Delta.”74
As a direct result of Major May’s two blistering After Action Reports Lieutenant Colonel Caridakis, Assistant Chief of Staff, MACV J-3, forwarded the following MACV Directive for the Chief of Staff’s approval. Note that the entire directive is not classified but that (C) denotes paragraphs that are specifically classified and (U) denotes specific paragraphs that are not classified.
MACJ3-033 Employment of PROJECT DELTA (U)
Chief of Staff ACofS, J3
LTC Caridakis/tnb
1. (U) PURPOSE. To forward a proposed MACV Directive, PROJECT DELTA, to Chief of Staff for approval
2. (C) DISCUSSION.
a. At Tab B is a letter from CO, 5th SFG requesting that a MACV Directive be published regarding the employment of PROJECT DELTA (Detachment B-52, 5th SFGA.
b. The proposed directive enclosed with the letter has been reviewed. J-3 concurred in except for para 3 a, b, c, (green flag), and the excessive details contained in para 5, Support Requirements (Red flag).
c. Subparagraphs 3 a, b, and c pertain to requests for PROJECT DELTA forces and the transfer of OPCON of Vietnamese elements to US Field Force Commanders/Senior Advisor. These paragraphs have been rewritten under COMMAND and CONTROL paragraph and delineate the request procedures for US Field Force Commanders/Senior Advisors to obtain PROJECT DELTA assignment and tasks the Field Force Commanders/Senior Advisors with the responsibility of coordinating with the Vietnamese Corps Commander for transfer of OPCON of Vietnamese elements. In addition, when transfer of OPCON of Vietnamese elements is not feasible, the US Field Force Commanders/Senior Advisor will be responsible for providing necessary support to PROJECT DELTA forces.
d. CO, 5th SFGA concurs with the above changes. (Ref telecon with MAJ McCullough, Ass’t S-3, 13 Nov 68).
e. At Tab A is proposed directive.
3. (U) RECOMMENDATION: That the proposed directive at Tab A be approved and published.
ELIAS C. TOWNSEND
Major General, USA
Assistant Chief of Staff, J3
2 Incl
asHEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES MILITARY ASSISTANT COMMAND, VIETNAM
APO San Francisco 96222
DIRECTIVE NUMBER : PROJECT DELTA
1. (U) PURPOSE: To provide guidance for employment of PROJECT DELTA.
2. (C) GENERAL: PROJECT DELTA is a joint US Special Forces and Vietnamese Special Forces special operations detachment with the primary mission of long range covert reconnaissance surveillance. The detachment has the capabilities to:
a. Gather intelligence for tactical or strategic exploitation.
b. Plan airstrikes, and conduct bomb damage assessment.
c. Interdict routes of infiltration and lines of communication.
d. Conduct limited search and clear operations.
e. Conduct special purpose raids:
(1) Hunter-killer missions
(2) POW recovery
(3) Downed air crew or body recovery missions
(4) Wire tap operations
(5) Prisoner acquisitions
f. Conduct harassing, cover and/or deception operations.
g. Conduct photo reconnaissance operations and furnish completed photo intelligence reports.
h. Conduct airborne personnel detector missions.
i. Combat test new equipment.
j. Conduct classified missions.
3. (C) EMPLOYMENT.
a. Assets
(1) 81st Ranger Battalion (Airborne), three (3) companies as reaction elements.
(2) Elements of 281st Assault helicopter Company, when operating in I or II CTZ.
(3) Tactical Air Control Party (TACP).
(4) CIDG Roadrunner Platoon (12 teams).
(5) CIDG bomb damage assessment platoon.
(6) USASF - VNSF reconnaissance platoon (16 teams).
b. Operations. PROJECT DELTA is normally utilized in an area of 1200 - 1500 square kilometers where there is a definite intelligence void. The area of operations (AO) and Forward Operating Base (FOB) are assigned exclusively to CO PROJECT DELTA. Requested boundary penetrations of the AO by other units or supporting arms are coordinated with CO PROJECT DELTA. During the operation, the AO is saturated with roadrunner teams and helicopter inserted reconnaissance teams, with the reaction elements held for insertion in one lift for the exploitation of developed contacts or the relief of embattled teams.
c. Logistics: PROJECT DELTA requires the following logistical considerations:
(1) Class II through V supplies including III-A and V-A.
(2) Aviation.
(a) C-130 aircraft for movement to and from FOB. For planning purposes 20-25 aircraft required.
(b) Radio relay aircraft.
