None the less, in February the field army, 283,000 strong, was activated. At the same time a corps structure was hastily introduced and the eight-corps strong main force assembled in north-west Bohemia to strike into the Main region. Charles, however, hesitated, concerned that his army was not combat ready and that logistics would be difficult to maintain. In mid March, he switched his main axis of advance from Bohemia to the Danube in order to protect Vienna. It was a change that improved neither the condition of the army nor its strategic position. It created wastage of men and horses, while the delay proved costly, perhaps fatal, allowing the French and their German allies to reinforce and consolidate their forces. When the Austrian army finally opened hostilities by crossing the Bavarian frontier on 10 April, Charles had very little confidence in a successful outcome.13 It was scarcely an ideal frame of mind in which to launch a war against the greatest military power in Europe.
CHAPTER TWO
The contending armies
THE ANATOMY OF THE HABSBURG ARMY
Embroidered by patriotic legend, the war of 1809 occupies an honoured place in Austrian military history. Yet it was undertaken on the basis of false strategic assumptions and with an army still far from fully combat capable. Soon after the final decision for war had been made on 8 February, its commander, Generalissimus Archduke Charles, had lost what little confidence he had in the campaign, telling General von Heldenfeld, his chief-of-staff, that, ‘I did not vote for war; let those who did assume responsibility’.1 The archduke had good reason to worry about the state of his army. He had made substantial reforms, but despite promises made in 1806 when he had been appointed the emperor’s chief military advisor for a second time as well as generalissimus, he rarely had a free hand to implement his reforms. His brother, the Emperor Francis, and his faction at court – as well as the various other archdukes, the military bureaucracy embodied in the Hofkriegsrat and a number of reactionary senior officers – had constantly interfered with his plans, frequently obstructing them. Disliking his brother, easily taken in and always suspicious, in March 1808 the emperor had gone so far as to set a number of officials to spy on the archduke. In this climate of intrigue and suspicion, it was hardly to be wondered at that the Austrian army should have entered the campaign in disarray.
CHARLES’S THEORIES ON STRATEGY AND GRAND TACTICS
It was the absence of a common up-to-date strategic doctrine, so Archduke Charles believed, that had largely contributed to the dismal performance of Austria’s senior commanders in the catastrophic campaign against Napoleon in 1805. In an attempt to put right these shortcomings, in 1806 he published a manual, The Fundamentals of the Higher Art of War for the Generals of the Austrian Army.2 Though it contained some new ideas, overall it remained faithful to the formal traditions of eighteenth-century warfare. In essence, the manual continued the essentially defensive strategic culture of the Habsburg army, which was concerned above all with preserving the army intact so as not to risk the collapse of the state. The manual opened with the statement that ‘war was the greatest calamity that can befall a state’, and continued with the assertion that there existed permanent strategic laws based on ‘irrefutable mathematical verities’. Above all these included calculation of ‘the means to achieve a desired objective’. The manual declared that ‘equal forces can never achieve a decisive result’, and, breaking with the cordon system, claimed that ‘the real art of war is how to concentrate superior numbers at the decisive point’. On the other hand, it also warned commanders against exposing their lines of communications, stating that, ‘Security of the lines of communications remains a basic necessity’. The old Austrian fighting system, the Generalsreglement, dating back to Maria Theresa in 1769, held that each general had his assigned place in battle, his duties rigidly circumscribed by precise orders. The archduke’s manual did not change this. It said nothing about the responsibilities and the initiative expected of senior commanders; similarly, the emphasis on careful planning and supply and the alignment of large formations in battle tended to check individual enterprise. On the other hand, as Charles admitted later, Austria’s senior commanders, who had grown up with the old system, were in any case not inclined or even able to adapt to a new style of warfare. Writing a remarkably honest account of his activities before and during the 1809 campaign, the archduke noted that there had been too little time for reforms to be completed and that most senior commanders favoured delaying the start of the campaign.3 In addition, the disastrous financial position of the state had prohibited any large-scale manoeuvres during the period 1806–9. When, with war now inevitable, corps formations were hastily introduced in February 1809, their commanders had no experience in handling large combined arms formations and were largely reliant on staff officers who themselves lacked training and experience.
