When Napoleon’s travelling coach clattered into Donauwörth before dawn, Berthier was absent. The chief-of-staff had ridden out towards Augsburg looking for his emperor. In the absence of his chief-of-staff, Napoleon studied the available reports, maps open and dividers in hand. He found that instead of being concentrated on the Lech in supporting distance of each other, his corps were widely scattered. Discounting smaller formations, Davout’s large corps was spread out on both banks of the Danube around Ratisbon, Lefebvre was assembling at Abensberg and Masséna and Oudinot were encamped around Augsburg. Neither Charles nor Napoleon had a precise knowledge of the other’s dispositions. The emperor, of course, knew about the slowly moving Austrian main force, which he designated the Landshut column. He was also aware of the approach of the considerable Austrian forces north of the Danube threatening Davout, whom Charles still assumed was retiring towards Ratisbon. Clearly, the most urgent task facing Napoleon was bring his exposed and dispersed corps into supporting distance.
Even before a much-relieved Berthier had returned before noon, Napoleon had formed the outlines of a plan of operations and issued a stream of orders. Discarding his initial intent to stand on the defensive behind the Lech, he now intended to wrest the initiative from Charles and then destroy him, using part of his army to pin the Austrians frontally, while another part would turn the Austrian left. To this end he planned to link up Davout and Lefebvre near Abensberg to constitute the pinning force, while he would use Masséna and Oudinot to move forward to Pfaffenhausen, ready to fall on the Austrian left. Additional formations such as Vandamme’s Württemberg 8 Corps, Pajol’s small French division, Rouyer’s unattached Rheinbund division and Nansouty’s heavy cavalry division were, if needed, to reinforce the Bavarians. About 1.30 p.m., a scant twelve hours after his arrival, Napoleon’s orders went out to Davout, Masséna and Oudinot. Davout was to march on Ingolstadt, but given the distance, nearly 60 miles, could not arrive there before late the next day. But Davout, a marshal with an acute strategic sense, was already prepared. He had reached Ratisbon on the 18th and had deployed his infantry divisions – Morand, Gudin, augmented by Saint-Hilaire’s division, which had arrived from its Baltic garrison in forced march – around the town. Friant, retreating from an encounter with Bellegarde at Amberg, was still on the other side of the Danube but was approaching rapidly. In addition, 3 Corps disposed of Saint-Sulpice’s 2nd heavy and Montbrun’s light cavalry divisions. A strong Corps Reserve Artillery with two 12-pounder batteries, four heavy guns each, four battalions of sappers, one of pontonniers, some miners and substantial equipment and provision trains, rounded out a large, experienced and well-led fighting force ready to move on short notice. Anticipating Napoleon’s order, Davout had already scouted the roads to the south-west, and during the night of 18–19 April had dispatched a battalion to secure the vital Saal defile where the main road along the Danube could be easily blocked. During the night of 19 April he marched out from Ratisbon. To shorten his march columns he moved his corps along four roughly parallel routes. While his trains took the main road along the river, his artillery, infantry, and cavalry stiffened by some infantry, took the secondary roads, little more than farm tracks. He left one regiment behind, the 65th Line under Colonel Coutard, to defend Ratisbon and especially the bridge across the Danube with orders to destroy it rather than to allow it to fall into Austrian hands.
Meanwhile, at about 7 in the evening both Masséna and Oudinot had received their orders, repeated in more explicit form during the night. They were to march from the vicinity of Augsburg and make with all speed for Pfaffenhausen, but despite Napoleon’s personal postscript to Masséna on his last set of orders – ‘Action! Speed! I greet you’4 – the marshal had not moved during the night and arrived at Pfaffenhofen only on 19 April, linking up with Oudinot, whose corps passed under Masséna’s operational control for a grand sweep on Landshut. Also on 18 April Lannes, a great offensive commander and one of Napoleon’s few personal friends, had arrived from Spain. The next day he assumed command of a task force drawn largely from 3 Corps, Morand and Gudin’s infantry and Jacquinot’s brigade of light cavalry, further reinforced by the heavy cavalry divisions of Nansouty and Saint-Sulpice, for a total of 25,000 men. By the evening of 19 April Napoleon’s corps were within supporting distance and ready to take the offensive the next day. Even so, the emperor was mistaken about the actual Austrian dispositions.