(c) Aircraft for TACP, normally two required.
(1) Designate the AO, adjacent unit responsibilities and location of FOB.
(2) Effect liaison with CO, 5th SFG and initiate planning with CO, PROJECT DELTA. Assume operational control of PROJECT DELTA upon movement into FOB.
(3) Provide additional reaction forces as required.
(4) Provide additional helicopter gunships or helilift support as required.
(5) Establish secure voice communications between FOB and OPCON headquarters.
(6) Designate priority on tactical air and arclight missions.
(7) Insure the availability of the required combat and logistic support for PROJECT DELTA forces.
5. (U) REPORTS. Upon completion of a PROJECT DELTA mission, Commanding Officer, PROJECT DELTA will submit after action report to this headquarters via the OPCON headquarters and the US Field Force Commander or Senior Advisor.
Enclosure 1 - Chain of Command
Enclosure 2 - Capabilities of Project Delta
Enclosure 3 - Operational Organization
Enclosure 4 - Project DELTA Reaction Force-81st Airborne Ranger Battalion
Enclosure 5 - CIDG Bomb Damage Assessment Plan
Enclosure 6 - Reconnaissance Team
ECT DELTA. Enclosure 7 - Road Runners
(3) Coordinate tactical airlift of all PROJECT DELTA elements to and from the FOB.
c. OPCON headquarters:
By the end of 1968 the winds of change were blowing in Washington, D.C. The uncertainty that prevailed on Capitol Hill began to affect conventional unit commanders in Vietnam. Project Delta would enter its final year and a half with a long and hard earned identity and would face much adversity through the indecisiveness and uncertainty of U.S. commanders on whom Delta depended for action.
CHAPTER XVI: THE BEGINNING OF THE END
“Counteroffensive, Phase VI”, 2 November 1968 - 22 February 1969. In November 1968 the South Vietnam government with American support began a concentrated effort to expand security in the countryside. This project was known as the “Accelerated Pacification Campaign.”
This period covers the election of President Richard M. Nixon and a change of policy brought about by his administration after January 1969 when he announced a coming end to US combat in Southeast Asia and a simultaneous strengthening of South Vietnam’s ability to defend itself. Formal truce negotiations began in Paris on January 25, 1969. The period can be characterized as marking time in preparation for an about face. Forty-seven ground combat operations were recorded during this period, the following being the most important:
(1). Operation NAPOLEON in the Dong Ha area initiated previously (1967) by Marine units, terminated on 9 December 1968.
(2). Operation WHEELER WALLOWA by 3d Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division and 196th Infantry Brigade (Light) in north-central Quan Tin Province. This ended on 11 November.
(3). Operation MACARTHUR initiated by 4th U.S. Infantry Division in II Corps tactical zone terminated on 31 January 1969.
(4). Operation COCHISE GREEN conducted by the 173d Airborne Brigade in Binh Dinh Province.
(5). Operation TOAN THANG II consisted of ground operations throughout III CTZ. This was a multi-division operation involving allied forces.
(6). Operation SEA LORDS was a coast and riverine operation. On 6 December Operation GIANT SLINGSHOT was started to disrupt enemy infiltration of materials from the “Parrot’s Beak” area of Cambodia. Air operations continued to be important with over 60,000 sorties flown”.65
Project Delta returned to III Corps for a two month operation running from November 16th, 1968 through January 16th, 1969. Operation Ares (7-68) was accomplished from an FOB located outside of the provincial capital city of Dong Xoai, which sat on a major five-highway cross roads, and was a logging area. The area was hilly with many lakes and streams. The FOB was set up across a 16 foot wide asphalt highway that had been widened and extended for about three thousand feet to form a runway. There was an SF A camp in the area that had been overrun earlier in a major battle for the area in 1965 (10 June 1965–20 June 1965) in which 2LT Charles Q. Williams, 5th SFG was awarded the Medal of Honor and the first SEABEE to receive the Medal of Honor was part of the battle.66