Charles also oversaw the publication of a series of teaching manuals elaborating tactical doctrines, entitled Contributions for the Practical Instructions of Officers of the Austrian Army. In all there would be eight, the first appearing in 1806 and the fifth in 1808. The remaining four were published after 1809. The series reflected the pronounced formalism of his strategic thinking, stressing linear closed-order formations. But again, two years of reform were too short to change the fighting culture of an army. Charles realized that while the Austrian Army of 1809 was much improved, it was still not equal to the French.4 As he wrote in a memorandum after the war: ‘Just before the outbreak of hostilities there were three important innovations in the army: the establishment of the Landwehr, the formation of independent all-arms corps, and the reorganization of the field artillery. But there was not enough time for these innovations to become firmly established and they had to be used before they had been tested.’5
To add to these shortcomings, there were question marks over Archduke Charles himself. Delbrück, the great Prussian historian, observed that the Austrian leadership in 1809, ‘overestimated the capabilities of the man whom they placed in command’.6 If this sounds a harsh judgment on the man who was clearly the most able Austrian general of the period, it was none the less borne out by the initial phases of the war of 1809. Furthermore, conscious of his dynastic standing and dignity, he was aloof not only from his troops but even from his senior commanders, sharing his proposed strategic moves only with his chief-of-staff and more often with his confidant, the first adjutant general, Friedrich Grünne. In fact, the adjutant general came to control access to the commander-in-chief, much to the annoyance of his corps commanders, themselves still selected by seniority and birth rather than by experience and merit.7 As Charles realized, almost of these men were products of the Theresian army and the wars against the Turks and had neither the intellectual capacity nor the imagination to break the bonds of their own experience and assume their new responsibilities under the corps system.8
In March 1809 GdC Archduke John, 29 years old and with very little experience, commanded the two-corps Army of Inner Austria. Archduke Ferdinand d’Este, the emperor’s 29-year-old brother-in-law and a competent officer, commanded VII Corps in Galicia, and Archduke Ludwig led V Corps but was relieved after Aspern–Essling though he returned ‘at the general disposition’ before Wagram. I Corps was under GdC Count Bellegarde, 53 years old and a learned soldier, if lacking enterprise, who had served with Charles in 1796. A Bohemian aristocrat, FZM Count Kolowrat-Krakowsky, 61 years old, commanded II Corps; FML Prince Hohenzollern-Hechingen, aged 52 and considered a competent soldier, led III Corps. FML Prince Rosenberg-Orsini was in charge of IV Corps, while GdC Prince Liechtenstein, highly regarded by Charles, commanded the Reserve Cavalry, and FML Baron Kienmayer, another steady officer, led II Reserve Corps. The only corps commander not of noble birth was FML Johann Baron Hiller of VI Corps, an able soldier but given to temperamental excesses. His relations with Archduke Charles were already tense. When commander of the Karlstadt Militär Grenze (Military Border), one of the several districts along the Austro-Turkish frontier, where all men were liable to military s
ervice in return for land grants, he had clashed with Charles over the extent of the reforms necessary. Matters did not improve during the 1809 campaign itself. Relations between Charles and Hiller became so bad that the general, claiming illness, would leave his command on the eve of the Battle of Wagram.
