leader called in gunships, Spooky, and two F4 jets, all coordinated by the Delta FAC. They provided illumination and suppressive fire until the team and crew could be extracted well after dark. The two downed aircraft and equipment left behind during the extraction were destroyed by tactical air strikes the next morning. An interesting side note to this rescue operation is carried in the After Action Report. The note states that although night extractions were now deemed to be feasible they should not be considered as a matter of routine. The one significant useful piece of information gleaned from this exercise was that parachute flares provided enough illumination so that a signal mirror could be used to locate ground elements. 49
On May 21st Roadrunner Team 107 requested an immediate extraction due to illness of a team member. On the first extraction attempt the helicopter received small arms fire wounding the pilot in the head and the Delta recovery NCO in the arm. The ship pulled off and directed the team to higher ground. The second attempt resulted in a gunship from the 281st being shot down by small arms fire. The helicopter crashed and rolled down into a small ravine and exploded in flames. Shortly after the crash a red signal panel was seen close to the wreckage. A Marine CH-46 responded to the crash but could not land near the area. They were successful in locating one crew member and rescued him. The Roadrunner team was located and extracted by a CH-3 Jolly Green Giant. More ships from the 281st arrived on station and detected two Americans on the ground. The rescue ship attempted to rescue them and came under heavy ground fire, killing one door gunner. It was decided to insert the 1st Ranger Company at first light to attempt a rescue. On May 22nd the 1st Ranger Company inserted under heavy ground fire. One Marine CH-46 was hit by ground fire and crashed on the LZ. The FAC sighted two of the three missing crew members on the ground and directed the Rangers toward them. The Rangers found one of the missing crewmen who had become separated from the pilot. The Rangers decided to remain in the area overnight after they evacuated the recovered crewman. The C&C aircraft reported seeing another signal panel from the air. On the 23rd the Rangers established radio contact with the missing pilot and linked up with him. During the extraction of the Rangers and the recovered pilot, three Rangers were killed; two Rangers and one interpreter were wounded. The missing copilot was never found despite continuous searches.49
During an aerial reconnaissance on May 27th, gunships from the 281st AHC intercepted a radio message from an Army FAC in an O1E Bird Dog saying that he had been hit and was going down in the Ashau. The gunships immediately rallied to his location and escorted him all the way back to Phu Bai.49
On June 4th LT Col. Baites, USMC Squadron 235, crashed his F8 aircraft in Delta’s AO. Hearing his radio transmission, two pilots from the 281st AHC sped to his location and rescued him within minutes of the crash.49
The teams were in constant contact throughout the entire operation. Injuries were frequent and required team extractions and personnel replacements, dangerous practices. On May 19th Team 9 jumped from a helicopter while inserting into high elephant grass. SSG Maurice Brakeman was impaled through the rectum on a punji stake placed on the LZ. The team was extracted and Brakeman was medevaced. He survived the ordeal and returned to Project Delta in 1970.
An indicator of the high activity in this area were the more than 1000 sorties flown by tactical air support aircraft on over 500 air strikes called in support of Delta’s operations. One of Project Delta’s missions was to identify targets and coordinate the air attacks from on the ground. Many of the air strikes were called in support of teams in contact during their missions and at the time of extraction. On June 15th, 1967 Project Delta headed back to
Nha Trang.49
CHAPTER XIII: LTC BRUISER ALLEN; BREAK CONTACT, CONTINUE MISSION
The fifth named campaign of the Vietnam War was “Counteroffensive, Phase III”, 1 June 1967-29 January 1968. The conflict in South Vietnam remains basically unchanged. As Operation JUNCTION CITY ended, elements of the U.S. 1st and 25th Infantry Divisions, the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, and the forces of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam swung back toward Saigon to conduct another clearing operation, MANHATTAN. This took peace in the Long Nguyen base area just north of the previously cleared “Iron Triangle.”
South Vietnamese Armed Forces became more active and capable under U.S. advisors. During the year the Vietnamese Special Forces assumed responsibility for several Special Forces camps and for the CIDG companies manning them. In each case all of the U.S. advisors withdrew, leaving the Vietnamese in full command.
With an increased delegation of responsibility to them, the South Vietnamese conducted major operations during 1967, and, in spite of VC attempts to avoid battle, achieved a number of contacts.