During Operation Ares thirty four Recon missions, twenty nine Roadrunner missions, eighteen Ranger operations, and five Nung Platoon operations were conducted. These missions included reconnaissance/surveillance, search and clear and rescue/recovery missions. During the operations, 66 enemy sightings and 41 enemy contacts occurred. Many Recon and Roadrunner teams were forced from their operating areas because of enemy pursuit, contact, or compromise. On December 5th Recon Team 12 ambushed seven NVA and managed to kill six and take one prisoner. On December 8th Recon Team 1 engaged an unknown sized enemy force and evaded with a prisoner. The prisoner died at the extraction LZ. One LLDB team member was separated from the team at the time of contact. The Nung Platoon was inserted on Team 1’s extraction LZ and began to search for the missing team member. The Nungs came under attack by an enemy company and called for air support. During the attack two Nungs were wounded. The Nungs continued their mission and located the body of the missing team member who had died of wounds sustained in the initial contact. On December 11th the 2nd Company, 81st Airborne Ranger Battalion came under attack by an enemy force. During the exchange of fire U.S. advisor SFC Tom Schultz and ROK advisor LT Wu were wounded.75
During Operation Ares, an unoccupied Battalion base area was discovered and ultimately destroyed. Numerous documents were captured that identified the unit as the VC 81st Rear Service Group. Documents captured through other enemy contacts identified the presence of the 70th Rear Service Group, its subordinate warehouse group H.10, and its subordinate Transportation unit V.532. The transportation routes between the two Rear Service Groups was patrolled and guarded by reconnaissance platoons of the 70th Rear Service group. The presence of these two units, the large number of troop sightings, the number of enemy contacts, the number of abandoned base camps and hospitals, and the discovery of a large number of bicycles indicated that the area was being used as a headquarters complex for convalescence, training, resupply, and food and weapons cache. Project Delta identified three major infiltration routes and numerous smaller high speed trails heavily used by foot, motorcycle and bicycle traffic. Many trails were covered with bamboo fronds to minimize noise and to hide the trails from the air.75
The following are excerpts taken directly from the After Action Report for Operation Ares. Although they don’t give a blow by blow of the entire missions they do serve to demonstrate the level of detail observed by the Recon teams even under enemy fire.
“Recon Team 10 (08 - 10 Jan 69). 090910H, vic coord YT276805, team heard 3-4 SA shots fired approx 1000 m SE of their position. (Item 148, Enemy Activity Overlay).
(2) 091100H, vic coord YT274796, team observed an enemy base camp consisting of 10
covered foxholes, 3 cook fire sites, 2 cooking pots, and 1 empty AK ammo case. Area showed no sign of recent use.
(3) 091500H, vic coord YT277797, team observed a 4 m wide, E/W trail consisting of
bamboo matting. Trail showed signs of heavy use by motorcycles, bicycles and foot traffic.
(4) 100900H, vic coord YT275795, team observed 6 VC moving E on a trail. Enemy point man was dressed in civilian khaki pants, black shirt, sandals, and wore a green triangle-shaped cloth tied around his head. He also wore a U.S. pistol belt with canteen on his right hip, a poncho and AK ammo vest. Remaining five enemy wore black PJ and mixed khaki pants/black shirts. The 1st and 2nd enemy were armed with ChiCom assault rifles. The remaining four enemy were armed with SKS weapons. Team initiated contact and enemy returned fire with numerous SA rds and fled. The following were captured: 1 AK-47 (SN 12047683), 1 AK ammo vest, 134 rds 7.62mm ammo (ChiCom and Russian origin), 3 brassieres, 7 panties, 1 U.S. pistol belt, 1 hammock, 6 BA 30 (make “Calor”), 1 ChiCom flashlight, 1 cooking pot, 7 bars of baby soap, 7 bars regular soap, 1 kerosene lamp, 1 can of milk, 1 bed sheet, 7towels (one U.S. green), 1 pair black socks (US type), 1 kilo rice, 1 slip (female undergarment), 5 black trousers (female), 5 black shirts (female), 1 black shirt (male), 1 shirt (khaki), 1 pair khaki trousers, 4 AK magazines, 1 oil can. 00920H, same coord, team observed 2 enemy KIA as a res of gunships, and USASF adv, in recovery ship, observed 1 enemy WIA (possibly KIA) approx 50 m W of vic coord YT275795. Enemy body was clothed with black PJ uniform. Helicopter received SA fire during extraction.”75
“Rcn Team 12 (10 - 12 Jan 69). (1) 101945H, vic coord YT297747, team heard 1 SA shot fired approx 400 to 500 m SE of their position. On 102045H, same coord, team heard 1 SA shot fired approx 400 to 500 m SE of their position. On 102245H, same coord, team heard 1 SA shot fired approx 400-500 m SE of their position. (Item 157, Enemy Activity Overlay).
(2) 110915H, vic coord YT296746, team observed a NW/SE trail approx 1/2 m wide that showed sign of heavy use.