Compounding the difficulties facing the Austrians, the army’s staff system remained defective. Archduke Charles did not possess a chief-of-staff comparable to Berthier, Napoleon’s able chief-of-staff, while the staff manuals dated back to the last decades of the previous century. In February 1809, with the army already mobilizing, Charles dismissed his chief-of-staff, FML von Heldenfeld, an unstable character, given to drinking in dives and keeping low company, long at odds with Grünne. His replacement, GM von Prochaska, was a man of modest talents and widely believed to be under the influence of the second adjutant, GM Wimpffen. Neither Grünne nor Wimpffen favoured an aggressive strategy. Moreover, army headquarters divided into four major and several minor departments, with the all-important Operations Chancery, which issued campaign and battle orders, becoming ever larger and more cumbersome. The hasty and belated introduction of corps formations complicated matters further. With only a small permanent staff available, untrained officers had to be assigned when the corps system was activated. Functions and composition of corps staffs mirrored that of the army staff and, in the field, administrative duties consumed too much valuable time. The Austrian staff was competent in administration and map making, but lacked experience in operational matters. In consequence, Austrian operational staff work was slow, often inefficient and on several occasions caused critical delays that compromised operations.
The corps themselves varied slightly in composition. Each line corps had three divisions, one designated as the advance guard composed of light troops including some light horse and two light 3-pounder batteries, each with eight pieces. The two line divisions comprised two or three line brigades each. There was no divisional cavalry, but each division had a 6-pounder support battery, normally placed in the corps artillery reserve. Average strength of the line corps stood at 29,000 to 32,000 men and between 64 to 84 guns. The Austrian Army lacked elite guard formations. The two reserve corps were regarded as elites, combining heavy cavalry with grenadier battalions drawn from the line infantry. The large I Reserve Corps fielded twelve grenadier battalions and six regiments, three brigades, of heavy horse; the weaker II Reserve Corps had one five-battalion grenadier brigade and two heavy cavalry brigades.
Perhaps the most important of the reforms carried out by Archduke Charles was the new Dienst-Reglement for the infantry, which consisted of forty-six ‘German’ and fifteen ‘Hungarian’ line regiments, the former conscripts, the latter nominally volunteers raised by the Hungarian Diet. The Reglement aimed to humanize discipline and raise troop morale by better treatment. It sharply condemned brutality as destructive to the concept of military honour and instead appealed to the soldiers’ military virtues. ‘Love of his monarch and an honest life … obedience, loyalty, resolution: these are the soldierly virtues.’9
The introduction of the code was accompanied by a shortened term of conscription, a move under discussion since 1802. Charles, who considered life-long service detrimental to morale, had wanted to reduce the term of service to a uniform eight years in all branches. The resistance to this among the military hierarchy was such that in the end, and as specified by decree in May 1808, service would be for ten years in the infantry, twelve in the cavalry and fourteen in the artillery, with discharges staggered to prevent a sudden exodus of trained men. The decree also established two reserve battalions for each of the German infantry regiments, with officers provided by each unit, and the rank and file consisting of men subject to conscription who had received four weeks of training in their first year and three weeks each year thereafter. The youngest reservists and recently discharged soldiers were to form a third battalion in each regiment, and if this did not provide sufficient numbers for active service, the shortages were to be made good by recruits chosen by lot from the fourth garrison battalion. The reserve provisions did not apply to the Hungarian regiments or to the Grenzer of the Military Border.
These small reductions of the service obligation for the professional army should not be considered a step towards the creation of a popular force. Charles and most senior generals always opposed militias as unreliable and of dubious value in battle, but agreed in the end, in June 1808, to their formation because the state finances did not permit a larger regular force to be maintained. Original estimates proposed that Austria would raise 180,000 men and Hungary 50,000, but the Hungarian Diet, never cooperative in military matters, refused. However, it did promise to call out its ancient levy, the insurrectio, if needed, and after a bitter debate promised to levy an extra 20,000 recruits the next year. In any case, except for some volunteer formations, the combat value of the nominal 170 Landwehr battalions, most poorly trained and equipped, with only seventy units actually mustered, remained problematic. During the war they failed as a home defence, but when their best units were brigaded with the regulars or used as individual fillers for the line, they did good service. For instance, seventeen Landwehr battalions would fight at Wagram. Also of potential importance were the ancient shooting guilds of the Tyrol, the Landes Schützen, volunteers who, resentful of having been placed under Bavarian rule after 1805, were planning to rise in support of Austria.