LANDSHUT AND THE BATTLE OF ECKMÜHL
Until the morning of 18 April, the Archduke Charles still assumed that Davout was north of the Danube, but was then informed that 3 Corps had already entered Ratisbon. He cancelled his intended crossing of the Danube upstream from Ratisbon and decided to employ his main force, III, IV, and I Reserve Corps, together with Kolowrat’s corps coming from the north, to trap Davout. By evening these corps, having marched north-east, reached the vicinity of Rohr, only 15 miles from Ratisbon, while Kolowrat was closing in on the opposite bank of the Danube. His left wing, V, VI and II Reserve Corps, was ordered to cross the Gross Laber river to attack the Bavarians.
On 19 April, Davout led his corps south-west to close up with Lefebvre, now aligned with Demont’s reserve division on his right upstream and Vandamme’s corps to his left. The terrain between the Danube and the Laber west of Ratisbon is complicated, covered with forests, broken by ridges and cut by valleys and streams. As Davout marched west, his flank and rearguard encountered elements of the Austrian III and IV Corps, but the terrain here favoured the French open-order tactics. With whole infantry regiments in skirmish order, Generals Saint-Hilaire, Friant and Montbrun checked the Austrians and then drove them out of the villages of Tengen and Thann to gain manoeuvre room. Meanwhile, Lefebvre with two divisions, Crown Prince and Deroy, had driven the Austrians back. Throughout the day Austrian commanders moved slowly and carefully, leaving behind units to secure their immediate line of communications but undermining their numerical superiority. Then, too, Charles, though only a few miles from the fighting, but always mindful of the need for a reserve to cover a possible retreat, had refused to commit his II Reserve Corps grenadiers.5
By nightfall, Davout had linked up with Lefebvre’s Corps and Vandamme’s 8 Corps and was approaching Abensberg from the east. During the night of 19 April the two armies faced each other along a 50-mile front, from Ratisbon to Pfaffenhofen. From left to right, Charles had a brigade near Pfaffenhofen, VI Corps at Augsburg, V, VI and II Reserve Corps to the south of Abensberg, III, IV and I Reserve Corps between Thann and Eckmühl, and II Corps advancing on Ratisbon from the north. Napoleon had Masséna and Oudinot pushing towards Pfaffenhofen, Lefebvre and Vandamme before Abensberg, and Davout placed from Abensberg to Abbach, with the 65th still holding Ratisbon. With his corps now in effective supporting distance, Napoleon disposed of nearly approximate numbers. He planned for Davout and Lefebvre to anchor his offensive. Lannes’s task force was to attack the Austrian centre while Masséna and Oudinot, supported by Vandamme and the cavalry, were to move on Moosburg and Landshut to cut off the Isar crossings and destroy the Austrian left, believed by Napoleon to be the main body of the Austrian army. In other words, while Napoleon was shifting his forces to the south, Charles was concentrating to the north.
The combats of 20 April are collectively referred as the battle of Abensberg, though they were not a single action. The French offensive began around 9 in the morning, and after numerous engagements by evening had achieved some of its objectives and destroyed the combat cohesion of V and II Reserve Corps, which fell back in disorder on Hiller’s VI Corps. However, the Austrians were not destroyed. With Masséna not having reached Landshut, Hiller stubbornly managed to contest the Landshut crossing. Still, by evening the Austrian army had been cut in two, with losses totalling over 6,000 men and twelve guns.6 Napoleon now assumed that he had destroyed the main body of the Austrian army. In fact, two-thirds of that army were still combat capable. In the north, Charles had managed to maintain a fairly orderly front against Davout and Lefebv
re on the line from Tengen to Peising. Meanwhile on the Danube, Liechtenstein’s I Reserve Corps and Kolowrat’s II Corps had forced Coutard’s out-of-ammunition regiment to bury its flag and surrender Ratisbon in the afternoon. More important was that Coutard had not been able to destroy the massive bridge over the Danube, thus giving Charles control over a vital river crossing and contact with his previously isolated right wing. Now Kolowrat could support the Austrian centre, which Charles had withdrawn to a 9-mile line from Abbach on the Danube to Eckmühl on the Gross Laber, pitting Davout’s and Lefebvre’s diminished corps against almost three corps: some 70,000 Austrians against 36,000 French.