Despite the success of U.S. and South Vietnamese Army operations, there were indications in the fall of 1967 of another enemy buildup, particularly in areas close to Laos and Cambodia. In late October, the VC struck again at the Special Forces Camp at Loc Ninh. Fortunately Vietnamese reinforcements saved the camp. At the same time, approximately 12,000 VC troops converged on a Special Forces camp at Dak To. This camp was located in northern Kontum Province, where the borders of Laos, Cambodia, and South Vietnam meet. In response to this potential threat, the U.S. and South Vietnam committed a total of sixteen battalions to the region to counter a disturbing enemy resurgence at Kontum and Loc Ninh65
Operation 6-67 was named Shakedown and was a continuation of Operation 1-67 to locate and destroy elements of NVA and VC units operating west of Nha Trang. The enemy units had sustained extensive losses at the hands of the Koreans earlier in the year and had dispersed. Recent information indicated that they were regrouping and attempting to regain battle strength while continuing to acquire provisions and conduct interdiction missions along roadways and travel routes. Teams 4 (SFC Bartlett, SSG Monroe, SGT Betterton) and 1 (SFC Stanfield, SFC Singh) conducted reconnaissance missions from July 6th through July 8th. Neither team detected any activity although both teams found their extraction LZs to be cultivated in corn. Team 3 crash landed on their LZ on July 7th with no injuries to the crew or the team. They were immediately extracted and the Nung Platoon (SFC Findley, SSG Rittenhouse, SP4 Meder) was alerted to secure the downed helicopter. The Nungs were inserted later on the 7th and established a perimeter around the aircraft. During a routine security patrol outside the perimeter the Nungs discovered a cache of corn, rice and manioc and destroyed it. They rigged explosive charges to the aircraft just prior to extraction on July 8th. The aircraft was destroyed a few minutes after the Nungs were extracted.50 The Nung Platoon was previously a non-operational element of Project Delta assigned camp security duties. Prior to Operation
Shakedown the Nungs were readied for field duty as immediate reaction forces and as reconnaissance in force units. During the time frame of this operation, Major Charles “Bruiser” Allen assumed command of Project Delta. He would be the longest serving Commanding Officer of the unit.
Just days after the conclusion of Operation Shakedown, Project Delta received an order to set up an FOB in I Corps at An Hoa to support the III MAF again. The enemy had established two known base camps in the mountains east of Delta’s assigned AO and was known to resupply the bases with personnel and equipment from Laos through the many east-west valleys including those from the terminating end of the Ashau. Delta’s mission was to identify any other base areas, and to identify which routes were being used and by which units. It was suspected that a number of way stations and rest areas were established in Delta’s AO and were being guarded by small local NVA and VC forces. These forces were apparently instructed not to fire upon aircraft so as not to give away their location. Delta was to find any way stations and destroy them with the use of tactical air.51
During Operation Samurai ten Recon missions and three Roadrunner missions were accomplished. Two Nung Platoon missions were launched as reconnaissance in force missions. The Rangers were tasked with ten operations: one battalion mission, four company missions and five platoon missions. The FOB at An Hoa was established as operational on July 17th, 1967. It was apparent from the beginning that the AO was saturated with small units used as trail watchers, way station guards, crop tenders, LZ guards and guides for larger units passing through. These small groups effectively sabotaged, watched and defended many LZs throughout the AO. Many insertions were thwarted by small arms fire on the LZs and others were compromised by strategically placed stakes and traps. Numerous contacts and firefights occurred during Operation Samurai. Most were with small units of three to six enemy. In the areas adjacent to known enemy infiltration routes along the terminus of the Ashau Valley, contacts with larger platoon and company sized units occurred. Invariably these contacts were immediately preceded by contacts with a smaller security force.51
Major Allen, a Korean War veteran, brought a leadership style to Project Delta that was both challenging and endearing to his men. Affectionately known as “Bruiser” he was a former football player and sported a perpetual chipped-tooth grin. He expected maximum professional effort from his troops and returned the effort with a fierce loyalty and determination to get the troops out of harm’s way at the right time. Bruiser was an independent commander and had his own ideas about how to efficiently run a clandestine reconnaissance unit. He had an immediate impact on Project Delta when he laid out the operations for Samurai. He delegated more reconnaissance in force missions to the Rangers and Nungs then had been previously done. He still retained the Rangers as the primary reaction force for Recon teams in trouble but began transitioning those responsibilities to the Nung Platoon as they demonstrated their abilities as the Project’s only mercenary force. He began Operation Samurai by inserting Recon Teams, Roadrunner Teams, Nung Recon Forces and Ranger Recon Platoons.