(3) 111530H, vic coord YT295740, team observed 12-15 enemy moving SW on the trail. Enemy were wearing mixed black, gray and tan uniforms, and green fatigue hats. They were armed with AK assault rifles. Enemy appeared to be unobservant, talked loudly, and wore their weapons at sling arms and on their shoulders. On 111615H, same coord, team observed 2 enemy moving SW on the trail. One wore a black shirt and brown trousers, and the other wore a brown uniform. Both wore green hats and were armed with AK assault rifles. On 120825H, same coord, team observed 9 enemy moving NE on trail. They were wearing brown uniforms and green hats, and had packs and were armed with AK assault rifles. On 120835H, same coord, team observed 1 enemy moving NE on the trail. Enemy wore black uniform and green hat and was armed with an AK assault rifle. He was carrying a civilian radio and played it loudly. On 120840H, same coord, team observed 2 enemy moving NE on trail. They had packs and were armed with AK assault rifles. Enemy got near team’s position, and turned around moving SW back down the trail. On 121010H, same coord, team observed 4 enemy moving NE on trail. they were armed with 3 AK assault rifles and 1 BAR. They were very observant; however, completely disregarded the LZ being blasted by an air strike. On 121015H, same coord, team observed 12 enemy moving SW on the trail. They were wearing brown uniform and green hats. Their packs were full of unk contents, and they were armed with AK assault rifles. On 121125H, same coord, team observed 5 enemy moving SW on the trail. They were brown unif, web gear, and appeared to be very observant. The first enemy wore a green hat and was armed with an AK assault rifle. the 2nd enemy wore a U.S. steel helmet and was armed with a BAR. The third enemy wore a green hat with a U.S. steel helmet hooked to his web gear and had his left shirt sleeve rolled to the elbow. The 4th enemy wore a green hat and was armed with an AK assault rifle. The 5th enemy wore a green hat and was armed with an AK assault rifle. On 121515H, same coord, team observed 1 enemy moving SW on the trail wearing black shirt and gray trousers and sandals. He was armed with an AK assault rifle. At approx 4-5 m range, team fired and enemy was KIA. On 112045H, same coord, team heard 1 SA shot fired approx 500 m SW of their location. On 112100H, same coord, team heard 6 SA/AW rds fired approx 500 m SW of their location. On 112200H, same coord, team heard voices and unk number of people moving NW of their position on trail. On120830H, same coord, team heard 1 SA sho
t fired approx 500 m SW of their position. On 120950H, same coord, Team heard 1 SA shot fired approx 1000 m NE of their location.75
“121345H, vic coord YT118543, Team 3 discovered a bicycle repair shop. It contained 3 used bicycles, 6 new bicycle tires, spare parts for bicycles and trucks. Area showed signs of having been used for vehicle repair. There was an old destroyed bunker at this loc, and also a 1 m wide, well used trench running SE/NW. Team observed 12 steel rods, 12 feet long, 1/2 inch thick (2 separate piles). 121415H, same loc, team heard chopping of wood approx 200 m N of their location. Team destroyed the bicycles, bicycle tires, and most of the equipment.”75
Medic SSG Dennis McVey recalls several incidents from his time at Dong Xoai.
“One morning during resupply, a CH 47 was on the ground with its turbines running and sitting next to the runway when a C -130 landed. The C -130’s right wing hit the rotor blades and about three feet of the wing was torn off. Unbelievably, the CH – 47 was able to fly out for repairs and no one on either aircraft or on the ground was injured. The C -130 taxied to the end of the runway, pulled off the edge and shut down. As it was going down the runway it spilled fuel all along the edge of the runway and the FOB, but luckily none of it caught fire. The flight crew was flown out as they did not want to stay out in the boonies with us. The next day a repair crew flew in and began working on the wing. They cleaned up the jagged edges, sealed the fuel tank and lines in the right wing and then fabricated a shortened wing tip on the plane. They would come in early in the morning and leave in the evening. They worked quickly and got the job done in three days. A crew came in and flew the C 130 out. During the time the plane was on the ground the Delta folks thought it would be mortared and destroyed before they could get it out but that did not happen. The night after the day it was flown out, the FOB got mortared with lots of rounds falling where the plane had been. I can only assume that it took that long to get a plan in action and get the mortars in place. It says a lot about the VC’s ability to react in that it took that long, and even though the plane was gone they still executed the attack.”66
Boots on the Ground: The history of Project Delta Page 21