On the morning of 21 April Napoleon still assumed that he had eliminated the main strength of Archduke Charles’s army. In reality, however, only two corps had been hurt and Hiller, leaving behind a strong rearguard to defend the bridgehead and the town of Landshut, was retreating east with three corps. Napoleon also did not know that the vital bridge at Ratisbon was now securely in Austrian hands. He was aware that Davout was under pressure and sent Wrede’s Bavarian division and Oudinot with two divisions to reinforce him with up to six divisions, while ordering Vandamme to position himself to contact Davout’s right flank and be ready to assist him in case of an emergency. Meanwhile, the emperor and his staff rode to Landshut. Although by this time Masséna had crossed the Isar at Moosburg and was moving up to Landshut, the emperor detailed one of his senior aides, General Georges Mouton, to lead a converged grenadier force of the 17th Line across the pile bridge, already set alight by Hiller’s rearguard. It was a notable feat of arms, typical of the personal combat leadership shown by senior Napoleonic commanders and their aides.
It was also perhaps unnecessary. With Masséna’s main force across the Isar at Moosburg, Hiller could not afford to be cut off. He tried to bring out as much of his ammunition train as he could, but eventually had to abandon some 600 ammunition wagons, 60 pontoons and 14 flags. By evening he was retreating on the road towards Vienna pursued at a distance by Bessières and all available light cavalry. To the north, however, Davout faced a build-up of the Austrian central column. Kolowrat’s II Corps, Liechtenstein’s Hohenzollern’s III Corps, Rosenberg’s IV Corps, a total of 75,000 men, along with I Reserve Corps, faced Davout and Wrede, who had but 36,000 men deployed in an arc from the Danube to Eckmühl. About mid morning Davout reported the growing threat to Napoleon. ‘Sire,’ Davout wrote, ‘I have the whole army in front of me,’ adding, ‘I will hold my position – I hope, but the troops are worn out and the enemy artillery is three times larger than mine.’7 During the day Friant and Saint-Hilaire, supported by Montbrun’s and Piré’s light horse, fought against greatly superior numbers, and it was not until General Piré, sent as Davout’s personal emissary, arrived at 2 a.m. on 22 April that Napoleon realized that in the north Davout faced the bulk of Charles’s army.
Acting on this intelligence, Napoleon ordered an immediate concentration on Eckmühl and with his battle staff rode towards the battle. On the way he issued a proclamation to his French and allied troops. ‘Soldiers: The territory of the Confederation of the Rhine has been violated. The Austrian general supposes that we are to flee at the sight of his banners and abandon our allies to his mercy. I arrive with the speed of lightning among you.’ There was considerable truth in this statement. Napoleon’s army was coming and it was coming fast.
During the morning of 22 April French troops, with Lannes’s provisional corps leading, marched between 17 and 20 miles. Shortly after 4 p.m. Davout, alerted by ten pre-arranged cannon salvoes from Gudin’s batteries, ordered a counter-attack to fix the Austrians and by mid afternoon Lannes struck against the Austrian left from the south and east. Attacked from two directions, although only Rosenberg was heavily engaged, the Austrian commanders did not understand that the corps system meant that the forward units would soon be supported and did not hold long enough to be reinforced. When Rosenberg’s troops began to retreat in disorder, leaving behind most of their guns and ammunition carts, they carried Hohenzollern and Liechtenstein’s corps with them. Charles now ordered a withdrawal north to the river.
To protect their withdrawal, at about 7 p.m. on 22 April, he committed part of his mounted reserve, twenty-nine half squadrons, near Alt Eglolffsheim. Fighting as separate regiments, and without the support of their cavalry batteries, which had already been pulled back, the Austrians were worsted by sixty-six French and allied squadrons supported by eighteen guns. Even so, the unequal combat had gained time and at about 10 that night the exhausted French broke off pursuit. During the night and the following morning, using both the stone bridge and a hastily built pontoon bridge some 5 miles east, Charles extricated the bulk of his troops to the north of the Danube leaving behind 6,000 men to defend the medieval fortress and stone bridge. After the dense morning mist lifted on 23 April, the emperor was frustrated when a series of assaults delivered against Ratisbon failed. Napoleon could neither afford to leave the place behind in Austrian hands nor mount a regular siege. The immediate capture of Ratisbon was vital. He was still worried how any setback would affect the loyalty of the Rheinbund princes. He was anxious, too, that failure might after all encourage the Prussians to intervene on the Austrian side. With reports of setbacks in Italy, he could also not afford to give Archduke John time to bring his estimated 75,000 men north. Therefore he believed that he had no choice but to renew the assault regardless of cost. The task was entrusted to Lannes. While supervising preparations, the emperor was hit by a spent cannon ball and slightly wounded on his right foot. While the wound was dressed, the news that he had been wounded spread like wildfire through the French ranks. Losing no time, Napoleon, though in considerable pain, at once mounted his horse and, riding down the ranks, stopping to bestow decorations and promotions to deserving soldiers, immediately restored the morale of his troops.