On July 23rd Ranger Platoon 23 made contact with a platoon sized force and suffered three killed and five wounded. They called for gunship support from the 281st AHC and enemy fire was effectively suppressed. Ten enemy were killed by air support. The platoon was reinforced by the remainder of the 3rd Company when casualties were evacuated. The reinforced platoon was given a search and destroy mission. They continued the mission through July 27th, when they made contact again.51
While the Ranger Platoon was engaged, the Nung Recon Force found itself surrounded while observing a village and called in an air strike. They successfully destroyed 16 structures and observed two secondary explosions. Enemy casualties were unknown and the force was extracted without injury.51
On August 2nd Recon Team 8 was inserted. The senior advisor, SFC Joe Singh, took SP4 Kurt Samide into the hole for his first recon mission. On August 3rd the team reported they had been in contact with an unknown sized enemy force in the early morning darkness, and the team had been split. Upon discovering that the team was split, the senior U.S. advisor, Joe Singh, returned to the scene of the enemy contact and found an M-16 with blood along the receiver and magazine. There was no sign of the separated team members. The Command and Control (C&C) helicopter, with Major Allen aboard, departed for the Team 8 AO and spotted two elements of the split team. Low on fuel, the C&C ship returned to the FOB and refueled. They returned to the last known location of the team and located the senior U.S. advisor and two LLDB and extracted them. A short time later the other two LLDB were extracted by hoist some distance away. SP4 Kurt Samide, the second U.S. advisor, was listed as Missing in Action (MIA). 2nd Company, 91st Airborne Ranger Battalion was inserted to search for Samide and clear the area.51 At the same time, Roadrunner Team 101 was engaged by a superior enemy force and expended all of their ammunition in the ensuing firefight. The team became split during the encounter and began evading the enemy. Extraction aircraft were not available due to the situation with Team 8 and 2nd Ranger Company. On August 4th a search was conducted for the Roadrunners. All aircraft received heavy ground fire from virtually all of the search area.
Three members of Team 101 were extracted under heavy fire. The rescue ships returned to base to refuel and then resumed the search. They soon found a fourth team member and extracted him under heavy fire. The Roadrunner team had initiated a firefight with a small group of NVA and been taken under fire by an estimated two companies of NVA. They expended all their ammunition and dropped their weapons and rucksacks as they fled.51
2nd Ranger Company had established a base perimeter and sent smaller patrols to search for Kurt Samide. One of the patrols was mistaken for an enemy force as it returned to the patrol base and was fired upon by their own unit resulting in two Rangers wounded. They were evacuated without incident.
On August 5th, Andy Sheppard, an advisor to the 2nd Ranger Company, found Kurt Samide wounded but conscious. The Rangers had encountered some resistance in their ascent of a ridge and Sheppard’s part of the column was stalled in the bottom of a steep ravine. While observing the area around him he was startled to see the tips of a pair of boots protruding from some dense undergrowth. He and one of the Rangers cautiously approached and pulled back the vegetation and found Kurt Samide barely conscious, very weak, and gravely wounded. He had been struck in the left hand during the initial contact at which time he lost his weapon. In the darkness after the attack he evaded the enemy and ran headlong into a tree and was knocked unconscious. He had lost a lot of blood and moved in and out of consciousness. He settled next to a tree and sat there with a grenade as his only weapon. He pulled the pin and waited for the enemy to find him. He passed out from blood loss and the grenade exploded, taking his right arm off below the elbow. In shock, he followed a stream bed to be near a source of water and continued to try to signal any aircraft flying overhead. Alone and seriously wounded, he decided to stay put until help arrived. Andy Sheppard tied a rope around Samide and assisted him up the hill as four Rangers pulled on the rope from the top.
Medics administered morphine and antibiotics and Samide began to realize that he had been rescued by the Rangers. Joe Singh accompanied the rescue effort and carried Samide to the extraction aircraft on his back. The Recon Section leader, Doc Simpson, was on the rescue ship to take him for medical attention. This was an oft repeated, but seldom recognized, pattern of loyalty and leadership demonstrated by the men of Project Delta. Joe Singh, fresh from a harrowing near-death experience of his own would not take no for an answer when it came time to make every attempt to find a team mate. Recon Section Leaders like Doc Simpson and Norm Doney considered it their sacred duty to take personal responsibility for the welfare of all men in their charge.60 Kurt Samide eventually spent a year in Walter Reed Army Hospital and learned to live with no right hand and limited use of his left. He was encouraged during his recovery by frequent letters from Delta’s Sergeant Major William Fuller.51,5
4 During all of this activity teams in the field were directed to go to ground. All insertions and extractions were postponed due to the unavailability of aircraft. A lot of people were in very vulnerable positions.
On August 6th Team 12 called for extraction. The recovery ship approached the LZ and was shot down. The crew escaped with only minor injuries as the ship crashed and burned. They successfully linked with Team 12. While the other recovery aircraft returned to FOB for refueling, a Marine CH-53 was dispatched to the scene of the crash and began to recover the crew and team by hoist. The first three men were successfully hoisted into the helicopter but as the second lift of three was hoisted the winch cable contacted a tree and broke. The three air crew members on the lift fell 150 to 200 feet to the ground. The remaining four men on the ground rushed to assist them and reported two crewmen dead and one seriously injured. Another 281st recovery ship flew in and dropped a Delta medic and picked up the four remaining men. The medic discovered that the third man had also died. A recovery crew of eight Delta volunteers was inserted and recovered the bodies of all three crewmen. The recovery ship came under heavy enemy fire while departing the LZ. Tactical air and helicopter gunships suppressed the enemy fire.51