REFORMS OF THE MAIN COMBAT ARMS
The mainstay of the army remained the regular line infantry. When mobilized, each of the German regiments, meaning all units raised outside the Kingdom of Hungary, were composed of three battalions and two grenadier companies, which on campaign were usually detached to form converged elite battalions and brigades. In the German regiments companies numbered 220 men, while the traditionally stronger Hungarian units had 238 men in each company. Few companies, however, ever reached full strength. The light infantry was composed of seventeen Grenzer infantry regiments, each formed in three battalions of six companies of varying sizes. Finally, in 1808, nine Jäger battalions, each of six companies, were raised. The most common infantry weapon was the M 1798 17.56mm-calibre musket, 150cm long and weighing about 4.8kg. The first two ranks of the Jäger were equipped with carbines, the third rank and all non-commissioned officers with short rifles. Ammunition issue was sixty pre-assembled cartridges, while rifle-armed men carried the makings of 100 rounds.
Charles considered infantry ‘able to fight in every type of terrain’ as the single most important arm of the army. New infantry regulations were issued in 1807. Although sometimes described as innovative, they retained the battalion as the basic combat unit and the three-deep line as the ideal formation, with columns used for movement and attacks against fortified places. Movement was to be carried out at the ‘ordinary’ or the ‘manoeuvre’ step, 90 to 95 steps per minute for the first and 105 steps for the second. A third tempo, the double or charging pace, 120 steps per minute, existed but was rarely used because it tended to disrupt alignment.
The best-known innovation was the ‘mass’, a formation one company wide and six companies deep. Replacing the square, a mass could manoeuvre, if slowly, either in closed or open order. In closed order, with the files touching the pack of the men in front, such masses could stand against cavalry charges and also manoeuvre on flat ground. While vulnerable to artillery, the mass formations performed well, repelling cavalry charges on the flat terrain of Aspern–Essling and Wagram.
If Austrian line infantry was generally sound, its main shortcoming was that in broken terrain and in skirmishing it was rarely equal to that of the French. The regulations provided that the third rank of each battalion could be detached as skirmishers, deployed some 300 paces from the main body with formed support platoons making up two-thirds of the skirmish line. As Radetzky, probably the best young Austrian general of the Napoleonic wars, observed ruefully, fighting in skirmish or open order could be undertaken only in a very limited manner because ‘we do
not understand this type of fighting’. The Jäger, who operated without many formal instructions, did rather better, but the Grenzer, Austria’s original light infantry, had been converted to line tactics in the 1770s and no longer excelled as skirmishers.
As for uniforms, all line regiments wore a short single-breasted white jacket (brown in the case of the Grenzer), with a high collar, small cuffs and short turnbacks in the regimental colours. German regiments wore white breeches with knee-length black gaiters, while the Hungarians and Grenzer sported tight light-blue pants and half-boots. Hair was cut short, and a crested leather helmet covered the head, though a cheaper light cloth shako, tapering towards the bottom, was introduced in the Hungarian regiments. The Grenadiers retained their traditional bearskins, while the Jäger wore a pike-grey uniform and a black Corsican hat. The Landwehr, by contrast, generally had little more than a grey smock and a black hat.
The Austrian horse comprised thirty-five regiments: eight of cuirassiers, six of dragoons, six chevaulegers, twelve hussars and three uhlans. Cuirassiers, wearing only a breastplate, which put them at a disadvantage in a melée, and dragoons were designated as heavy cavalry, the remainder as light. The heavy regiments had six squadrons of 135 men; the light cavalry was larger, with eight squadrons of 150 troopers in each regiment. All troopers carried a cut-and-thrust weapon. The heavy cavalry also had straight and heavy swords while the hussars and uhlans carried curved sabres. The uhlans, of course, were equipped with lances. There was a liberal allocation of firearms. Each trooper had two pistols, and each squadron had at least eight carbines and eight short rifles, a carryover from the wars against the Turks when Austrian horse had made considerable use of mounted fire. By 1809, however, shock action with the armes blanches was regarded as the primary tactic.
The Emperor's Last Victory Page 3