After two assaults by volunteers from Morand’s division had been beaten back with heavy losses, Lannes in person stepped forward. Grasping a scaling ladder he shouted, ‘Before I was a marshal I was a grenadier – and so I am still’. As he started to carry the ladder forward his aides tried to deter him. Exclaiming that they all would be dishonoured if the marshal were wounded before all his aides were killed, they wrestled the ladder from him. The sight of a marshal of the empire tussling with his aides as to who should lead the assault inspired a cry of enthusiasm from the entire division. Officers and men rushed forward to scale the walls, and when the assault troops entered the town the Austrian garrison capitulated. Yet beyond delaying Napoleon for some hours and again demonstrating the inspiring style of Napoleonic combat leadership, the affair did little to change the overall situation.
CHARLES RETREATS TOWARDS VIENNA
To the end of his life Napoleon was proud of the way he had handled his command in the six days following his arrival at the front. In exile on Saint Helena he said: ‘The battle of Abensberg, the Landshut manoeuvres and the battle of Eckmühl were my most brilliant and most skilful actions.’8 Still, though he had hurt the Austrian army, he had not destroyed it. But having suffered heavy casualties, 10,700 on 22 April alone, Archduke Charles had turned despondent. Even while combat continued at Ratisbon, on 23 April he sent a message to his brother advising him to make peace: ‘With half the army in dissolution, I have no option but to cross the Danube at Ratisbon and make for Bohemia.’ The army, he continued, had to be saved at any price and no reliance could be placed on either the Landwehr or the insurrectio. On the contrary, the army might ‘well be needed to deal with events in the interior of the Monarchy’. An end to hostilities, he told the emperor, was imperative and the sooner the better, ‘because once the enemy has entered the lands of Your Majesty they will be ruined and like Prussia occupied for many years’.9
After the fall of Ratisbon a vigorous pursuit with several French corps might have brought disaster to Charles, and it was one of Napoleon’s maxims always to destroy the main enemy army before moving on his capital. But considering that
the archduke was two days ahead and worried about developments in Italy and news of insurrections in Germany, Napoleon decided to end the war quickly by conquering the enemy capital. Initially sending Davout after Charles, he countermanded the order once the archduke had entered Bohemia. 3 corps recrossed the Danube on 29 April as Napoleon turned against Hiller This decision violated his basic strategic principle and has been considered by some historians as a mistake. Perhaps so. For even as the Austrian army marched east towards Bohemia, for once matching the French marching speeds, an average of 14 miles a day, the archduke, acting on his own, tried to come to an accommodation with Napoleon. ‘Your Majesty’, he wrote, in a letter allegedly composed by Grünne and dated 28 April, ‘has announced your arrival by cannon shots without leaving me time to compliment you. I had hardly heard of your presence when the losses I sustained caused me to realize it painfully.’ He continued with the suggestion that ‘perhaps Fortune has chosen me to assure my country a durable peace’, and closed the letter assuring Napoleon that, ‘I feel flattered Sire to have crossed swords with the greatest captain of the age … I beg Your Majesty to believe that my ambition always leads me towards you and that I shall be equally honoured, Sire, to meet you either with the sword or the olive branch.’10
Though Napoleon ignored this abject communication, it did much damage to Charles’s reputation in Vienna, where there were renewed efforts to remove him from command. But there was no one to replace him. Meanwhile, making his way through Bohemia into Austria, he arrived on 16–17 May on the historic Marchfeld, east of Vienna on the left bank of the Danube. Together with Bellegarde, who had joined him during the retreat, and Hiller, who had crossed over to the right bank at Krems, the archduke now disposed of some 130,000 men. But he had arrived too late. Despite this rapid march, the capital had already been surrendered to Napoleon.
The Emperor's Last Victory Page 6